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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a study of Transcendent Exceptional Human Experiences (TEHEs), with a 
particular focus on language.  Three concepts effectively characterise the experiences of 
interest: a loss of time and space, connection with nature, the Universe or something 
Higher and a deep emotional affect.  In considering the relevance of these experiences for 
sociology, it is argued that language is a social activity and TEHE accounts are therefore 
also social.  However, this raises a paradox: whilst these experiences are often claimed to be 
ineffable, language is all we have with which to study them.  Previous approaches to 
TEHEs in social science generally looked for explanations and tended to overlook this 
social aspect.   
 
Interviews were collected and analysed using a set of methodological principles informed 
by Conversation Analysis and Discursive Psychology, but also by feminist and 
transpersonal research. These principles identify the important and relevant aspects from 
the influential methodologies and where possible, address perceived limitations, 
incompatibilities and criticisms of these approaches.   
 
The analysis reveals the structure of the TEHE accounts and establishes the presence of 
some normative patterns.  Reported thought is analysed as a discursive device.  It is argued 
that reported thought works to negotiate epistemic authority and experiential responsibility 
(the agency of TEHEs and the rationality of the speaker faced with an extraordinary 
experience).  Respondents‘ spontaneous accounts of self-transformation are also analysed 
and show how potentially sensitive issues concerning the discursive construction of 
identity, consistency and change are managed in talk.  This research contributes to 
discursive psychology and linguistic analyses concerning reported thought and agency.   It 
also contributes to discursive work regarding identity, whilst making links with 
consciousness studies and (tentatively with) sociology of spirituality.  Finally, this thesis 
emphasises the importance of an empathic and respectful approach to TEHEs and 
identifies various pragmatic, intellectual and personal tensions faced during research. 
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Chapter 1 
Setting the scene for a study of Transcendent Exceptional Human Experiences 
(TEHEs): Why consider these experiences sociologically at all? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
  
This thesis is a study of Transcendent Exceptional Human Experiences (TEHEs), in 
particular the language of these experiences.  The term Exceptional Human Experience 
(EHE) was first coined by Rhea White (1990) in order to describe a class of experiences 
often considered extraordinary and profound.  The addition of transcendence to this label 
aims to capture the way in which these experiences somehow surpass ordinary experience 
and ordinary boundaries (e.g. space, time, the self) and are subtly distinct from other 
exceptional human experiences.  There are several issues concerning terminology, labelling 
and definition that require further exploration and these will be discussed in more detail 
later in the chapter.  Firstly, however, it is important to establish via illustration the kinds of 
experiences we are concerned with.  Below are a few examples.  
 
 ―One day as I was walking along Marylebone Road I was 
suddenly seized with an extraordinary sense of great joy and 
exaltation, as though a marvellous beam of spiritual power 
had shot through me linking me in a rapture with the world, 
the Universe, Life with a capital ‗L‘, and all the beings 
around me.  All delight and power, all things living, all time 
fused in a brief second.‖ 
(Hardy, 1979: 1) 
 
This experience is reported by Alister Hardy (1979) in his book ‗The Spiritual Nature of Man‘.  
Hardy‘s original request for reports, of what he, and others, termed ‗religious experiences‘ 
has led to an accumulation of accounts by The Alister Hardy Society Religious Experience 
Research Centre (RERC), currently numbering 5, 716.1  Here is another example. 
 
 ―I was listening to the music and looking through the open 
window at a tree in the garden, when something strange 
happened. I felt that I had left my body and had become 
one with the tree in the garden, with the pebbles on the 
garden paths and with everything else in the universe. I felt 
some mild amusement seeing my body sitting there in the 
living room. I had a feeling of indescribable bliss, a feeling 
that everything was, is, and forever will be as it should be, 
and could not be any other way, and that time did not pass, 
                                                 
1 This number was established through personal communication with Anne Watkins & Jean Matthews from 
the RERC in Lampeter, Wales on 17.05.06. 
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that the future was contained in the past and the past 
contained in the future, and there was only one time, time 
present.‖ 
(Determinist, 2000, see Tart www.issc-taste.org) 
 
This experience is an excerpt from one of the submitted accounts, available at Charles 
Tart‘s website – The Archives of Scientist‘s Transcendent Experiences.  At the time of 
writing there are 94 archived accounts illustrating a broad range of transcendent 
experiences.  In addition to the written examples above, the one below is taken from the 
reports collected for this research project. 
 
―I could still hear sounds I could still hear the birds and I 
could still hear the animals but they were very loud…and 
everything around me seemed to just stop and I don‘t know 
it was very strange and how do I explain this it was suddenly 
as if as if something had opened up in front of me and I 
suddenly I don‘t know everything suddenly made sense like 
erm the world and everything in it suddenly just seemed to 
make sense and I suddenly realised that everything I knew 
all my everything I knew about science everything I had in 
my mind about the reason that we‘re here and evolution I 
realised that that was just some small part of something 
much much much much larger much huger and I I don‘t 
know I suddenly had no doubt that there was something 
much bigger I don‘t know how long I was sort of in this 
weird state but I realised there was something much bigger 
something much more powerful than than anything I could 
possibly imagine.‖ 
(Alice, 2005) 
 
These three examples offer a glimpse into what might be meant by the term Transcendent 
Exceptional Human Experience (TEHE) and help to show the sorts of experiences, and 
therefore accounts, that this thesis explores.  Whilst the content of the experiences appears 
to be different, the accounts are united by a supremely positive, somewhat intangible, 
emotional high or peak, coupled with a powerful kind of revelation of knowledge, about 
‗life‘ in its broadest sense.  They also appear to describe unusual and special moments, in 
that these are not habitual life experience.  In this way, we can begin to see that TEHEs are 
actually considered to be starkly different from mundane or seemingly ‗ordinary‘ reality, 
and to many, there appears to be something radically and qualitatively different about them.  
As Eliade has suggested, these experiences have an ‗out of this world‘ quality: a 
transcendent aspect. 
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―In each case we are confronted by the same mysterious act 
– the manifestation of something of a wholly different 
order, a reality that does not belong to our world, in objects 
that are an integral part of our natural ‗profane‘ world.‖ 
(Eliade, 1961: 11) 
 
Additionally, Eliade intimates that, whilst somehow beyond our everyday reality, these 
experiences are also somehow embedded in our world.  This is an important point, one we 
will return to several times both in this chapter and throughout the thesis. 
According to both those who report them and many who have written about them (e.g. 
Bucke, 1905; Hardy, 1979; James, [1901-2] 1982; Laski, 1961; Maslow, [1964] 1976; White, 
1990, 1994, 1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b; Wulff, 2000) these experiences are fascinating, 
amazing and awe-inspiring.  They have been pondered over, written about and reflected 
upon over centuries and across cultures.  They have even been reported to be the most 
profound experience amenable to humanity.   
 
This thesis is an exploration of the language of these experiences and this chapter outlines 
how these experiences have been characterised in previous literature including their main 
features and some of the reported triggers.  Following this, we consider how prevalent they 
are in the general population and how significant they are often reported to be.  This leads 
into a discussion around definition, noting that there are both practical and ethical issues to 
consider when selecting a suitable label for these experiences.  Finally, there is an 
exploration of why language might be important in a study of this kind and the 
identification of various tensions that this thesis aims to address but cannot resolve.  Firstly, 
the next section consists of a review of academic literature regarding TEHEs.2 
 
1.2 Reviewing the academic study of TEHEs 
 
TEHEs can be described as reaching ‗above and beyond‘ the realms of habitual experience.  
In other words, they are not seen to occur within the realms of the ordinary, the normal or 
the everyday.3  One conceptualisation refers to these experiences as, 
 
                                                 
2 Use of the term TEHE does not negate the need for a discussion about definition, but instead 
acknowledges that some label is required before the issue of definition and labelling is discussed later. 
3 However, there is some interesting work which suggests that the ordinary is extraordinary and ‗everyday life‘ 
(a phrase connoting humdrum normality) is a misleading conception (Sandywell, 2004).  Such a 
conceptualisation, it is argued, conceals the specificity and contingency of material existence. 
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―A moment of extreme happiness; a feeling of lightness 
and freedom; a sense of harmony with the whole world; 
moments which are totally absorbing and which feel 
important.‖ 
(Williams & Harvey, 2001: 249) 
 
Across time, contexts and disciplines, various labels have been employed to articulate this 
phenomenon.  These include, mystical experiences (Underhill, 1911; Wulff, 2000); the 
numinous (Otto, 1923); religious experiences (James, [1901-2] 1982; Hardy, 1979); spiritual 
experiences (Kennedy et al, 1994); ‗cosmic consciousness‘ (Bucke, 1905); ecstatic 
experiences (Laski, 1961); ‗oceanic feeling‘ (Freud, 1962); peak experiences (Maslow, 
[1964]1976); ‗minerva experiences‘ (Otto, 1966); ‗transpersonal experiences‘ (Grof, 1972); 
‗transcendental‘ (Neher, 1980) or ‗transcendent‘ experiences (Williams & Harvey, 2001); 
‗aesthetic‘ experiences (Bourque, 1969); extraordinary experiences (Helminiak, 1984); 
wondrous events (McClenon, 1994); high holy moments (Van Dusen, 1999);  and 
revelatory experiences (Williams, 1999). 
 
This array of referents illustrates the diversity of description that these experiences have 
been afforded.  Indeed, the above list is not exhaustive (see for instance Braud, 2002: 2 or 
Palmer & Braud, 2002: 5).  This significant descriptive variability certainly warrants further 
consideration of the use of language and meaning in discussing, studying and 
understanding these experiences.  Given the wide variety of descriptive terms, it would also 
be useful to explore the characterisation4 and historical context for these experiences.5 
 
One of the earliest and most significant works on the topic is William James‘ ([1901-2] 
1982) Varieties of Religious Experience where he attributed four dominant characteristics to 
religious experiences.  The first, ineffability6 or indescribability, pertains to the claim that 
the experience ‗defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in 
words‘ (p367).  The second is that religious experience possesses a ‗noetic quality‘.  This 
suggests that religious experience provokes, ‗states of insight into depths of truth 
unplumbed by the discursive intellect‘ - that is, knowledge, revelation, insight or 
illumination can be imparted during or in connection with the experience, which cannot 
                                                 
4 Because there is not always consistency between different works in the literature in terms of labels or 
definitions, the characteristics and features are gleaned from a variety of texts concerning mystical, religious, 
transcendent, ecstatic and peak experiences and cosmic consciousness.  
5 There are others who have made significant contributions to this field, not all of whom can be 
acknowledged in great detail here including Rudolph Otto, Paul Tillich and R.C. Zaehner. 
6 Ineffability will also be discussed later in more detail because as a characteristic it is of some importance. 
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necessarily be effectively articulated but can in some way be ‗sensed‘ or ‗felt‘ (p367).  The 
two, marginally lesser characterisations according to James (p367-8) were, ‗transiency‘ – 
which referred to the fleetingness of the core experience, though an ‗afterglow‘ may persist 
for some time; and ‗passivity‘ – to describe the feeling that one is ‗grasped and held by a 
superior power‘, which is perceived as distinct from oneself or an external force.   
 
Since James‘ seminal work, many others have spent time studying and characterising these 
experiences (e.g. Bucke, 1905; Laski, 1961; Maslow, [1964]1976; Stace, 1960).  Other 
characterisations include, an overwhelming emotional effect; somehow being lifted out of 
oneself (Greeley, 1975); losing one‘s self or the ego (Maslow, [1964]1976); a sense of 
‗oneness‘ (the ‗unifying effect‘ – Maslow, [1964]1976) with or a feeling of being connected 
to something greater7 (Wulff, 2000); awareness of a presence8 (Hay & Morisy, 1978); a loss 
of space and time (Maslow, [1964]1976); a deep sense of knowing sometimes combined 
with a revelatory understanding often about the mystery of life and death (Bucke, 1905).   
 
Hardy (1979) noted that religious experiences are quite diverse in character.  Firstly, 
descriptive accounts can include reference to different experiential contexts, a dream or a 
near death experience (NDE9), for instance.  Secondly, the reported sensations and features 
of the experience can be wide-ranging.   
 
 ―Some may describe their feelings in terms of trust, 
awe, joy, or bliss; exceptionally they may reach the 
heights of ecstasy.  Others may have sensory 
impressions, see lights, hear voices, or have the feeling 
of being touched.‖ 
(Hardy, 1979: 2) 
 
Indeed, Hardy‘s book divides the accounts that he collected into ninety-two different 
categories on the basis of their descriptions and features.  Reported descriptions are wide-
ranging and include references to extra-sensory perception, contact with the dead, feelings 
                                                 
7 Greater here is used in a dual sense to communicate something literally larger, but also in some sense 
superior or more powerful – sometimes conceptualised as God or a divine being, but also referred to as a 
form of ultimate energy or power as in, the Life Force, the Cosmos, the Source etc., and not reported 
exclusively as ‗external‘ to the self. 
8 This may be experienced as malign (e.g. see Jakobsen, 1999 and Singleton, 2001 for more on ostensibly ‗evil‘ 
experiences), but the vast majority of reports convey a benevolent presence. 
9 NDEs do not have a universally agreed definition but they are considered to be experiences that occur in 
close proximity to death – actual or threatened imminent.  Experients commonly report some form of 
detachment from their physical body and sometimes being able to ‗see‘ the dead or dying physical body, 
experiencing a blindingly bright light often at the end of a tunnel, experiencing a life review, meeting celestial 
beings and having predominantly strong, positive, and pleasant feelings of love (Moody, 1975). 
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of unity, and feelings of comfort or protection, a sense of wholeness, certainty, 
enlightenment, and joy, love and affection.   
 
Stace (1960) (and Laski, 1961) are often seen as developing the work that James started in 
characterising these experiences and providing a yardstick for categorising religious, 
mystical and transcendent experiences.  Indeed, Wulff (2000) suggests that Stace‘s (1960) 
first defining characteristic (unitary consciousness), captures the distinctive essence of 
transcendence.  He describes it here. 
 
―The disappearance of all the physical and mental 
objects of ordinary consciousness and, in their place, the 
emergence of a unitary, undifferentiated, or pure 
consciousness.‖ 
(Wulff, 2000: 400-1)  
   
This idea, that the transcendent in some way affects the consciousness of an experient, is a 
feature identified by others.  For instance, Huxley (1963: 1) suggested that ‗for normal 
waking consciousness, the phrase, "God is Love," is no more than a piece of wishful 
positive thinking…[whereas]… For the mystical consciousness, it is a self-evident truth‘.  
Bucke‘s (1905) work was also concerned with this shift.  He conceptualised ‗cosmic 
consciousness‘ as the highest level of consciousness that humans can reach, which 
incorporates the broadest notions regarding life and the universe.  Thus, for many, what 
effectively characterised these experiences was that they enabled radical change in the 
experient‘s perspective.  As Maslow proposes, 
 
―In the peak experiences, we become more detached, 
more objective, and are more able to perceive the world 
as if it were independent not only of the perceiver but 
even of human beings in general.‖ 
(Maslow, [1964]1976: 61)   
 
 
Finally, whilst recognising that ‗mystical‘ experiences have been characterised in numerous 
ways, Wulff identifies the shift in consciousness as a common aspect. 
 
―Most commentators agree, however, that any experience 
qualified as mystical diverges in fundamental ways from 
ordinary conscious awareness and leaves a strong 
impression of having encountered a reality different from – 
and in some crucial sense, higher than – the reality of 
everyday experience.‖ 
(Wulff, 2000: 397) 
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The distinction made is between arguably ‗mundane‘ states of consciousness that people 
experience most of the time, and other more striking types of consciousness, which stand 
out.  James proposed that these special and ‗potential forms of consciousness [are 
experienced as] entirely different‘ (p374).  One interesting observation is that many of the 
reported features are not unique to TEHEs (White & Brown, 2000a).  These features are 
often physiological or psychological (e.g. goose pimples or excitement) and are just as likely 
to be reported during ordinary experience.  The difference, however, is the reported sense 
that during a TEHE any combination of these components (plus some ostensibly 
intangible quality) is rarely experienced as ‗ordinary‘ at all.  
 
 
1.2.1 Mysticism 
 
Previously, these experiences were interpreted as religious phenomena.  Experiences were, 
by default, connections with the Divine and therefore automatically spiritual or religious 
(e.g. Bucke, 1905; Underhill, 1911; Otto, 1923; Stace, 1960).  One of the dominant 
frameworks for understanding them was mysticism.  Persistently dismissed by science, 
mysticism has been viewed by many with suspicion, distrust and scorn – and has been 
often misunderstood as magic or witchcraft (Underhill 1911).  Definitions of mysticism, are 
numerous and variable, though its concern has been with moments of transcendence from 
the ‗sense-world‘ to the ‗cosmic‘ and a ‗non-individualistic‘ activity seeking a connection 
with ‗Perfect Love‘ and the spiritual (Underhill 1911: 85-87).  Individuals writing about 
moments of transcendence were often revered as highly spiritual mystics who had accessed 
and explored the pinnacle of human experience (e.g. St John of the Cross, 1991; St Teresa 
of Avila, 1946; Dame Julian of Norwich, 1994).  Mystics were those who pursued such 
spiritual heights, devoted their lives to such a quest and had a clear spiritual discipline.   
As Schneiderman (1967) observed,  
 
―The study of mysticism has been hampered by at least 
two circumstances: preoccupation with the indescribable 
contents of heightened spiritual consciousness, and a 
refusal to regard the mystic in relation to his social 
context.‖   
(Schneiderman, 1967: 91) 
 
Here Schneiderman suggests that mysticism contained two problematic assumptions.  
Firstly, that indescribability automatically signalled spiritual significance.  Secondly, that 
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mystical experience was assumed to be timeless and universal regardless of when and 
where it was reported.  This meant that mysticism could only offer a limited academic view 
of these experiences.  This is something we will return to at the end of this chapter. 
 
Nonetheless, the way in which these experiences are understood has changed.  They are no 
longer the preserve of religion or mysticism and are not only reported by mystics or highly 
spiritual individuals.  They are much more widely reported (Back & Bourque, 1970; Hardy, 
1979; Wulff, 2000).  Indeed, Maslow ([1964]1976) surmised (on the basis of his own 
research) that peak experiences were egalitarian: that they could happen to anyone.  
Furthermore, whilst not all contemporary TEHEs have religious associations, many are still 
perceived as encounters with the sacred.  But as White & Brown note, the way they are 
understood may have changed. 
   
―It appears that exceptional or transcendent experiences, 
many of which were once associated with religion, are 
being experienced by more people in the midst of daily life.  
This may be not so much because these experiences are 
becoming secularised, but because the sacred is being 
found in the midst of daily life‖. 
(2000b: http://www.ehe.org/display/ehe-pageab52.html?ID=72) 
 
They suggest that these experiences are still glimpses of the divine, but that they occur in 
different contexts because of our shifting relationship with formal religion in particular.   
 
The contexts in which TEHEs occur are varied and it is sometimes the context that is 
considered a key factor, perhaps even a trigger for, the experience itself.  Reported 
favourable environments include nature or natural environments, such as those of stunning 
aesthetic beauty, solitude, peacefulness or tranquillity (Laski, 1961).  Indeed, TEHEs have 
been reported in settings with forests (e.g. Williams & Harvey, 2001), lakes, rivers, 
coastlines, mountainous landscapes, deserts, moor lands, countryside, gardens and parks 
(Marshall, 200510).  As Marshall (2005: 86) points out ‗subjects may be gazing at a tree, a 
plant, a crystal, a rock, a mountain, water waves, sunlight, clouds, birds in flight, sunrise, 
sunset, stars in the night sky‘.  Furthermore, experiences have been reported in urban and 
                                                 
10 It is worth noting that Marshall (2005: 82-85) distinguishes between predisposing circumstances (individual 
differences such as demographics or personality types) and antecedent circumstances (immediate contextual 
triggers and long to medium term factors such as relationships, reading and spiritual practices).  However, we 
are interested only in the short-term antecedent circumstances here for their social content (some of the 
predisposing circumstances are also discussed in Chapter 2 as they have been cited as explanations for 
TEHEs). 
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rural environments, occurring at night and during the day, in upright or supine positions, 
whilst being still or moving and during both extreme and clement weather.  Maslow 
([1964]1976) found that peak experiences tended to happen when people were on their 
own, whilst others maintain that experiences can take place whether in solitary or collective 
situations (Marshall, 2005). 
   
Contemporary triggers include sporting activity (e.g. Murphy & White, 1995), and 
computer use (Laarni, Ravaja, Kallinen, & Saari, 2004).  Laarni, Ravaja, Kallinen, and 
Saari‘s (2004: 412) research tentatively suggests some similarities between transcendence 
and the ‗intensity, absorption and engagement‘ reported by some computer users.  
Furthermore, there are instances of reported religious experience in response to media 
output such as Mel Gibson‘s film, The Passion of the Christ (Gedicks & Hendrix, 2005).  
However, new technologies and digital media as potential triggers are still fairly 
controversial, as Gedicks and Hendrix point out, 
 
―Can encounters with God really be evoked by something 
as mercenary and prosaic as a movie, a television show, or 
a rock cd?  Many believers are put off by purported 
spiritual reactions to mass culture, thinking them vaguely 
vulgar, tainted by commercial and other spiritually dubious 
motivations.‖  
(Gedicks & Hendrix, 2005: 131-132) 
 
Wulff, drawing on work by Greeley (1975), Hardy (1979) and Laski (1961), lists a variety of 
more widely accepted triggers.11 
 
―Religious services…impressive natural settings, flowers, 
scents, fine (or sometimes violent) weather, sunrise or 
sunset, breezes, light patterns, music, poetry, art, beautiful 
cities, sacred places, swift movement, creative work, sex, 
childbirth, watching children, illness, depression, the 
prospect of death, personal crisis and so on.‖  
(Wulff, 2000: 410) 
 
Religious activity is listed first and is often considered the most common trigger for 
TEHEs.  The National Spiritual Transformation Study12 (NSTS) found that 50% of 
                                                 
11 For a longer list of almost 200 triggers compiled from various sources (including, Greeley, 1975, Hardy, 
1979, Laski, 1961, and others) see White and Brown (2000b). 
12 A module insert included in the 2004 General Social Survey in the USA on the nature of spiritual 
transformation and spiritual experiences in contemporary USA (Smith, 2006). 
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experiences were triggered by ‗participation in ordinary religious activities‘ (Smith, 2006: 
288).  Additionally, many people (47%) report their experiences in the context of negative 
circumstances, such as illness, proximity to death, dying, or an accident and other problems 
including divorce, financial or job difficulties and drug and alcohol abuse. 
 
Wulff also includes music,  as a trigger for states ‗beyond the plane of the ordinary‘ (see 
also Aldridge & Fachner, 2006).  Reimer (1995: 12) suggests that TEHEs can be induced 
by any engagement with music from listening to conducting, though it would seem that 
music needs to be culturally familiar to an individual to precipitate a profound musical 
experience.  Another trigger mentioned is childbirth (Laski, 1961).  However, there does 
not seem to be widespread knowledge or ‗belief‘ in the potential ‗high‘ of childbirth, 
particularly in contemporary Western societies where labour tends to be dominated by 
medical discourse and expectation of pain (Fox & Worts, 1999).  There are also reports of 
sex-related TEHEs.  These differ from practices such as Tantra13 in their spontaneity (as 
opposed to cultivation), yet are seen to have the same spiritual content (Wade, 2004).  
Similar feelings and levels of significance are reported in sex-related TEHEs (when 
compared with other TEHEs).  However, there tends to be a general reluctance to equate 
other profound TEHEs with those of a sexual nature. 
 
These reported triggers are not explicitly explored in this study; nonetheless, they are 
interesting for they highlight experiential contexts as often social and interactional (e.g. 
childbirth, sex).  They also point to the number of common contexts which many 
experients report.  But just how prevalent are TEHEs (or how often they are reported) in 
the general population?  
  
 
1.3 Incidence of TEHEs and related experiences 
 
In depicting the backdrop for a study of TEHEs establishing reported levels in the general 
population would be useful.  However, figures are often incomplete, begin with varying 
aims and purposes, and the last comprehensive collation of statistics (for the UK) was done 
                                                 
13 Tantra or Tantric sex is commonly misunderstood and misrepresented in the West and bears little 
resemblance to actual Tantric practices that originated in the East (White, 2003).  Tantra evolved out of 
Indian practices known as ‗Kaula‘, which were acts that sexualised ritual rather than those which ritualised 
sex.  This evolution saw Kaula move from – ―the production of powerful, transformative sexual fluids…into 
simple by-products of a higher goal: the cultivation of a divine state of consciousness homologous to the bliss 
experienced in sexual orgasm (White, 2003: xii).      
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in 2000 by Michael Argyle.  Establishing the incidence of TEHEs has always been difficult, 
not least because people may not always report them.  However, they are generally thought 
to be more common than expected in the population (Greeley, 1975) and there is some 
evidence (reviewed below) to suggest that many people report religious and mystical 
experiences.14 
   
One of these sources, the British Gallup Poll, found that 48% of people responded 
positively to the question ‗[have you ever] been aware of or influenced by a presence or 
power, whether you call it God or not, which is different from your everyday self?‘ (Hay & 
Heald, 1987: 20).  This 48% of respondents can be further broken down as shown in fig. 1.  
Fig. 1 shows that the highest numbers of people reported awareness of synchronicity 
patterns (29%) and awareness of the presence of God (27%). Whereas the least numbers of 
people reported experiencing all things being one (5%) – an oft-cited characteristic of 
TEHEs.   
 
Fig. 1 Breakdown of the 48% of positive responses (Hay & Heald, 1987) 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 I am indebted to Anne Watkins and the Religious Experience Research Centre for providing me with some 
of these statistics – sourced by Anne from personal correspondence to Dr Peter Fenwick from Professor 
Paul Badham (2002) on mystical experiences and statistics. 
Breakdown of reported experiences  
29% 
27% 
25% 22% 
18% 
16% 
12% 5% 
 Awareness of synchronicity patterns (29%)         Awareness of the presence of God (27%) 
 Experience of answered prayer (25%) 
 Awareness of presence of someone who has died (18%)        Awareness of sacred presence in nature (16%) 
 Awareness of an evil presence (12%)         Experiencing all things being one (5%) 
        Awareness of presence (not called God) (22%) 
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Another source, which collated results from surveys conducted between 1983-9 by the 
American National Opinion Research Centre (total 5,420 respondents), provides an 
average positive response of 40%, whilst a review of research from 1962-1990 suggests a 
35% average (Yamané & Polzer, 1994).  Argyle also cites the work of Hay (1992), who 
reports a 31% positive response in British people surveyed.  Hay (1992) also details how 
many times people report having had TEHEs: 17% once or twice, 9% several times and 
5% often.  As Badham (2002) sets out in his correspondence, the Alister Hardy Religious 
Experiences Research Centre (RERC) provides an overall summary of these findings, 
suggesting that ‗between a third and a half of people surveyed say they have had a religious 
experience…that would actually be between 31% and 48%...[from] the surveys…[Argyle] 
cites‘. 
 
However, in addition to these statistics there are a few more up-to-date figures from the 
UK (Hay, 2000, 2002) and the US (Kennedy & Kanthamani, 1995a; Smith, 2006).  In the 
UK, David Hay and Kate Hunt repeated the survey he originally conducted with Gordon 
Heald (Hay & Heald, 1987), and Hay took part in a BBC television series looking at the 
spirituality and religiosity of the nation.  The survey suggested that numbers reporting these 
experiences has increased in recent times.  
  
―In June of this year, we obtained the results of a repeat 
survey, which we did in conjunction with the BBC's recent 
Soul of Britain series. These suggest that more than 76% of 
the national population would admit to having had a 
spiritual or religious experience. That is to say, in not much 
more than a decade there has been almost a 60% rise in the 
positive response rate to questions about this subject. The 
great majority of these people are of course not regular 
churchgoers.‖ 
(Hay, 2000: http://www.martynmission.cam.ac.uk/BIAMSHay.htm) 
 
Hay (2000, 2002) and Hay and Hunt (2002) suggest that these higher levels may be 
indicative of an inherent spiritual disposition in humans and could be due to increased 
awareness of spirituality in the population and the possibility that some social changes have 
made the subject matter less taboo.  However, it is worth noting here that the majority of 
positive responses about spiritual or religious experiences (55%) did not report a peak or 
transcendent moment as such, but instead ‗the recognition of a transcendent providence: a 
patterning of events in a person‘s life that convinces them that in some strange way those 
events were meant to happen‘ (Hay & Hunt, 2002: 13).  In this sense, it is likely that 
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recognition of a transcendent providence and experiencing transcendence are different experiences, and 
that figures for the latter only, may not be as high.  Nevertheless, the number of those 
reporting awareness of the presence of god (from 27% to 38%), of prayer being answered 
(from 25% to 37%) and of sacredness being present in nature (from 16% to 29%) were all 
higher than the original survey. 
 
In one study about spiritual experiences in the US, there was a positive response of 60-72% 
(Kennedy & Kanthamani, 1995a), though it is acknowledged that the sample was not 
representative, and was made up of people who have an interest in paranormal phenomena 
and those who take part in parapsychological work.  The most recent statistics concerning 
TEHEs in the US are from the NSTS in 2004 (Smith, 2006).  The basic findings show that 
just over half of the respondents (50.4%) reported some form of spiritually transforming 
experience.   
 
Overall, these studies suggest that about half the current population will have some form of 
TEHE (though it is possible that less would report them).  Even with a more conservative 
estimate – of a third – this is still a substantial section of the population who are likely to 
report a TEHE.   
Placing this within a context of other surveys considering paranormal and anomalous 
experiences more generally allows limited comparison.  Indeed, comparison is difficult for 
various reasons, not least because we are rarely comparing like for like in terms of 
questions asked and people surveyed.  In other words, there is a distinct lack of 
representative and randomised populations surveyed in this field with many surveys 
focusing on more easily accessible and therefore cheaper university or college populations.  
The other issue is that many surveys are interested in paranormal belief as opposed to 
reported paranormal experience (e.g. see Irwin, 1993, for a review of some of this 
literature).  And finally, as there are a range of experiences considered ‗paranormal‘ or 
‗anomalous‘, there are often differences regarding how constructing measures has been 
approached (e.g. see Fox, 1992: 423).   
Nonetheless, there have been a few representative surveys in Europe and the US detailing 
numbers of paranormal experiences.  Firstly, Greeley (1975) reported that nearly a fifth of 
the general US population reported frequent paranormal experiences. Additionally, 
comparative cross-cultural studies (using the same measures as Greeley) produced similar 
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results in finding that paranormal experiences were fairly commonly reported though 
frequency and type of experiences reported differ across cultures (Fox, 1992; Haraldsson, 
1985; Hay & Morisy, 1978; McClenon, 1990, 1994).  Some of these results and others 
reported a 36% positive response rate in the UK (Hay & Morisy, 1978); a 50% response 
rate in San Francisco-Oakland area of the US (Wuthnow, 1976) and between 20% and 41% 
across three surveys in the US (Back & Bourque, 1970).  We could conclude that in the 
context of anomalous experiences more generally, TEHEs are surprisingly widely reported 
in the general population, though when compared to less controversial experiences (e.g. 
déjà vu) we may expect numbers to be comparatively lower.  
 
1.4 The significance of TEHEs 
 
TEHEs regularly feature other ‗paranormal‘ factors that do not fit within the archetypal 
‗mystical‘ experience and there are a wide variety of TEHEs that have been reported.  
Indeed, White (1994) devised five overarching experiential types to accommodate different 
EHEs.  These five types are mystical, psychic, encounter-type, death-related and exceptional normal 
and each covers a range of experiences.  So for instance, peak experiences, conversion 
experiences, revelations, stigmata, transformational experiences, kundalini15 and 
transcendental music (e.g. ‗music of the spheres‘ or ‗celestial music‘) all fall under the 
umbrella of mystical experiences.  White observes that her typology for EHEs is provisional 
and that the experiences could be categorised and classified in alternative ways.  She notes 
that some experiences may have more than one label or overlap in places.  For example, 
while ‗transformative experience‘ falls under the label ‗mystical experiences‘, White (1994: 
149) acknowledges that ‗sometimes [transformation] is associated with all types of EHEs‘. 
 
It is this element of transformation combined with transcendence that unites EHEs as 
moments of profound significance in people‘s lives, despite experiential differences.  
Palmer and Braud suggest that, 
 
                                                 
15 Kundalini is an Eastern term originating from Hinduism thought to be a form of spiritual energy often 
conceptualised as a serpent coiled at the base of the spine, which can be said to be ‗awakened‘ or aroused 
through kundalini experiences (Sannella, 1987).  The form that such an awakening takes can differ but often 
includes involuntary shaking and trembling of the body.  Additionally, it may take place over a number of 
years and involve considerable mental anguish and suffering.  Jung (1996) used the concept of kundalini to 
discuss a person‘s accession to higher states of consciousness and the process of individuation. 
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―EHEs may serve as gateways to transcendent behaviours, 
freeing one, and allowing for the realisation of more of 
one‘s true potential as a human being.‖ 
(Palmer & Braud, 2002: 41) 
 
Furthermore, White (1994, 1999b) suggested that this ‗transformative aspect‘ can provide 
experients with the impetus to change their lives and themselves for the better.  Here we 
will review some of the reported changes that make these experiences often considered 
profound and transformative. 
 
TEHEs are, in the main, considered to be fleeting and transient (James, [1901-2] 1982), 
though there are reports of dramatic, lingering after effects on experients‘ lives (Wulff, 
2000).  These changes range from alleviating difficult issues in an individual‘s life to 
dramatic conversion testimonies (James, [1901-2] 1982).  There are often reports of 
transformation in people‘s beliefs, attitudes and outlook on life. 
 
―Some experients report feeling an intensified love and 
compassion for others, and many say that life as a whole 
has taken on new meaning.‖ 
(Wulff, 2000: 403) 
 
Other reported after-effects include ‗an increased sense of well-being; remedial changes in 
health; increased sense of meaning and purpose; [and] spirituality‘ (Palmer & Braud, 2002: 
7).   It has been suggested that TEHEs can bring about certainty that death is not the end 
for some experients.  Bucke, for instance, saw cosmic consciousness as fostering ‗a sense of 
immortality, a consciousness of eternal life, not a conviction that he [or she] shall have this, 
but the consciousness that he [or she] has it already‘ (Bucke, 1905: 2).  Some of these 
positive reported consequences have been charted, and are laid out in the table below (fig. 
2). 
 
Fig. 2 Table showing reported consequences from closed NSTS questions (Smith, 
2006: 291) 
Consequence % of Respondents 
Greater sense of meaning and significance in life 51.7% 
Changed outlook on life 49.6% 
Positive changes in relations with others 43.2% 
Life changed overall 42% 
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It is clear from fig. 2 that just over half of the NSTS respondents report a ‗greater sense of 
meaning and significance in their lives‘ as a direct consequence of their experience.  The 
other changes mentioned concern their outlook, their relationships and their lives generally.  
These quantitative categories are fairly broad and do not indicate specifically what 
constitutes these changes.  However, fig. 3 shows the open-ended responses from the 
NSTS survey. 
 
 Fig. 3 Table showing reported changes from open-ended section of NSTS (Smith, 
2006: 289) 
Consequence % of Respondents 
Becoming more religious/spiritual/closer to God 38% 
Becoming a better person 17% 
Increased appreciation of life 15% 
Getting married/starting a family 6% 
Ceasing bad behaviours 3% 
Increased hope/love 3% 
Becoming more open-minded 3% 
Developing purpose/meaning in life 2% 
 
Fig. 3 displays some different reported consequences from fig. 2, including ‗becoming 
more religious/spiritual/closer to God‘ as the most commonly reported (38%).  This is not 
entirely made up of new religious conversions but also points to deepening existing 
religious or spiritual sensibilities.  Other reported changes to outlook include an ‗increased 
appreciation of life‘ (15%) and ‗developing purpose/meaning in life‘ (2%).  Reported 
behavioural changes include ‗becoming a better person‘ (17%) and ‗ceasing bad behaviours‘ 
(3%) and attitudinal changes concern ‗increased hope/love‘ (3%) and ‗becoming more 
open-minded‘ (3%).  The majority of these reported consequences are intangible.  The only 
reference to a discernible life change concerns ‗getting married/starting a family‘ (6%).  
 
Overwhelmingly these reported changes are positive and many effects are considered 
beneficial or even therapeutic to people‘s lives.  This is a popular conception which is 
increasingly researched and reported on.  For example, Williams and Harvey (2001: 249) 
note that, ‗interest in transcendent or spiritual experience may be motivated by the belief 
that these experiences are psychologically beneficial‘.  These perceived benefits are an issue 
of fairly recent interest but not completely new.  Underhill (1911) noted the potentially 
therapeutic benefits of mystical experiences (e.g. as psychologically transformative).  
Additionally, some work suggests that TEHEs are correlated with positive affect and 
emotional well being generally (e.g. Greeley, 1975; Hay & Morisy, 1978).  Greeley even 
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proposed that an experient‘s well being may be greater than those who do not have these 
experiences.   
 
Furthermore, long-term beneficial therapeutic effects are commonly cited in relation to 
religious or mystical experiences (Wulff, 2000) – for example, in helping address distress as 
a result of, ‗threats to life (Noyes & Slymen, 1979), solitary ordeals (Logan, 1985), 
unresolved grief (Aberbach, 1987), and posttraumatic stress disorder (Decker, 1993)‘ 
(Wulff, 2000: 413).  In this sense, it would appear that there is great personal significance 
for people in these experiences and that the effects can be life-altering.  Some suggest that 
this profundity and real effect on people is a reason in itself to study TEHEs. 
   
―If such experiences improve the quality of life and the 
emotional wellbeing of the bereaved [and others], if they 
correlate with positive mental health (they do), then are 
they not worth studying?‖ 
(Greeley, 1991: 370)  
 
Here Greeley suggests that researchers have a responsibility to investigate experiences that 
appear to increase emotional well-being. 
 
However, whilst the overwhelming majority of reported effects from TEHEs are positive, 
there are some individuals who report ‗fear, apprehension and misunderstandings‘ (Palmer 
& Braud, 2002: 7).  These reactions are thought to be fleeting effects associated with the 
onset of the experience (as unexpected and unusual events), as opposed to lasting 
impressions.  However, there is evidence in parapsychology acknowledging those disturbed 
by psychic experiences and coverage of those who have required therapy as a result (see 
Coelho, Tierney & Lamont, 2008; Kennedy & Kanthamani, 1995b: 250).  Interestingly the 
opposite has also been proposed.  Namely, that these experiences can prompt therapeutic 
effects which seem to alleviate trauma (e.g. in post traumatic stress disorder) in some cases 
(Decker, 1993) and may help circumnavigate some clinical conditions (if only because 
TEHEs are no longer automatically classified as mental illness). 
 
This is a striking assertion but is one that may be gaining a stronger foothold in psychiatry, 
where there is increasing recognition that not all people reporting ‗delusions‘ suffer from 
mental health problems (see for instance, Bell et al, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2007, 2008).  For 
example, practitioners in psychiatry have noted that some people who report ‗anomalous 
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experiences‘ show no signs of pathology, indeed, quite the opposite; they display healthy 
signs of mental well-being.  
  
 
―There is increasing evidence [e.g. Johns & van Os, 2001] 
that a significant minority of the population hold strange 
and unusual beliefs and may have sensory experiences that 
would otherwise be considered as part of psychosis if it were 
not for the fact that they are rarely troubled by them. It 
seems that psychosis may not always be a sign of mental 
illness, but simply another way of constructing reality.‖ 
(Bell, 2004: http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2004/1/4/18195/51102) 
 
This is a significant acknowledgment within psychiatry as it suggests the shifting of 
boundaries between pathology and psychological health.  This research will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2 alongside other work about these experiences in psychiatry, 
psychology and parapsychology. 
 
It would appear that TEHEs are often seen as significant, meaningful and positive events 
by those that report them.  However, there is work that suggests this meaning requires 
cultivation and does not just ‗happen‘ (e.g. Collins, 1991; Eugene Thomas, 1997).  
Furthermore, Palmer and Braud (2002) emphasise that these experiences provide a 
potential opportunity for positive outcomes and transformative effects.  They conclude that 
telling others about TEHEs in a supportive environment appears to greatly increase this 
potential.  Before their study, which explored disclosure in supportive and non-supportive 
environments, 79% of individuals reported that their TEHEs had positive life-altering 
effects.  However, after the study, 96% of those that experienced some form of 
intervention or disclosure setting reported that,  
 
―Their EHEs affected their lives by providing guidance, 
increased awareness, openness, connectedness, and 
opportunities for transformative change.‖  
(Palmer & Braud, 2002: 40) 
 
These findings, as Palmer and Braud note, seem to be in line with those of Wickramasekera 
(1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1993) who found that integration and assimilation of these 
experiences into an individual‘s sense of self might contribute to a decrease in symptoms of 
disease and promote positive health and well-being benefits. 
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However, the benefits of disclosure could be culturally specific – a Western phenomenon – 
or reliant upon particular kinds of disclosure settings.  For instance, Eugene Thomas (1997) 
argues that opportunities for positive transformation are dependent upon supportive 
cultural contexts and frameworks of understanding. 
 
―I think we tend to underestimate the corrosive effects of 
our materialist and reductionist western world on spiritual 
matters.  This one-dimensional view of reality tends to look 
on mystical-type experiences as aberrant at best, if not 
outright pathological.  Thus it provides little help in making 
sense of mystical type awakenings [or TEHEs] other than 
labelling them as ‗crazy‘.‖ 
(Eugene Thomas, 1997: 167) 
 
Whilst not everyone agrees that this framework should be religious, it is suggested that 
TEHEs should be valued to encourage positive outcomes.  As we have seen, people report 
a diverse range of phenomena and they also report being affected in a variety of profound 
ways suggesting that these experiences can be of considerable significance to many 
experients. It also appears to matter how experients perceive the environment in which 
they share or disclose their experience, e.g. as favourable and supportive.  These 
considerations have consequences in terms of developing an ethical approach towards 
researching TEHEs.  Additionally, there are issues regarding what we mean by TEHE, and 
practical and ethical ramifications concerning terminology.  Consequently, in the next 
section we discuss the problem of definition. 
 
 
1.5 Definitional concerns 
 
Clearly what counts as ‗transcendent‘, ‗exceptional human‘, religious, spiritual or mystical is 
sometimes problematic to gauge and defining these experiences can be tricky.  Rigid 
definition can mean the shoehorning of experiences into ill-fitting labels for the sake of 
convenience and tidy categorisation.  Indeed, Greeley (1975) has previously drawn 
attention to the absurdity of quantifying or categorising experiences that have been deemed 
‗ultimate‘ ones.  This is worth considering as it may be difficult in some cases to 
(definitively) label an experience or establish distinctions between similar experiences. For 
example, near death experiences (NDEs) or out of body experiences (OBEs) may both be 
considered transcendent and exceptional and the distinction between them can be 
somewhat intangible.   
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Similar in some ways to NDEs, reported factors in OBEs include, a floating sensation, and 
of being in some sense outside of one‘s physical body, sometimes even ‗seeing‘ the body 
during the experience (termed autoscopy) (Alvarado, 2000).  White (1990) has noted that 
the differences between experiences are not as distinct as they are often considered to be.  
She suggests that in addition to NDEs and OBEs, there are close relationships between 
NDEs and reported UFO encounters16, between NDEs and mystical experiences, and 
between OBEs and lucid dreams17. 
   
However, there may be some notable, and sometimes subtle, differences.  For instance, 
those who report NDEs do not tend to report ineffability as a feature of their experience, 
whereas this is often a key feature of religious or mystical experiences.  Additionally, 
experiences such as lucid dreaming are not generally afforded the same degree of 
profundity.  What this illustrates is that there appears to be some distinction between a 
TEHE and EHEs more generally, albeit sometimes subtle, subjectively afforded and 
difficult to identify.  Indeed, there are instances of NDEs with reported ineffability (see 
Moody, 1975: 25-6) and lucid dreams as potentially profound (see LaBerge & Rheingold, 
1990) contravening the tendencies detailed above.  It is worth noting that a range of 
experiences may be considered transcendent and profound by those who have them.  
Pertinently, in the NSTS, those respondents who mention an experience (by which they 
were spiritually transformed) report a wide variety of different phenomena such as OBEs, 
NDEs, crying, seeing visions, receiving signs and contact with the dead, angels or spirit of 
some sort (Smith, 2006).  What this demonstrates is that experients apply different labels 
and different terms of significance to their experiences.   
 
Whilst the issue of definition is complex and multifaceted, and a solution may appear 
somewhat arbitrary, some form of label is required to ensure clarity and consistency.  
EHEs generally are sometimes categorised by a broader term such as anomalous or 
paranormal within some academic circles (Cardeña et al 2000a), and also supernatural, 
wondrous events (McClenon 1994), or NTEs (Nonordinary Transcendent Experiences, 
                                                 
16 UFO encounters vary from reported meetings or visitations from alien craft or beings, to differing levels of 
interaction with or intervention from (at the extreme, abduction and perhaps insemination or probing by) 
alleged extra terrestrials (Mack, 1994). 
17 Lucid dreaming describes a form of dreaming where the dreamer is, in some sense, aware that they are 
dreaming.  The lucid dream world is often reported to be more vivid and more ‗real‘ than other dreamscapes.  
Some lucid dreamers are able to exert some control over the dream environment and will things to happen 
(LaBerge & Gackenbach, 2000). 
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Braud 2002).  But I have selected the term ‗transcendent exceptional human experiences‘ or 
TEHEs.  The term EHE was first coined by Rhea White. 
 
―I introduced the term exceptional human experience 
(EHE) because I wanted a general rubric under which all 
types of nonordinary, paranormal, mystical, supernatural, 
peak, and extraordinary experiences could be placed.‖ 
(White, 1999a: 1) 
 
Semantically, transcendence portrays these experiences as set apart from ordinary 
experience (see for instance, Tart, 1999).  More than this though, it provides a term under 
which a variety of experiences can be studied or explored together with a common 
definitional core, instead of separately with strictly defined delimitations.  In the past 
experiences were treated as distinct and certain experiences were the remit of discrete 
disciplines.  So, for instance, mystical experiences were mainly the preserve of students of 
religion, parapsychologists studied psi18 experiences, psychiatrists studied OBEs and near 
death researchers studied NDEs (White, 1999b).  Treating these experiences as radically 
distinct may mean that what unites them is sidelined and suggests that each experience is 
easily classified, which is not always the case.  In this sense, the definition and use of TEHE 
aims to maintain a degree of balance between, on the one hand, the nebulous nature of the 
boundaries between these experiences whilst on the other, retaining the core profound 
focus which is of concern here.  
 
This focus is centred upon three core characteristics.  They are: transcendence (a loss of time 
and space/ordinary boundaries), profundity (being deeply moved) and connectedness (oneness 
with nature, the universe or something higher).  In this sense, the experiences of most 
interest are those subjectively afforded personal profundity and significance and transcend 
the ‗mundane‘ or ordinary aspects of people‘s lives.  Further to these three characteristics, 
the approach taken in this study assigns the primary responsibility of definition to the 
respondents.  Therefore, if respondents identified their experience in the text of the advert 
and chose to respond, it is they who have subjectively classified their experience as aligned 
with these features. The advert19 read: 
                                                 
18 Psi is a ‗hypothetical construct relating to the presumed anomalous transfer of information or energy for 
which there is, arguably, objective evidential support‘ (Targ, Schlitz & Irwin, 2000: 220) – see Bem and 
Honorton (1994) for a review of this evidence and Hyman (1994) for further discussion.  Psi-related 
experiences include phenomena such as: telepathy (mind-to-mind communication), precognition (anomalous 
knowledge of the future), clairvoyance (anomalous knowledge of distant events) and psychokinesis 
(manipulation of the physical by the mind). 
19 See appendix 1 for the full advert. 
 30 
Have you ever had an experience where you 
 - lost a sense of space and time?  
 - felt at one with the universe, nature or something ‗higher‘?  
 - felt profoundly moved or deeply affected? 
 
However, in the literature, there are numerous discussions and justifications regarding 
differing definitions.  Within religious studies and philosophy some of the debate concerns 
how particular experiences may be defined as mystical, who is authorised to classify an 
experience and whether a particular label is useful.  Indeed, Franks Davis (1989) and others 
(e.g. Brainard, 1996) have suggested that an individual does not have to see their experience 
as religious or mystical for it to be defined as such.  Brainard (1996) suggests that the 
authority for determining whether an experience is mystical is often placed with the 
experient but that this deferral is misplaced.  The term ‗mystical‘ has been criticised for 
being too vague (e.g. Katz, 1978; Penner, 1989).  It may also have the added disadvantage 
of appearing somewhat old-fashioned, too deeply religious and indicative of ‗holy‘ 
individuals such as religious leaders or spiritual gurus.  However, Brainard (1996: 365) 
argues that even though ‗mystical‘ might connote ‗culturally diverse phenomena‘ it can ‗still 
be linguistically coherent and useful to scholars‘.  Indeed, it is the ‗collective interest in a 
certain category of experiences‘ that allegedly provides this coherence (p365).   
 
This approach upholds that researchers and scholars are better equipped to label, classify 
and categorise the experiences they are studying.  However, this stance neglects the effects 
of labels and their social and cultural connotations in primary research.  Labels and 
definitions are not merely an academic concern; they have practical and ethical 
ramifications. 
 
 
1.5.1 Practical issues 
 
One issue concerns terminology.  It has been suggested that certain labels are off-putting to 
some experients.  For example, there is considerable reported embarrassment with the term 
‗religious‘ (Hay, 2003), and this label can have negative connotations for people 
(Underwood, 2006).  Additionally, the term ‗spiritual‘ has ‗New Age‘20 associations for 
                                                 
20 The ‗New Age‘ movement is not a coherent or organised body of knowledge or customs but is instead a 
loosely connected bundle of beliefs and practices pertaining to personal religion, meaning and spirituality.  It 
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some experients, which is not always perceived as a favourable connection (Underwood, 
2006).  Furthermore, folklorists and anthropologists have demonstrated that terms carry 
sometimes unexpected connotations for ‗informants‘ and are invariably culturally specific 
(for more on cultural specificity see, Young & Goulet, 1994).  For instance, professional 
folklorist Gillian Bennett (1987: 26) discovered that the phrase ‗supernatural‘ elicited 
negative reactions in her research population – as ‗its connotations were wholly evil and 
taboo‘ for them – and altered her line of questioning to be focused on ‗the mysterious side 
of life‘.  The importance of getting terminology right is also demonstrated by Kennedy and 
Kanthamani (1995a). They expanded their definition in response to feedback when they 
realised that the label of ‗psychic‘ was insufficient for many of their respondents‘ other 
experiences, such as communication with the dead or apparitions. 
 
Furthermore, labels portray particular perspectives or positions towards experiences or 
phenomena (e.g. ‗sceptic‘, ‗believer‘ or ‗sympathiser‘) and as Palmer and Braud suggest,  
 
―The selection, wording and interpretation of these 
experiences are influenced strongly by the context and 
belief system of the author.‖ 
(Palmer & Braud, 2002: 6) 
 
Labels may therefore represent scepticism or hostility towards TEHEs, preventing people 
from identifying their own experiences with particular terms.  Additionally, if experients 
consider the possible reaction to their experience to be less than favourable they may be 
inclined not to tell others about it.  Davis, Lockwood and Wright (1991) found, in studying 
peak experiences, that just over half of the participants cited their prior reluctance to report 
their experience.  The reasons they cited for this reluctance included, that the experience 
was very special, intimate and personal; fear of being mocked; of having their experience 
trivialised or undervalued; and being thought of as ‗odd‘ or ‗crazy‘.  Just under a quarter of 
respondents reported not having disclosed the experience to anyone else at all and just over 
half had only informed two people or less.  This was also reported in work done by Hay 
and Morisy (1985) whose respondents cited fears of being seen as mentally unstable.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
operates in a diverse set of forms from individual practitioners (such as Reiki or Crystal Healers) to New 
Religious Movements (e.g. Neopaganism) to self-guided spiritual quests (Heelas, 1996). 
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1.5.2 Ethical issues 
 
Closely entwined with these practical concerns is an ethical dimension. People are less 
likely to disclose their experiences for fear of criticism or ridicule from others (Hay, 2003).  
Additionally, an ethical project is one that prioritises respect, awareness and sensitivity 
towards research populations (BSA, 2002).  These are significant considerations.  Without 
first-hand reports and accounts there is no way in which to study what people tell us about 
these experiences.  If TEHE accounts are to be elicited, the research slant and context need 
to be presented as non-threatening, safe, supportive and non-judgemental.      
 
In Western societies, and therefore Western research contexts, TEHEs are mostly viewed 
as ‗anomalous‘ experiences.  However, the association with ‗anomaly‘ can be 
disadvantageous for furthering understanding.  For instance, White suggests that sensitivity 
to meaning in studying these experiences is vital. 
 
―It seems to me that if we hope to understand the 
phenomena of parapsychology, it is wrong to call them 
[these experiences] anomalous because that places them in 
a context devoid of meaning.‖ 
(White, 1990: 8)   
 
She suggests that the way in which anomalous tends to be understood - ‗as yet unexplained 
by science‘ - and its focus on explanation and possible causality rather than alternative 
exploration is problematic.  Searching for the social correlates (e.g. demographics, such as 
age, gender or educational attainment) associated with anomalous experience led to the 
construction of ‗plausible explanations‘ for the reporting of these experiences; namely the 
social marginality hypothesis (also known as the deprivation theory) and the cultural source 
hypothesis21.  The first of these refers to the idea that individuals in society who are socially 
marginalised (with poorer education, social status, minority ethnicity) will be more alienated 
and therefore more likely to be attracted to paranormal beliefs (and therefore experiences) 
as a form of escape from their deprivation (e.g. see Bainbridge, 1978; Wuthnow, 1976).  
Paranormal beliefs, and by inference paranormal experiences, are seen to be ‗caused by‘ 
social marginality.  The second tends to assume that explanations for these experiences can 
be found in the host culture of the individual reporting the experience and has often been 
the underlying assumption in scientific studies of the anomalous or paranormal (McClenon, 
1994).  One of the problems with these hypotheses is their focus on explaining these 
                                                 
21 These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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experiences, and their failure to consider the importance and meaningfulness of these 
experiences for experients.  Furthermore, there is also a lack of any acknowledgement that 
it might be important to try and adopt a methodologically respectful stance in light of this 
reported significance.  
 
As Campbell and McIver (1987: 42) note, terms such as anomalous, ‗all refer to a 
relationship of separation from, if not actual opposition to, normal or widely accepted 
culture‘.  This idea, that experiences or phenomena labelled anomalous rest upon claims 
that fall outside of ‗our generally accepted cultural storehouse of ―truths‖ (Truzzi, 1974: 
245) does highlight their ‗unusual‘, ‗unexplained‘ and potentially controversial status.  
Whilst the label anomalous stakes a claim for neutral and non-partisan grounds, it is rooted 
in a Western philosophical framework and a scientific framework viewing the unexplained 
as a scientific anomaly. 
 
We only have to consider the distinction between Northern Europe and North American 
cultures when compared to Eastern Europe, Central and South America, South Asia, 
Africa and amongst various indigenous peoples where there is recognition of, value and 
often importance attached to TEHEs (Palmer & Braud, 2002).  Indeed, as Greeley (1991: 
367) has highlighted, for many non-Western peoples, ‗the extraordinary is ordinary, the 
astonishing is commonplace, [and] the wonderful is mundane‘.  So, if respondents report 
life-changing and significant experiences, we, as researchers, have a responsibility to be 
mindful of and respect this.  The importance of conceptualising these experiences 
respectfully is noted by Bucke (1923: 12) who rejects labels such as ‗supernatural or 
supranormal‘ insisting that experiences, such as TEHEs should be seen as ‗natural‘ (i.e. not 
ordinary, but not abnormal).   
 
Through selecting the label ‗transcendent exceptional human experience‘ (TEHE), 
sensitivity to the experients extends into the scholarly context and allows for these 
experiences to be treated with respect and afforded import.  This is because this term is 
embedded in a certain approach towards these experiences (Palmer & Braud, 2002).  This 
stance prioritises meaning and understanding rather than seeking solely to explain (Young 
& Goulet, 1994).  Braud argues that,  
 
―An important aim, complementary to explaining, 
predicting, and controlling, is understanding.  
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Understanding has to do with a complete description, a 
complete experiencing and an appreciation of meaning.‖ 
(Braud, 1994: 295) 
 
This approach aims to be ‗much more hospitable to human experiences‘ and to inherently 
acknowledge ‗the complexity, richness, pluralism, and multiplicity of the world‘ (Braud, 
1994: 295).  Focusing on meaning allows experients to report how deeply significant their 
TEHEs can be. 
 
Establishing and maintaining a respectful approach towards these experiences within 
academic research is not simple.  On the one hand are the requirements of academic rigour 
and the way in which TEHEs provide data to be studied.  On the other is an ethical 
concern regarding the need to treat respondents and their accounts as considerably more 
than merely a source of data.  It is not known whether the balance that this demands is 
possible, only that it is important to acknowledge and aim towards it.  In the next section 
we consider the key academic aspect to these experiences in this thesis – the language of 
TEHEs. 
 
 
1.6 The language of TEHEs 
 
There are various issues concerning language that it is important to acknowledge and 
consider when studying TEHEs.  Firstly, that in researching experience what we actually 
have to work with are the accounts, the reflections, and the reports of experients not the 
experiences themselves (Wooffitt, 1992; Yamané, 2000).  A similar conclusion has been 
reached by researchers in related fields; namely, religion (Yamané, 2000); the paranormal 
(Blackmore, 1988); and consciousness (Dennett, 1991).  What this means, at the very least, 
is that researchers are reliant upon these descriptions (the experiential accounts) as data.  
These descriptions are by their very nature, linguistic, whether spoken or written, which 
means that a good place to begin exploration is in the language of this description.  
Evidently then, there are conceptual and methodological considerations to be broached 
regarding the status of these accounts, how they can be fruitfully studied and the nature of 
the relationship between language and experience.  As Yamané suggests, 
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―It is in the nature of experiencing and its linguistic 
expression that the two are loosely coupled and therefore 
we do not study phenomenological descriptions of 
experiences but how an experience is made meaningful.‖ 
(Yamané, 2000: 173) 
 
Yamané suggests that the description of the experience is not merely a direct reflection of 
what objectively occurred but is imbued with social processes (e.g. meaning-making).  As 
the quote from Eliade (1961) noted at the very beginning of this chapter there are ways in 
which these experiences are a part of the world around us.  This observation – that 
reporting experience is tied up with the social – is one such aspect of this.  Nevertheless, 
the conceptual and methodological issues this broaches are discussed in more detail across 
Chapters 2 and 3.  At this stage, it is sufficient to recognise the emergent practical issue: 
namely, that our data is a form of language use.  The second issue regarding language is one 
identified earlier that we return to in more detail below – the issue of ineffability.   
 
 
1.6.1 Ineffability 
 
This is a commonly reported characteristic of TEHEs, noted by all the key thinkers such as 
Bucke, James, Maslow, and Stace.  It would appear that many TEHEs are perceived to be, 
and reported as ineffable.  Being beyond words, the central tenet of this claim is that the 
language we use is inadequate or unable to capture the true meaning of an overwhelming 
and unusual experience.  Indeed, it is suggested that because mystical states and related 
experiences are such a radical departure from ordinary forms of consciousness, they cannot 
effectively be articulated.  As Stace has pointed out, 
 
―One of the best-known facts about mystics is that they 
feel that language is inadequate, or even wholly useless, as 
a means of communicating their experiences or their 
insights to others.  They say that what they experience is 
unutterable or ineffable.  They use language but then 
declare that the words they have used do not say what they 
want to say, and that all words as such are inherently 
incapable of doing so.‖ 
(Stace, 1960: 277) 
 
However, Stace also highlights the seeming paradox in this claim.  Indeed other scholars 
have also reported surprise at the claim of ineffability when there are many descriptions of 
these experiences that exist in the literature (e.g. Franks Davis, 1989; Robinson, 2000).  It 
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has been proposed that the assertion of ineffability reflects the subjective sense that the 
essence of these experiences cannot effectively be conveyed. 
 
―These experiences are essentially ineffable (in the sense 
that even the best verbal phrasings are not quite good 
enough), which is also to say that they are unstructured 
(like Rorschach ink-blots).‖  
(Maslow, [1964]1976: 72) 
 
If we wholly accept that TEHEs are beyond language, then how can we meaningfully 
approach any study of these spontaneous experiences, when all we have is the description 
of the experience and not the experience itself to observe?  Instead, it is useful to think 
about why experients might claim ineffability and what implicit reasons there might be for 
this assertion. 
 
Franks Davis (1989) posits five possible reasons why experients claim ineffability in 
relation to these experiences.  One: ‗poetic hyperbole‘ – in calling an experience indescribable, 
the experient conveys a sense of importance and significance, of being overwhelmed by 
something out of the ordinary (p15).  Two: experiential exclusivity – only those who have the 
experience can understand it.  Three: the experience is fundamental and all-encompassing – the 
individual is overwhelmed by ‗profundity‘ so that they are unable to effectively convey the 
experience (the perceived core of the ineffability claim).  Four: the experience is ‗inherently 
paradoxical‘ – the experience presents logical contradictions e.g. experiencing God as 
personal and impersonal concurrently (p17).  Five: to connote apprehension of the tremendous, 
the Ultimate or the Holy – as the ultimate mystery, not amenable to language.  However, 
Franks Davis rejects complete ineffability stating: 
 
―The mystics‘ descriptions may not be adequate; they may 
be inextricably bound up with models and metaphors, and 
the divine may remain ultimately beyond the grasp of 
human concepts, but that does not mean that the often 
eloquent attempts of the mystic to communicate his [or her] 
‗vision‘ are not intended to give us some indication of an 
ultimate reality beyond his [or her] own personal life.‖ 
(Franks Davis, 1989: 19) 
 
In other words, despite claims to ineffability, TEHE accounts exist and they represent 
attempts to communicate and convey the experience.  Furthermore, Franks Davis‘ (1989) 
exploration of ineffability suggests that it might be employed to some degree as a rhetorical 
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strategy or discursive resource that is drawn upon by experients to effectively share their 
experience.   It would seem important then for a study of TEHEs to consider how these 
communicative resources are used and how the experiences are constituted via language, as 
it is through this medium they are made accessible.  This is particularly important to draw 
attention to when a rigorous and empirically-founded consideration of what these are and 
how they are achieved remains absent from the work in this field conducted so far.  In this 
sense, it is important to note how this discussion of ineffability highlights an issue 
overlooked in previous literature on TEHEs and related experiences (language and its‘ 
implications). 
 
 
1.6.2 Disclosure of TEHEs 
 
The third issue concerning language is that of disclosure.  The literature has been focused 
on why experients might be inclined to disclose their TEHEs or not (e.g. Davis et al, 1991) 
and discerning the perceived benefits of sharing experiences.  The latter is emphasised by 
Palmer and Braud (2002) in terms of helping the individual make sense of their experience.  
Braud (1994: 297) points out that there is evidence to suggest that recognition, ownership, 
sharing (in a supportive environment) and valuing one‘s experience ‗is beneficial to one‘s 
physical health and psychological well-being‘.  Conversely, Palmer and Braud (2002: 8) have 
proposed that non-disclosure of TEHEs may lead to ‗increased stress and may constitute 
risk factors for physical, psychological and spiritual health and well-being‘ in a similar way 
to non-disclosure of other significant ‗traumatic, embarrassing and secret experiences‘.  The 
benefits of sharing TEHEs in a supportive environment is acknowledged by a variety of 
scholars including Wickramasekera (1986a, 1986b, 1987, and 1993) who found that 
integration and assimilation of these experiences into an individual‘s identity may be 
distinctly beneficial for well-being. 
 
However, there is another aspect of disclosure that appears to have been overlooked thus 
far: that disclosure itself is a practical activity.  When sharing or reporting an experience, 
experients provide an experiential account and it is precisely the existence of this disclosure 
which has allowed scholars to scrutinise, analyse and contemplate these experiences at 
length.  Thus the identification of the act of disclosure as a descriptive activity allows us to 
introduce another insight into how and why TEHEs might be particularly interesting to 
sociology – namely their social aspect.   
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TEHEs though, have not readily been ‗at home‘ within sociology.  Indeed, Greeley (1991) 
noted that there was a dearth of investigative studies looking at accounts of this kind.  
Whilst this has changed somewhat in recent years, the situation has not radically altered.  It 
is likely that one of the major reasons for their neglect is that TEHEs are not considered 
relevant to a study of society or the social world.  From this point of view, TEHEs are 
private, internal and solitary experiences, which do not lend themselves to observation, nor 
are they interactive or public in any way.  As such they are more naturally situated within 
subjects such as psychology, religion and philosophy.   
 
However, this view fails to grasp that many of the reported triggers for these experiences 
have a social aspect e.g. collective settings such as religious services, interaction with others 
such as sexual relations, and culturally significant events such as childbirth.  Additionally, 
when these experiences are shared, spoken or written down they are immediately projected 
into the social world.  ‗Because of the sense in which all experiences are private, we rely 
heavily on subjects‘ own descriptions of their perceptual experiences‘ (Franks Davis, 1989: 
22).  So our knowledge of TEHEs occurs in the domain of the social - we cannot know 
anything about these experiences unless experients articulate, communicate; and ultimately, 
tell people about their experiences.   It was the social aspect which Schneiderman (1967) 
noted as absent from mysticism‘s contribution to the study of TEHEs.  And this process, 
that propels them into public, social and interactional contexts, is of distinct interest to 
sociologists.  As sociologists note, all human experience is inextricably tied up with the 
social.  Wilson (1996: 11) succinctly suggests that, ‗even experiences undergone in privacy 
or isolation have an inevitable social content‘.   What he means is that as human beings we 
often make sense of our experiences by talking or writing about them.  This sense-making 
process is a social one and at the heart of it is language.  As Taylor asserted, 
 
―All experiences require some vocabulary, and these are 
inevitably in large part handed to us in the first place by 
our society, whatever transformations we may bring on 
them later.  The ideas, the understanding with which we 
live our lives shape directly what we could call religious 
experience; and these languages, these vocabularies, are 
never those simply of an individual.‖ 
(Taylor, 2002: 27-28) 
 
In doing so we draw on the knowledge we already have about the world around us to make 
contrasts and comparisons.  Our previous experience in and of the social world informs 
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how we interpret and understand new experiences.  Indeed, how else would an individual 
recognise, label or give meaning to an experience?   
 
In this vein, language can be acknowledged as a vital part of the social aspect, as disclosure 
is the act which makes TEHEs present in the social despite their appearance as private 
experiences.  Thus, it becomes clear how crucial understanding the use of language is in 
understanding any human experience.  In other words, all accounts of experience, all 
interviews, are in the first instance, social.  Any experience is construed and shared through 
language and it is this common territory that affords the first opportunity to access and 
explore these experiences in some way.  Therefore, a study of TEHEs is as much about the 
language (and the social) as it is about subjectivity and consciousness.  There is a 
perspective on language in the social sciences which informs our approach that it is worth 
introducing next.   
 
 
1.7 The dynamic and action-oriented features of language use and description  
 
As we have already noted, the reporting of an experience is not a straightforward ‗factual‘ 
disclosure of events, and, in being inextricably bound up with social processes, it is also an 
activity.  Contemplating this raises questions about what else is being accomplished by the 
experients when they disclose their experiences.  At the very least this begins to identify 
accounts as practical discursive acts where things are achieved with that very telling, from 
meaning-making (Yamané, 2000) to other social actions (Wooffitt, 2005a).   
 
Schrager (1998) identifies three things that are of interest in providing insight into various 
social phenomena that are evident in narratives.  The first of these concerns the idea of the 
narrator adopting different points of view and speaking from different perspectives during 
the story.  This is reflective of Goffman‘s (1981) notion of footing when the speaker, as it 
were, ‗quotes‘ someone else or ‗shifts footing‘.  However, Schrager does not really discuss 
footing in quite the way Goffman does.  Instead he talks about how the use of different 
perspectives is an invocation of the social and social relationships.  But it is also a way in 
which actions are performed within a social context.  In other words, the inclusion of other 
voices in a narrative is used to achieve certain actions and convey specific things.  Schrager 
alludes to some of the other things that are communicated in conversations, such as a 
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speaker‘s stance towards a particular set of circumstances, e.g. as ‗ambivalent… 
antagonistic… neutral‘ (p288).  Indeed,  
 
―My point of view as teller registers various sorts of 
distancing not just by what I say but in intonation and 
other paralinguistic features - by the way I say it.‖ 
(Schrager, 1998: 288) 
 
The second element of the social that can be located in these accounts is the direct 
comparison and contrasting that can be done searching for similarities, differences, 
omissions and elaborations.  This point of view maintains that, 
 
―Experience…comes to make sense by being connected 
with others‘ experiences.  These connections are not 
simply pre-established in events.  They are recognised, 
forged, elaborated, and invoked in interaction.‖ 
(Schrager, 1998: 288) 
 
The third element of this is where Schrager suggests that experiences (or accounts of 
experiences) in a sense exist upon a continuum, from the individualised or ‗unique‘ events 
to the multiple instances - which lend themselves to categorisation and generalisation.  ‗To 
become the subject of narrative, experiences are either individualised or generalised‘ 
(Schrager, 1998: 295); this refers to the way in which the teller constructs the experience or 
incident they are narrating, as unique or common events.  But according to developments 
regarding language in the social sciences there is a little more to consider here. 
 
It was James ([1901-2] 1982) who suggested that something about the quality of such 
profound experiences evades description.  A variety of explanations have been offered to 
address this alleged gap in linguistic resources.  One of these theories propounds that the 
language we currently employ in everyday interactions is inadequate for these purposes.  
Some posit that erotic or symbolic language was used to try and effectively convey 
concepts considered difficult to communicate (Fromm, 1951; Wulff, 2000).  This kind of 
language consisted of metaphorical, mythical and analogous linguistic strategies that 
engaged the emotions and the imagination.  For Bruner (1986), this language is the 
language of storytelling.  He contends that whilst we are familiar with the language of 
science ‗we know precious little in any formal sense about how to make good stories‘ 
(Bruner, 1986: 14).   
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Further explanations for this linguistic gap include that TEHEs are too intense or 
overwhelming to articulate experience or that they somehow ‗fall beyond‘ words.  Yet 
people do describe, communicate and convey these experiences; they do attempt to put 
their experiences into words.  But how we understand the relationship between language 
and experience is often philosophically defined. 
  
―Does the experience itself dictate the language in which it 
is described or is it…entirely irrelevant to the linguistic 
clothing that the experiencer drapes about it?‖  
(Rorty, 2004: 87) 
 
Within the social sciences, specific methods and approaches have been evolving towards 
the study of discourse22 (namely discursive psychology and conversation analysis) aiming to 
reveal how people make sense of the world and their experiences through their use of 
language.  This work has consistently demonstrated that the language we use to describe 
our experiences is socially and interactionally produced (e.g. Schegloff, 1997).  That is, the 
way in which an account of a TEHE is described will be informed primarily by the 
circumstances or setting in which the report is communicated (whether written or spoken).  
These, mostly ‗non-conscious‘ processes of selection and construction perform social 
actions –  we do things with our talk (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998) – and can begin to 
inform us about some of the foundations of such accounts.  That is, language is a site of 
sociality and a site for social action – things are done with and in talk.  Language can have 
social and interactional effects and consequences; it assembles and constructs the social, 
and is not merely a straightforwardly representational medium. 
 
In particular, studies have persistently revealed that language is context-dependent and is 
designed for the situation in which it occurs (Edwards & Potter, 1992a; Wooffitt, 2005a).  
Speakers make ongoing judgements, interpretations and inferences about what is expected 
of them in the setting they find themselves and orient themselves to these factors.  In other 
words, language is first and foremost about the context for which it is produced.  It also is 
social action; utterances perform actions and have effects, which are ‗played out‘ in the 
interactive setting.  This empirically-founded concept – the action-orientation of language – 
can help us to approach TEHEs differently because this approach to description has not 
been developed in previous work on TEHEs.  Indeed, James ([1901-2] 1982) and others, 
did not consider the constitutive role of language when considering religious experience.   
                                                 
22 These approaches will be outlined in more detail in Chapter 3 on methodology. 
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Brockmeier (2002: 85) suggests that James‘ omission raises three particular issues which it 
is worth emphasising here.  Firstly, ‗he [James] aims to study the construction of the 
religious mind without taking into account one of the most important tools used at this 
construction site‘ – language.  Secondly, ‗ignoring language not only misses the interplay 
among experience, consciousness, and reality, it also – as a consequence – misses the 
crucial cultural hinge between society and the individual‘.  Thirdly, Brockmeier identifies 
‗the mystical paradox‘ (p86), which is the contradiction established via the claim of 
ineffability versus the existence of experiential accounts.  Here, he identifies the puzzle that 
faces us in coming to study these experiences sociologically: how can we approach TEHEs 
if they are claimed to be ineffable, and language is the medium through which social 
scientists can study them?  As the developments concerning language, action, interaction 
and description demonstrate, however, there are new ways of considering the concept of 
ineffability and therefore, ways of addressing issues concerning language and sociality not 
previously considered.  Focusing on ineffability in this way allows us to see how it has been 
previously been viewed as a substantive issue, but that actually it appears also to have 
rhetorical purpose.  This has both illustrated the importance of language as an analytical 
consideration and centralised a concern with it practical effects.    
 
However, Brockmeier also suggests that there is something ‗extra-discursive‘ about these 
experiences even though they possess a cultural and discursive element. 
 
―There are undeniable experiential realities that language 
cannot capture, not even touch.  But there also can be no 
doubt that as soon as they are taken as representing or 
embodying meaning and, as in our case, transcendent 
values, that is, as soon as they enter a cultural discourse, 
they do take on a discursive form.‖ 
(Brockmeier, 2002: 88) 
 
In this sense, these experiences can be seen as having both individual and cultural 
significance.  They are private and personal, but also public and social when thrust into 
discourse, whatever form that takes.  Additionally, they are defined, interpreted and 
understood within cultural and historical bounds.  However, across contexts these 
experiences do seem to be understood as atypical human experience: they are generally 
perceived as special, significant and profound experiences. They are afforded personal 
meaning and significance, they are seen as having life-changing potential, and they are 
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viewed as overwhelmingly positive, transformational, revelatory and extraordinary (Cardeña 
Lynn & Krippner, 2000b).   
 
It would seem then that not only are there reasons for studying these experiences from a 
sociological perspective, but also because of their intrinsic human interest.  Experiences so 
reputedly profound and life-changing perhaps have many ways in which to contribute to 
knowledge and understanding, though there are reservations about the extent to which 
academic study can effectively capture or represent these aspects.  At this stage, it is 
sufficient to note that there is an inherent tension in this thesis between recognising and 
respecting the value of TEHEs and effectively conducting a rigorous academic analysis of 
these experiences in new and insightful ways.    
 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
 
The material covered in this chapter is extensive.  We have reviewed the definition, 
characterisation, features and reported effects of TEHEs.  Before moving on it is worth 
summarising the key points that inform the subsequent focus and effectively highlight the 
areas of interest for a sociological study in particular.  After exploring the issues we are left 
with a paradox and a tension. 
 
The paradox is that TEHEs are viewed as private and ineffable, yet we have access to the 
public accounts of them to study.  That is, despite claims not to be able to describe these 
experiences, many experients do provide a description of their experience.  So we are faced 
with the question of how we study them.  We have highlighted the potential importance of 
language and communicative resources in a study of TEHEs.  This focus is something that 
is missing from previous work looking at these kinds of experiences.   Thus, at the heart of 
this thesis is a focus on the language of TEHEs. 
 
The tension is that for the experients these are profound, possibly life-changing encounters 
which radically transform lives and selves.  But for academics they are primarily a series of 
discursive acts – the reporting, the disclosure.  This leads to an ethical issue – how can an 
empathic and respectful concern for the personal significance be reconciled with an 
analytic focus on discursive activity invited by the nature of the data provided by the 
accounts?  Indeed, there are some reservations about the ability of any academic endeavour 
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to address or investigate these reputedly profound experiences.  There is a sense in which it 
seems somewhat absurd to use intellectual tools to investigate and scrutinise phenomena 
not thought to be amenable to the intellect (James, [1901-2] 1982) at all.  These are not 
dilemmas and tensions that can necessarily be resolved here but they can nonetheless be 
recognised as inherent contradictions for the researcher and the thesis presented here. 
 
This thesis therefore explores TEHEs and how they are reported and communicated, 
focusing on the subjective accounts and meanings afforded to them by those who report 
them.  Given that these experiences are often claimed to be ineffable (or indescribable) 
how do people talk about their experiences?  These experiences are reputedly profound, 
ultimate and intangible, so how do people make sense of them?  As White has pointed out, 
 
―We must try to see how these experiences fit into the 
context of the person‘s life, to ask what the meaning of the 
experience is for the person who has it.‖ 
(White, 1990: 11) 
 
White also advocates understanding or investigating meaning from a starting position of 
acceptance: that is, accepting that the experient views the experience as real.  The priority is 
what is important for the respondents about their reported experiences, and the aim is to 
demonstrate their understanding regarding their experience (at one particular time, in one 
particular context).   
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Chapter 2 
Seeking to explain: Previous approaches to TEHEs in  
Scientific and Social Scientific fields 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The last chapter identified the way in which TEHEs are suitable for sociological scrutiny.  
This chapter explores the many different approaches that have been taken towards TEHEs 
in the past.  These various disciplinary strands have explored and researched these kinds of 
experiences in different ways.  TEHEs have been extensively reflected on and written 
about from a religious or mystical perspective (e.g. St John of the Cross, St Theresa).  
Furthermore, the work of many scholars, including William James, Maurice Bucke, William 
Stace, Margaret Laski, Abraham Maslow, Alister Hardy, and Charles Tart has been 
extensive and wide-ranging.  In some senses this corpus of work spans the disciplines of 
philosophy, psychology, religious studies, parapsychology, sociology and anthropology.  
Indeed, this subject is not confined to one particular discipline, though the more specific 
interests, emphases and concerns of researchers and scholars may be quite different.   
 
What this indicates is that a vast literature spanning numerous disciplines could be drawn 
upon to discuss these experiences.  In some cases this means that the approach taken to 
reviewing some bodies of literature is with a broad brush, focusing on pertinent issues.  
Essentially, it is more productive to focus on areas of research that this project speaks 
directly to and highlight the concerns within each particular field that are relevant.  
Consequently, the review discussion begins with a focus on research conducted and the 
approach taken in psychology, which includes, and has been informed by, work in 
psychiatry and neuroscience.  Following this, work in parapsychology is examined, before a 
focused consideration of the previous approach adopted by the social sciences, and 
sociology, more specifically.  Additionally this chapter considers the recent interest in the 
method of introspection from the field of consciousness studies.  As the last chapter 
showed, the nature of language and profundity are at the heart of this project.  However, 
whilst one of these issues – profundity – has been recognised (but not always respected) by 
some research, the other – the discursive aspect – has yet to be fully acknowledged by 
those who have studied these experiences. 
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2.2 How have TEHEs been studied in the past?  
 
2.2.1 Psychology (and Neuroscience) 
 
Within psychology there has been limited investigation of TEHEs and they are mostly 
treated as anomalous or paranormal experiences.  Some psychological research has focused 
upon the identification of certain personality characteristics and individual differences 
associated with these experiences.  There is some work which suggests that individuals 
reporting one type of experience, for example lucid dreaming, are also more likely to report 
others, e.g. NDEs, hallucinations, hypnagogia, transcendent experiences and out-of-body 
experiences (LaBerge & Gackenbach, 2000).  Much of this work suggests that certain 
people may be more likely to have paranormal experiences (or a belief in the paranormal) 
than others (e.g. Auton, Pope & Seeger, 2003; French, 2003; Kennedy & Kanthamani, 
1995; Peltzer, 2002; Thalbourne, 1995).  It is hypothesised that the individual differences 
associated with a disposition to these experiences and certain sleep-related23 states, reflects 
flexibility in consciousness (Watson, 2001).  From this perspective certain individuals can 
more easily manoeuvre different levels of consciousness.  However, this flexibility is not 
necessarily consciously willed or determined.  These individuals are more likely to score 
highly on tests of hypnotisability, creativity and fantasy proneness (for examples of the 
measures used to gauge these associations see Gallagher, Kumar & Pekala, 1994; Kumar, 
Pekala & Gallagher, 1994).  It is possible that other individual differences such as 
‗extraversion, self-confidence, open-belief systems or a willingness to introspect‘ also affect 
the propensity to have such experiences, particularly psi (Holt, Delanoy & Roe, 2004: 433). 
 
One theory proposes that individuals who are prone to fantasy-based states have ‗thin 
boundaries‘, which contributes to an easier flow or slippage between reality and fantasy 
(Hartmann, 1991).  In line with this theory, individuals with ‗thicker boundaries‘ would 
tend towards blocking or stemming this flow and adhere more closely to ‗reality‘, 
preventing any leakage from fantasy-based phenomena.  So individuals with thin 
boundaries (or more flexible consciousness, perhaps) would find the differentiation 
between ‗reality‘ and ‗non-reality‘ less clearly defined or concrete.  In a similar vein, 
Thalbourne and Houran (2000) conceptualised the characteristics of schizotypy24, fantasy-
                                                 
23 Such as daydreaming, nightmares, lucid dreams, visions and apparitions (Watson, 2001) also known as 
fantasy based states (Hartmann, 1991). 
24 Schizotypy is a psychometrically-measured trait including aspects which are found in the clinical spectrum 
of psychosis (Schofield & Claridge, 2007).  Usually divided into positive and negative schizotypy, the former 
includes magical thinking and unusual experiences and has been correlated with ‗paranormal‘ experiences and 
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proneness, absorption, creativity, and paranormal experiences as manifestations of the trait 
of ‗transliminality‘.  They defined transliminality as a ‗tendency for psychological material to 
cross (trans) thresholds (limines) into or out of consciousness‘ (Thalbourne & Houran, 2000: 
853).  The ease of transference between states of consciousness probably also relies on 
several mediating factors, such as the context (i.e. being in bed as opposed to driving a car) 
and perhaps the presence of other dispositional characteristics.  Indeed, with specific 
reference to TEHEs, Wulff (2000: 408-9) suggests that there may be a ‗mystical trait‘ of 
sorts, where experients possess a range of predisposing factors, adding that ‗set and setting 
are also significant factors‘. 
 
Whilst mainstream psychology has tried to discover which ‗characteristics‘ or individual 
differences are strongly associated with TEHEs, it has however, generally neglected their 
potential implications for the study of consciousness.  Since the discovery that these states 
can share some of the same features as neuropsychiatric syndromes without necessarily 
being pathological, anomalistic psychology has been more inclined to take an interest 
(Beyerstein, 1996).  Anomalistic psychology, for example, has centralised its concern with 
studying and understanding phenomena considered extraordinary or ‗paranormal‘ 
predominantly in terms of pre-existing physical and psychological explanations (see 
http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/apru/ for more information).   
 
The dominant conceptions of brain, mind and consciousness employed by psychology are 
primarily informe d by research employing the latest neuro-technology.   These techniques 
include brain scanning apparatus which has allowed neuropsychological research to explore 
various hypotheses concerning brain activity and ‗religious or mystical‘ experience.  The 
transcendent states suggested by TEHEs are seen to offer potentially fruitful avenues for 
furthering scientific understanding about the relationship between the mind and the brain.  
To this end, there have been several experiments conducted, with findings that have 
provoked some discussion and debate amongst scholars.   
 
Some of these experiments have been conducted by Persinger (1983, 1987, 2002, and 2003) 
who sent a weak electromagnetic signal through individuals‘ brains via a metal helmet and 
found that most people reported sensing a presence, sensations of floating, flying, leaving 
                                                                                                                                               
beliefs (see Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, Bischoff & Mischo, 1999).  Negative schizotypy is ‗usually measured 
in terms of physical and/or social anhedonia, [and] has been identified by several researchers as a stable and 
important indicator of risk for mental ill-health‘ (Schofield & Claridge, 2007: 1909). 
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the body and other ‗mystical‘ experiences.  As a result, Persinger suggested that the root of 
these reported characteristics are located in the brain because these sensations are 
seemingly triggered by stimulation of the temporal lobe region.  However, we might want 
to question the extent to which reporting such sensations can be seen as equivalent to a 
spontaneous mystical experience, and take issue with the idea that an individual‘s 
description is equal to or unproblematically reflective of the experience itself.   
 
Beauregard and Pacquette (2006; see also Beauregard & O‘Leary, 2008) also found that this 
region of the brain (amongst others) was activated in their experiments with Carmelite 
nuns and brain activity during ‗Unio Mystica‘ (transcendent union with God).  However, 
their experiments were reliant upon the nun‘s recall of the transcendent state rather than 
concurrent introspection (reporting the experience as it happens) as it is not a state that is 
considered accessible at will.  Other experiments were able to study neural activity during 
meditative states.  D‘Aquili and Newberg (1993, 1998; see also Newberg & D‘Aquili, 2000; 
Newberg, D‘Aquili, & Rause, 2001a; Newberg, Alavi, Baime, Pourdehnad, Santanna, & 
D'Aquili, 2002b) monitored blood flow in the brains of monks meditating.  When the 
monks reached a ‗transcendent high‘ they pulled a cord which released a harmless dye into 
their bloodstream highlighting the active areas of the brain.  The dye showed increased 
activity in frontal brain regions (associated with focused attention) and decreased activity in 
the back brain regions, such as the parietal lobe (associated with orientation).  Newberg 
suggested that this is consistent with meditators descriptive accounts regarding reported 
loss of self and space and time.  However, whilst many of these experiments are 
groundbreaking in providing information about brain activity in seemingly altered states, 
there are some limitations of applicability and ecological validity.   
 
Spontaneous experiences are notoriously difficult to capture in the laboratory, so observing 
transcendent experiences in ‗real‘ time is highly improbable.  In this sense, it is difficult to 
draw firm conclusions about spontaneous mystical ‗states‘ from experimental research into 
induced meditative ‗highs‘.   Additionally, there are good reasons to question the use of 
descriptive accounts as direct routes to actual experiences.  
 
Furthermore, there have been suggestions that because of observed activity in the temporal 
lobe (and some similarities in accounts) that there are links between temporal lobe epilepsy 
(TLE) and mystical experience or religious ‗ecstasy‘ (e.g. Cirignotta, Todesco, & Lugaresi, 
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1980; Devinsky & Lai, 2008; Saver & Rabin, 1997; Schacter, 2006; Waxman & Geschwind, 
1975) and TLE and psychic experience (e.g. Fenwick, 1993).  TLE is thought to be caused 
by unusual electrical activity in the brain‘s temporal lobes and many sufferers ‗report that 
their seizures often bring on extraordinary experiences of transcendent wonder, luminous 
insight – or, at times, harrowing, uncanny fear‘ (Pickover, 1999: 1; also see LaPlante, 1993, 
for more on TLE and religious experience).  TLE has often been cited as a retrospective 
explanation for some historic mystical visions, such as those of Mohammed, Moses and St 
Paul (Landsborough, 1987; Pickover, 1999), and Ellen White, co-founder of Seventh Day 
Adventist Movement (Peterson, 1988), amongst others (see Devinsky & Lai, 2008: 637; and 
Saver & Rabin, 1997: 501-2 for more extensive lists).  However, such explanations are 
deduced from written accounts, composed in different historical and cultural eras, with 
little reflection about the mediated nature of the experiences and how accounts do not 
present the actual experiences themselves.   
 
Nonetheless, to suggest that religious or mystical experiences have roots in the limbic 
system25 (connected to strong emotion) or are ‗brain-based‘ does not preclude them from 
being meaningful.  Saver and Rabin (1997, 1998) argue that all experience is brain-based 
and that such a claim is not particularly exceptional as it is not directed at verifying or 
disproving the objective reality of religious experience.  ‗Brain activity does not 
contaminate or invalidate our mental experiences; rather, it makes possible, and shapes, our 
mental and spiritual life‘ (Saver & Rabin, 1998: 476).  Nonetheless, despite this, they do try 
to distinguish ‗normal‘ religious experience from that triggered by brain disorders; whilst 
others recognise that this distinction is hard to determine and culturally defined: 
 
―How can we distinguish the physiology or validity of a 
religious experience in someone with epilepsy or psychosis 
from that of a religious sage?  We can‘t.  Disorders of 
spiritual-religious function could result in a relative lack of 
or excess of activity.  Normal function is culturally defined 
and varies radically.‖  
(Devinsky & Lai, 2008: 637)   
                                                 
25 Azari, Nickel, Wunderlich, Niedeggen, Hefter, Tellmann, Herzog, Stoerig, Birnbacher and Seitz (2001) 
compared neuroimaging for religious and non-religious subjects via the induction and sustained achievement 
of a religious state and found that limbic areas were not activated.  However, these states were subjectively 
assessed by the subjects and no conceptual distinction was made between spontaneous experience and the 
states induced in the laboratory.  Other work (Arzy, Idel, Landis & Blanke, 2005) has suggested a connection 
between altitude and mystical states.  The authors suggest that many non-mystic contemporary mountaineers 
have reported similar experiential characteristics to those found in the accounts of religious figures in the 
three monotheistic religions.  They consider some of the work in cognitive neuroscience regarding the effects 
of altitude on the brain in order to make this connection.     
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William James also noted that recognising organic brain processes as underlying mystical 
experience did not detract from their profundity, as all states of mind were underpinned by 
organic processes.  He further warned against reducing such experiences solely to their 
material roots.  Despite this, according to Wulff (2000: 405), although there is little direct 
evidence to support it, mystical states are ‗increasingly thought to be correlates of certain 
forms of activity in the brain‘s temporal lobes‘.  Indeed, although not entirely in agreement 
with this perspective, Persinger, Koren and Lafreniere (2008: 269) note its dominance: ‗the 
intrinsic premise of modern neuroscience is that all experiences and capacities are derived 
from the function and structure of the human brain‘.   
 
This neuropsychological explanation has perhaps increased in popularity due to the rapid 
expansion of and advances in neuroscience and studies in consciousness.  These 
experimental findings are certainly interesting and they are driving forward understanding 
of neural activity and blood flow in different regions of the brain.  However, there are 
various limits to these contributions.  Firstly, it is virtually impossible to capture 
spontaneous states in the experimental context and therefore neuroscience can only 
provide limited exploration of spontaneous TEHEs.  Psychology has tended to look for 
the causes of these experiences in naturalistic areas.  Explanations for spontaneous states 
include brain anomalies, such as neurological malfunction or damage, and for induced states, 
chemical levels and electrical activity in certain regions of the brain through meditation or 
indoctrination are seen as responsible. This perspective suggests that altered states derive 
from a universal brain system combined with certain culturally specific manipulations 
(Sargant, 1957, 1973; Beyerstein, 1996).  In this vein, psychology has argued ‗that altered 
states of consciousness are altered states of certain brain systems‘ (Beyerstein, 1996: 16). 
   
Secondly, the confines of this field mean that findings come about in the laboratory, rather 
than in the ‗real‘ or social world.  Indeed, with the exception of Maslow and other 
humanist psychologists interested in peak or transpersonal experiences, psychology and 
neuroscience have tended to approach these experiences experimentally or rely upon brain 
scanning technologies for their insights.  Whilst these methodologies are useful they fail to 
provide any insight into the lived experience itself or the occurrence of TEHEs in real 
world contexts.  A related issue is that most of the approaches regard the accounts of 
experiences as offering a more or less acceptable substitute for the actual experience itself.  
Finally, there is sometimes (but not always) a neglect of how profound and significant these 
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experiences are reported to be.  A similar perspective has been dominant within psychiatry, 
where many of these experiences have been considered indicative of delusion. 
 
 
2.2.2 Psychiatry (and Psychopathology) 
 
There has regularly been confusion between mystics and insanity.  Up until fairly recently, 
it was assumed that people reporting unusual or seemingly inexplicable experiences were 
simply deluded or psychotically disturbed26.  Thus in psychiatry, the distinction between 
psychosis and spiritual experience has been somewhat hazy and the subject of 
disagreement.  Sanderson, Vandenberg and Paese (1999: 608) argued that previous versions 
of the DSM (The American Psychiatric Association‘s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders), the dominant diagnostic tool for psychiatry ‗simply associated religiosity 
with severe psychopathology‘.  Furthermore, historically, EHEs and related beliefs have 
been considered hallucinations and delusional or false beliefs (Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2003).   
 
Hallucinations and delusions are viewed as potential indications that individuals are in 
some way ‗out of touch with reality‘ (Young, 2000: 49).  These indications form part of a 
range of symptoms that are used to clinically diagnose psychosis and mental illness, such as 
schizophrenia.  The DSM – IV characterises delusions as false beliefs established via 
mistaken suppositions about external reality and which are contrary to that of dominant 
culture, and hallucinations as mistaken perceptions (APA, 1994).   Within this conception, 
delusions are perceived to be notions that are not upheld or believed by significant 
numbers of the population, whilst hallucinations are viewed as anomalies and symptomatic 
of mental malady. 
 
Somewhat problematically, these measures contain an assumption that discerning incorrect, 
false or bizarre beliefs is a straightforward process and that these are fairly self-evident (Bell 
et al, 2003).  However, guidance for identifying delusional beliefs is sketchy and judgement 
is subjective and inconsistent.  Yet as research has shown, spiritual or religious experiences, 
purported hallucinations and ‗bizarre‘ beliefs are not particularly reliable measures of 
psychopathology (see Kroll & Sheehan, 1989).  Furthermore, although Thalbourne and 
Delin (1994) found mystical experience correlated with measures of manic and depressive 
experience, others reached the conclusion that mysticism and psychosis actually have little 
                                                 
26 It could be argued that this perspective is still fairly dominant in the lay population. 
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in common (Arbman 1970; Noll 1983; Austin 1999).  Overall, research has generally 
concluded that mystical experiences and psychopathology do not correlate.  Many (e.g. 
Tart, 1996) maintain that there is a qualitative difference between the mystical and the 
pathological, which is notably profound when a genuine mystical experience has occurred.  
And Marshall (2005) suggests that the association of mystical experience with pathology is 
a frequent misidentification.  
 
―…it is a common mistake to assume that mystical 
experience is not genuine if it is associated with an organic 
(or psychological) disorder.  Mystical experiences have 
often been dismissed as products of brain pathology, and 
even those sympathetic to the experiences may assume that 
the presence of an organic pathology detracts from their 
validity.‖ 
(Marshall, 2005: 101) 
 
Interestingly, many studies actually suggest the opposite of an association with pathology: 
that TEHEs correlate with positive affect (e.g. Hood 1974; Greeley 1975; Mallory 1977; 
Hay & Morisy 1978).  This is re-iterated by Tamatea and Evans, (2002: 149) who suggest 
that ‗some anomalous experiences may not actually be indicative of mental illness, but 
rather possession of positive talents – even if [the experiences are] distressing‘.   
 
It has been argued that there are many individuals in the general population displaying 
‗symptoms‘ without necessarily developing psychosis (Maher, 1999).  Indeed, as Johns and 
van Os (2001: 1131; see also Buckley, 1981) have noted, ‗people with intense spiritual or 
religious beliefs can have experiences similar to the positive symptoms of schizophrenia‘.  
Furthermore, results comparing ‗normal‘ populations with ‗deluded‘ individuals have been 
mixed (see Roberts, 1991; Jackson, 1997; Jones & Watson, 1997; Peters, Day, McKenna, & 
Orbach, 1999, for more on this).  Outside of a clinical setting many of the ‗symptoms‘ of 
mental health problems are viewed and treated differently.  Many of them can also be 
located psychometrically in the general population (Johns & Van Os, 2001).  Schizotypy, as 
noted earlier, is a non clinical trait identified by psychometric measures and shares some 
features with schizophrenia, its clinical cousin.  As fairly high levels of schizotypy are 
reported in the general population this appears to call into question the assumption that 
certain beliefs and experiences are necessarily pathological. 
 
More recently within psychiatry it has been argued that not all conceptions labelled 
delusions are the same and that delusions are not necessarily the main indication (or 
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source) of psychopathology in those diagnosed with psychosis.  Bell, Halligan and Ellis 
(2003: 422) advocate an approach towards delusions that is flexible and views patients as 
‗cognitive beings firmly situated within their social milieu‘, allowing psychiatry to 
comprehend what appears to be a continuum of beliefs.  Indeed, it is possible that ‗the 
distinction between normal beliefs and delusions is a matter of degree, rather than a 
qualitative difference‘ (Peters et al, 1999: 84).  It has been acknowledged that one of the 
problems with current diagnosis is that many people without psychosis report belief in 
‗paranormal‘ phenomena, hold what might be termed ‗delusional beliefs‘ by some, and 
experience ‗hallucinations‘ and ‗anomalous experiences‘.   
 
Indeed, the findings of Peters, Day, McKenna and Orbach (1999: 94) ‗suggest that form 
may be more important diagnostically than content: it is not what you believe, it is how you 
believe it‘ (my emphasis).  Thus the extent to which an individual is suffering, distressed or 
preoccupied by their experiences or beliefs seems to be a key factor in positive diagnosis.  
So for example, reports of hallucinations and delusions alone does not necessarily equal 
psychosis, which is more dependent on further aspects such as how frequent and 
disturbing they are plus how the individual copes and behaves both in reaction to them and 
generally (Johns & van Os, 2001).  However, despite these difficulties, psychiatry continues 
to use the concept of delusion as a central indicator of pathology (Bell et al, 2006a, 2006b).   
 
Clearly psychiatry has been concerned with assessment and evaluation of the extent to 
which TEHEs are (or could be) indicative of psychosis.  This has sometimes had 
questionable usefulness or applicability.  For instance, there have been attempts to 
retrospectively diagnose historical figures with contemporary clinical disorders, such as 
saints and artists (see for example, Otsuka & Sakai‘s, 2004, account of Haizmann‘s alleged 
schizophrenia).  Again, similar to previous approaches, psychiatry has tended to take the 
language used to describe an experience at face value when there may be good reasons not 
to do this.  Furthermore, the effect of confusion between mystical states and psychosis has 
resulted in a persistent view of TEHEs as psychopathological phenomena, a notion that 
may take some time to shift.  This kind of approach has not, in the main, allowed for the 
significance of TEHEs to be respected or acknowledged, nor has it been able to effectively 
separate the experiences and the beliefs from the ability to cope or suffering.  In 
parapsychology a scientific focus has resulted in a similar neglect of the personal 
significance of the experience. 
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2.2.3 Parapsychology  
 
What are now commonly termed ‗paranormal‘ and ‗anomalous‘ experiences were originally 
investigated as psychic experiences by proponents of psychical research.  The Society for 
Psychical Research (SPR) was established in England in 1882 and was the first organised 
centre for research into a variety of phenomena including trance mediumship, hypnosis, 
clairvoyance and thought-transference (Alvarado, 1998).  Research and interest in this field 
grew and spread.  In 1885 the American Society for Psychical Research was established and 
William James produced various works aligned with clinical and general psychology 
(Cardeña, Lynn & Krippner, 2000a), whilst J.B. Rhine‘s parapsychological research 
emerged nearly fifty years later.  Rhine‘s work was less concerned with internal states of 
consciousness and more interested in objective phenomena, following current trends in 
behaviourism (Alvarado, 1998).  Rhine is often cited as one of the main founders of 
contemporary parapsychology. 27  
 
Contemporary parapsychology is generally viewed as a peripheral and controversial branch 
of psychology (see for example a recent article and response plus public comments in the 
mainstream media on the ‗worth‘ of parapsychology in Radnofsky, 2007, and Watt, 2007).  
Parapsychology‘s marginalised status is evident considering it receives both limited funding 
and limited opportunities to disseminate findings (see Alcock, 1987, for a further 
discussion regarding this).  Despite this status however, it is a popular subject with students 
and the phenomena under study are also of fascination to the wider populace (Cardeña et 
al, 2000a).   
 
The discipline has been concerned with a variety of phenomena including psychic 
phenomena - telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition (generally called psi), OBEs, NDEs, 
apparitions, lucid dreams, past life experiences, anomalous healing experiences and mystical 
or transcendent experiences (for a comprehensive review of these phenomena see Cardeña 
et al 2000b).  As to whether such experiences are rare or more prevalent than is assumed, is 
perhaps difficult to accurately assess, but certainly some (e.g. déjà vu) are considered to be 
more widely reported (and accepted) than others (e.g. UFO-related).  However, studying 
TEHEs has not been a core task of experimental parapsychology.  
 
                                                 
27 For more on the emergence and history of parapsychology see Beloff (1993); Edge, Morris, Palmer and 
Rush (1986); Melton (2001); Irwin and Watt (2007); O‘Hara and Harrison (2007) and Wolman (1977).    
 55 
One key exception to this is the work of Charles Tart.  Tart‘s work on altered states of 
consciousness28 (ASCs) has spanned several decades and his anthology of ASCs research 
first published in 1969 rapidly became a classic in the field.  Tart (1969) suggests that whilst 
ASCs can present semantic and philosophical difficulties, subjectively most individuals can 
discern a ‗normal‘ state of consciousness from an ‗altered‘ one.  Parker (1975: 8) suggests 
that ASC be taken to mean ‗any state of mind that differs markedly enough from that 
which we associate with our normal waking selves‘.  ASCs can be seen to include any 
number of different phenomena including mystical states, trance states, and lucid dreaming.  
Tart observed that ASCs were viewed with suspicion within mainstream society, and that, 
despite the psychedelic revolution (increased interest and experimentation with psychedelic 
drugs leading to more AS experiences) they were still equated with pathology.  Slowly, 
however, a variety of works were published (between 1960 and 1990) which suggested that 
the field of parapsychology was expanding to include states of consciousness as part of its 
subject matter.   
 
Parapsychologists, such as Tart, are less convinced that ASCs have a definitive explanation 
but work in this area does tend towards the experimental and scientific.  The need to be 
scientific has prevailed – to the extent that parapsychology has stringent experimental 
protocols, higher significance levels than any other branch of science and has been subject 
to numerous discussions regarding methodology and replicability (for example, see 
Wiseman & Milton, 1997, for proposed guidelines on how to conduct more reliable psi 
experiments, and Zingrone & Alvarado, 1999, for a review of these guidelines).  This desire 
for recognition from orthodox science has meant that parapsychology‘s approach has 
tended to be experimental.   
 
Parapsychological research has been predominantly focused on three areas with a distinct 
emphasis on the first two.  These are, establishing authenticity – revealing whether 
phenomena have actually occurred; revealing underlying processes – exploring or 
developing explanations as to how phenomena come about; and understanding paranormal 
phenomena from an experient‘s point of view – focusing on the phenomenology and 
experiential aspects (Irwin, 1999: 9).  Whilst there has always been some parapsychological 
research that is not experimental (e.g. mostly that with a phenomenological focus), the 
predominant concern is experimental laboratory studies of parapsychological phenomena.  
                                                 
28 It is worth noting that distinctions have been made between ASCs and anomalous experiences (see 
Cardeña et al, 2000a: 4). 
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Many have argued that this preoccupation has led to an ongoing (and fairly unproductive 
debate) between sceptics and believers as to the ‗reality‘ of paranormal phenomena (e.g. 
Greeley, 1991).   
 
Of late there has been much discussion and debate regarding the future of psychical 
research, parapsychology and particularly of parapsychology in its current form (see for 
instance, the edited collection by Thalbourne & Storm, 2005 or the papers listed for the 
Parapsychology Foundation‘s conference, 2008: http://www.pflyceum.org/265.html).  A 
focus on the experimental approach to parapsychological phenomena has, according to 
some researchers, meant that little progress has been made (e.g. Blackmore, 1988; White, 
1990).  Indeed, it has been suggested that to date the only real finding in experimental 
parapsychological research is the ‗experimenter effect‘29 (White, 1990).  In this sense, it is 
notoriously difficult to pinpoint exactly what is being measured or produced in 
parapsychological experiments. 
 
There are various researchers within parapsychology and related fields, such as 
transpersonal psychology and consciousness studies (including William Braud, Etzel 
Cardeña, Hoyt Edge, Charles Tart, and John Palmer) who recognise the benefit of 
experimentation whilst also endorsing and recognising complementary approaches.  Rhea 
White (1990) went further and advocated an approach more interested in meaning and 
understanding than scientific experimentation.  She proposed that the experiential and the 
internal aspects of phenomena should be explored as a potentially fruitful and insightful 
avenue regardless of their objective reality.  This kind of approach is one that prioritises 
understanding and emphasises respect and sensitivity towards the experiences and those 
that report them.  However, whilst this approach is commendable in terms of its ethics and 
sensitivity towards experients and their reported experiences, it has also tended to see 
experiences as accessible to a greater or lesser extent via the descriptions it studies.  
Additionally, this approach is still a marginalised one within parapsychology and 
predominantly the focus of research reflects the scientific and cognitive orientations of 
psychology – mainly because these kinds of experiences are categorised as psychological 
phenomena. 
                                                 
29 The experimenter effect is the term used in relation to the discovery that successful results (those showing a 
statistically significant effect) in parapsychological experiments were more likely if researchers were psi 
supporters as opposed to sceptics.  Some recent work has looked at the relationship between experimenter 
belief and experimenter effect (Watt & Wiseman, 2002), whilst other research has looked at the psychological 
characteristics of psi researchers in order to try and further understand psi-conduciveness (Smith, 2003).   
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2.2.4 Sociology and social science 
 
It is conventionally assumed that TEHEs are private, personal and individual (mental or 
cognitive) experiences and are therefore psychological phenomena.  However, there is 
much that might interest sociology.  McClenon (1991) advises that phenomena need not be 
experimentally proven to qualify as legitimate for social study, indeed the experience itself 
is a justifiable subject for investigation; and Greeley (1991) notes that these experiences are 
reported by a significant number of people, and that they are meaningful.  
 
―Whether parapsychological phenomena are real or not is 
notably less important than the sheer fact that experiences 
of such phenomena whatever their physical or 
metaphysical nature, are commonplace.‖ 
(Greeley, 1991: 367) 
 
However, most approaches within social sciences have tended to be more interested in 
‗explaining‘ TEHEs, and demonstrate what might be termed a reductionist approach, with 
little consideration of any phenomenological features, linguistic construction or the 
reported import of the experiences.     
 
Within the social sciences much work has focused on explanations for, or social correlates 
of these experiences (Bourque & Back, 1968; Bourque, 1969; Bourque & Back, 1971).  
Studies have attempted to establish the individuals most likely to have these kinds of 
experiences on the basis of their social characteristics or demographics, e.g. ethnicity and 
class, in order to develop a theory to explain such phenomena.  One of the most prevalent 
theories has been the deprivation theory/marginality hypothesis/compensation approach.  
This theory posits that marginalized individuals will be more likely to have anomalous 
experiences or paranormal beliefs because of their relatively poor status and disadvantaged 
circumstances in society (Bainbridge, 1978; Connor, 1984; Warren, 1970; Wuthnow, 1976).  
As Irwin explains, 
 
―The deprivation and alienation associated with marginal 
status in society is held to encourage such people to appeal 
to magical and religious beliefs, presumably because these 
beliefs bring various compensations to the lives of their 
adherents.  Under the social marginality hypothesis, the 
demographic correlates of paranormal belief should be 
those that represent indices of social marginality.‖ 
(Irwin, 1993: 6-7) 
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Explanations for TEHEs from this perspective include wish-fulfilment, delusion, escapism 
or a coping strategy because of an individual‘s (relative) social destitution.  However, 
studies that have considered the associations between TEHEs and demographics have 
tended to produce contradictory or conflicting findings, so it is worth reviewing them 
briefly here.   
 
Most studies have tended to be interested in paranormal belief and demographic 
correlations rather than with reported experiences.  Considering age, results seem to show 
that young adults report higher rates of paranormal beliefs with the exception of traditional 
religious beliefs (e.g. Blackmore, 1984; Emmons & Sobal, 1981).  Irwin (1993: 8) suggests 
that this is actually ‗at odds with the social marginality hypothesis‘ because in Western 
society it is youthfulness that is prized over maturity.  Therefore it is the elderly who would 
constitute a socially marginal group.  Other results concerning experiences and age showed 
an increased likelihood of TEHEs during childhood, especially between the ages of 3 and 
10 years and even more likely in the over 40s or 50s (Palmer & Braud, 2002).  Similarly, 
Greeley‘s (1975) study shows a fairly even distribution of experiences across the age 
groups, with the most experiences reported for those in their fifties (43%).   
 
Studies considering differences between men and women regarding paranormal belief have 
generally found that women have higher rates than men (e.g. Randall, 1990; also see Irwin, 
1993: 8, for more detail on these studies).  However, rates vary depending upon specific 
phenomena – for example men report stronger belief in UFOs, women in ESP – and the 
social marginality hypothesis does not account for this variation.  Results for 
socioeconomic status alone have been somewhat inconsistent and dependent upon 
definition and measurement.  Emmons and Sobal (1981) used unemployment as a marker 
of social marginality and found fairly low levels of paranormal belief reported by this 
group.  They also found no correlation between belief in astrology and unemployment 
whereas Wuthnow (1976) found higher levels of belief in astrology in the unemployed and 
those not able to work.  And finally, considering ethnicity as a dimension of social 
marginality is also inconclusive.  In the US, compared to the general population black 
individuals showed a lower level of belief in ESP (Emmons & Sobal, 1981), but black 
college populations reported higher levels of precognition than whites (Tobacyk, Miller, 
Murphy & Mitchell, 1988).  Other cultural differences include higher rates of belief in ESP 
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in college students in China than the US (McClenon, 1990) and higher rates of belief in 
telepathy in Britain and Iceland compared to Sweden (Haraldsson, 1985).     
 
Some studies have combined these demographics looking for patterns.  For instance, Hay 
and Morisy (1978) compared trends between the US and the UK of reported ‗religious, 
ecstatic and paranormal‘ experiences.  They found in the UK results that women and those 
in ‗higher classes‘ (social class brackets) more commonly reported experiences and the 
likelihood of a positive response increased with age.  However, Back and Bourque‘s (1970) 
research found the opposite results in terms of social class.  Bourque (1969) also found that 
there were differences between aesthetic and religious experience (aesthetic experience 
constituted a transcendent high devoid of any religious content).  Those reporting aesthetic 
experiences were predominantly white, middle-class, well-educated residents of the 
suburbs, whilst those reporting religious experiences were more frequently from ethnic 
minorities, poorly educated, rural residents.  However, these latter examples are US figures 
and appear to show ‗class‘ and ‗ethnic‘ differences in relation to language, education and 
religion rather than the occurrence of actual experiences being related to particular 
demographics.  Indeed, Hay and Morisy (1978: 263) suggest that Back and Bourque‘s 
(1970) data is ‗cognitively biased and skewed by age‘, arguing that, ‗old people tend to have 
smaller incomes and to have had less years of education than others‘.  So for instance, if 
there is a correlation between lower levels of education, age and positive responses then 
this finding might be explained by this statement.   
 
The most recent demographics obtained in relation to these kinds of experiences, were for 
the NSTS, a module in the General Social Survey of 2004 in the US looking at spiritually 
transformative experiences (Smith, 2006).  These results did not find any significant 
differences in reporting for sex, age, marital status or socioeconomic status.  Whilst there 
were also no differences in reporting for Hispanic ethnicity, more black Americans 
reported spiritual change than whites or other ethnicities.  Furthermore, regional variations 
in reporting were also recorded – being highest in the South (59.7-61.2%) and lowest on 
the East coast in New England (24.1%).  Smith (2006: 287) explains these regional 
differences in terms of religious differences – ‗basically, spiritual/religious changes are 
much more common among those actively engaged in religion and among those in 
fundamentalist and evangelical denominations‘.   
 
 60 
As is clear from this brief review, empirical support for the social marginality hypothesis is 
patchy at best, and not consistent.  Despite the overall results being inconclusive, it has 
been cited as a useful theory by some.  For instance, there are those (e.g. Goode, 2000, 
Rice, 2003) who consider the theory to offer a fairly good explanation for ‗paranormal 
religious beliefs‘ (e.g. heaven, hell, the devil and creationism).  More recently, attempts to 
demonstrate this have been made by researchers (e.g. Rogers, Qualter & Phelps, 2007).   
This paper concluded that subjective social loneliness and attachment emerged as 
predictors of paranormal belief.  However, the question as to whether social loneliness and 
other predictors were adequate equivalents of deprivation or social marginality, or 
consistent with other definitions, was not broached.  This is one reason to approach the 
social marginality hypothesis or deprivation explanation with caution.  That is, how is 
deprivation or marginality to be defined?  Moreover, there are clearly difficulties associated 
with the assignment of individuals to socially marginal groups and measures of deprivation.  
Indeed, explanations and definitions are not consistent across different studies.  
  
Furthermore, deprivation explanations tend to assume a causal relationship between the 
experience (and reported belief) and the notion of deprivation, but fail to explicitly show or 
address how this relationship operates (Wooffitt, 1989).  Ultimately, the underlying theory 
is somewhat patronising – suggestions from an academic elite that individuals can be 
identified as ‗marginal‘ or ‗deprived‘ (in varying ways using different indicators) and that 
this is a satisfactory explanation for their reported experiences – which negates any possible 
attribution of meaning or significance by those who report them.  Additionally, much work 
has actually refuted the marginality hypothesis and compensation or deficiency theories 
suggesting that there is little conclusive evidence to support these claims (e.g. Campbell & 
McIver, 1987; Greeley, 1975, 1991; Hay & Morisy, 1978; MacDonald, 1995; McClenon, 
1994).  For instance, Greeley (1975) suggests that those who report paranormal experiences 
are not deprived, they are normal people and these experiences are normal experiences.  
This point of view upholds that many different people, from differing social backgrounds 
with different social (and psychological) characteristics report these kinds of experiences.  
Such a diversity of experients therefore cannot be adequately accounted for by a theory of 
deprivation or marginality.  Nor can this reductionist perspective allow any room for 
meaningfulness. 
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2.2.4.1 Cultural source hypothesis 
 
Another explanation, often implicit in mainstream social science, according to McClenon 
(1994) is the cultural source hypothesis (CSH).  Also termed the contextual view, this 
position has asserted that tradition, discipline, culture and society are the defining factors of 
these experiences.  Not strictly speaking a hypothesis, more a presupposition that the 
source of these experiences is in ‗social structures, stories and beliefs that stimulate the 
imagination and give rise to misinterpretations of everyday experiences‘ (Cheyne, 1998: 5).  
This theory would purport that ‗paranormal‘ experiences and TEHEs can, at least to a 
certain extent, be explained by the culture in which the experient is immersed.  By way of 
illustration, Hufford (1982: 101) notes that ‗the difference between a hallucination and an 
objectively real experience is, at least on the face of it, a matter of interpretation, and we 
tend to consider such decisions culturally produced‘.  That is, these decisions are informed 
by ideas available in an individual‘s cultural resources.  According to Marshall (2005), the 
CSH is also fashionable for explaining religious or mystical experience.  As he states, 
  
―It has become popular to maintain that mystical 
experiences are thoroughly conditioned by the religious 
traditions in which they occur. Mystical experiences, it is 
asserted, are products of religious indoctrination and 
training.‖  
(Marshall, 2005: 2)    
 
Whilst the CSH might assume that TEHEs are in some way produced by the host culture 
or context in which they arise, others would argue instead that culture affects or mediates 
TEHEs in a way that any experience is mediated by culture (e.g. Yamané, 2000).  In this way, 
most social researchers would agree that we cannot access pure experiences and that they 
are constructed through and by the social.  However, there are many researchers (e.g. 
Bailey & Yates, 1996; Fenwick & Fenwick, 1995; Fox, 2003; Hufford, 1982, 1995, 2005; 
McClenon, 1994) who have argued for an element of universality to some of these 
experiences (e.g. NDEs, transcendent or mystical experiences, ‗Old Hag‘ or sleep 
paralysis30).  This notion is sometimes called the experiential source hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
30 Sleep paralysis describes a state that is believed to occur mostly as the body is waking from the REM state.  
Characterised by reported features such as feeling awake, being physically paralysed apart from the eyes, 
which can move or open, a pressure on the chest, sensing a malevolent presence or figure, sometimes hearing 
footsteps and feeling fear perhaps due to the feeling one is about to be attacked or even killed (Hufford, 
1982). The experient is often able to ‗break out‘ of the state of paralysis by willing a limb to move or 
becoming ‗aware‘ or ‗conscious‘ and turning the experience into an OBE or a lucid dream. 
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2.2.4.2 Experiential source hypothesis 
 
The experiential source hypothesis (ESH) advocates that there are core elements to these 
experiences, which transcend culture and context and are rooted in processes that are 
physical, physiological and psychological (Hufford, 1982, 1995, 2005; McClenon, 1994).  
The ESH does not deny that there are secondary cultural aspects which also inform an 
experient‘s account of their experience, but argues that there are universal features 
underlying any cultural specificity (McClenon, 1994).  These universal features are an 
essential or deep part of the structure of the experience and allude to universality in both 
the human brain and personality.   
 
The ESH is strengthened by the work of Hufford (1982), who took a then relatively 
unknown phenomena (old hag or sleep paralysis – see earlier footnote for a description) 
and elicited similar descriptions from experients in different cultural settings.  Exploring 
what was then widely thought to be a folk tale, Hufford collected numerous accounts of 
people‘s experiences and found consistent patterns.  The same features were found in 
accounts from people who had no contact with the cultural tradition from which the folk 
tale originated.  Thus what emerged was a very convincing case that sleep paralysis 
contained a universal core, with stable features in cross-cultural descriptions.   
 
Hufford demonstrated how the experience under study could be the central feature of 
research.  He interviewed experients employing a respectful stance that honoured the 
experiences under investigation.  Part of this was achieved by treating the experiences as 
really happening for those that reported them.  Furthermore, Hufford was able to 
demonstrate that the employment of rigorous and systematic methods is not necessarily at 
odds with an ethical approach towards informants or respondents.  By withholding 
judgement about the reported experiences (and their ‗reality‘) Hufford was able to allow the 
respondents to report value and import where they deemed it relevant.  In this sense, there 
are valuable principles to be gained from Hufford‘s work. 
 
Other reported experiences are situated firmly in culturally-based narratives and beliefs and 
separating the ‗pure‘ experiential from the cultural is a virtually impossible task.  Indeed, 
Hay and Morisy (1978) claim that, phenomenologically speaking, TEHEs are not merely 
experienced passively for cultural meanings to be imposed on.  Instead they are 
experienced by acculturated beings ready to interpret by drawing on relevant and available 
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cultural resources.  So whilst the ESH has positive aspects (agnosticism towards the reality 
behind experiences whilst respectfully recognising the reality for the experients) there is an 
underlying assumption that objective features of the experiences can be identified by 
studying consistencies in peoples‘ accounts.  This would suggest that the ESH, akin to 
other approaches, relies upon a naïve view of language and description: as more or less 
good representations of actual events or inner realities.   
 
Feminist work considering women‘s experience has also tended to see women‘s accounts 
as a reflection of their experience.  Nonetheless, it is useful to consider feminist 
perspectives on women‘s religious experiences as these tend to value the ‗voices‘ and 
experiences of women.  Therefore, a feminist approach to research is explored next for 
there are insightful and applicable considerations for this study of TEHES.   
 
 
2.2.4.3 Feminism 
 
Perhaps surprisingly there is not a body of work within feminism that has considered 
women‘s transcendent experiences.  Indeed, feminist interest in this subject matter tends 
not to be concerned with TEHEs per se (though see Raphael, 1994, for a philosophical 
discussion regarding feminism and numinous experience).  Instead, feminists have focused 
on women‘s relationship with religion (or the spiritual), more often than not their exclusion 
from positions of power (hooks, 2000; Walter & Davie, 1998), their involvement in or 
departure from traditional religion (e.g. Hertel, 1995; Brereton & Bendroth, 2001) or the 
oppressive nature of religious or mystical establishments (e.g. Jantzen, 1994) rather than 
‗document the ordinary religiosity of millions of churchgoing women‘ (Walter & Davie, 
1998: 640).  Other projects prioritise women‘s spiritual practices; for instance, women‘s 
spirituality as personal development (e.g. Bogdan, 2003; Leonard, 1990; Rountree, 2002); 
spiritual pursuits as potentially politically emancipatory (Finley, 1991) or personally 
empowering (Zappone, 1987) and even the use of the spiritual as part of a research 
methodology (Bruce, 2008). 
 
However, whilst Raphael‘s (1994) consideration of the numinous is concerned with the 
socially constructed nature of experience it is simultaneously railing against the patriarchal 
nature of mysticism.  In this sense, Raphael sees both the language and the experience of 
the numinous as constrained and ‗conditioned by a patriarchal conception of God‘ (p523).  
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Furthermore, whilst she effectively makes a claim for the constitutive nature of experience, 
it is not extensively explored and she does so with an emphasis on ‗the importance of 
gender difference in the study of religious experience‘ (p525).  Although there is 
undoubtedly real academic value in considering the gender within these experiential 
accounts, it is not a focus for this thesis.  Additionally, there has been little critical 
engagement in most of these works with the constructionist perspective on language.     
 
Whilst the introduction of feminism at this stage might appear (at least initially) to be of 
limited relevance, there is an interesting parallel between feminism and TEHEs plus 
various methodological and ethical insights to be gleaned from this literature.  Feminist 
work has argued that women have historically been marginalised (e.g. Rowbotham, 1973), 
were often dismissed by the mainstream and not always treated respectfully.  In many 
senses, TEHEs have received comparable treatment.  However, there are other reasons 
why feminist research can inform the study of TEHEs.   
 
One of the most relevant aspects concerns how feminist research has been prolific in its 
championing of subjective personal experience as a valid research focus (Graham Yates, 
1983).  Feminist research projects cover a vastly wide-ranging scope of topics with a 
tendency towards highly personal, sensitive, challenging and contentious subjects; from 
breastfeeding (Spencer, 2008), to rape (Gregory & Lees, 1999), to prostitution (O‘Neill, 
2000), to abortion (Aléx & Hammarström, 2004).  Research often has a collaborative, 
emancipatory or liberatory focus, and is interested in providing a public forum for women‘s 
voices and their experiences (Beasley, 1999).  Whilst the claims of this project are more 
modest and the accounts are not limited to those of women, there is a precedent within 
feminism for the collection and analysis of experiential accounts.  Furthermore, there is a 
great deal of value placed upon this kind of research material and those who provide it. 
       
The second important aspect regards ethics and the critique of traditional forms of 
knowledge (see for example, amongst many others, England, 1994; Deem, 1999; Maynard 
& Purvis, 1994; Skeggs, 1994).  Unpacking this aspect we find that it contains numerous 
sub-issues including:  
 the consideration of the impact of this kind of research upon its participants, the 
treatment of respondents coupled with sensitivity and respect towards them and 
their experiences  
 65 
 the way in which the relationship between the researcher and the researched is 
played out during (and after) the entire research process and a reflexive approach 
towards the researcher‘s role and involvement 
 the way in which the respondents and their experiences are analysed, represented 
and written up in the process of research  
 
All of these facets of a feminist-influenced ethics can be viewed as important to a project 
researching ‗experience‘ that is keen to value respondents and treat them sensitively, 
ethically and with respect.  This is not to suggest, however, that practical dilemmas do not 
arise nor problems emerge during research.  Nor that any consideration of ethics is 
essentially more feminist than or morally superior to other research.  Instead, this 
consideration of feminism follows in the footsteps of other research employing discursive 
analytic methods keen to also be reflexive researchers informed by feminist work (e.g. 
Guimaraes, 2007; Weatherall, Gavey & Potts, 2002), combined with an imperative to fairly 
represent people‘s reportedly meaningful and profound personal experiences.  Firstly, in 
aiming to balance out the demands of ethics versus methodological professionalism, 
Guimaraes (2007) reflects about her experience of conducting research and how this 
clashed with methodological conventions in conversation analysis.  Secondly, Weatherall, 
Gavey and Potts (2002) reflected on the extent to which their current practice as Pakeha 
feminist discursive psychologists was in sync with early feminist research ideals concerning 
ethics and politics and how to best represent an ‗Oppressed Other‘ (p532). These issues are 
discussed further in the next chapter.   
 
 
2.3 Summary 
 
It is worth summarising the main issues from conventional approaches in psychiatry, 
psychology, parapsychology and the social sciences here as they inform our subsequent 
direction.  Overall it is clear that the focus in these fields has been on experimentation, 
assessment, evaluation and correlation.  Ultimately then, the pre-occupation has been with 
explaining TEHEs by reference to social correlates, personality characteristics or forms of 
mental pathology.  The majority of studies (with a few notable exceptions) have therefore 
not addressed the meaning of these experiences or developed an appropriate and sensitive 
approach (and the ones that have, we need to learn from e.g. Hufford, 1982, 1995, 2005; 
and some of the work in transpersonal psychology plus some of the more general 
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principles from feminist work).  In seeking to explain they have predominantly explained 
away, what are for some people, profound experiences.  Additionally, these approaches 
have not adequately considered what is being explored by studying experiential accounts.  
They have neglected to see the accounts as produced or the experiences as ‗accounts‘ at all. 
 
 
2.4 Introspection and consciousness studies 
 
These accounts of TEHEs are a form of introspective data and there is a precedent within 
psychology and related work within consciousness studies which has recently re-employed 
introspection as a valuable methodological tool.   
 
Consciousness studies emerged only fairly recently (1990s) in its current form (Lorimer, 
2001).  It is a complex field, loosely held together combining work from various disciplines 
including neuroscience, philosophy, physics, psychology and other social sciences.  Other 
bodies of knowledge are additionally drawn on intermittently by different researchers 
including the natural sciences, religion or theology, anthropology, and Eastern traditions.  
What this eclecticism demonstrates, is a diverse field of study where researchers, theorists 
and philosophers often hold fundamentally different views about the nature of 
consciousness and the way in which it can be studied.  
 
Theories of consciousness could be said to exist on a continuum that ranges from the 
third-person approach, to the first-person approach.  A third person approach is closely 
tied to a scientific model, concerned with objective, observable processes and phenomena.  
Third person methods in the field of consciousness refer to observations about ‗the study 
of...natural phenomena‘ (Varela & Shear 1999: 1).  These ‗phenomena‘ would include 
neural and chemical activity in the brain and different psychological states discerned via 
brain scanning technologies.  Because the phenomena of concern here are considered 
observable and objective they are also considered measurable, verifiable, and open to tests 
of reliability and validity.  Science, with its emphasis on and establishment of the third-
person perspective as inherently more reliable, testable, measurable and directly observable 
has meant that first person methods such as introspection have persistently been viewed as 
unreliable and of less value.   
 
A first person approach can be seen as the investigation of individual subjective experience.  
‗By first person events we mean the lived experience associated with cognitive and mental 
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events‘ (Varela & Shear, 1999: 1) (original emphasis).  Introspection is considered one of 
the main routes to this lived experience.  However, although introspection can be 
considered the quintessential method for a first person approach, there are those that argue 
that phenomenological investigations are more pertinent for a study of consciousness (e.g. 
Ginsburg, 2005; Petranker, 2003).  Nevertheless, this distinction may merely be too 
philosophically nuanced for the current discussion and it is sufficient to consider that a first 
person methodology takes as its data the linguistic account or report of a subject(s). 
 
A variety of theories drawing on differing philosophies have been developed regarding 
consciousness.  The most dominant are termed ‗productive‘ theories and suggest that 
consciousness is brain-based, brain-contained or brain-produced.  More controversial and 
more marginalised ‗transmissive‘ theories propose that consciousness is in some way 
filtered or transmitted through the brain and may be the result of a correlation between the 
brain and subjective experience (Lorimer, 2001).  Nonetheless, the key debate is about 
whether the mind has qualities that are independent from the brain and whether all mental 
experiences can, in principle, be explained by neurological processes.  Some scholars 
however, (e.g. McGinn 1991, Velmans, 2000) have suggested that the predominance of the 
third-person approach and productive (brain-based) theories tend to avoid the idea of 
consciousness and explain it away rather than addressing it.  Indeed, Chalmers (1995) 
makes the claim that science is good at explaining physical mechanisms and the 
performance of functions (i.e. of consciousness) as it takes a reductive view and its 
underlying philosophy lends itself to this perspective.  He notes however, that there is an 
‗explanatory gap‘ (Chalmers, 1995: 4; originally coined by Levine, 1983) when theorising 
consciousness, between the explanations regarding the performance of functions, and 
experience. 
 
In this sense, there is a clear distinction being made between the objective and subjective 
worlds of consciousness.  Philosophical concepts of ontology and epistemology are 
traditionally employed when considering what consciousness is, as Velmans (2000) attests,  
 
―Is the universe composed of one thing (monism) or are 
there two (dualism)? Does the world have an observer-
independent existence (realism) or does its existence 
depend in some way on the operations of our own minds 
(idealism)?‖ 
(Velmans, 2000: 3) 
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The conceptual distinction that exists between objective and subjective has led to a very 
specific conundrum for the study of consciousness, that is, how objective processes give 
rise to subjective experience.  As Chalmers (1995:2) articulates, ‗it is widely agreed that 
experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how 
it so arises‘; and this has been termed the ‗hard‘ problem of consciousness.  As yet there is 
still no neural location (Crick 1994) or material substance that has been found to be the 
stuff of consciousness.  
 
It is this predominantly ‗objective‘ scientific approach, which some researchers (e.g. 
Fenwick, 2001; Lorimer, 2001; Josephson, 2001) argue has led to difficulties in studying 
non-ordinary states of consciousness or ostensibly anomalous experiences.  As Lorimer 
points out, 
 
―If one is wedded to a materialistic brain-based philosophy 
that excludes the possibility of paranormal experiences, 
then one is very reluctant to accept the challenge that these 
experiences ostensibly pose to the established view.‖ 
(Lorimer, 2001: 10)    
 
Indeed, an increasing number of researchers have drawn attention to the limitations of 
materialism alone for fully understanding consciousness (e.g. Barušs, 2001; Braud, 2002; 
Fenwick, 2001; Lorimer, 2001; Josephson, 2001; Velmans, 1993, 2000; Wilber, 1997).    
Several researchers (e.g. Edelman, 1992; Fenwick, 2001; Josephson, 2001; Lorimer, 2001) 
acknowledge the place and relevance of scientific methods to a study of consciousness.  
However, many advocates of the scientific method view the first person approach with 
distrust and suspicion.  Whilst the third person perspective is considered to be an 
established, objective measure of particular phenomena or processes, a first person method 
such as introspection has been considered immeasurable, unreliable, distortable, 
inconsistent and thus problematic by scientists (Cardeña, 2004).   
 
In light of this rejection of introspection as a reliable scientific method, there has been a 
resurgence of interest by many attempting to transform the status and rigour of first person 
research within the study of consciousness.  This has taken a variety of forms from 
attempts at standardisation and validation strategies (e.g. Vermersch, 1999; 2003) to 
requests for increased testing for error (Goldman, 2004), to calls for increased trust in 
subjective reporting, whilst acknowledging the inbuilt limitations in introspective methods 
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(Jack & Roepstorff, 2003), to adopting a pluralistic approach combining various different 
methods of introspection depending on the research question (Cardeña, 2004).  Others 
still, argue that subjective investigation should be more concerned with the 
phenomenological investigation of consciousness and conscious experience (e.g. Petranker, 
2003; Ginsburg, 2005).  However, many have actually claimed that the distinction between 
third and first person methods may be misplaced for both conceptual and pragmatic 
reasons.   
 
Several researchers (e.g. Cardeña, 2004; Varela, 1996; Velmans, 1993; Wilber, 1997) albeit 
in different ways, suggest that the distinction between first and third person methods 
produces an impasse and might be a misplaced distinction, whilst others endeavour to let 
the two approaches coexist (Cohen & Rapport 1995).  Conceptually speaking, it has been 
argued that the distinction overlooks the way in which third person methods are employed 
by individuals who are as equally embodied and entrenched in the sociocultural world as 
the ‗creators‘ of introspective accounts (e.g. Varela, 1996; Velmans, 1993).  As Varela 
(1996) has famously claimed, there is no ‗view from nowhere‘.  Velmans concurs with this 
claim when he states, 
 
―The observer‘s experience does not change as he changes 
perspectives!  All that changes is his focus of interest, and 
consequently, the relationships under consideration.‖ 
(Velmans, 1993: 10) 
 
In this sense, he believes that the distinction is irrelevant.  As we are always grounded in the 
‗phenomenal world‘ it is only the focus of our attention and the emphasis we afford 
different elements at different times that alters. In other words, there is no privileged, 
observer-free, or neutral position from which to view and describe any phenomena.   
Additionally, in a pragmatic sense, some scientists recognise the importance of and quite 
often the reliance upon methods such as introspection in substantiating experimental 
findings, for example. Whilst third person methods, e.g. experimental psychology, are often 
framed as objective and first person methods subjective, as if in direct competition, in 
reality, so-called ‗subjective‘ methods often complement ‗objective‘ methods as an integral 
part of experimental practice.  Many researchers have identified the reliance of 
experimental methods on first person accounts, for example in the post-hoc interview (e.g. 
Goldman, 1997, 2004; Jack & Roepstorff, 2003 amongst others).  Post-experimental 
interviewing is commonly carried out in research to determine subject‘s explanations, 
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clarifications or feedback about the experiment.  However, the degree of reliance upon 
introspective accounts in experimental science is not universally agreed upon.  Goldman 
(1997; 2004) has claimed that experimenters rely substantially on subjects‘ introspective 
reports31, whether in post-experimental interviewing or during experiments, for verification, 
feedback or clarification.  He points out that this reliance is informal, often implicit in the 
design and not considered problematic by third person science.  Within the experimental 
approach accounts are obtained by introspection, and they tend to be treated as a route 
(albeit a faulty or inaccurate one) to experience and states of consciousness.  That is, this 
approach towards introspection assumes that language can capture an independent reality.   
 
Yet, conversation analytic research has repeatedly shown that interacting parties construct 
their responses with reference to (their interpretation of) the interactional requirements of 
that particular setting.  And approaches informed by discourse analysis (e.g. Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987) have noted how language is socially produced; thus the construction of 
any subject‘s account regarding their conscious experience will be tied to and designed for 
the context in which it is produced.  In this respect language cannot be viewed as an 
unproblematic or direct route to experience.  Indeed the relationship between language and 
(actual) cognitive processes has been the subject of a fairly recent edited collection (te 
Molder & Potter, 2005), which develops perspectives on this relationship by scholars 
broadly informed by ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.  Therefore, as in other 
approaches to the study of consciousness, there has been little consideration of how 
introspective accounts are produced, nor is there any acknowledgement of the interactional 
and constitutive nature of description. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
From the review it is clear that existing research tends to ignore key components of the 
TEHE: its meaning, the phenomenological nature of the experiences, and the social and 
discursive production of reports.  With a few notable exceptions the bulk of the research 
has neither prioritised, nor focused upon these aspects, leaving some important and 
uncharted territory in this field. 
 
                                                 
31Dennett (2003) suggests that scientists are agnostic about the truth of subject‘s claims and take a neutral 
stance towards this issue.  Dennett thus claims that scientists do not rely on introspective reports or depend 
on them for verification.  
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Additionally, as we have seen, whilst the experience is a private and occasionally significant 
period of an altered state of consciousness, it is also a psychological state which is made 
public through social practices of communication and description.  What this means is that 
whilst the field of consciousness provided the method of introspection in order to study 
conscious experience and psychological states, it has thus far neglected to note that it is 
only the accounts of these experiences that we can study (and should study?), rather than 
the experiences themselves.  And the kinds of accounts that are produced here lend 
themselves to analysis from two complementary perspectives, Discursive Psychology and 
Conversation Analysis. 
 
It is also notable how the potentially meaningful nature of these experiences has been 
sidelined by the bulk of research.  The work of Hufford (1982, 1995, and 2005) provides an 
illustrative example of how respectful work can proceed.  However, there are other insights 
which can be gleaned from work in transpersonal psychology and feminism regarding the 
development of an appropriate methodology which respects these experiential reports and 
treats the experients ethically and sensitively.  These will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Researching and Analysing Accounts of TEHEs 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
From the last chapter we have noted that previous approaches to TEHEs across a range of 
disciplines have tended to ignore the role of language and communication as important.  
Similarly, on the whole, there has been a lack of concern for the personal aspects of these 
experiences and the ethical issues for researchers that arise from them.  This chapter thus 
outlines the analytic and methodological approach, which takes these issues into 
consideration.  So, in addition to Conversation Analysis (CA) and Discursive Psychology 
(DP), transpersonal and feminist approaches have been methodologically informative to 
the research process.  It is therefore important to acknowledge and outline the relevant 
aspects of these approaches.   
 
The first part of this chapter details these methodologies, highlighting their varying 
strengths and suitability for a study of TEHEs.  Secondly, some of the limitations and 
problems with these approaches are noted, not least the identification of possible 
conflicting or contradictory elements and attempts to rectify or address them.  Thirdly, 
some common methodological principles are detailed which seek to present the integrated 
ethos and approach of this project.   These principles aim to inform a sophisticated and 
rigorous approach, foregrounding the substantiation, accountability and validity of analytic 
claims combined with an ethos of equitability, respect and ethical reflection. 
 
This chapter will also incorporate and outline the research process; research design, how 
data were collected and transcribed and how the analysis was conducted.  Furthermore, the 
limitations of a solely linguistic, ‗academic‘ or socially scientific approach to these kinds of 
experiences (due to their alleged profundity) are highlighted.  Indeed, it is argued that 
crucial aspects of these experiences are overlooked by or missing from any academic 
analysis.  These limitations highlight a tension between the academic and the personal, 
which has been consistent throughout this research and remains unresolved.  Finally and in 
this vein, it is argued that this approach builds on previous work and ultimately advocates a 
pluralistic and integrated approach to the study of exceptional human experiences more 
generally. 
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3.2 Transpersonal Research Methods 
 
There are various methods that have been used and considered apt for studying TEHEs 
(also paranormal or anomalous experiences, more generally).  Perhaps the most relevant 
approach to researching these experiences is a transpersonal one.  Initially this approach 
was specifically devised for ‗extraordinary or ultimate human experiences‘ to provide 
‗alternative modes of awareness and intuition‘ not catered for by traditional research 
methods (Braud & Anderson, 1998a: ix).  Traditional methods would include ordinary ways 
of conducting research e.g. focus groups, interviews, ethnography, surveys, experiments 
and the epistemological assumptions associated with these methods.  Indeed, transpersonal 
methods are advocated for use in tandem with other methods (including traditional and 
quantitative approaches) and can be used in a complementary fashion.  Their 
‗complementary‘ status to conventional approaches has been emphasised recently and 
approaches endorsed include,  
 
1. ―Nonverbal (art, image, symbol, movement) and story-telling approaches 
2. Inclusive and multicultural research approaches and ways of knowing 
3. The study and application of local, indigenous, and spiritual wisdoms and 
experiences that serve positive end goals 
4. Re-conceptualization of ordinary, neglected, anomalous, or pathologized 
experiences in transpersonal terms.‖  
(Anderson & Braud, 2007: 1) 
 
Invariably qualitative methods are employed as this is seen as the best way of representing 
the ‗idiographic and personal nature of transpersonal experiences‘ (Braud & Anderson, 
1998a: x). 
 
Transpersonal methods were inspired by activities taking place in the field of transpersonal 
psychology – originally associated with a variety of names, the best known of whom are 
probably Abraham H. Maslow, Anthony Sutich and Stanislav Grof.  Other influences to 
the field, theoretically and otherwise include, William James, Carl Jung, Erich Fromm and 
more recently, Ken Wilber.  The whole nature of the transpersonal refers to its Latin, 
etymological roots, with ‗trans, meaning beyond or through, and personal, meaning mask or 
façade – in other words, beyond or through the personally identified aspects of self‘ 
(Anderson, 1998: xxi).  The focus, therefore, of transpersonal psychology has been the 
most profound and ultimate human experiences, for instance peak experiences, because 
our ordinary selves and usual states of consciousness appear to be somehow transcended 
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(Maslow, [1964]1976).  Originally, this meant an exclusive focus on the scientific or 
empirical study of these phenomena.  However, transpersonal methods have expanded 
often being used in and developed by researchers in disciplines such as anthropology, 
sociology, parapsychology, consciousness studies, medicine and philosophy (Anderson, 
1998). 
 
Transpersonal methods are varied.  However, there is a general ethos and approach that 
could be said to be indicative of a transpersonal approach, much of which concerns the 
behaviour of the researcher and the way in which the respondents or participants of a 
particular project, and their experiences, are treated.  One of the key aspects is a respect 
for, and sensitivity towards the experients and their experiences – also termed ‗honouring 
human experience‘ (Braud, 1994; Anderson, 1998).   
 
―Honouring human experience is an ordinary human 
exploration practiced here in the focused context of 
research.  It particularly requires approaching each research 
topic with a beginner‘s mind, an attitude that feels wonder, 
enjoyment, surprise, playfulness, awe, and deep 
appreciation.‖ 
(Anderson, 1998: xxvii, original emphasis)     
 
This form of humility and open-mindedness towards others‘ experiential claims does not 
necessitate complete agreement with or wholehearted acceptance of differing worldviews, 
beliefs, or experiences, however.  Instead, respectfulness, a non-judgemental approach and 
agnosticism towards the ‗reality‘ of these experiences is advocated.   As James (1911: 101) 
has pointed out, ‗anything is real of which we find ourselves obliged to take into account in 
any way‘.  Thus, the concern is not to test the physical reality of particular experiences but 
instead to reveal the personal significance of those same experiences (Braud, 1998: 235-7).   
 
Transpersonal methods encourage creative and novel approaches to research practice; 
additionally they require considerable personal involvement from the researcher towards 
the topic being studied, but are also viewed as potential sources of significant experiences 
for the researcher in the process of research itself. 
 
―These transpersonal research methods incorporate 
intuition, direct knowing, creative expression, alternative 
states of consciousness, dreamwork, storytelling, 
meditation, imagery, emotional and bodily cues, and other 
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internal events as possible strategies and procedures in all phases of 
research inquiry.  Both the topics of research inquiry and the 
methods employed are potentially transpersonal or spiritual 
in nature.‖ 
(Anderson, 1998: xxx, original emphasis) 
 
A transpersonal approach endorses and values any potentially transformative experiences 
for the researcher either prior to the process as an instigator or during it.  However, as 
White (1998: 143) notes, although various different types of experiences might occur in this 
context, ‗few, I imagine, were honoured at the time of their occurrence or when the 
research findings were reported in technical journals…they are considered folklore, 
unscientific, unreliable, ―lucky‖ – relegated to the underside of the research process‘.  
 
One other aspect that is central to transpersonal methods is the deployment of creativity 
and vitality in the entire research process.  This might apply to research design, collecting 
data, analysis or writing up but generally encourages an intuitive approach, prioritising the 
applicability for each particular project, and the ‗feelings‘ of the researcher and the 
feedback from research participants.  Examples of this sort include the use of imagery and 
opportunities for participants to draw, paint or sketch for a project on dreams (Fagen, 
1998); using observation of freeform movement as one aspect of exploring the 
phenomenological experience of ‗being-movement‘32 (Fisher, 1998); and promoting 
flexibility towards the potential impact of the interview and considering innovative ways of 
feeding back to participants – e.g. that fostered supportive shared storytelling (Bushell-
Spencer, 1998).  However, having also established in Chapter Two that any study of 
experience is equally a study of language and communication, then it would seem pertinent 
to draw on methodologies with this as their focus.  Because the data for this project are 
interview-based accounts, it is important that they are acknowledged as language or 
discourse.   
 
 
3.3 Discourse Research 
 
There are various approaches to the study of language relevant to this project.  One of 
these is conversation analysis (CA) and the other is discursive psychology (DP).       
 
                                                 
32 ‗Being-movement‘ is a particular expression employed by Fisher (1998: 184) to describe ‗any type of 
dance/movement practice that allows the mover to move in an undetermined, nonstructured, freestyle 
manner, with the attention focused inwardly and on the experience of the movement‘.   
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CA and DP are methods for discourse research or discourse studies (Wetherell, Taylor & 
Yates, 2001).  Other approaches under this broad heading include, discourse analysis, 
critical discourse analysis, Foucauldian discourse analysis and critical discursive psychology, 
though even within disciplines there are often quite significant differences (Wooffitt, 
2005a).  For instance, researchers may align themselves with different perspectives on key 
methodological issues such as language, cognition and how the social world can and should 
be understood.  Therefore, it is the version of CA outlined by Wooffitt (2005a) and the 
version of DP detailed firstly, by Edwards and Potter (1992a; and re-clarified in various 
locations including, Potter, 2003a, 2003b; Potter and Edwards, 2001) that are used here.  
However, it is worth noting the significant contribution of Potter and Wetherell‘s (1987) 
now seminal text on discourse analysis, and the development of differing strands of DP, 
influential and relevant to many of the issues in this thesis (e.g. Edley & Wetherell, 1997; 
Wetherell, 1998; 2003a, 2003b, 2007; Wetherell & Edley, 1999).  Firstly, some background 
detail about the development of CA as a research methodology and analytic practice will be 
provided.  This will be followed by an outline of DP33.   
 
 
3.3.1 Conversation analysis 
 
Developed originally by Harvey Sacks, and subsequently by Emmanuel Schegloff and Gail 
Jefferson, CA examines talk as a socially organised phenomenon, with an order, a structure 
and various formal properties (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998).   Amongst these properties are 
aspects now taken for granted in many academic disciplines, including the turn-taking 
element to interactional exchanges and the sequential nature of talk (see Jefferson, 2004a; 
Sacks, 1992, 2004; Sacks et al, 1978; Schegloff, 1968).  Sacks set about recording and 
collecting empirical, naturally-occurring spoken interactions whilst discovering and 
developing the notion that there was ‗an intrinsic orderliness… [to] interactional phenomena‘ 
(Psathas, 1995: 8, original emphasis).     
 
CA‘s inception was influenced by ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, [1967] 1984), which 
attests that social action is achieved through the operation of implicit and pragmatic 
reasoning skills.  Ethnomethodology tends to emphasise an interpretive approach, focusing 
on sense making in any given moment.  However, ethnomethodology had no systematic or 
                                                 
33 These discussions of CA and DP are relatively brief and introductory.  More detailed discussions of specific 
substantive issues can be found in relevant parts of the thesis. 
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formal methodology and Sacks was seeking a rigorous and systematic method for studying 
action and interaction (Schegloff, 1992).  Indeed, Sacks focused his analyses on instances of 
everyday speech and argued that no interaction was too minor or seemingly irrelevant an 
object of study and thus CA developed in ways seemingly antithetical to its interpretivist 
roots.  For instance, according to some ethnomethodologists, as well as being an offshoot 
of ethnomethodology,  
 
―…conversation analysis has also ended up becoming a 
technical study of language-in-interaction that in various 
ways supplants the methods of members with its own 
more technical lexicon.‖ 
(Laurier, 2007: 4) 
 
This focus on the minutiae of conversation meant that a meticulous and detailed 
transcription method was required; therefore Jefferson developed a system aiming to 
capture various aspects of speech (Jefferson, 2004b).  This system includes transcribing or 
representing participants taking turns during conversation, any gaps or pauses in speech, 
simultaneous or overlapping speech, speech emphasis and intonation – speed, volume and 
length of sounds, incorporating breathing and sighs, when audible.  However, as Wooffitt 
(2005a: 13) identifies, CA ‗is not simply the study of transcripts: it seeks to make sense of 
those events of which the transcription is a representation‘.  CA‘s aim therefore, in part, is 
to reveal the structures, actions and sense-making processes involved in social interaction 
through close attention to talk. 
 
Conversation analytic research has repeatedly demonstrated that talk consists of structured 
utterances; that interaction between individuals is not completely random, messy or 
disorganised - as was previously assumed in the social sciences (Heritage, 2001).  CA 
demonstrates how speakers possess tacit knowledge about the structures and rules of 
conversation, which informs their interactional business.  These rules are not immutable, 
but instead are locally managed and coordinated from moment to moment.  That is, 
though general rules associated with interaction exist (for instance, the way in which we 
greet each other – see Goffman, 1971; Kendon, 1990) these are, to certain degrees, flexible 
and malleable.  So whilst there are ‗rules‘, CA has identified and shown the specificity and 
contingency of interaction, where an individual‘s utterances are anchored to their tacit 
understanding of what is required from one moment to the next and not merely shaped by 
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an overarching linguistic system or universal grammar.  The way in which a piece of talk is 
designed and produced is tied to talk that immediately precedes it: it has sequentiality.    
 
―Talk is social action produced in the first instance for 
specific co-participating others, and is designed to attend 
to interactional and interpersonal matters relevant to the 
parties‘ immediate ‗here-and-now‘ concerns as interaction 
unfolds.‖ 
(Wooffitt, 2005a: 178)  
 
Therefore, within an interactional context, speakers employ linguistic resources, orientate 
to their understanding of the setting and produce utterances based on their interpretation 
of previous utterance.  Utterances can be seen as, ‗accountable products of common sets of 
procedures‘ (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984: 1) from this perspective.   
 
This means that the language used to talk about our experiences (and talk per se) is socially 
produced and contextually driven (Schegloff, 1997).  Discerning the purpose and function 
of language requires attending to the context in which it occurs – as talk performs specific 
tasks in the immediate interactional situation.  And CA provides a way in which to both 
demonstrate these procedures and identify contingent and common properties in particular 
types of talk settings – e.g. talk about TEHEs or paranormal experiences, see for example 
Wooffitt (1992, 2001).  Furthermore, CA provides a method to identify these processes 
explicitly in the data.  CA‘s analytic focus is the turn-by-turn basis of interaction and the 
organisation and design of talk which can reveal what the interactional parties interpret as 
the relevant features in the immediate context of their interaction.  These features can be 
seen as devices that are selected and deployed by speakers in conversation in order to 
accomplish certain actions: as Sacks asked, ‗what are the properties of an object which 
permit it to do this or that task?‘ (1995: 31).  CA is interested in determining these actions 
and can be considered the study of talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, 1987). 
 
In addition to taking account of the interactional nature of language and communication, 
CA‘s approach offers qualitative analysis increased validity and accountability.  Firstly, this 
is achieved via the inclusion of longer, more precise transcription than conventionally used 
in social science.  Secondly, any analytic claims are explicitly grounded in the verbal 
interactions and exposed to immediate critique and scrutiny by all readers, thus promoting 
analytic accountability.  Thirdly, CA endorses deviant case analysis.  This process can 
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enable more sophisticated and comprehensive analytic claims about all the instances 
obtained from the corpus.  It is this rigour and increased validity through formality that 
provides further desirability about CA as a method for any analysis of language and 
interaction and thus a study of TEHE accounts. 
 
 
3.3.2 Discursive Psychology 
 
Another discourse methodology which is has been influential in this project is Discursive 
Psychology (DP).  There are several features of DP that can be considered identifiably 
relevant for a study of TEHEs, which will be discussed below.  In many senses, discursive 
psychology can be seen as a distinct arm of discourse analysis (Potter, 2004).  It emerged 
from both work in sociology and social psychology as a critique of traditional psychology‘s 
assumptions and methods.  Particularly informative to its development was Potter & 
Wetherell‘s (1987) volume on discourse and social psychology, which is centrally concerned 
with reportedly mental phenomena in a discursive way.   
 
It has been suggested that it is ‗misleading to talk of DP as a method‘, as ‗it is an approach 
embedded in a web of theoretical and metatheoretical assumptions‘ (Potter, 2003a: 784-5).  
Instead, it is more relevant to identify the features that characterise it as an approach.  
Especially as, since its inception, there have been a wide range of influences and 
inspirations for different branches of DP including Wittgenstein, ethnomethodology, 
conversation analysis, narrative analysis, Bakhtin/Voloshinov and post-structuralism 
(Wetherell, 2007: 663).  Discursive psychologists question the cognitivist assumptions that 
they consider to be inherent in much social psychological work.  
 
―Rather than seeing…discursive constructions as 
expressions of speakers‘ underlying cognitive states, they 
are examined in the context of their occurrence as situated 
and occasioned constructions whose precise nature makes 
sense, to participants and analysts alike, in terms of the 
social actions those descriptions accomplish.‖  
(Edwards & Potter, 1992a: 2-3) 
 
In other words, language is not treated as a direct route to internal or mental subjective 
events.  Instead, discursive psychologists, such as Edwards and Potter, are concerned with 
the construction of factual accounts and speaker‘s descriptions of their mental states.  It 
has been suggested that DP (and discourse analysis generally) provides ‗for a somewhat 
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wider set of concerns and materials than those addressed by conversation analysis‘ (1992a: 
28).  More specifically, DP has an interest in the social organisation, content and subject 
matter of talk, the ‗action, construction and variability‘ of talk, the rhetorical organisation of 
talk, and an interest in how any references to cognition and cognitive processes in talk 
perform interactive work (Edwards & Potter, 1992a: 28).   
 
There are various substantive matters that could be of concern to an analysis informed by 
DP (in the same way that CA could be applied to any interaction regardless of its 
substantive content).  However, DP does have specific interests related to psychology.  
These have been divided into three dominant strands by Potter and Edwards (2003; see 
also Hepburn & Wiggins, 2005).  The first is focused on how psychological topics such as 
‗memory‘ or ‗attitudes‘ are employed in talk or discourse more generally.  For instance, how 
the use of reportedly ‗remembered‘ events help to perform some interactional work – ‗a 
memory is not a mere recalling, isolated and serene, but is related to communicative actions 
and interests‘ (Edwards & Potter, 1992a: 16).   Secondly, psychological terms commonly 
employed within psychology are examined to understand their role in discourse.  The third 
focus concerns ‗the ways in which psychological matters including thoughts, beliefs and 
attitudes, are topicalised, handled, or implied‘ in talk (Edwards & Stokoe, 2004: 499).  In 
other words, the invocation of, or reference to psychological states is studied as a matter of 
discursive interest.  Thus any talk that is likely to employ ‗recollection‘ of some description 
and include speaker‘s references to their ‗thoughts‘ or ‗beliefs‘, such as talk about TEHEs is 
a legitimate candidate for DP analysis.  
  
―Through looking at how people talk about mental states, 
researchers can therefore study something which is hugely 
significant – the criteria and practices a community 
develops and through which it recognises and constitutes 
its psychological life.‖ 
(Wetherell, 2007: 664) 
   
Talk about these matters is seen as both constructive and action-oriented.  The term 
constructive captures the way in which each individual instance of talk provides ‗a 
particular version of things, rather than any other‘, whilst action-oriented denotes the way 
in which any talk ‗is always analysably doing something (e.g. countering, complaining, 
praising, justifying), and not merely being dumped from memory‘ (Edwards & Stokoe, 
2004: 500).  Talk concerning perception, for instance, does not mean that corresponding 
underlying mental (or cognitive perceptive) processes are being revealed.  Furthermore, 
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establishing these processes is set aside in order to focus on the communicative and 
interactive implications of the actual talk (Edwards & Potter, 1992a; Potter & Edwards, 
2003). 
 
Whilst DP is often used for topics of interest to psychology, it is applicable for most other 
interactional contexts.  Additionally, there have been movements to extend DP to topics of 
interest closely related to TEHEs – e.g. towards developing a discursive parapsychology 
(see Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005, 2008).  Furthermore, Wetherell (2007: 673) notes the 
potential benefits of applying ‗more systematic empirical analyses‘ to other areas of social 
science currently employing ‗vague and loose constructionist accounts of identity‘. 
Wetherell (2007) also notes the differing paths, research foci and stances taken by different 
discursive researchers working within a broader definition of ‗discursive psychology‘ than 
Potter and Edwards would accept.  It is worth mentioning those here; for whilst the 
analytic methods employed in this work are, in the first instance, informed by the DP of 
Potter & Edwards, there are conceptual and methodological issues that are informed by a 
more critical approach34 (e.g. that of Wetherell, 2007).  These approaches in many ways are 
quite distinct.   
 
Potter and Edwards‘ approach to DP would not consider the integration of wider social 
theory as appropriate to an analysis, for instance, and would remain concerned with the 
immediate interactional context defined in quite strict terms (e.g. see Schegloff, 1997, 
1999).  Wetherell, however, has historically been much more sympathetic to the integration 
of wider theory and ideas in discursive analyses, such as the postructuralism of Lacan or 
Mouffe (e.g. Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Wetherell & Edley, 1999).  More recently, her stance 
has incorporated the idea of a ‗personal order‘ (Wetherell, 2007: 661), which is the 
conceptualisation of a consistent self-identity via an accumulation of repeated ways of 
interacting. She explains this in more detail as an extension of earlier ideas she developed 
with Edley (e.g. the concept of psycho-discursive. For more on this concept see Edley & 
Wetherell, 1997). 
     
―Over time particular routines, repetitions, procedures and 
modes of practice build up to form personal style, psycho-
biography and life history and become a guide for how to go on 
in the present... A person or individual is [thus] a site 
                                                 
34 This is evident in the reflective and critical appraisal of the analytic approach in Chapter Seven.    
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displaying...[a] kind of ‗open continuity‘. In the case of personal 
order, the relevant practices could be described as ‗psycho-
discursive‘‖ 
(Wetherell, 2007: 668). 
 
The main ‗loose grouping‘ of analysts and researchers has sometimes been termed ‗critical 
discursive psychology‘ (Wetherell, 2007: 665).  Critical discursive psychologists in general 
work to combine both micro and macro approaches to discourse in their analyses (e.g. 
Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Wetherell & Edley, 1999) but this is diversely accomplished.  
Approaches are sometimes informed by Rhetorical Psychology (RP) (Michael Billig), 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) (such as 
Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak and Teun Van Dijk), but also narrative analysis, 
psychoanalysis and social identity theory in addition to conversation analysis and discursive 
psychology (see Wetherell, 2007: 665, for examples). 
  
This myriad of influences have been discussed critically elsewhere (see for instance 
Wooffitt‘s, 2005a, recent comparison of CA and DA for a discussion and critique of RP, 
CDA and FDA; see also Edley, 2006; Frosh, Phoenix & Pattman, 2003; Wetherell, 2003a, 
2007 for ongoing debates about psychoanalysis and DP), however, there are also some 
general methodological points to acknowledge from this work.  These include debates 
concerning how analysts can or should consider the wider context in which interaction 
operates and the way in which any ostensibly ‗extra-discursive‘ or ‗non-discursive‘ issues are 
analytically broached (including concepts of ‗interiority‘ or ‗inner‘ self).  These issues are 
more fully discussed later in the chapter and in Chapter Seven.   
  
 
3.3.3 CA and DP: similarities and differences 
 
It is difficult to establish the differences between CA and DP because, in part, ‗discursive 
psychologists have developed lines of inquiry which overlap with those in conversation 
analytic studies‘ (Wooffitt, 2005a: 129).  In CA there tends to be more consensus towards 
method and approach than in DP.  However, while DP is fervently anti-cognitivist and 
solidly constructionist in its approach towards mental state formulations and their 
correlation with actual underlying cognitions (Potter, 2004), CA‘s approach to the role and 
nature of cognition in interaction is more diverse.  It is also dependent on individual 
researchers (see for example the differences between discourse researchers, some of whom 
are conversation analysts and discursive psychologists, exemplified in the chapters of the 
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collection on conversation and cognition edited by te Molder & Potter, 2005).  
Furthermore, some recent comment has emphasised the potential benefits of moving 
beyond a ‗post-cognitivist‘ methodological era (see Kitzinger, 2006). 
 
Despite differences in the concerns and particular projects of CA and DP, there is much 
convergence between them.  They are both concerned with the use of language in a variety 
of different situations and contexts - predominantly those that are ‗naturally occurring‘35 or 
‗naturalistic.  Along with the majority of disciplines under the rubric of discourse studies or 
research, both traditions question the assumption that language is a ‗vehicle for getting to 
the real nature of events‘ (Wetherell, 2001a: 16), as discussed in the previous chapter.  That 
is, adopting a CA (or DP) methodology involves embracing a certain type of 
epistemological position: one that is anti-realist36 (Edwards, 1997).   
 
Thus, in adopting a methodological and analytical perspective closely informed by CA and 
DP, it is important to identify what I am taking from CA and DP and developing in my 
own subsequent analyses.  Firstly, I am adopting a non-cognitivist and anti-realist view of 
language; occupying an epistemological stance that is social constructionist (following DP‘s 
alignment with Wittgenstein‘s philosophy, e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992a; Potter, 2001).  It 
is Edwards and Potter‘s DP that closely informs my analysis and Wetherell‘s (2007) 
position which informed my subsequent critical appraisal of the analysis.  In this sense, I 
am employing a CA-informed empirical approach with a detailed and closely grounded 
analysis of language in interaction.  Wetherell‘s (2007) position does not closely inform my 
analysis as it does not have a wholly satisfactory way of integrating the micro and the macro 
in an analysis and the notion of ‗personal order‘ is too closely aligned with a possible theory 
of self and/or positioning bringing further conceptual and possible theoretical problems.  
However, it is the spirit of her critical insights, about the possible limitations of this kind of 
analysis, that are drawn on later to evaluate the effectiveness of this analytical approach. 
 
At this stage, it is worth briefly outlining the final influential discipline – feminism – that 
has informed the design and conduction of this research project particularly in terms of the 
practical ethics, sensitivity and respect towards respondents (the relevance of which was 
                                                 
35 The issue, definition and status of naturally occurring data in CA and DP research will be considered in 
more detail later in this chapter. 
36 However, this is by no means definitively decided amongst discourse researchers and some argue that there 
is room for a critical realist approach, which is less epistemologically motivated and more methodologically 
driven – presumably in a pragmatic sense (see for instance recent debates between Sims-Schouten, Riley & 
Willig, 2007; Speer, 2007, and Riley, Sims-Schouten & Willig, 2007). 
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established in Chapter Two).  It has therefore also been influential in developing the 
methodological principles employed throughout. 
 
 
3.4 Feminism 
 
One of the initial issues with feminist research is that it is not something which is easy to 
define, although researchers tend to be confident that it is distinctly and essentially 
different from other forms of research (Nash 1994).  Nonetheless, these differences are 
somewhat elusive.  It has been suggested that doing feminist research is more about 
upholding certain principles and observing parameters that inform and guide the inquiry 
rather than religiously obeying stringent protocols (Maynard & Purvis, 1994).  However, 
these guidelines are not fixed, which introduces an element of impossibility to feminist 
research (Reinharz, 1992).  Yet one encouraging suggestion is that feminist research 
incorporates a diversity of possible routes (Schacht & Ewing, 1997).   
 
One of the central tenets of any feminist project is a concern with gender (Luff, 1999).  
However, this concern is not at the heart of a study of TEHEs.  Consequently, it is more 
applicable in this context, to speak of the influence of feminism in this project.  As DeVault has 
suggested, it is possible to 
 
―Draw a distinction … between ‗feminist research‘ and 
‗feminist methodology‘ [where] ... ‗feminist research‘ [can 
be seen] as a broader category including any empirical 
study that incorporates or develops the insights of 
feminism.  Feminist studies may use standard research 
methods, or they may involve explicit attention to 
methodological critique and innovation.‖ 
(DeVault, 1996: 31) 
 
In this sense, this project ‗incorporates and develops‘ the distinct ethical and reflexive 
critique that feminism has levelled at mainstream and traditional methods.  In part this is 
directed towards the historic suppression and devaluation of lived experience in research 
(Rowbotham, 1973).  However, this research is not specifically about women – therefore it 
is not straightforwardly a feminist project.  Instead, this study includes features that 
characterise a feminist ethos in the research process.  These include placing the researcher 
(and their interests or agenda) in the research process, employing techniques of reflexivity 
throughout the research process and prioritising ethical considerations (Hawkesworth, 
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1989).  This ethos specifically informed the approach taken towards research participants, 
the conflicted sentiments in interviews (between passivity and involvement – discussed 
later), the subject matter and its treatment but also the way in which the entire research 
process was reflected upon.  Whilst these are not all solely feminist concerns, many of 
them originated in feminism and are central to feminist principles.  
  
Methodological issues such as these are informed by a feminist critique of knowledge 
production.  Within this critique, feminist research reconsidered the status of objectivity, 
whilst consistently aiming to highlight the relationship between research and epistemology, 
i.e. concerning engagement with the political, the theoretical and the practical (e.g. 
Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1987, 1991; Stanley, 1990).  As some of these issues are central to 
a feminist ethos and therefore this project, it is worth discussing them in brief here.  
Feminists argue that the production of knowledge, since the Enlightenment, was being 
portrayed as neutral; concerned with factuality, objectivity, rationality, and logic (Lennon & 
Whitford, 1994).  Valid and reliable knowledge was produced only when the ‗male‘ author 
detaches ‗himself‘ from his biases and bodily experience (Assiter, 2000).  In other words, 
dominant forms of knowledge were being presented as (allegedly) impartial creations, 
where the authors remained concealed.   
 
Feminists subsequently argued that there is power in this anonymity: where an invisible and 
hidden ‗knower‘ makes claims about and classifies the ‗known‘ (Maynard, 1998).  As a 
result, feminists argued that any claims rooted in research are not neutral; they are informed 
by the individual(s) doing the researching.  Knowledge is constructed and not merely ‗a 
disinterested reflection of reality‘ (Nash 1994: 68).  For some feminists (e.g. Haraway, 1988) 
true or complete objectivity is a myth as all knowledge is produced and created by partial 
and socially located agents.  Indeed, Harding (1987) claims that researchers are not 
anonymous, invisible, voices of authority, but subjective, located individuals with interests, 
biases, and motivations.  For these reasons it is important that the inevitable partiality of a 
researcher is in some way acknowledged and explored.  In this research, this issue is 
discussed more extensively in the concluding chapter.    
 
Issues regarding ethics and exploitation are often cited as archetypal feminist concerns. But 
any research can have real effects upon both the researcher and the researched that may 
not arise until after the research has finished (Maynard & Purvis, 1994).  To combat any 
adverse effects some feminists suggest that research should be directed towards the 
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interests of those being researched (e.g. Maynard & Purvis, 1994; Mies, 1983; Skeggs, 
1994).  However, these interests might be difficult to discern, different according to 
different individuals and impossible to represent.  Nonetheless, it is seen as important to 
promote a more equitable research process that informs emancipation and social change.  
In this respect, reciprocity and (where possible) the levelling of relations between the 
researcher and respondents are emphasised (Maynard & Purvis, 1994).  In an ideal research 
situation an inclusive process is encouraged whereby the respondents play an active role 
and epistemic authority is shared.  However, the practicalities of conducting research may 
mean that implementing these strategies is neither possible nor desirable.  Nonetheless, 
there are more modest aims which can be pertinent to this project, which is influenced by 
feminism.  For instance, meaningful interpretation can only arise when the methodology 
are sensitive to and retain ethical values towards the participants and their experiences, 
according to a feminist approach37 (Deem, 1999).  
 
Given that there is evidence suggesting people are reluctant to disclose their TEHEs (e.g. 
Davis et al, 1991; Hay & Morisy, 1987; Hay, 2003) it is important to be aware of and 
sensitive to these issues.  Considering that the most direct source of data for these 
experiences is the first-hand reports or accounts of TEHEs and not the actual experiences 
themselves, a reflexive and respectful approach is important.   
 
 
3.5 Methodologies and Limitations 
 
As noted previously, all methodologies have limitations, and some of the relevant 
limitations to the methodologies discussed previously are outlined below.  These influential 
approaches to research have conflicting and contradictory elements between them.  Some 
researchers (e.g. Coalter, 1998; Hammersley, 1992) argue that there are problems with 
feminist approaches to research.  The political feminist agenda concerning emancipation 
and social change is seen as incompatible with the ‗neutral‘ or impartial approach towards 
data collection and analysis advocated by CA (e.g. Schegloff, 1997, 1998; Wetherell, 1998).  
Indeed, these are often the issues upon which feminists and CA researchers are seen to 
differ most: how respondents are ‗treated‘ in the research process and analysis (this refers 
to both the issue of impartiality versus politicization and to that of ethics).   
                                                 
37 These issues are not solely the preserve of feminism. However, they are at the heart of debates about 
feminist methodology and research and feminism has been at the forefront of critiques, often pushing the 
agenda in social science research. 
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Most feminists would support the promotion of non-hierarchical research relationships and 
insist that respondents should be the driving force behind the research as far as is possible 
(Campbell & Salem, 1999; Speer, 2002a).  Alternatively, CA and DP advocate an approach 
towards data which seeks to minimise, if not completely avoid, any ‗contamination‘ of the 
data by researcher intervention38 (Potter, 2003c).  However, recent work has argued for, 
convincingly defended and set precedents for the practice of feminist CA (see Kitzinger, 
2000, 2003, 2007; Speer, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a; and Stokoe, 2000).  Yet feminist CA is 
specifically concerned with how gender is oriented to and constructed by speakers, it is 
often politically motivated (towards women‘s emancipation) and is strictly and formally 
aligned with a ‗purer‘ form of CA than adopted here.  Furthermore, there is no evidence of 
feminist CA being open to alternative, creative and ‗looser‘ methodologies such as 
transpersonal psychology.  It is clear then, that although feminist CA sets a precedent in 
terms of the blending of approaches; it is not a suitable method for this particular project.    
 
Nonetheless, within feminist CA there is at least one example of how methodological 
conflicts between the principles of CA and feminism were experienced and dealt with in 
practice (e.g. Guimaraes, 2007, who provides an insightful discussion into coping with 
methodological ‗incompatibilities‘ in research).   Guimaraes (2007) reported feeling a moral 
imperative to intervene on behalf of her participants when she felt it would benefit them in 
her study of recorded police interviews with Brazilian women reporting violence.  This was 
despite the role her presence initially had – to seek consent for the interview to be taped – 
and awareness of the professional role of invisible presence she ‗should‘ inhabit in terms of 
not ‗contaminating‘ her data.  
 
One of the many limitations with any methodology is the tension between academic 
credibility on the one hand and personal integrity on the other.  There is no denying the 
recognition of profundity for those who report these experiences (and possibly the 
researcher themselves, see for instance, Young & Goulet, 1994; McClenon & Nooney, 
2002).  However, the place of this potential subjectivity and reflection is difficult to gauge 
in an academic project.  A need to be ‗honest‘ and open about research practices on the 
one hand and yet analytically ‗scientific‘ on the other presents a lived tension and one that is 
written into the very fabric of this thesis.  Nonetheless, there are other limitations that can 
be identified from the various influential methodologies that it is necessary to review and 
                                                 
38 This is often done via the use of so-called ‗naturalistic‘ data, used to refer to recordings where the 
researcher did not direct the interaction. 
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consider here.  Following this, the common methodological principles will be outlined in 
order to strengthen the overall approach.   
 
 
3.5.1 The limitations of transpersonal methods 
 
It is possible that some transpersonal research could be criticised for a lack of internal 
validity, by the standards of traditional methodologies.  Indeed, this has been noted by 
researchers themselves.  ‗Obviously, exploring and envisioning these ―farther reaches of 
human nature‖ require loosening up on some of the conventional uses of experimental 
control, especially what has been known as internal validity‘ (Anderson, 1998: xxviii).  
Transpersonal research methods propose additional, more fluid indicators of validity than 
traditional methodologies would propound including, bodily wisdom and emotional 
validation. 
   
―Being attuned to the emotional and feeling states of 
researchers, research participants, and even the readers or 
audience for the research reports can give immediate 
feedback about the success of a research endeavour.‖ 
(Braud, 1998: 219) 
 
According to Braud (1998: 219), when feelings tantamount to ‗excitement, surprise and 
delight are supplemented by feelings of awe and gratitude then researchers can be assured 
that they are being true to the experiences that are being explored and that their approach 
and findings are valid‘.  This perspective upholds that alongside ‗empirical adequacy‟ or 
demonstrability, there should also be ‗experiential adequacy‘.  That is, not only should 
methods be rigorous and explicit, and findings reliable and valid, any conclusions should 
resonate with the research population. 
 
Additionally, whilst transpersonal methods do claim to be open to combined approaches 
and are not specifically aligned with particular methodological foundations, there is often 
an implicit claim throughout that these methods can ‗get at‘, describe and document the 
actual experience they seek to study.  In other words, there does not appear to be 
consideration of the potential issue faced by researchers in studying experience: that there 
is no way of directly accessing experience. 
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3.5.2 The limitations of Feminist research 
 
Aside from any perceived limitations with the difficulty of defining feminist research, there 
are various criticisms that have been directed at an approach informed by feminism.  
However, whether these are seen as strengths or limitations is likely to depend on 
individual researchers.  For instance, one of the most common criticisms of feminist 
research is that it has an inherent political bias and built-in subjectivity which is problematic 
for the validity of any research outcomes.  Indeed, there has been some quite vociferous 
disagreement between feminists and non-feminists regarding the place of the ‗political‘ in 
research (Hammersley, 1992, Hammersley & Gomm, 1997; Ramazanoglu, 1992; Temple, 
1997).  Whilst some non-feminists suggest that political ideals have no place in research 
(e.g. Hammersley, 1992) – despite their potentially ‗laudable‘ aims – others suggest that the 
presumed politicization of gender in every project can pre-empt or skew any analysis, 
allegedly resulting in merely ideological analyses (Schegloff, 1997).   
 
Feminist researchers (and other qualitative researchers since) however, have argued that any 
analysis will be imbued with individual researchers‘ theoretical, personal and political 
penchants. 
―Data analysis is inseparable from theory and theorising… 
[and involves] explicitly or implicitly applying a way of 
seeing, a particular analytical vocabulary and related 
insights.‖ 
(Marvasti, 2004: 84) 
 
Indeed, CA‘s attempts to align itself with a more positivistic approach may well be 
problematic for reasons that many feminists‘ identified over ten years ago, namely the 
social respectability of and weightier epistemic authority of positivistic science, based on 
claims of alleged political neutrality and value-free analysis (Dachler, 1997).  And whilst 
some methods (e.g. CA and DP) claim to have explicit analytic accountability, it is difficult 
to maintain that any research is completely value-free. 
   
Instead, feminist researchers advocate an openness and reflexivity about their subjectivity.  
Many welcome and celebrate it as an inevitable part of any research process, advocating 
being reflexive and as upfront and open as possible.  This reflexivity is centred upon 
explicitly acknowledging the researcher‘s presence and impact on the research and 
analytical processes (Hawkesworth 1989).  Furthermore, this feminist influence on the 
approach encourages analytical accountability and the explicit demonstration of findings 
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being open to dispute and for verification by others.  However, there is no feminist (or 
other) ‗manual‘ on reflexivity and discerning what constitutes effective reflexivity or 
establishing an academically acceptable level of reflection appears to be quite difficult.  
According to England (1994: 82), ‗reflexivity is self-critical sympathetic introspection and 
the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as researcher‘ (original emphasis).  But 
reflexivity is a contested concept with no easy route to resolution (see for instance, Lynch, 
2000, who is highly critical of the concept and practice).  The challenge here is how to 
coalesce these radically divergent impulses: the academic sphere and the personal (and 
moral?) dimension in research.  Other criticisms regarding feminist research include the 
prioritisation of gender as a subject or element for analysis regardless of subject matter.  
However, this particular criticism is side-stepped in this project as it is informed more by 
feminist characteristics or a feminist research ethos than it is a ‗purely‘ feminist project.   
 
 
3.5.3 The limitations of CA & DP 
 
Numerous criticisms have been levied at CA, DP and their distinctive approaches to 
research and analysis.  Common criticisms include, that they sacrifice wider or broader 
analytic concerns for a focus on the minutiae of social interaction and take extremely 
limited units or fragments of conversation as their data (e.g. Edley, 2001; Edley & 
Wetherell, 1997, 1999; Wetherell, 1998, 2003a, 2003b).  This includes the suggestion that 
they lack the ability to analyse traditional sociological concepts, such as gender, power, 
inequality, or class.  Additionally, claims to political neutrality and value-free analysis have 
been criticised.  The main criticism considered claims that neither takes into account the 
wider context of talk. 
 
Edley and Wetherell (1997) suggest that CA is limited by its sacrifice of any broader 
historical and cultural context in its analysis of social interaction.  CA is often dismissively 
referred to as preoccupied with the micro-features of interactions and unable to address 
broader issues.  However, Wooffitt (2005a) suggests that this is a misunderstanding of what 
CA is.  
    
―To identify CA as a tool for the analysis of micro-
interactions obscures its primary focus on generic 
properties of intelligibility, structure and order, and 
constitutes a serious misunderstanding of its objectives.‖   
(Wooffitt, 2005a: 166) 
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But is everything that is relevant to an interaction identifiable in the conversation?  CA 
considers any focus on broader ideologies as a sacrifice of sensitivity to interactional 
context (Wooffitt, 2005a).  But Edley and Wetherell (1997) argue that there are other 
aspects of interest to interaction besides demonstrable activities and orientations and this 
should not be denied by analysts.39   They suggest that what is uttered in interaction also 
makes reference to wider contextual factors (in a reflexive or constitutive capacity).  
Further, Wetherell (2003b: 24) argues that CA has constructed ‗an unsustainable distinction 
between ‗talk‘ and ‗society beyond the talk‘‘, which is mistaken.  She claims this distinction 
implies that we can effortlessly differentiate the discursive from the extra-discursive in 
discrete conversational instances.  However, Wetherell argues that this artificially 
constructed distinction is misplaced.  In discussing the research interview as a site of 
cultural or normative articulation, she argues: 
 
―The interview is a highly specific discursive genre, but it 
also often rehearses routine, repetitive, and highly 
consensual (cultural/normative) resources that carry 
beyond the immediate local context, connecting talk with 
discursive history.  Speakers do not invent these resources 
each time.‖ 
(Wetherell, 2003b: 25) 
   
There is no question of adopting an exclusively broad focus for data analysis as this would 
clearly sacrifice methodological rigour and robustness.40  But in addition to an individual‘s 
tacit orientation to the interactional context demonstrable in their utterances, ‗as best we 
can establish it, to be sure‘ (Schegloff, 1999b: 579), are other things that can be said about 
an interaction.  Wetherell (1998) claims that it is necessary to analyse the wider discourses 
or resources that people use to interpret and make sense of their lives, as well as attempt to 
reveal the organisation and structure of interaction.41  It is argued that there are identifiable 
elements of people‘s talk which indicate the broader context in which they operate, for 
instance, cultural, social, religious, or specialised group (Edley & Wetherell, 1997).  These 
                                                 
39 In addition to the wider context, CA has been accused of neglecting non-verbal interaction and 
communication in interaction.  However, body movement, facial expression and gestures are studied where 
possible (video-data) in conjunction with speech (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998).  Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that too much emphasis has been placed on non-verbal interaction in the past (Wood & Kroger, 
2000) without any discernible method with which to ‗read‘ or interpret it accurately.  More recently, Heath 
(2004) has done some work on using video-data to analyse interactions and Lerner (2008) has embarked upon 
a programme (with Geoff Raymond, though there are no publications to date) to formalise the way in which 
non-verbal interaction and body movement can be studied. 
40 If by robust we mean analytically strong and persuasive, and by rigour we mean thorough (and not 
inflexible). 
41 However, it is difficult to know how we might go about doing this in practice, as the aims of micro and 
macro approaches are often in tension. 
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are factors which may be important aspects to consider and draw upon within an analysis.  
The pertinent methodological dimension relevant is a researcher‘s ‗attention to the social 
context in which information about a culture or a people is gathered‘ (Marvasti, 2004: 36).   
CA‘s reluctance to characterise the context or setting of an interaction is because there are 
numerous ways in which this can be done (Schegloff, 1987, 1997).  Conversation analysts 
have argued that deciding which contextual details are pertinent for a particular interaction 
is very difficult.  Consequently, every analytic ‗version‘ of the interaction (with varying 
contextual features) could be considered in some sense, to be true.  Schegloff (1997) argues 
that this is problematic because it means that discriminating between and evaluating the 
strength of particular claims is impossible.  When all claims are possible versions of 
possible truths then all claims are relative.  But any analysis is to some degree about 
interpretation and the ‗truth‘ of an interpretation will depend on subjective understanding 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  Furthermore, as Wetherell (2003b: 25) suggests, analysis is 
effectively communicated by demonstration and argumentation: ‗there is more to the 
knowledge game of scholarship than argument by demonstration, however‘ (my emphasis).  
That is, researchers must convince their readership and audiences of their empirical claims 
with demonstrative reference to the analytic materials firstly, and then with reference to 
other resources such as historical arguments, similar or contrasting examples, other works 
or theories and personal and cultural knowledge.  These resources are always employed and 
deployed in idiosyncratic ways, reflecting the impact of particular researchers on particular 
projects.  Indeed, this point is well demonstrated by the nuanced and varied approaches to 
the study of discourse and CA; even researchers from the same ‗discipline‘ do not always 
agree methodologically or analytically and the boundaries around such disciplines are 
regularly contested42 (Wetherell, 2001a, 2001b). 
 
For many researchers to omit any reference to a wider context may be considered 
insufficient; just as utterances do not take place within an ‗interactional vacuum‘ (Wooffitt, 
2005a), neither does interaction occur within a cultural vacuum.  Interactional features, 
considered ‗extra-discursive‘ by some analysts may well be of interest to others and feed 
into theory and methodology.  Schegloff (1997) however, argues that people endow 
situations with meanings; take up certain identities and not others, and orient to an 
interpretation of context, which therefore means that: 
                                                 
42 Discursive psychology in particular is often selected as a methodology for scrutiny, criticism or discussion.  
One recent example is the exchange between Housley and Fitzgerald (2008, 2009) and Edwards, Hepburn 
and Potter (2009).  
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―It is those characterisations which are privileged in the 
constitution of socio-interactional reality, and therefore have a 
prima facie claim to being privileged in efforts to understand 
it.‖ 
(Schegloff, 1997: 167, original emphasis) 
  
This argument upholds that the only context that can be reliably identified analytically and 
therefore the only one that is relevant, is that to which the speakers display an orientation 
in their talk.43  Schegloff (1999b) deems reference to other aspects of context as self-
indulgent.  That is, the wider features of an interaction can only be understood through the 
speaker‘s utterances, constructions and categorisations: by the design of their talk and by 
their explications of relevance.  
 
This is a powerful argument.  But it does not by definition dismiss references to a wider 
context and it is excessively reproachful to suggest that some analysts are ‗unrestrained‘ (or 
worse).  Whilst Schegloff argues that contextual references should be securely anchored in 
the analytic locale first and foremost, he does not instate a blanket condemnation of wider 
claims.  Extracting precisely what defines the wider context and how this is enacted in 
analysis is, in some senses, an issue of semantics or method – and it is perhaps this that has 
perpetuated the quandary regarding context for discursive work.  Clearly any references to 
wider features need to be justified, but should not necessarily be dismissed outright because 
they are tricky issues.  Indeed Schegloff (1997) himself posits that any identification of 
broader concerns needs to be more precise and more accountable.  Furthermore, as 
Wetherell (2003b) has argued, making this distinction between contexts may be somewhat 
artificial in the sense that all society is constructed.  Additionally, contexts cannot be 
decided prior to an analysis and require demonstration of relevance.  But there is 
legitimacy, in addition to paying close attention, to want to ‗step back‘ and make justifiable 
broader assertions or arguments (as recent work attests, e.g. Sims-Schouten et al, 2007; 
Wetherell, 2003b).   
 
One study that goes some way towards balancing these aspects is a study conducted by 
Hutchby (1996).   Hutchby‘s study analysed radio talk show phone-ins using CA.  
Subsequently, findings were placed in a wider context, relevant to the data and analysis, 
referring to Foucault‘s theory of power.  This analysis did not impose theory upon 
                                                 
43 Comments such as Schegloff‘s, (but see also, Speer, 2007) often draw criticism for appearing to advocate 
methodological monotheism instead of a broader methodological church in the social sciences (e.g. by Riley 
et al, 2007). 
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empirical observations but aimed to merge the micro and macro.  Hutchby argued that CA 
should not shy away from considering social asymmetry and power relations in interaction, 
but claims that the mistake is in assuming that power exists before analysing the data, 
which results in looking for examples of it.  Wooffitt (2005a) goes on to point out how 
Hutchby‘s (1996) work is illustrative of a broader position, which remains true to CA‘s 
methodological principles, whilst considering how this analysis is also more broadly socially 
located.   
 
 
3.6 Methodological principles 
 
The most effective way of proceeding is to construct some common methodological 
principles based on the strengths of these approaches, which neither dilutes, nor betrays 
their core assumptions.  There is a precedent set already in CA, with the introduction of a 
feminist ‗agenda‘ to analyses (e.g. Kitzinger, 2000, 2003, 2007).  Additionally, transpersonal 
methods are often conventional methods combined with a transpersonal ethos.  Examples 
of conventional methods that can be used and imbued with the transpersonal approach 
include discourse analysis (and discursive psychology), narrative analysis, feminist 
approaches, phenomenological approaches, and experiential methods (Braud & Anderson, 
1998b: 256-283).  Furthermore, a recent paper by Davis (2009) explicitly argues for 
methodological pluralism in ‗humanistic and transpersonal psychology‘.  Other 
combination approaches include Sims-Schouten, Riley and Willig‘s (2007: 119) recent 
attempt to perform a ‗systematic empirical critical realist discourse analysis‘.  However, this 
research has been criticised for failing ‗to consider the impact of the interview context on 
their participants‘ accounts, and ‗how their participants orient in their responses towards 
that context and its associated interactional constraints‘44 (Speer, 2007: 132).  Furthermore, 
Edwards and Stokoe (2004: 505) express concern about the practice of ‗analytical 
eclecticism‘ (my emphasis) as it may dilute the consistency and rigour of principles found in 
CA for instance.  However, it is possible that there is a case to be made for a degree of 
methodological eclecticism, so long as its analytic principles are rigorous, systematic and 
explicit (see Wetherell, 2003b).  This is what I have attempted to do here, with a focus on 
uniting methodological principles, whilst retaining a core analytic focus. 
 
                                                 
44 The issues concerning interviews will be briefly discussed later in the chapter and returned to in the 
conclusion. 
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These methodologies have many strengths which are pertinent for particular kinds of 
projects with particular kinds of data.  It is also worth considering precisely what they can 
bring to an analysis of accounts of TEHEs. 
 
 
3.6.1 Principle I – Strong analytical and empirically grounded claims 
 
It is claimed that CA offers ‗the best way‘ of analysing talk (Wooffitt, 2005a: 2).  One of the 
reasons for this claim is that CA asserts itself as a data-driven analysis, not led by theory.  
This assertion has the benefit of positioning analytic findings as visible in the data 
(Schegloff 1996), and distances the researcher from accusations of imposed analyses.  That 
is, a frequent criticism of qualitative research concerns the perception that researchers have 
a preconceived agenda to promote or that their analysis arises closely informed by existing 
theory.  In this respect, CA (and DP) encourage the active resistance of so-called 
‗premature theorising‘ (Wooffitt, 2005a: 72) and advocate grounding any empirical 
observations with close reference to respondents‘ talk.  This is considered a key strength of 
CA (and DP) in that it liberates the researcher from attributing their own interpretations of 
what is relevant to the speakers, instead providing a tool to reveal what is actually relevant 
to participants within any given interaction (Potter, 2003a; Schegloff, 1997).  This kind of 
strength is a desirable and often elusive one in any qualitative project.  Therefore, in trying 
to discern how people understand and make sense of their transcendent exceptional human 
experiences, this principle is of considerable appeal. 
 
 
3.6.2 Principle II – Accountability, rigour, reliability 
 
CA has also provided various insightful analyses to social phenomena, shedding light on 
interaction in a directly accountable way, whilst DP has provided similar insightful analyses 
to psychological contexts and topics (and increasingly other interactional settings also).  CA 
and DP analyses are open to analytical scrutiny by other researchers so that accuracy can be 
tested, checked and data re-analysed if requested, hence providing methodological rigour 
(Sacks, 1992).  This in turn facilitates the emergence of a formal, reliable and consistent 
method, a goal of social research to which many disciplines aspire (Marvasti, 2004).  
Additionally, this can be seen to directly address issues of validity and responsibility in 
analysis: the findings are laid bare for others‘ assessment.  Encouragement of analytic 
scrutiny can also be seen as characteristic of feminist research – presenting findings in a 
way that can be considered and (re)interpreted by others (Blau, 1981).  Again, these key 
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aspects are notions that would be pertinent to any qualitative research project, and can thus 
increase the accountability of the analysis and findings in this study of TEHEs. 
 
 
3.6.3 Principle III – Social constructivist approach to language and interaction 
 
CA and DP have constructed a cogent critique of traditional social and psychological 
research.  In considering people‘s discourse as providing unproblematic access to a 
particular subject of study without considering ‗the properties and significance of the 
discourse itself‘ (Wooffitt, 2005a: 72) traditional social and psychological research has 
overlooked the way language actually operates in interaction. Indeed, one of the central 
tenets of discourse research is that, ‗in a profound sense, accounts ‗construct‘ reality‘ 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987: 34).  What this means is that the versions of CA and DP, which 
inform the methodological principles in this research, do not see language as a direct 
representation of an individual‘s mental state, or as a literal account of ‗what is really going 
on‘ (Edwards, 1997).  Instead they assert that social interaction is a constitutive context and 
argue that language should be centralised as the key constitutive component.  In other 
words, language produces and creates meanings, identities, and a sense of the social reality 
for the individuals involved, whilst the interaction takes place.        
 
It is this that CA seeks to get at and which, it is suggested, should be of concern to all 
researchers studying interaction of any description.  Thus language becomes a central focus 
of any CA and DP informed study. Through recognising that a study of TEHEs is firstly 
about language and communication, any analysis is potentially able to offer fruitful insights 
about how people understand and make sense of their experiences.  For, in their talk about 
these experiences is their own understanding of this telling, of their reported experience, in 
a particular context, at a particular time. 
 
 
3.6.4 Principle IV: Ethics, Reflexivity and Responsibility 
 
As there is evidence to suggest that people sometimes find it difficult to report TEHEs and 
related experiences (Davis et al, 1991; Hay & Morisy, 1987; Hay, 2003), it is important to 
consider the way in which the research process is approached, particularly considering that 
reports of this kind may be judged negatively.  This makes these accounts potentially 
sensitive and affords considerable responsibility to the researcher in handling and 
representing data.  Awareness that the researcher plays a significant, influential and 
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constitutive part in the entire research process – from design and data collection, through 
analysis and presentation of findings is thoroughly discussed within both feminist (e.g. 
Blau, 1981; Borland, 1991; Kirsch, 1999; Maynard & Purvis, 1994; Stanley & Wise, 1990) 
and transpersonal approaches (e.g. Anderson, 1998; Braud, 1998; Davis, 2009: 17).  Many 
feminists argue that researchers should contemplate the ethics of interpretation and the 
responsibility for representing the voices and lives of the respondents (e.g. Maynard, 1998; 
Maynard & Purvis, 1994).  This endorses a sensitive, non-judgemental approach to the 
disclosure of their experiences (Braud & Palmer, 2002).  Equally, drawing on the ethos of 
feminist and transpersonal approaches this means acknowledging the humanity of the 
research population, and treating them with respect and consideration. 
 
However, this does not mean that analysis should merely reflect the views of the 
respondents.  Indeed, respondents may not agree with our analytic interpretations, so a 
respectful and cautious approach may be required, though this does not mean betraying the 
integrity of our research findings (Sangster, 1998).  Clearly, it is desirable to forge a balance 
between the fair representation of respondents and academic credibility, but this is not easy.  
Throughout the research and the analytic process, judgements are inevitably being made, 
alongside selection and omission.  This process of selection and omission puts the 
researcher in a powerful position of responsibility as their depiction of the research 
population is somewhat final.   
 
Sensitivity to this responsibility, it has been argued, requires the researcher to be reflexive.  
That is, the researcher should make an explicit attempt to be aware of the individual 
interpretations (biases and prejudices) that they bring to bear on the research process and 
analysis (Olesen, 1994).  Therefore it is fundamental that the impact of the self on the 
research process including the analysis, is acknowledged, 
  
 ―We cannot rid ourselves of the cultural self we bring with 
us into the field any more than we can disown the eyes, 
ears and skin through which we take our intuitive 
perceptions about the new and strange world we have 
entered.‖  
(Scheper-Hughes, 1992: 28)  
 
It has been argued that absolute objectivity, complete impartiality or researcher neutrality 
are simply not possible (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) – which might lead to questions about 
the practical reality of ‗unmotivated observations‘ (Schegloff, 1999b: 577) in primary 
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research with non-naturalistic data.    Therefore, maybe the best we can hope for is a ‗least 
partial‘ standpoint that is as critically reflexive as possible (Haraway, 1988). 
However, whilst some degree of awareness is requisite for an ethical project, the extent to 
which this takes centre stage is not agreed upon.  It would seem that for some, too much 
‗navel-gazing‘45 may be counter productive to a research project. 
 
―In the last resort, I wonder how much soul searching is 
useful: is endless debate self-indulgent, sometimes an ex 
post facto justification of our work…‖ 
(Sangster, 1998: 94) 
 
In this sense, deciding the boundaries for reflexivity is difficult (something I will return to 
in the conclusion), but it is also vitally important that ethics and responsibility are 
considered, especially considering the inherent inequality in the research relationship 
(Kirsch, 1999).   
 
Having outlined the four main methodological principles which steer the research process, 
it would be useful to provide an outline of how the research was conducted.  Prior to this, 
there are some pertinent issues concerning the type of data being used in this project – 
interviews – which require acknowledgement, as there has been some cogent criticism 
recently about the status of interview data for discursive analyses (e.g. Potter & Hepburn, 
2005).  This will be discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter, but it is important 
to identify this issue here. 
 
 
3.7 Data and analysis 
 
3.7.1 Naturally occurring data 
 
CA and increasingly, DP, advocate the use of ‗naturally occurring‘ data.  This originated 
from Harvey Sacks‘ analytical attention which seemed to focus on mundane instances of 
interaction.  In DP there has been a gradual move towards naturally occurring talk also, and 
recognition of its alleged advantages over more traditional forms of data such as interviews 
(Wooffitt, 2005a).  But what do we mean by naturally occurring talk and what counts as 
naturally occurring?  What implications does this have for conducting research? 
 
                                                 
45 Reflecting on and ‗introspecting‘ about one‘s own role in the research process. 
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Potter describes naturally occurring talk as, 
  
―Spoken language produced entirely independently of the 
actions of the researcher, whether it is everyday 
conversation over the telephone, the records of a company 
board meeting, or the interaction between doctor and 
patient in the surgery.  It is natural in the specific sense that 
it is not ‗got up‘ by the researcher using an interview 
schedule, a questionnaire, an experimental protocol or 
some such social research technology.‖  
(Potter, 2004: 205) 
 
This description emphasises and ultimately prioritises the study of real-life interaction, and 
seemingly rejects ‗artificially produced‘ talk.  However, the term natural has been 
considered problematic in that participants in these settings are often aware that their 
conversations are being tape-recorded.  This issue has been discussed in some detail (see 
Speer & Hutchby, 2003a, 2003b; Hammersley, 2003a).  To take this into account – that 
interactions are not straightforwardly ‗naturally occurring‘ – the label ‗naturalistic‘ has been 
adopted for these data sources (see for example, Potter & Hepburn, 2007).    
 
Potter (2004) has noted that this description also results in the construction of a hierarchy 
about what constitutes good and bad data.  Therefore he has suggested that discursive 
analysts can instead position their approach towards their data (whether naturalistic or not) 
as being analytically and theoretically distinct (from other qualitative approaches).  By 
considering their approach as distinctive,46 those using DP (and CA) can position themselves 
differently to traditional qualitative researchers.  Nonetheless, naturalistic recordings are 
still recommended as the least problematic source of data for conducting a CA or DP 
analysis.  But what if obtaining naturalistic recordings is virtually impossible?   
 
With respect to some kinds of data it can be difficult to obtain naturalistic recordings.  In 
some cases it may be possible to hold a focus group, which, with a ‗neutral‘ facilitator, may 
offer the next best thing (Potter & Hepburn, 2005).  However, in researching TEHEs, 
these options were not feasible.  For instance, Palmer and Braud (2002) have suggested that 
people are more likely to feel comfortable sharing their TEHE in a supportive 
environment.  It became immediately clear that obtaining naturalistic conversations or 
accounts of these experiences in talk would be near impossible.  It is evident that these 
                                                 
46 Rather than reifying naturalistic talk, when it may be tricky to ascertain ‗natural‘ versus ‗contrived‘ talk - see 
Lynch (2002), ten Have (2002), Potter (2002) and Speer (2002) for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
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types of experiences may be discussed with close others, but they are not commonly 
verbally reported or articulated in the public domain despite the widespread public 
fascination with such experiences.  Furthermore, it has been suggested that people are 
reluctant to divulge these experiences for fear of ridicule; especially when they are 
considered personally profound or significant and there may be considerable personal cost 
(Palmer & Braud, 2002; Tart, 1999).  Considering these potential sensitivities around 
collecting accounts of this kind, it was necessary to approach potential respondents 
thoughtfully and cultivate a conducive and supportive context in which they could talk 
about their experiences.  It was thus decided that face-to-face interviews would be 
conducted.  
 
As there was a specific interest in the construction of these accounts and how people 
talked about and made sense of their TEHEs in this project, then it seemed vital not to 
merely rely on existing written accounts (which were collected with different purposes, 
definitions, allusions and categorisations47) but instead look for people willing to tell me 
about their experiences: essentially to be interviewed.  However, the unavailability and 
impossibility of obtaining naturalistic data for this study does not sidestep some of the 
perceived inherent problems that qualitative interviews may have for a study informed by 
CA and DP principles (e.g. as cited by Potter & Hepburn, 2005), and this will be further 
discussed and reflected on in the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
    
 3.7.2 Data Collection 
 
Thirty interviewees were recruited in a variety of ways:   
- A poster advert was physically placed on several notice boards on campus at the 
University of York (see appendix 1). Five participants were recruited this way. 
- The same advert was placed in several ‗esoteric‘ or ‗mind, body, spirit‘ shops in York at 
that time (e.g. Cosmic Trader, Odds Bodkins) and The Healing Clinic (then in Fulford, 
York) – one participant was obtained via this route. 
-  An advert (containing the same text) was ‗virtually‘ placed online on YorkExtra (an 
intranet news service at the University of York, updated daily, which automatically pops 
                                                 
47 For instance, the large collection started by Alister Hardy at the Religious Experiences Research Centre, 
published this invitation to submit a written account.  ‗All those who feel that they have been conscious of, 
and perhaps influenced by, some Power, whether they call it God or not, which may either appear to be 
beyond their individual selves or partly, or even entirely, within their being‘ (Hardy, 1979: 20).  Additionally, 
written accounts of spontaneous ‗unexplained‘ or ‗unusual‘ phenomena can be found in publications, such as 
The Fortean Times, though these are not always transcendent, profound or ‗mystical‘ experiences. 
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up on networked computers when the user logs on) intermittently throughout 2005-
2006. Twelve participants were recruited via this channel. 
- Some respondents were obtained via a kind of ‗snowballing‘ technique or word of 
mouth – for instance, one respondent invited me to talk about my research to a Healing 
& Spirituality group and an Interfaith Group.  Snowballing resulted in obtaining eight 
more respondents. 
- Adverts were placed in The Fortean Times (http://www.forteantimes.com/) and 
Kindred Spirit (http://www.kindredspirit.co.uk/) magazines, which yielded three 
respondents. 
- Finally, an article about the research appeared in ‗Nouse‘ (see appendix 2), a student 
newspaper at the University of York, in November 2006 (one participant obtained). 
 
Upon contact with respondents a mutually agreeable time and venue was arranged for 
interview.  All respondents were interviewed using a face-to-face unstructured format.  
Interviews were conducted in a variety of places including cafes in Bristol and London, 
respondents‘ homes in and around London and York and also in Wentworth College, at 
the University of York.  Interviews lasted between twenty minutes and two and a half 
hours, but most were approximately one hour.  Respondents were given an information 
sheet about their participation in the project (see appendix 3).  This was designed in line 
with BSA (2002) guidelines on issues regarding informed consent and general social 
research ethics.  However, there are always shortcomings with the process of informed 
consent.  This is mainly because the information relayed to potential participants will 
always and necessarily be limited e.g. lacking any underlying philosophical assumptions, 
missing an articulation of theoretical context with no explication of how the project relates 
to broader disciplinary concerns (see Weatherall et al, 2002: 534-5).  Whilst there are often 
pragmatic rationales for such omissions, this cannot negate the potential effect on those 
taking part.  As a recent paper exploring the challenges that qualitative researchers face 
attests (particularly those researching sensitive topics), 
 
―It [informed consent] is so much more than just signing a 
form to say that they are willing to offer you information, 
they are actually allowing you into their lives, they are telling 
you personal information that might be quite hard, so you 
need to demonstrate a certain degree of discretion, of 
respect, of appreciation for what they are doing ‘cause the 
reality is that it is more than just words, it‘s more than just 
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what you are going to analyse, it‘s their life, their experience 
and you need to make sure that you are aware of that.‖ 
(Anonymised researchers in Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen & 
Liamputtong, 2007: 330) 
 
This consideration, not just that it might be difficult for people to talk about their personal 
experiences, but also that their participation may have unanticipated effects upon them, 
informed the way in which the research was conducted. 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity were re-emphasised at this point and a pseudonym was 
selected by the respondent for use in any written materials.   The use of a name, rather than 
a number or code as is often used in CA or DP, was informed by the ethos of 
transpersonal and feminist research approaches, and done in a way to emphasise the 
humanity of the respondent (as opposed to viewing them as data collection resources).  As 
England (1994: 82) suggests, ‗[the] point is that those who are researched should be treated 
like people and not as mere mines of information to be exploited by the researcher‘.  This 
practice humanises contributions, brings narratives to life and has also been used in 
feminist CA (e.g. Speer, 2001a, 2001b).  At this point respondents were asked if they still 
wanted to participate and whether they consented to be taped (interviews were recorded on 
two different types of devices – a digital Dictaphone: an Olympus VN 5500, and/or an 
audio-cassette Dictaphone: Sony TCM 200DV).  Undoubtedly the issue of negotiating 
consent is not necessarily as simple or straightforward as indicated above.  Indeed, it may 
be difficult for participants to withdraw from taking part at this stage of the process and 
some respondents may retrospectively report feeling their comments were too revealing 
(Dickson-Swift et al, 2007).  However, some respondents were contacted after the 
interviews had taken place and consent was again verified with those respondents at that 
stage. 
 
Prior to consenting to begin recording a few of the respondents asked questions about the 
research process and about my particular stance, interest or position on the ‗truth‘ of these 
experiences.  Others had expressed similar queries in the initial contact stages (prior to 
interview).  Some of these questions were also concerned with how the interview material 
would be used and how it would be represented.  In particular some respondents expressed 
concerns about the potential refutation of the reality of these experiences and subsequent 
discrediting of the individuals and their experiences (similarly reflective of the reported 
findings by Davis et al, 1991; Hay & Morisy, 1987; and Hay, 2003).   My response was, in 
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exact detail, different on each occasion.  However, I did maintain an overall position, the 
sense of which I tried to communicate for each respondent (if asked).  That is, that my 
interest was in exploring the kind of extraordinary experiences people have and what 
meanings people attribute to them; and that I was not concerned with establishing the 
‗truth‘ or ‗reality‘ of these experiences, but instead was interested in their subjective 
impressions.  Predominantly these questions seemed to be concerned with seeking 
reassurance that the material they shared with me (a stranger) would not be misused or 
misrepresented.  These questions and my responses to these concerns were not taped.   
 
The interviews consisted of an invitation to tell me what happened (such as ‗so if you‘d like 
to tell me what happened‘) and then I listened to their account.48  Wooffitt and 
Widdicombe (2006) suggest that unstructured interviews can be deliberately ‗more passive‘ 
(in order to obtain an account less tied to researcher-led agendas).  Wooffitt (1992) has 
proposed that the interviewer can minimally invite the respondent to tell them about their 
experience.  This invitation is designed to be as ‗impartial‘ as possible in order not to 
influence the subsequent account.  Furthermore, it is advised that the interviewer remains 
silent until the respondent has completed their account.  Indeed, this is a technique 
employed in previous research (e.g. Wooffitt, 1992) on the basis of which substantial and 
substantiated analytic claims have been made.  These story narratives lasted between ten 
minutes and two hours.  Interviewees‘ accounts were largely uninterrupted, in that no 
questions were asked during this time, but I was an active participant in that I was nodding, 
and offering minimal continuers, such as ‗mmhm‘, smiling, and laughing on occasion.  I 
was also present and engaged in an emotional and embodied sense, as were the 
interviewees.  Clearly there are difficulties with noting non-verbal behaviours without video 
data and those listed above are recalled retrospectively.  Whilst many discursive researchers 
might have concerns with this retrospective recall, it is included to convey those aspects of 
interaction not effectively captured by textual representation.  Additionally, it is important 
to note that video data was not collected due to the highly sensitive nature of the subject 
under discussion (though it may be possible to negotiate this as a data collection method 
with future participants). 
 
So, although I did not make active verbal contributions (unless necessary), during the initial 
experiential description in terms of actual linguistic or lexical utterances, I was physically 
                                                 
48 This is covered in more detail in the Chapter Four regarding the tour of a typical account. 
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present.  It is likely that non-verbal gestures (such as facial expressions, eye movements and 
hand gestures) contributed to the interaction.  However, it has been claimed that these 
features are easily overemphasised, tricky to identify in taped, rather than filmed, data, and 
difficult to analyse; as what counts as non-verbal interaction is not agreed upon49 (Wood & 
Kroger, 2000: 62).  Nonetheless, it is difficult to define my involvement in the process as 
truly passive.  Furthermore, it is difficult to remain ‗passive‘ in the face of people disclosing 
sensitive personal experience (setting aside that it might also be ethically undesirable).  This 
issue has been raised by other researchers grappling with this incompatibility (e.g. 
Guimaraes, 2007) and arguments have also been articulated regarding how the engagement 
of a ‗researcher… as an active and reflexive participant‘ (Griffin, 2007a: 265) can be 
desirable.   
 
Consequently, I consistently experienced a tension, between trying to maintain (impossible) 
‗impartiality‘ and the practicalities of being located and situated in the social world.  Any 
participation in a face-to-face interaction requires some degree of active engagement and 
some form of personal influence, a factor that some CA and DP researchers have aimed to 
avoid by using more naturalistic data.  However, researchers must still engage and ‗interact‘ 
with their materials or data (such as the substantive content of naturalistic recordings), 
through listening, transcribing and analysing and some have suggested that any impact of 
these ‗interactions‘ are silent and absent from the process.  As Griffin (2007a) points out, 
  
―If (some) CA and DP researchers appear determined to 
avoid ‗contaminating the field‘ with their messy presences, 
they also pay minimal attention to the ways in which ‗the 
field‘ might affect their analytic work or the rest of their 
everyday lives.‖ 
(Griffin, 2007a: 253) 
 
As recent work attests, researchers exploring disturbing, sensitive or highly personal 
experiences are likely to be affected in some way by the material they are analysing (see 
Dickson-Swift et al, 2009). 
 
 
3.7.3 Transcription  
 
Following data collection, via the interviewing process described above, the formal analysis 
process began.  The first practical action this requires is transcription.  In conventional CA 
                                                 
49 For these reasons, an analysis of non-verbal communication is not performed here. 
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and DP studies excerpts are transcribed in detail, whereas the transcription system found in 
this thesis is more in line with ‗Jefferson-lite‘ (Potter & Hepburn, 2005) as it is not really 
necessary to produce the level of detail found in CA inspired work.50  Transcription is not a 
straightforward neutral process of representing data and there are potential problems with 
the way in which interaction is represented by transcription.  In transforming talk into 
something that can be worked with, it should be acknowledged that ‗there is always some 
sort of intervention, interpretation or transformation of the discourse‘ by the researcher 
before analysis (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 56).  And in some sense this will affect or guide any 
subsequent analysis. 
 
Once taped, the interviews were transcribed verbatim, initially in a standard way (without 
the inclusion of pauses, intonations, and prosody).  Subsequent analysis commenced via 
listening to the tapes alongside the basic transcripts until particular aspects began to emerge 
as interesting.  Also at this time, the first parts of the interviews were transcribed in some 
detail, informed by CA transcription conventions (see Jefferson, 2004b).  These sequences 
provided rich material for analysis as they consisted of what might be called the experiential 
accounts including the core element of the extraordinary experience (that which Wooffitt, 
1992, identified as ‗I was just doing x…when y‘).  The transcription conventions included 
the use of keyboard symbols in order to indicate stress and intonation, volume and pitch, 
speed, stutters and self-repairs.  Pauses longer than 0.2 seconds in length were detailed in 
tenths of a second, whilst shorter pauses were indicated by the symbol (.).51  Additionally, 
single symbols such as ‗<‘ were used to mark the onset of changes in the speed of 
utterance delivery (compared to surrounding speech).  The return to normal speech was 
either so rapid, or difficult to discern that it was considered misrepresentative to include an 
arbitrary corresponding closing symbol (e.g. ‗>‘).  Furthermore, a decision was made to 
reproduce regional accents as they were delivered, only where the accent was very 
pronounced.    
 
CA has often been misunderstood as the study of transcripts because it provides a fine 
level of detail depicting intricate interactional features.  However, 
   
                                                 
50 However, compared to some self-professed ‗Jefferson-lite‘ transcriptions (e.g. Griffin, 2007a) my extracts 
are transcribed in a more detailed fashion and are somewhere in between ‗Jefferson-lite‘ and pure CA – see 
for example, Norrick and Spitz (2008) or Coates (2007) for similar transcription styles. 
51 See appendix 4 for a more detailed breakdown of the symbols used or those included in quoted data 
extracts. 
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―The transcript is seen as a ‗representation‘ of the data: 
while the tape itself is viewed as a ‗reproduction‘ of a 
determinate social event.‖ 
(Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998: 74) 
 
The detailed transcription techniques should not be considered as the data, and are not 
analysed in isolation, but alongside the tape-recording.  In this sense the transcripts can be 
viewed as an aid to the analytic process.  Furthermore, the inclusion of detailed 
transcription allows for increased analytic accountability and the more closely grounded 
illumination of analytic claims. 
 
 
3.7.4 Analysing data 
 
Turning any data from seemingly ‗raw‘ interaction into analytic story is a lengthy process.  
It is a process that involves differing levels of focus at different moments (from close up to 
wide angle throughout the expedition).  In practical terms this requires moving back and 
forth from account to account, sometimes slowly, at other times quite rapidly; intensive 
periods of listening following the transcripts; noting observations; and subsequent revisions 
and re-revisions of provisional analytic ideas.  Most advice on developing CA skills suggests 
selecting a particular sequence to consider in detail (e.g. ten Have, 1999).  A sequence is 
defined as starting when an action or topic is initiated in talk and responded to.  Its ending 
occurs when the speakers are no longer referring to this prior action or topic.  Analysts are 
then advised to explore the turns in a sequence, consider what selections made by the 
speaker are doing, pay attention to the timing and taking of turns and think about the 
invocation of roles or identities for the speaker, and the organisation and design or 
construction of turns (ten Have, 1999).   
 
However, what is immediately clear with interview data is that there are specific challenges 
involved in analysis.  Unstructured interviews do not proceed as mundane or ordinary 
conversation and instead may be characterised by lengthy or seemingly monologic 
elements, where the respondent is engaged in extended segments of talk (Hutchby & 
Wooffitt, 1998).  In these segments the interviewer may be fairly silent and thus the 
narrative appears predominantly uninterrupted.  The challenges that this brings to a data 
analysis informed by CA principles is that there is no discernible and established analytic 
unit - the turn of each speaker - to couch and refer descriptions to.  It is these turn 
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construction units that would usually offer a conversation analyst a way in which to check 
and ground their analytic claims. 
 
Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) have specifically addressed and explicated this issue.  In the 
initial stages of analysis the suggestion is to follow conversation analytic procedures.  So, in 
analysing the data for this research I considered each experiential account individually at 
first and formulated some general observations about the structural organisation of the 
account and any interesting features, closely following Hutchby and Wooffitt‘s advice. 
   
 ―Then with these initial observations in mind, return to 
the original data corpus to find any other sequences which 
appear to have similar properties, thereby building a 
collection of possible or candidate cases of a specific 
conversational phenomena.‖ 
(Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998: 186) 
 
Consequently the identification of any potentially interesting structural or organisational 
features was then considered in light of the other accounts, to establish whether particular 
phenomena could be demonstrated in different instances.  However, these processes of 
identifying features require skill and practice.  They are also the ingredients which are most 
difficult to impart or explain to others and may remain implicit when attempting to 
describe analytic journeys, as how they were noticed may be difficult to make explicit.   
Analysis was informed by Schegloff and Sacks‘ (1973: 299) analytic question of ‗why that 
now?‘, and trying to understand how the talk in these accounts was constructed of those 
particular utterances.  It has been argued that it is important, however, that an analysis does 
not just become an opportunity to spot commonly known features identified by discursive 
research, such as three-part lists, but instead should look to see what kind of work is being 
achieved with these features (Antaki, Billig, Edwards & Potter, 2003).  Schegloff (1996) 
recommends potentially beginning an analysis with tentative noticings.  This may be 
noticing what action is being done in the talk and then proceeding to highlight how certain 
talk is being used to achieve this action or noticing a certain feature of talk and questioning 
what the outcome of such a feature is.   
 
In order to aid the analytic process and develop my analytic skills, I conducted a fairly in-
depth analysis of each account, considering at first the structural features and organisation - 
the beginnings, middles and ends of the narrative (the focus of the next chapter).  Firstly, 
this involved describing in detail what was happening with the talk.  Merely describing an 
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unfolding account was quite a difficult task as it was time consuming and did not feel 
particularly analytical.  However, this activity provided me with a meticulous route into the 
data.  At times, stating what appeared superficially to be ‗the obvious‘, granted me access to 
insights that would otherwise have remained hidden.  Indeed, at this stage of the analysis I 
began to identify certain common features and properties of the accounts whilst also 
considering what kind of interactional work was being performed.  Pragmatically, this 
involved listening to the interviews whilst simultaneously inspecting the transcripts in fine 
detail.  Secondly, ideas and notes gleaned from this first trawl of the data were revisited for 
concepts that stood out or appeared to be potentially common instances.  Armed with 
these potential features I went back to the transcripts and the recordings to check these 
embryonic ideas against the various accounts.  Subsequently, any potentially common 
features were checked and tested against the data and different instances were compared to 
establish whether the same or subtly different actions were being performed and how the 
phenomena were being deployed as discursive resources.  This enabled refinement of the 
analysis and identification of salient features (those most notable and most common).52   
 
The analytic story was developed and eventually finalised through persistent revision and 
refinement, from repeatedly shifting from the raw data (transcripts and recordings) to the 
story (analytic concepts and features) and working with both alongside each other and 
tweaked as new instances of particular phenomena were included and increasing in 
technical sophistication as my analytic skills improved.  The analytic chapters thus explicate 
this process more coherently and begin to demonstrate how considering the nature of 
language and communication in these accounts of TEHEs can offer insights regarding 
their foundations and what was relevant to respondents.  It is worth noting that the 
accounts that I collected are clearly different from many existing written accounts of 
mystical experiences for instance, in that all are spoken and none are relayed by alleged 
‗saints‘ or ‗mystics‘ (however, there is not the space to discuss this any further here).  
Additionally, studying these profound constructions in such fine-grained detail has stirred 
me to reflect upon the limits of a discursive analysis and the tensions associated with this 
for these experiential accounts. 
                                                 
52 It is worth noting at this point that ineffability was a common and notable feature of many of the 
interviews but that it was not selected for inclusion in the analysis because the findings concerning reported 
thought were considered more timely and topical (there is a dearth of work independently analysing reported 
thought).  However, ineffability is certainly an issue of considerable analytic interest also and could be taken 
up in future research.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that an analysis of these accounts can be informed by CA and 
DP, but that a methodological approach can be more widely informed by additional 
approaches.  Drawing upon the ethos of both feminist and transpersonal approaches has 
meant the prioritisation of a notably respectful, sensitive and ethical way in which to treat 
both respondents and their experiential accounts.  Recognising that all methodologies have 
limitations and tensions, it is also pertinent to note that there are numerous strengths with 
an analytical approach informed by CA and DP, such as rigour, explicit accountability and 
increased validity.  In this sense, the methodological principles derived from these 
approaches have guided the entire research process and analysis and argued for a 
consideration of the socially produced nature of language in a study of TEHE accounts.    
However, this is not to suggest that a close consideration of the contextual nature of 
language will be every researcher‘s concern or that this can tell us everything we can know 
about these experiences.  Certainly, I would align myself with other researchers (e.g. Braud, 
2002; Cardeña, 2004, Wilber, 1997; Williams, 1996) in their call for more integrated and 
methodologically pluralistic approaches to studying these kinds of experiences and 
consciousness, more generally. 
 
 
3.8.1 Representing and capturing profundity 
 
Language cannot be ignored in studying these experiences, at least in part because such a 
vital aspect has rarely been considered adequately before.  But is this satisfactory?  In a 
study of transcendent exceptional human experiences, is this enough?  Intuitively, I feel that 
there may be something qualitatively lacking from the resources that academia or the social 
sciences can offer me with which to research these kinds of experiences.  Employing a 
methodology that has prioritised language, communication and a certain kind of analytic 
gaze has at times felt frustratingly limited and stifled my intuition and creativity.  I am left 
wondering whether in exploring the language of the accounts of people‘s experiences I 
have done justice to some of the reportedly most profound, life-changing, deep and 
moving experiences and those that report them.  In other words, are these experiences 
represented fairly by this kind of analytic account?  Would the experients recognise or align 
themselves with these findings?  Indeed, can any methodology deliver on this?  Given that 
these experiences are often reported as the ‗ultimate‘ human experience, how can or should 
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we go about studying them?  These are not easy questions to answer as Wulff‘s comments 
on studying mystical experiences illustrates when he says that: 
 
―Mysticism [and thus these kinds of experiences] not only 
eludes empirical study but by its very nature also calls into 
question the assumptions, methods, and modes of thought 
of modern Western scientific investigation.‖ 
(Wulff, 2000: 427) 
   
Additionally, conducting this kind of research has persistently flagged tensions and 
incompatibilities for me as researcher, between adopting an ‗impartial stance‘ and an 
empathic one, between myself as ‗consummate professional‘ and myself as human, 
subjective and socially situated (as ultimately flawed).  There are also some pragmatic 
methodological, analytical and conceptual issues that this chapter has raised regarding the 
status of interview data (seemingly versus naturalistic recordings) for discursive work and 
the role and definition of the wider context in which interactions reside.  Both these and 
the reflexive issues flagged above will be returned to in the concluding chapter (7).   
 
The three empirical chapters that follow are concerned with detailing the analyses and 
develop the methodological principles articulated earlier in the chapter.  The next chapter 
(4) begins with a tour of the more structural features of a typical account. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Touring TEHE accounts: beginnings, middles, and endings 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter offers an introduction to the data.  Focused predominantly on an overview of 
the accounts, their organisation and structural features, the aim is not to offer an in-depth 
analysis of any specific devices that appear in the excerpts included here.  Instead, this 
chapter is more concerned with identifying similarities and differences in the way 
respondents presented the accounts of their TEHEs.  Included are the ways in which the 
narratives were elicited and how respondents embarked upon and concluded them.  
Invariably the accounts are told as stories and therefore where relevant, literature 
concerning storytelling and story organisation (e.g. Goodwin, 1984; Jefferson, 1978; Sacks, 
1974, 1986) is drawn upon.  Essentially, this chapter provides a tour of a typical account, 
stopping along the way to point out aspects of interest and notable features, particularly 
concerning the beginnings, middles and endings of these accounts. 
 
 
4.2 Invitations and initial responses 
 
All of the interviews begin with an invitation or request (from me as interviewer) for the 
respondent to tell me about their experience.  This is phrased in terms of an event or 
occurrence having taken place and establishes, in a broad sense, the expectations of what 
should follow.  The exact phrase used varies, in terms of lexical selection, but the meaning 
is fairly similar across interviews, as demonstrated in the five examples below taken from 
the start of different interviews.53 
 
1 I:   so (.) if you (.) just want to describe your experience  
 
1 I:   if you‘d just like to tell me about your experience 
 
1 I:  so if you wanna (0.5) if you want to tell me ab[out ◦your experiences◦ 
 
1 I:  so if we sta::rt em by you talking about (0.6) your experience really 
 
1 I:   so if you just wanna tell me (0.3) what happened 
                                                 
53 In excerpts from the interviews I am ‗Interviewer‘ referred to as ‗I‘ from here onwards, and the 
respondents are referred to by initials from their pseudonyms – which is mostly used in full when discussing 
their account in the text. 
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Clearly these invitations do have some differences (which will be noted where relevant 
later) but they all convey the orientation to my role as listener (at least in the first instance) 
where the respondent is expected to relay their experience.  There is also an implication 
that this is the first activity of the interview via phrases such as, ‗first of all‘ (see extract 6, 
p126) and ‗start‘, suggesting that there are likely to be other requirements or topics raised 
for discussion later on.  Secondly, there is common use of the term ‗just‘ which invites a 
minimal and directed response from the interviewee, downplaying their contribution or its 
potential formality.  Both these phrases can work to imply there may be further requests 
for narrative contributions later.  However, at this stage these topics or issues are not 
expounded.  Whilst this invitation necessarily limits the range of responses that can follow, 
the boundaries of limitation cluster around prior understandings of what is expected in this 
context.   
 
Atkinson and Drew (1979) demonstrated how awareness of these expectations ensured due 
process in Court.  They noted for instance, that whilst the content of talk could vary 
enormously, the structure of a question and answer format was ubiquitous.  Questions 
were deployed strategically by legal teams with varying end goals (e.g. to elicit information, 
admission, contradiction and inconsistency). Atkinson and Drew‘s explication of the way in 
which Court interaction proceeds, with roots in both ethnomethodological and CA 
traditions, effectively demonstrated these institutional interactional processes in some 
detail.  These expectations, conventions and thus routine formulations were also observed 
in ordinary telephone interaction by Schegloff (1968, 1986).  Schegloff (1968, 1986) 
focused his analyses on the first few seconds of telephone calls and identified common 
normative sequencing to this introductory talk that consisted of various elements. These 
elements included an initial summons/answer sequence (originally identified and detailed in 
Schegloff, 1968), an identification sequence, a greetings sequence, and ‗howareyou‘s 
sequence exchanges, before then moving on to the topics of talk (for more detail see 
Schegloff, 1986: 117)     Furthermore, despite the research interview not strictly being seen 
as an institutional context, there are still considerable expectations and conventions to the 
structure and format of the interaction.   
 
In this project, respondents have replied to an advertisement requesting participation from 
those who consider themselves to have had certain kinds of experiences (see appendix 1) 
and they have been provided with an information sheet about the research interview (see 
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appendix 3).  Although these introductory utterances do not include any of these details 
that have taken place prior to the interview they do implicitly suggest that there is some 
shared understanding between the respondent and the interviewer regarding what is 
subsequently expected.  For example, although the specific details of the event(s) about to 
be relayed by the respondent are unknown, there is a shared awareness that it is considered 
to be ‗extraordinary‘ in some way by the respondent.   
 
The initial invitation also serves to offer the role of speaker to the respondent.  At this 
point the speaker is orienting to what they understand to constitute this ‗telling‘ and their 
role in relation to it.  In being invited to speak about ‗what happened‘ the expected 
response is an account of the respondent‘s experience.  This is the moment where the 
respondent is offered the role of storyteller, in addition to that of speaker.  Gubrium and 
Holstein (2009: xix) define a ‗storyteller as one who provides an account of experience or 
event of his or her own‘ and it is commonly argued that any events offered in this story 
form are ‗presented as true‘ (Polletta & Lee, 2006: 702).  What constitutes a story or 
narrative within the social sciences can vary, but there are various elements that are seen as 
fairly important.  Narratives are invariably seen as a (series of) past event(s), which are 
temporally or chronologically ordered, ‗with a beginning, a middle, and an end‘, where story 
‗events and characters… [are] related‘ and set in a structure or ‗emplotment‘ (Ewick & 
Silbey, 1995: 20).  However, there has been some criticism of this formulation as too 
narrow and exclusive of ‗smaller stories‘ found in ordinary talk and interaction (see for 
example, Bamberg & Georgakopoulou, 2008).  Nonetheless, stories at the very least must 
be about events or characters and relational and ordered somewhat for them to be 
recognisable as stories. 
 
As Houtkoop and Mazeland (1985) have noted there may be a temporary suspension of 
turn-taking conventions when a story, event, occurrence or joke is being told.  In this 
sense, usual expectations about the dialogical nature of conversation or the typical question 
and answer format of interviews is postponed or deferred, as the ‗storyteller‘ becomes the 
primary speaker.  However, it is worth noting that in ordinary conversation there is more 
scope for direct co-construction from other speakers, especially at the onset or emergence 
of a story.  Stories are, in the first instance, produced via collaboration with other speakers 
– ‗this collaboration being established through a preface/request sequence‘ (Goodwin, 
1984: 229).  In other words, in ordinary talk the way in which a story emerges is locally 
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occasioned and managed by all the interacting parties.  The interview setting provides a 
slightly different context in which stories are directly solicited. 
 
Some recent work considering narrative and storytelling (e.g. Atkinson & Delamont, 2006; 
Bamberg, 1997; Bamberg & Georgakopoulou, 2008; Benwell & Stokoe, 2006; 
Georgakopoulou, 2006a, 2006b; Schegloff, 1997b; Stokoe & Edwards, 2006) has been 
critical of the overly privileged status of researcher-elicited narratives through qualitative 
interviews in social science research.  This is partly because many analysts have considered 
such narratives as fairly unproblematic routes to author‘s or narrator‘s identities (Bamberg 
& Georgakopoulou, 2008).  But equally the suggestion has been that ordinary interactional 
processes are obfuscated by the research interview context.  As Stokoe and Edwards (2006: 
57) have argued, ‗studies of interviewer-prompted narratives make it difficult to see what, 
in their daily lives, people are doing when they tell stories and, therefore, what stories are 
designed to do‘ (original emphasis).  In many respects, such criticisms are certainly warranted.  
However, it may be problematic if the result of this criticism is the rejection of certain 
types of data.  Instead, it may be more productive to suggest that analysts with interviewer-
elicited stories consider the actions being performed or accomplished in those stories and 
recognise that there is a distinction between ‗stories-in-interviews‘ (my term) and 
‗narratives-in-interaction‘ (Stokoe & Edwards, 2006: 57).  However, this does not preclude 
the discovery of similar designs, features, functions and actions being located in both. 
 
Indeed, in the set of interviews collected and analysed for this project similarities were 
identified across the data some of which can be found in mundane interaction.  Following 
the opening request in the interviews, respondents (invariably) construct a narrative about 
what happened.  These narratives vary in length and content but many of them seem to 
begin in similar ways with similar phrases and similar actions performed. 
 
Firstly, the phrases used that occur in response to a request for ‗what happened‘ are 
prefaced by utterances such as:  
 
Richard – (see extract 1) 
 
1 I:   if you want to tell me what happened 
2 R:  right .hh (1.0) erm:: (0.6) in nine::t:een: (0.8) eight:::y one when I wuz  
3  finishing off my degree  
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Anna (see extract 2) 
 
1 I:  if you just wanna tell me what happened 
2 A:  okay well erm (0.8) I s‘ppose (1.0) t-the main one really for me happened  
3  (1.5)  
4  er about just over a year ago (1.0) .hh and it was in connection with er a  
5  telephone call (0.5) that I had (1.2) and basically erm  
 
Kerry (see extract 14) 
 
1 I:   so if you wanna start just by telling me what happened  
2 K:  okay .hhhh erm  
3  (1.3) 
4  it‘s just one of those things where you look back and you think  
5  now I wonder what was going on there (.) really 
 
These excerpts demonstrate that the initial utterance tends to contain an affirmative 
response to the interviewer‘s request, such as ‗yeah‘ or ‗okay‘.  The onset of a turn here is 
directly addressed to the request made by the interviewer and is only made up of one or 
two words.  It would seem that these turn onsets are acknowledging the request to tell what 
happened, giving consent and taking up the invitation.  The possibility of launching straight 
into the telling of the story or event is open to the interviewees, but none of them do this.  
This would suggest that there is something important or routine about the need to 
acknowledge the request being made of them.  In this way, utterances such as ‗okay‘, ‗right‘ 
and ‗yeah‘ act as an acknowledgement in response to a request.   
 
Some of the interviews bypass this explicit acknowledgement, but do not immediately 
embark upon the substance of the story either.  Instead, fillers such as ‗erm‘, ‗well‘ or a 
short pause are included.  Furthermore, accounts that begin with an acknowledgement also 
go on to include fillers.  Fillers have been seen as discourse or response markers which can 
perform several functions in talk (Schiffrin, 1987).  One suggestion has been that fillers 
such as ‗well‘ act as a delay device, buying the speaker time before the narrative proper 
begins.  Additionally, they are also found in ordinary conversation as responses to requests, 
refusals or compliments, which have been interpreted as postponing tactics and devices to 
avert any potential face-threatening (see Brown & Levinson 1987, Levinson 1983).  
However, it is difficult to empirically ground claims of ‗averting face-threatening‘ in these 
instances.  Nonetheless, there may be a case for seeing fillers as hesitation devices.   
 
Indeed, all these expressions serve to indicate to the listener that a turn is about to start or 
that the beginning of the account is unfolding and can therefore be seen as having some 
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transitional function (Schiffrin, 1987), in this case from pre-interview talk to interview.  
Furthermore, fillers such as these are not always found in Transition Relevant Places (TRPs 
– small pauses in talk where it is possible for another speaker to initiate a turn at talk) in 
storytelling talk in ordinary interaction.  Fillers can act as a means of holding the floor, and 
when particularly prolonged they decrease the speaker‘s chances of the story being 
interrupted.  Additionally, in ordinary talk there are identifiable shifts which indicate a story 
is about to be told e.g. verb tense or orientation to the temporal and spatial story details 
(Jefferson, 1978; Labov, 1972; Linde, 1993; Polanyi, 1985).  But in the interview context 
these indications are not as necessary.  Instead, deployment of these markers here portrays 
an awareness of ordinary interview expectations and the requirement of taking up the role 
of interviewee.  This contrasts with naturally occurring stories in talk where the emergence 
of a story is locally occasioned and managed (see Sacks, 1974, 1986; Jefferson, 1978; 
Goodwin, 1984) and may be recipient or speaker initiated (Fujii, 2007).  In this way, these 
hesitation markers display the respondent taking up their turn and thus accepting their role 
as both interviewee and storyteller.   
 
It is possible that „well‘, „erm‘, or a pause, signal a ‗change of state token‘ much like the use 
of ‗oh‘ in naturally occurring talk (see Heritage, 1984).  ‗Oh‘ is often used to display a 
change of mental state in conversation.  The change of state in these instances is the shift 
that is required of the respondent to interviewee and storyteller.  In other words, the 
respondent‘s participatory status is open to change with the onset of this request if they 
accept the invitation.  This displayed change may also be recognition of the degree of 
formality that is afforded by the interview setting in contrast with any pre-interview 
interaction, for instance.  Hesitation markers also imply that there is cognitive activity 
taking place.  Indeed, they have been conceived as fillers or hesitation devices that allow 
the speaker time to plan ahead what is going to come next (Brown & Yule, 1983a, 1983b; 
Wardhaugh, 1985).  Additionally, a ‗change of state‘ token (Heritage, 1984) is viewed as 
displaying a mental state shift.  But to attribute actual cognitive activity requires a 
commitment to a certain kind of cognitivism, which suggests that thoughts are occurring 
when speech indicates thus.  Instead, it may be more analytically precise to see these 
hesitation devices as giving the impression that the speaker is planning the trajectory of the 
story, and ‗displaying‘ a shift in mental state and see them doing discursive work rather 
than betraying actual mental processes (Edwards & Potter, 1992a) – as this is not 
something we can definitively know.  Therefore, it may be more verifiable to see these 
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hesitation markers as a way of managing participatory status.  Such a premise would 
propose that these devices are deployed by the respondent in order to show doing story 
planning and to mark a shift – a change of status – to one of interviewee or storyteller.   
In summary: following a request for ‗what happened‘, responses have a distinct and 
identifiable structure or pattern.  Virtually all the accounts begin with an acknowledgement, 
then a hesitation marker before then embarking upon the story preface.  This is significant 
as there are no instances that do not have at least one or two elements of this structure – 
demonstrating quite a convincing finding.  More formally this can be laid out thus (where 
A and B are the interviewer and interviewee respectively): 
 
A – Request 
B – Acknowledgement + Hesitation Marker + Story Preface 
 
As noted, it would appear that the hesitation marker acts as a way of managing 
participatory status in this kind of talk for the respondents.  This means that it serves to 
enable a shift in state and role, and the transition from ordinary speaker to interviewee and 
storyteller. 
 
Following this, respondents launch into the beginning of the story – the story preface – a 
tour of which comes in the next section.  Indeed, in considering the structure of these 
accounts it is important to examine the sequential unfolding of the story and how it is 
produced with a beginning, middle and an end.  However, it can appear somewhat arbitrary 
to definitively decide where beginnings end, where middles start and stop and where 
endings begin.  Particularly in lengthier extended narratives, there is interpretation involved 
in determining where an experiential account commences and ceases.  Simultaneously 
however, there is a structure that seems common to these narratives, even if pinpointing 
the individual start and finish points of sections or segments is more intricate. 
 
 
4.3 Beginnings as story prefaces 
 
Following the initial responses as set out above, the substantive beginnings of these 
accounts commence with story prefaces.  Sacks (1974) identified preface sequences at the 
beginnings of stories in ordinary conversation.  He noted that these usually included an 
introduction of the story topic or some form of story characterisation and details such as 
the time and/or place in which the story was set.  In the accounts collected for this study 
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however, there is limited story characterisation offered at the start of the accounts.  This is 
perhaps because the relevance of the story‘s telling does not need to be established in the 
interview setting in the same way that it does in ordinary conversational contexts.  
Nonetheless, respondents do provide details concerning the scene, context or background 
in which the story took place. 
   
This is achieved in various different ways.  One of the ways this is done is by establishing a 
number of ostensible ‗facts‘ or details about the story.  Such detail includes information 
such as, the time it took place (usually a calendrical formulation including any combination 
of date, month and year, though more often the latter two); the location (sometimes 
geographical: towns, countries, or specific and general places, e.g. a friend‘s living room or 
in hospital); and those involved (if additional persons were present).  Clearly the exact 
detail varies but the general function is seemingly the same – the contextualisation and 
grounding of the experience in the respondent‘s terms – i.e. their identification and 
selection of details considered important, relevant or pertinent to the account in this 
interactional setting.  The following extract (1) is taken from the beginning of the Richard‘s 
interview where he is beginning to talk about his first TEHE. 
 
Extract 1 – Richard 
 
1 I:   if you want to tell me what happened 
2 R:  right .hh (1.0) erm:: (0.6) in nine::t:een: (0.8) eight:::y one when I wuz  
3  finishing off my degree  
4  (1.2) 
5  an::d (1.4) in:: (.) I s‘ppose (1.4) something started happening in about 
6  (2.1)   
7  february march time (0.6) when I -s- when I was asleep (0.7) and I‘d wake  
 
Following a hesitation device and a lengthy pause, there is an orientation to when these 
events reportedly started, in a calendrical formulation – ‗in nine::t:een: (0.8) eight:::y one‘ 
(line 2).  This is followed by an explication of what Richard was doing (in a broad sense) at 
the time – ‗I wuz finishing off my degree‘ (lines 2-3).  On line 5, Richard effectively 
illustrates the relationship between question and response by mirroring my use of 
‗happened‘ (line 1) with ‗happening‘.  Subsequently, Richard reorients to when the events 
began by way of reference to a more specific calendrical formulation – ‗about (2.1) 
February March time‘ (lines 5-7) – the long pause helps to convey Richard ‗doing‘ 
recollection.  This level of detail is inserted before orientation to the ‗what happened‘ 
request, and before divulging what we might consider to be the story detail itself.  Again 
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the story preface is designed in such a way as to introduce the listener to irrefutable details 
that ground the subsequent experience in ordinary reality.  There is also a sense in which 
the extraordinariness of the subsequent experience is demonstrated via this display of 
detailed recall of mundane aspects (Edwards & Potter, 1992a).  It is notable that this is a 
commonly identifiable aspect of narratives more generally. 
 
―Narrative thrives on the contrast between the ordinary, 
what is ‗normal‘, usual, and expected, and the ‗abnormal‘, 
unusual, and unexpected.  It has effective means at its 
disposal for rendering the unexpected intelligible.‖ 
(Czarniawska, 2004: 9) 
 
Furthermore, the establishment of certain contextual details at the outset convey the ‗facts‘ 
of the story: both important features of constructing a plausible account.  Stokoe and 
Edwards (2006: 62) have shown how people orient to the notion of stories having ‗proper‘ 
beginnings, in ordinary interactions.  An orientation to this notion is designed to serve 
particular justificatory purposes e.g. ‗doing mitigation‘.  What this also demonstrates is that 
beginnings are selected and constituted as deemed relevant for the telling.  So, in this 
context it is relevant and important to establish these background facts at the beginning of 
the story proper. 
 
Establishing the ‗facts‘ of the story are an important and almost universal feature of the 
accounts.  The next extract (2) follows a similar pattern, including some comparable details 
in the initial description. 
 
Extract 2 – Anna 
 
1 I:  if you just wanna tell me what happened 
2 A:  okay well erm (0.8) I s‘ppose (1.0) t-the main one really for me happened  
3  (1.5)  
4  er about just over a year ago (1.0) .hh and it was in connection with er a  
5  telephone call (0.5) that I had (1.2) and basically erm  
6  (1.9) 
7  er about a year previous to that I had (0.7) ha- suffered er quite an upsetting  
8  experience I‘d had a heterotopic pregnancy (1.4) and you probably think  
 
At the outset, Anna includes an acknowledgement + hesitation markers combined with a 
short pause – ‗okay well erm (0.8)‘ (line 2).  Then she indicates that this is not the only 
TEHE she has had, but that it is the one she considers most significant – ‗t-the main one 
really‘ (line 2).  Frequency of experiences only tends to be mentioned when there is more 
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that one experience to be relayed.  Following this, Anna‘s account contains references to 
approximately when the event occurred – ‗er about just over a year ago‘ (line 4) – and she 
identifies a mundane, real-world event that pertains to her experience – ‗in connection with 
er a telephone call‘ (lines 4-5).  Subsequently, she is concerned with embarking upon the 
story proper.  The references to seemingly objective facts about the story help display how 
the experience was so extraordinary (and made such an impression) that seemingly 
mundane detail could be recalled (see Wooffitt, 2005b, for more on the discursive function 
of flashbulb memories).  Indeed, features of the reported environment in which the 
experience took place are often reported, invariably with some fine detail conveying the 
sense of a deep impression left on the respondent.   
 
 
4.3.1 Variations on a pattern  
 
However, there are differences in the focus of this scene-setting activity and even if the 
differences are only slight they are nonetheless important to mention (see Antaki et al, 
2003, about the importance of genuinely and honestly representing data).  There are six 
respondents‘ beginnings that appear to differ slightly.  The majority of respondents 
immediately begin by talking about a specific event or occurrence (their experience) as the 
topic (after acknowledgement + hesitation marker).  However, three respondents (Eva, 
Tina and Celeste) interrupt the initial expected sequence with a ‗checker‘ – a statement or 
question which allows the speaker to confirm what is expected from the request (Brown & 
Yule, 1983a).  Nonetheless, despite this interruption, the sequences then commence with 
the expected A + B structure referred to earlier.  The remaining respondents (Kitty, 
George and Fred) differ in that there is no specific contextual detail provided, however, 
elements of the expected sequence are still identifiable. 
 
The next extract (3) is the first of those to contain a slight variation on the pattern 
identified previously.  Here Eva describes her first out of body experience.   
 
Extract 3 – Eva 
 
1 I:   ((tape starts abruptly)) experiences 
2  (1.2) 
3 E:   ok th-these are the out of body experiences I I think? (0.5) 
4 I: ((nodding))  
5 E: yep .hhh er:m (0.6) the first one when I was er about nine (1.2) a- it might  
6  have been eight or ten but anyway (0.6) an::d  
7  (1.7) 
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8  I was (0.7) erm (0.3) lying on some buttercups (.) the very rich (1.3) I think 
9  they‘re rhizome ones (.) er::m (0.6) short yellow ones (0.5) >and the sun  
10  was shining and it was a beautiful day and I was just lying there (0.6) .hh (.) 
11  and >whether it‘s significant or not I don‘t know but there was a little stone 
12  trough with water there (0.7) and (.) er (1.0) I was watching the clouds 
13  (1.5)  
14  in the blue sky (0.7) and erm 
 
Eva begins, somewhat unusually, after a pause then a brief acknowledgement but no 
hesitation marker and categorises her experiences with descriptive labels – ‗ok th-these are 
the out of body experiences I-I think?‘ (line 3).  Furthermore, lines 3 and 4 show a repair 
sequence, where Eva seeks clarification and this postpones the expected sequence.  
Additionally, my non-verbal ‗nodding‘ response provides a second invitation for Eva to 
proceed with her story.  This has a perceptible ‗checking‘ function and indicates that the 
respondent has previously divulged something about these experiences to the interviewer 
prior to the interview – as in these are the out of body experiences that I mentioned to you earlier54is 
that what I should be talking about now?  Additionally, it suggests that there might be various 
other TEHEs that the respondent could talk about.  Then on line 5, Eva continues with an 
acknowledgment, hesitation and filler - ‗yep .hhh er:m‘ (line 5), which shows the receipt of 
my nodding and ‗permission‘ to continue.  Additionally, it demonstrates that despite the 
existence of an interactional obstacle (repair), the A + B structure resumes immediately 
afterwards, just prior to the storytelling detail.  This works to provide further evidence for 
this sequence as routine. 
 
Again Eva orients to the multiplicity of her experiences by stating ‗the first one‘ (line 5) and 
then includes a couple of references to her reported age at the time of the event – ‗I was er 
about nine (1.2) a-it might have been eight or ten but anyway‘ (lines 5-6).  She begins with 
an approximation of her age – ‗about nine‘ – then goes on to formulate this further with 
explicit references to possibly being ‗eight or ten‘.  The pause of just over a second in the 
middle of this serves to communicate cognitive activity taking place in the consideration of 
this.  Stating these possible ages allows for a margin of error in the accuracy of the detail.  
Furthermore, she goes on to state ‗but anyway‘ as if to dismiss the ultimate importance of 
these finer details.  It would seem that across all the accounts there are consistently 
references to notions of when the event occurred – whether in the form of a year, date or 
the experient‘s age often coupled with pauses to ‗show‘ remembering and recall ostensibly 
                                                 
54 Indeed, the respondent had informed me that she had experienced several TEHEs and the ones she was 
going to talk about were out of body experiences. 
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taking place.  Additionally, these factual details are often presented in tandem with other 
possibilities such as being ‗about nine… eight or ten‘ (this extract) or ‗february march time‘ 
(extract 2, line 7)  Establishing the spatial and temporal anchors for the experience sure up 
the account‘s factuality, as the event is then located in the ‗real‘ world, at a semi-specific 
point in time.   
 
Subsequently, Eva goes on to seemingly display recall of the detail of the environment in 
which the experience occurred (lines 8-14).  The specificity of this detail helps to convey 
that there were ordinary features that are recalled efficiently from the context in which the 
experience happened.  This works to portray how memorable and significant the event 
was.  The detail provided as scene setting contextualisation for these stories does appear to 
be directed towards a display of accuracy and therefore truth or plausibility.  By offering up 
considerable specific detail, respondents are working to show that despite being 
extraordinary, their stories are both believable and credible. 
 
However, the overwhelming matter of interest in these extracts is their seeming deviation 
from the A + B structure identified earlier at the beginnings of accounts.  This is 
particularly interesting because upon closer inspection it is clear that the expected 
sequential structure is merely postponed for repair/clarification.  Extract 4 is another 
instance of this.  Here Tina is describing her near death experience in the ocean. 
 
Extract 4 – Tina  
1 I:   so if you just wanna tell me (0.3) what happened 
2 T:   ah now I have this written down and I just wrote it down recently   
3 I: mm 
4 T: but I suppose you still want it for the ((indicating to tape recorder)) 
5 I:   ((smiling and nodding)) 
6 T:   ◦ok alright◦ (0.6) well it was about nineteen eighty one or nineteen eighty  
7  two 
8 I:   mm  
9 T:   and I worked on a ship (0.6) erm (1.2) which went up and down the pacific  
10  coast (0.4) an::d we were (1.3) a group of us went to the beach? 
11 I: mm 
12 T: this was in ((place)) ((clears throat)) and I got caught in a rip tide we all got 
13  caught in a rip tide (0.9) a:hm 
14  (2.3)  
15  I was in the water for a long time jst struggling for a long time (0.3) erm  
16  (0.4) I (.) in terrible pain and (1.2) <couldn‘t swim anymore and I had all  
17  seized up an‘ .hhh (1.2) I absolutely knew I was going to die I knew there 
18  wasn‘t any h:ope that I would get out of there or anything and (0.4) I was  
19  only twenty one or twenty two or three (0.6) just terrible 
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After my initial request (line 1), the beginning is prefaced with a checker – ‗ah now I have 
this written down and I just wrote it down recently [mm] but I suppose you still want it for 
the ((indicating to tape recorder))‘ (lines 2-4).  This utterance is interesting for a couple of 
reasons.  Firstly, it is clearly and uniquely demonstrative of the respondent‘s explicit 
orientation to the recording device present at the time of the interview (for more on this 
see Speer & Hutchby, 2003a, 2003b; Hammersley, 2003a).  Secondly, it is another repair 
sequence for clarification, which again postpones the routine A + B structure. 
   
However, immediately following the ‗checker‘ Tina orients to similar detail found in the 
majority of other accounts (suggesting that the acknowledgement + hesitation marker are 
routine formulations in these stories-in-interviews).  Only after my second indication to 
proceed via non-verbal gestures ((smiling and nodding)) does she then embark upon the story.  
On lines 6-13 she does scene-setting activity, provides an approximation of the year the 
event took place (line 6), some detail concerning what she had been doing at the time the 
event occurred (lines 9-10) and where it took place (lines 10-13).  These details again seem 
to function in a way which institutes the story‘s factuality and grounds it in ordinary reality.  
Additionally though, once the middle or core of the story is begun, this does not preclude 
additional contextual detail from being included but that there are often alternative 
functions to the inclusion of these details later in the story.  Tina offers an approximation 
of her age ‗I was only twenty one or twenty two or three‘ (lines 18-19).  This is inserted at 
this point in the narrative to highlight her relative youth and the earlier suggestion of a 
possible and tragic, premature death – ‗I absolutely knew I was going to die‘ (line 17).  This 
contrast is effectively managed through the introduction of her approximate age and 
reinforced by her negative evaluation of the situation – ‗just terrible‘ (line 19). 
 
These ‗checker‘ questions do not occur very often at the beginning of the interviews 
(though they do occur in other places, some of which will be referred to later) but there is 
one other interview (Celeste) which contains an early checker question.  This sequence also 
shows a postponement of the expected structure akin to extracts 3 and 4.  Additionally, this 
and the next few extracts (5-8) also display slight differences in the substantive content of 
the story narrative.  In extract 5, Celeste is talking about her experiences and interests.  
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Extract 5 – Celeste 
 
1 I:  so if we sta::rt em by you talking about (0.6) your experience really [in 
2 C:                              [okay (.) 
3  okay erm well you had three different items I mean obviously they go  
4  together quite a lot as well (0.7) but does it matter to you (1.0) no? 
5 I:  just you talk about it[ in your own word[s 
6 C:             [okay    [erm just well the reason I  
7  responded to the advert was becaus:e (1.1) it- things like that always catch  
8  my attention (.) erm moments of being (0.3) non-being (0.9) erm (1.3)  
9  contemplation meditation and and and obv- I mean (0.4) it overlaps with  
10  sort of my academic interests that have come from my personal interests  
11  (0.3) where I look into mysticism in quite (.) you know thorough detail as 
12  well (0.6) reading things but (.) equally participating in different (0.6) erm  
13  (0.7) what I would call spiritual (0.3) erm ents:: (0.5) activities or or tut (0.4) 
14  erm >but these are things that you seek out whereas I think what you were 
15  asking for is more about experiences that (0.5) you maybe you cultivate but 
16  they also (0.4) sometimes find you or that‘s how it feels  
17  (0.3)  
18  OR or actually feels more like (0.4) you start reaching a level where you‘re 
19  (0.5) seeing things that were always there (0.4) and it so it‘s not as if you‘re 
20  £some privileged person who‘s reached a certain level ↑no you‘re just (0.4) 
21  your eyes open more(0.4) and you see these things (0.3) and and that‘s  
22  maybe why (.) suddenly it feels like their perception has expanded  
23  (0.7) 
24  but (0.7) it to me it feels more (0.3) >£I‘ll be more specific soon but  
25  EHEH  it feels more like (0.8) as if you‘re just starting to be aware of a  
26  certain (0.6) undercurrent 
 
Celeste begins her account with the same features identified previously (acknowledgement 
+ hesitation marker) – ‗okay (.) okay erm well‘ (lines 2-3) – but then proceeds to insert a 
checker oriented to the advert that was placed in order to obtain respondents (lines 3-4).  
This again is a repair sequence seeking clarification, which postpones the story narrative 
aspect of the A + B structure.  In orienting to the advert (see appendix 1) Celeste is 
working to establish what is required of her, interactionally speaking, in this setting.  Such 
an insertion emphasises that it is the interviewer who sets the agenda and scope of the 
topic for discussion, regardless of the ‗opportunities‘ for interviewee – led discussions.  
Also of interest here is the way in which, akin to institutional settings (see for instance, 
Stokoe & Edwards, 2006: 61-2), what is deemed appropriate for the setting is topicalised.  
Additionally, what is appropriate may be more easily identifiable or more overtly managed 
in an institutional setting, for example legal.  In citing Derber‘s (1979) work, Ewick & 
Silbey (1995) state, 
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―Content rules, as they operate within different cultural 
and institutional settings, define what constitutes an 
appropriate or successful narrative.  They define 
intelligibility, relevance, and believability, while specifying 
what serves as validating responses or critical rejection‖. 
(Ewick & Silbey, 1995: 207) 
  
My response (line 5) represents an attempt to return to the telling of experience and serves 
to appear concerned with the interviewee‘s point of view (‗in your own words‘).  This is 
also a second invitation to proceed with the telling and is a topic initiating utterance.  It has 
a similar function to the nodding and smiling illustrated in extracts 3 and 4. 
 
Celeste then continues by invoking or describing aspects of her self and identifying herself 
as a person with certain interests and proclivities.  She mentions contemplation and, 
meditation (line 9), mysticism (line 11) and ‗spiritual…activities‘ (line 13) which work to 
position her in a certain way and align her with certain interests and potential identities.  In 
this extract her referents to self are clearly owned by the way she uses expressions of 
agency – using ‗I‘ and ‗my‘ and citing her ‗academic interests‘ and ‗personal interests‘ (line 
10) to make claims about her identity.  She also refers directly to the expectations of the 
interview – ‗whereas I think what you were asking for is‘ (lines 14-15).  Celeste is here 
engaged in identity work, but is also providing an unsolicited rationale for responding to 
the advert.  It is possible that this occurs because of the way in which the initial invitation is 
phrased.  For instance, instead of being requested to provide ‗what happened‘, Celeste is 
asked in a looser formulation to talk about her experience (line 1).  Celeste‘s ‗checker‘ 
question on lines 3-4 could thus be understood as a request for clarification about the 
interactional requirements.  Furthermore, Celeste‘s response to the invitation is general in 
the same way in which the request for information about her experience is more general.  
Interestingly, Celeste does show an awareness of the expectation to be specific – ‗£I‘ll be 
more specific soon but EHEH‘ (lines 24-25) – and laughs, which shows her engaged in the 
activity of doing possible troubles resistance (Jefferson, 1984).  That is, Celeste explicitly 
demonstrates her understanding that there is an expectation for her response to be more 
specific and that she is in some way contravening this expectation. 
 
So, Celeste orients initially to the general rather than the specific and her talk concerns her 
‗self‘ and her interests as the contextual detail.  This generality is also found in Kitty‘s 
narrative (extract 6) beginning where her immediate orientation is to her creative writing 
and her self in general terms.   
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Extract 6 – Kitty 
  
1 I:   so (.) if you (.) just want to describe your experience  
2 K:  o[kay (.) erm I guess er::             
3 I:   [◦first of all◦  
4 K: the best thing is: (.) to talk about first (.) is er::m my writing (.) cos I write  
5  very creatively (0.8) and um (0.6) as well as academically and it‘s always  
6  been a really important part (0.8) of (1.0) my life and keeping myself sane  
7  (0.6) but when I write (0.3) erm (.) creatively it‘s a very strange experience  
 
Kitty begins her response with an acknowledgement + hesitation marker – ‗okay (.) erm‘ 
(line 2), which in part runs concurrently with me uttering ‗◦first of all◦‘ (line 3) rather 
quietly.  However, what she does next contravenes the expected sequence.  Firstly, she 
deploys a tentative expression – ‗I guess‘ – followed by an evaluative one – ‗the best thing‘ 
(lines 2 & 4) – in introducing what she is going to ‗talk about first‘ – ‗her writing‘ (line 4).  
These introductory expressions offer an evaluative rationale for the subsequent talk in 
positive and tentative terms so as not to convey absolute dismissal of what might be 
expected.  A design of this kind comes across as a careful attempt to orient to that which is 
important and relevant to her.  So, instead of talking about a specific experience, Kitty talks 
in more general terms about her experiences - she proposes that she is someone who 
regularly experiences TEHEs whilst engaged in writing creatively.  Any scene-setting 
activity is focused around portraying a particular kind of person and identity – ‗I write very 
creatively (0.8) and um (0.6) as well as academically and it‘s always been a very important 
part (0.8) of (1.0) my life‘ (lines 4-6).  This rationale provision and identity work is similar 
to that found in extract 6.  Both respondents go on to provide specific descriptions of 
individual experiences, although whilst Celeste‘s are unsolicited, Kitty‘s are explicitly 
requested. 
 
George similarly begins (after the insertion of a hesitation marker) by orienting to the 
proposed frequency of experiences and identity work.  In the next extract (7) George‘s 
initial talk concerns aspects of his identity that are in some senses at odds with his later 
experiences. 
 
Extract 7 – George 
 
1 I: okay ((beep beep)) (just use that one55) so if you wanna tell me erm (.) about  
2  your experiences 
                                                 
55 This is a guess at what was said as it is mumbled, but is a reference to the tape recorder, as there were two 
running and one stopped working. 
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3  (0.9) 
4 G: er:m (0.7) I think what prompted me really I‘d had a number of experiences 
5  during my life (0.4) e::r 
6  (2.0) 
7  and I‘d always been (0.8) very much (0.6) a a c-cynic I mean I‘m an er  
8  (0.6) atheist er (1.2) I- I‘ve always been somebody who wanted to 
9  (1.6) 
10  have a go at new age (0.9) people of religion [in general  
11 I:                    [mm 
12 G: >I don‘t know why [I know it‘s wrong I shouldn‘t do that but [        
13 I:          [mm                         [heh  
14 G: c‘s I‘m very very cynical n:n (0.8) and I want everything proved to me I  
15  want to experience it before I can believe it [      
16 I:              [mm 
17  (0.4) 
18 G: then about er (1.6) gaw twenty five years ago now (1.0) I:: (0.7) I had an  
19  experience in my bathroom I was just standing there waiting for the bath to 
20  fill and we have one of these h-heat lamps a really bright one [       
21 I:                   [mm 
22 G: (1.9)  
23  and I‘m gonna have to go back to a previous experience (.) sorry 
 
In response to the request to talk about his experiences, George begins immediately to 
offer a rationale for his participation in the research concerning the frequency of his 
experiences – ‗erm (0.7) I think what prompted me really I‘d had a number of experiences 
during my life‘ (lines 4-5).  Akin to the other extracts above, this is not something that is 
explicitly sought by the initial request but is voluntarily offered.  Following this, George 
orients to aspects of his identity such as being a ‗cynic‘ and an ‗atheist‘ (lines 7-8) – and the 
kind of person he is or was – ‗I‘ve I‘ve always been somebody who wanted to (1.6) have a 
go at new age (0.9) people of religion [in general‘ (lines 8-10).  This is the detail that George 
provides as a backdrop prior to talking about his experiences specifically.  It is interesting 
that George orients to this identity work upfront in his interview as he later returns to this 
detail after relaying his experiences to explicitly demonstrate how he is changed (see 
Chapter Six for more concerning this notion of transformation).   
 
Only later does George begin to talk about his experiences referring to expected contextual 
details, including orienting to the timing of the event – ‗twenty five years ago now‘ (line 18) 
– and the whereabouts and location – ‗I had an experience in my bathroom‘ (lines 18-19).  
It would seem therefore that there is something quite important about establishing a 
particular kind of identity for George at the outset, before he embarks upon his story.  
George does another interesting thing relating to the notion of story chronology later by 
suddenly making reference to a ‗previous experience‘ (line 23).  Here George intimates that 
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it is necessary to run through events in a chronological sequence – a common feature of 
stories or narratives generally (Ewick & Silbey, 1995) – in order to accurately represent his 
experiences.  This orientation to the relevance of sequential order is interesting as it is both 
a reference to normative story expectations and a device concerning the ostensibly accurate 
presentation of self and events in this context.   
 
Finally, Fred does something quite different from any of the other respondents at the 
beginning of his interview, which is demonstrated in extract 8 below. 
 
Extract 8 – Fred  
 
1 I:  so if you wanna (0.5) if you want to tell me ab[out ◦your experiences◦ 
2 F:                      [okay well I‘ll (0.5)   
3  let me start firstly wiv wiv erm (0.5) some fings my farver (.) mention‘d 
4 I:  >mm↑hm? 
5 F:   er:m (.) he was in the second world war (.) er abroad (.) erm he was a sniper 
6  and he was wiv a friend of ‗is a colleague I suppose  
 
Fred embarks upon his account with an acknowledgement + hesitation marker – ‗okay 
well‘ (line 2) – and then goes on to seek permission to talk about something different from 
that requested – ‗let me start firstly wiv wiv erm (0.5) some things my farver (.) mentioned‘ 
(lines 2-3).  He indicates awareness of his talk‘s contravention of expectations by this 
permission-seeking activity (‗let me‘) and shows the temporary nature of this diversion 
from the request to talk about his own experiences (‗start firstly‘).  Subsequently his request 
is acknowledged with ‗>mm↑hm?‘ (line 4), though the intonation and prosody conveys 
mild surprise as these details were not requested or expected.  Fred goes on to report his 
father‘s experiences in a similar form to the other beginnings, with details of what his 
father was doing at the time, where he was and who he was with (lines 5-6).  This is 
perhaps provided to show that others have reported these experiences (subsequently Fred 
talks about his wife‘s experiences also) as a way of deflecting their unusual or 
unconventional status.  
 
The variation in these extracts actually serves to bolster the case for the routine A + B 
structure (acknowledgement, hesitation device and story preface).  Extracts 3-5 
demonstrate that despite obstacles (repair sequences seeking clarification) the structure is 
merely postponed and resumed after the repair sequence.  The remaining extracts (6-8, but 
also extract 5) still contain sufficient elements of the structure for it to be identifiable as 
routine.  Indeed, they mostly differ only in the way the contextual detail is provided.  That 
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is, they do not refer to time, place or specific experience in the beginning section.  
However, a number of them are clearly doing identity work in these openings.  The 
orientation to identity work prior to any account detail demonstrates the importance to the 
experiential narrative of aligning themselves with particular categorisations to ensure that 
the story is interpreted correctly.  It is possible that in providing this alignment at the 
beginning, particular presentations of self, help augment credibility and believability, via the 
concept of perceived authenticity.  
 
 
4.3.2 Summary 
 
The focus in this section has been upon the beginning of accounts.  It is notable that the 
majority of accounts include some scene-setting activity or story preface whether located 
immediately after the acknowledgement + hesitation marker or deferred slightly in the 
narrative (as with the deviant cases).  These scene-setting details are important and are 
included to serve several functions.  The first is directly concerned with displaying 
cognitive competence.  In relaying some of the finer detail associated with where and when 
the experience took place, including other contextual details such as what the experient was 
doing at the time, or the inclusion of broader social events such as current affairs, enables 
the experient to exhibit their memory for the event.  Effectively, ‗showing‘ that their recall 
for the detail surrounding their experience is intact (by reference to details such as their age, 
the year and what they were doing at the time) works to establish the credibility or 
factuality of their account.  Secondly, this seeming display of cognitive prowess, equally 
allows for the extraordinary experience to remain absolutely rooted in and strongly 
connected to the ‗real‘ lives and tangible existence of these individuals.  So, whilst the 
experience might be considered unusual or ‗out of this world‘ even, it is utterly inextricable 
from mundane reality.  The implication is that it really happened to cognitively competent 
and grounded, cognisant beings.  
 
Any deviant cases display these elements also, but equally include checkers, references to 
experiential generalities and identity work.  The checkers seem to be included to verify 
interactional expectations, whilst the reference to multiple experiences points to their 
normal status for the respondents in question.  The concern with self-presentation upfront 
indicates the importance of how the story is received and interpreted and thus how an 
individual is judged or categorised as a result.  The one-off inclusion of third party 
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experiences may be further working to emphasise the ‗normality‘ of these experiences as 
opposed to their perceived irregularity.   
 
 
4.4 Middles – Story Peaks 
 
The middle section of these narratives contains the ‗what happened‘ detail of the 
experience being articulated.  At this point utterances concerning what occurred are 
imparted.  The exact detail and content of this material varies as does the length and 
amount of time devoted to it, but there appears to be at least one pivotal ‗swing‘ moment 
in each story (there are sometimes more than one in an entire narrative).  This pivotal 
moment, sometimes also called a ‗narrative peak‘ (Li, 1986), might be considered as a 
climactic moment in the telling of a story.  In many of these accounts there are several such 
peaks as more than one experience is being relayed.  Additionally, some respondents seem 
to be reporting their thoughts at, or in close proximity to, these peak moments.    
 
 
4.4.1 I was just doing x… when y 
 
Sometimes, this moment is delivered via a device identified by Wooffitt (1991, 1992) as ‗I 
was just doing x when y‘.  This device is considered to be a method of establishing 
ordinariness whilst revealing an extraordinary event and can be found in various extracts.  
In the next extract (9), taken from the core ‗story‘ of the narrative, Helen is talking about 
sensing the presence of a dead person or spirit in a house that she and her husband viewed. 
 
Extract 9 – Helen 
  
1 H:  Bob said you know there‘s someone here ‗cos Bob‘s sensitive as  
2  well (0.5) and erm  
3  (0.9) 
4  and we both sort of sat in and tu[tuned in and and erm (0.3) 
5  I:          [mm  
6 H: didn‘t really get all that much at the time but (0.4) er then we went home we 
7  really liked the place and then this chap (1.0) must have followed us:: becos 
8 x/y I was peeling potatoes at the kitchen sink and there was this (0.4) person I  
9  could feel him (.) >standing behind my right shoulder and he ses  (.) I‘m Alf 
10  you know he said (1.2) and so we referred to him as Alf after that 
 
Helen is talking about not having been able to effectively communicate with the person 
whilst they were in the house – ‗tu[tuned in and and erm (0.3) didn‘t really get all that much 
at the time‘ (lines 4-6).   She suggests that this person followed them home – ‗this chap 
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must have followed us becos‘ (line 7).   At this point, however, it is only really the use of 
‗tu[tuned in‘ (line 4) that would indicate that this person is not physically present in an 
ordinary capacity.  This individual‘s status as not tangibly physically present is confirmed 
via the device identified by Wooffitt (1991, 1992).  This device relies upon the expression 
of a mundane activity (I was just doing x…) followed by the disclosure of an extraordinary 
event (…when y).   
 
Helen delivers this by reference to the mundane activity of ‗peeling potatoes at the kitchen 
sink‘ (line 8), a normal, ordinary chore, which achieves several things.  Firstly, as Wooffitt 
has pointed out these mundane activities (in this case peeling potatoes) are ones that most 
people can identify with – allowing Helen to identify herself as just like anybody else i.e. 
normal and ordinary.  Secondly, it also has the effect of constituting her (at this ‗pivotal‘ 
point) as a passive recipient of events beyond her control.  In other words, it conveys this: 
that the experience happened when she was engaged in a normal, mundane activity – she 
was not expecting it, nor did she imagine it, as it ‗interrupted‘ this activity in the physical 
realm – and it could have happened to any other regular person.   This idea – that 
interacting parties work to align themselves with the category of ‗ordinary‘ – was originally 
discovered by Harvey Sacks (1984) and has been seen to be fairly ubiquitous in everyday 
interaction since.  Thirdly, it also gives the impression that in the face of extraordinary 
events the details of mundane activities, such as ‗peeling potatoes‘, can be precisely recalled 
(Wooffitt, 2005b). 
 
Following this, Helen goes on to report the extraordinary event – ‗and there was this (0.4) 
person I could feel him standing by my right shoulder‘ (lines 8-9) – via a sensing expression 
(‗I could feel him‘) with a positional statement (‗standing by my right shoulder‘).  These two 
aspects of the y component of Helen‘s narrative help to communicate how extraordinary 
the event was.  That is, Helen could reportedly sense the presence of someone who was 
not tangibly physically present and yet could locate him spatially – in other words Helen 
claims the sense of presence was extraordinarily powerful.  Finally, Helen includes the 
reported speech of this ‗person‘ – ‗and he ses (.) I‘m Alf you know he said‘ (lines 9-10) – 
which can be seen to add a level of drama and involvement to the story (Holt, 1996, 2000), 
particularly as this ‗person‘ is not physically there.  This is the first ‗peak‘ within the story 
that can be found in Helen‘s narrative and it hinges on this normalising device – as a way 
of demonstrating ordinariness despite the onset of extraordinary events.  Additionally it is 
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representative of the social organisation of storytelling which ‗regulates not only when and 
what kinds of stories can be told, it also governs…how stories are told‘ (Ewick & Silbey, 
1995: 208). 
 
Examples of the x/y device regularly appear in the accounts and contribute towards 
credibility despite detailing extraordinary incidences.  JM‘s account illustrates this 
effectively in extract 10 where he is talking about recovering from a serious operation in 
hospital. 
  
Extract 10 – John More   
 
1 JM:  and so often when you‘re in hospital (0.5) you‘re kind of asleep and then  
2  you wake up then you go back to sleep you know you have periods of sleep  
3  an‘ then .hhh and erm 
4  (1.4) 
5  there was one particular night (.) when I was sort of in that in between stage  
6  between sleep (0.6) and consciousness you know that (.) kind of (.) that grey  
7 x area between the two .hh and erm (0.9) I was just laid there with me eyes  
8 y closed (.) and then I had this vision 
9  (0.8) 
10  there was this (.) female face (.) with er golden hair (0.5) like that you see (.) 
11  j-just just there looking straight at me 
 
Again the peak in this extract is in the form of an x/y device.  JM talks about being ‗just 
laid there with my eyes closed‘ (lines 7-8).  This common activity can easily be identified 
with by anyone.  Additionally, it is a likely and expected activity connoting ‗rest‘ for 
someone recuperating from a serious operation.  There is also a degree of innocence and 
passivity construed by this activity thus pointing to the spontaneity of the subsequent 
experience.  JM then includes the extraordinary element – ‗and then I had this vision (0.8) 
there was this (.) female face with (.) er golden hair‘ (lines 8-10).  It is evident that the 
experient must strike a balance between factuality and normality - that is, the storyteller 
needs to appear as a credible witness to extraordinary events, whilst also convincing the 
listeners of their ordinariness and normality.  It is important that they not be categorised as 
‗crank‘ and that their testimony is taken seriously (Potter, 1996).  The x/y device seems to 
assist in enabling this balance.   
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4.4.2 Reporting thoughts 
 
There are other accounts that also contain this x/y element as part of the peak or middle of 
the narrative.  However, there are also other common identifiable features that can be 
found in this location also.  The next three extracts (11,12, and 13) show the use of these 
features effectively.  It is known that reported speech often appears in crucial moments 
within storytelling (e.g. Buttny, 1998; Chafe, 1982; Holt, 1996, 2000; Labov, 1972; Li, 1986; 
Mayes, 1990; Tannen, 1989) and this is demonstrated by its inclusion in extract 9 (line 17), 
but in many of the accounts, respondents also seem inclined to include their ostensible 
‗thoughts‘ at the time of the event.56  In extract 11 Rose is talking about having had a 
‗trapped spirit‘ in her house, someone coming to resolve this and her subsequent 
extraordinary revelation or realisation.   
 
Extract 11 - Rose  
 
1 R: SO er::m (0.6) right this is >with-the with-the trapped spirit (.) this bloke  
2  had to come out to the house and a::w you know (0.4) all sorts of  
3  shenanigans went on and e:r (0.7) e::r I learnt the expression (1.1) taking  
4  somebody to the light and (0.3) being you know having an inquisitive mind 
5  always want to understand more so I started (0.5) doing a lot of research  
6  into (0.4) erm (0.5) er people who could rescue trapped spirits and just just 
7  just understanding >trying to understand how mediums work erm 
8  (0.6) 
9  but the thing about this bloke that really (0.5) er pressed all my buttons was 
10  that (.) he was a very good healer erm and had a lot of success with people 
11  with cancer and conditions like that but .hhh the >most exciting thing for  
12  me was that he could heal animals and telepathically communicate with  
13  animals which (0.6) .hh might‘ve s-s- could‘ve sounded like nonsense to a  
14  lot of people but to me I just thought (.) ↑E:::::hhuuuuu:::h oo:::h you know 
15  this a:::hhh my god I know why I‘m here you know I‘m love animals I‘m  
16  absolutely besotted with animals (.) and the idea of being able to (0.4) do  
17  something more for them than just (0.5) taking them to the bet-vet 
 
Here, the extraordinary moment is communicated via the reporting of Rose‘s thought at 
the time – ‗but to me I just thought (.) ↑E:::::hhuuuuu:::h oo:::h you know this a:::hhh my 
god I know why I‘m here‘ (lines 14-15).  Her thought conveys the onset of a sudden 
realisation and absolute revelation, further achieved by the exaggerated prosody in her 
utterance.  The appearance of reported thought at crucial points in the narratives can be 
found elsewhere also.  In the next extract (12) there are several reported thoughts that 
                                                 
56 These devices are covered in extensive detail in Chapter 5, so are merely observed and referred to here as a 
common feature, rather than analysed as a discursive device. 
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reportedly occur prior to one of George‘s experiences that happened in his bathroom.  
Consecutively this extract follows on from extract 8 though there is some talk in between 
the two excerpts when George reports nearly dying in a car crash, experiencing a life 
review, being convinced that he was to die and then being angry when he didn‘t.  
Sequentially, this is followed by an incredibly vivid dream just afterwards (extract 4, 
Chapter 5). 
 
Extract 12 – George 
  
1 G:  I suppose it was maybe a month later (0.8) and I-I was standing in the  
2 x bathroom and I was looking up at this light and I thought (0.9) this is well I  
3  was looking at the back of my eyelids I thought (0.4) ↑o↓h >the b-colours I  
4  can see are pretty much the colours I can see when I was having the dream  
5  it was this golden colour (0.7) I thought what would happen if I just sort of  
6  (.) allowed myself to think about the dream at the same time (0.4) and the  
7  second I did  
8  (1.9)   
9 y I was comp- (.) white light everywhere it was just like bang ((clicks fingers))  
10  (0.8) and 
11  (2.4)  
12  th-no presence there wasn‘t I didn‘t get the sense of a person there it was 
13   just (0.5) light (0.6) everywhere and I felt (0.4) I‘ve never had cocaine but 
14  I‘m sure it was quite like this it was unbelievably (0.9) just right (.) I felt (0.5) 
15  amazing I felt wonderful I just stayed  
16  (0.3) 
17  now this-is this-is the spooky part I know this is this is I‘m really gonna be 
18  shooting myself in the foot here (0.4) by telling you this part but 
19  (3.7) 
20  was that there was a voice 
 
There are three reported thoughts (lines 2, 3, & 5) all of which come in between the 
delivery of a mundane x and an extraordinary y.  The x component – ‗I-I was standing in 
the bathroom and I was looking up at this light‘ (lines 1-2) – establishes George engaged in 
ordinary activities (looking up at the ordinary light in the bathroom).  From lines 2-6 
George then includes three reported thoughts.  They all concern a previous experience 
George has talked about concerning a significant dream he had which contained some 
vivid colours and was reported in itself as an extraordinary experience also.  The first 
thought – ‗and I thought (0.9) this is well‘ (line 2) is self repaired to include a statement of 
what he was doing at the time – ‗looking at the back of my eyelids‘ (line 3).  The second 
thought concerns the colours from the dream – ‗pretty much the colours I can see when I 
was having the dream it was this golden colour‘ (lines 4-5).  The final thought George 
reports concerns him considering ‗what would happen if I just sort of (.) allowed myself to 
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think about the dream at the same time‘ (lines 5-6).  Effectively then, the reported thoughts 
would seem to ‗set up‘ the extraordinary experience (or y element), which is then delivered 
– ‗the second I did (1.9) I was comp- (.) white light everywhere it was just like bang‘ (lines 
7-9).   
 
There are further thoughts reported elsewhere.  In extract 13, Richard is talking about the 
onset of his out of body experiences. Prior to this extract Richard was talking about several 
experiences of ‗sleep paralysis‘ where he reported waking up unable to move.  This 
phenomenon is sometimes also called ‗old hag‘ as experients sometimes report the 
sensation of pressure on the chest, which has been depicted as a hag-like creature in 
folklore (Hufford, 1982).   
 
Extract 13 – Richard 
 
21 R: and then they (.) they they just stopped 
22  (1.0) 
23  ((mouth clicking noise)) an::d I suppose it would be hh about a year later  
24  (0.7) erm (0.7) I think (.) July time (0.6) e:r of eighty two (.) erm I was  
25 x staying at a (0.7) a friends house who and I was sleeping on her settee   
26  (1.8) 
27 y an::d 
28  (2.0)  
29  I woke up in that state again (1.3) absolutely paralysed (0.9) an::d I could  
30  hear myself (0.4) groaning (1.3) erm  
31  (2.8) 
32  and I heard the door open (0.9) and I remember thinking o↑h (.) she must 
33  have heard me heheh (0.9) an::d and it wasn‘t her (0.6) it felt like 
34  (2.9) 
35  somebody was coming definitely (.) coming into the room (0.6) but (0.5) as 
36  they sort of came into my field of vision (0.9) it was like they were a  
37  luminous being (0.8) made of fibres of light or something like this (.) just a 
38   (1.1) a silhouette of a person (0.8) and they came (0.7) and I could hear the 
39  breathing which was very deep  
 
Richard sets up the extraordinary event with an x element – ‗I was staying at a (0.7) a 
friends house who and I was sleeping on her settee‘ (lines 24-25) – and then includes the y 
straight after (lines 27-30).  The mundane activity of sleeping is contrasted with the 
extraordinary and unexpected activity of waking up unable to move combined with an 
audible groaning.  Richard then also includes his alleged thinking at the time of the event – 
‗and I remember thinking o↑h (.) she must have heard me heheh‘ (lines 32-33).  It is 
possible that the inclusion of these cognitive processes could contribute to the presentation 
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of a credible and believable witness to these events as objective and factual.  Consequently, 
reported thoughts are explored in more detail in the next chapter (5). 
 
 
4.4.3 Summary 
 
It would seem that the middles of these accounts, whilst varied in substantive detail, share 
some common features.  The main feature is the presence of at least one peak or pivotal 
moment in the story, which is more often than not marked out by the presence of 
Wooffitt‘s ‗I was just doing x…when y‘ device and sometimes the presence of reported 
thoughts and/or reported speech.  These features often mark out the transition from or 
contrast between ordinary and extraordinary elements of ‗what happened‘ and act as 
indicators of these dramatic moments.  It would appear that the inclusion of the x/y device 
is there to normalise the experient and ground them in the mundane world firstly, whilst 
also showing how the extraordinary was unexpected and spontaneous, and how they were 
invariably passive recipients.  It is worth considering the purpose of storytelling as it is 
always strategic.  
 
―Narrators tell tales in order to achieve some goal or 
advance some interest [not necessarily explicit or 
conscious]…we tell stories to entertain or persuade, to 
exonerate, or indict, to enlighten or instruct.‖  
(Ewick & Silbey, 1995: 208) 
 
However, the purpose of the stories in this project may not be easily categorised for the 
very reason that they are elicited, rather than spontaneously occurring.   
 
 
4.5 Endings – Story Closure 
 
The endings of these narratives are not always easy to characterise upon first inspection 
because although there are sometimes cues in the utterances of the respondent which 
suggest that they are reaching the end of their experiential account, it is harder to pinpoint 
what those cues are without a closer, more systematic consideration of the data.  Gubrium 
and Holstein (2009) have also noted the diverse ways in which stories can end and that they 
do not always have a clearly defined end point. 
 
In investigating the data more closely it is evident that there are various ‗ending‘ 
formulations.  As per the length of the narratives generally, the time spent on endings 
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varies from respondent to respondent.  But invariably, once ‗what happened‘ is 
communicated the respondent engages in, or conveys some form of, ‗reflection‘ about the 
experience(s).  Whilst it may be problematic to label a particular section of talk as 
interpretive or descriptive (Wood & Kroger, 2000), it is possible that utterances could be 
viewed as the respondent engaged in ‗doing‘ some form of sense-making activity. 
  
  
4.5.1 Sense-making and knowledge 
 
This activity enables the respondent to do the business of sharing their understanding of 
their experience, construed as a judgement, an interpretation or just knowledge.   In the 
following extract (14) Kerry has just been talking about the moment one of her close 
relatives died in hospital. 
 
Extract 14 – Kerry  
 
1 K:  and there‘s j‘st (0.4) I dunno >something about the fact that I wasn‘t there 
2  but I got there just in time? (0.5) and (0.5) and that was all just (0.7) I don‘t 
3  quite know how to explain it but it was (1.0) there was a physical sense of 
4  (1.5) 
5  er:m (0.4) ◦heheh◦ it sounds really metaphysical .hh but two worlds (0.5) 
6  meeting for a moment (.) 
7 I:  mm 
8  (0.9)  
9 K: an::d (0.6) so therefore the passing from one to another (0.7) was actually 
10  quite a natural thing? (0.8) and quite (0.3) er:m (1.2) quite easy (.) er:m it  
11  sounds very sc(h)ience fi(h)ction to say (0.5) like some kind of portal and I 
12  don‘t me[an that 
13 I:     [mm 
14 K: but that (0.6) that‘s kind of the sense that they actually (.) that the physical 
15  atmosphere in there was so different  
16  (0.9) 
17  erm (0.7) the nurses and whatever had left us on our own (.) cos I mean  
18  they‘d (0.3) they‘d decided sometime previously that they weren‘t they  
19  stopped fighting [and .hhh 
20 I:       [mm  
21 K: and erm (0.7)so they‘d they‘d left us so I went out to say (0.8) ◦y‘know◦  
22  she‘s actually gone and she said oh yeah I know 
23  (1.5) 
24  and you think  
25  (2.1) 
26  and you don‘t think about these things at the time you just (.) kind of take it 
27  all (.) in your stride but you just think actually that‘s (0.5) that‘s really (0.9) 
28  there was something very definitely (.) happening  
29  (1.6) 
30  over a (0.3) a wider (0.5) physical area than just inside her body (0.9) as it  
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31  was gradually (.) failing (0.8) does that make sense? (.) 
32 I:  mm  
33 K: erm (0.8) so yeah (0.4) a really intangible kind of thing (.) but it was  
34  definitely (0.9) there was definitely something going on  
35  (0.4)  
36  and (0.8) you know (.) I‘m not gonna say that there were kind of (0.7) flights 
37  of angels singing her [to her rest or anything like that but it was (0.7) 
38 I:            [◦hmph◦ 
39 K: it was definitely like there was a er (1.1) some kind of presence (1.3) erm (.) 
40  in a very electrical kind of way  
 
Here Kerry‘s utterances perform the function of reflecting on her experience.  In a very 
broad sense, her talk communicates her being engaged in some form of interpretation and 
sense-making activity.  During this part of the account the way the talk is designed presents 
her position with some distance from unconventional explanations of what might have 
happened.  For instance, she refers to ‗two worlds (0.5) meeting for a moment‘ (lines 5-6), 
prefacing it with a distancing device – ‗it sounds really metaphysical .hh but‘ (line 5).  ‗But‘ 
is a well-known distancing device people use to establish their personal separation from 
potentially unpalatable (or in this case unconventional) statements (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987).  Additionally, she mentions the utterance sounding ‗very sc(h)ience fi(h)ction‘ (line 
11) and ‗like some kind of portal‘ (line 11) whilst laughing.  Laughter has been 
demonstrated to be an effective troubles resistance device (Jefferson, 1984), and 
comfortably positions Kerry as gently mocking the content of her talk.  That is, as it might 
be somewhat problematic to straightforwardly suggest there is a portal linking life and 
death, the introduction of laughter allows Kerry to use it as a comparison device whilst 
maintaining distance from it (via mild derision) as a definitive explanation of her 
experience.   
 
She completes the narrative by making a contrast between ‗flights of angels singing her 
[relative to her rest‘ (lines 36-37) and ‗some kind of presence (1.3) in a very electrical kind 
of way‘ (lines 39-40).  This contrast is also a comparison between an extreme and specific 
claim, which could be challenged or seen as controversial, and a lesser, vaguer construction 
with no commitment to a concrete explanation of what the ostensibly intangible 
phenomena was.  This is the point at which her experiential account finishes, in Kerry‘s 
case this is indicated by a longish pause and an expectant look at the interviewer but the 
latter is not something captured by this level or type of transcription.  It is also possible 
that the phraseology of this ending that works to sum everything up (lines 33-40) and show 
the final conclusion of the experient, in a fairly objective and matter of fact fashion assisted 
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by the term ‗but‘.  This final conclusion serves as an effective interpretation of the entire 
experience, also acting perhaps, as a concise summary and a way of marking the end of the 
account. 
 
Other respondent‘s accounts include references to several experiences in succession before 
finishing, some told as discrete experiences and some with an entire narrative woven in 
between.  John Cooper‘s (JC) narrative includes a series of individual experiences and the 
next extract (15) is one of these.  Here he is talking about one of his out of body 
experiences (for the beginning of this experience see extract 6, Chapter 5). 
 
Extract 15 – John Cooper  
 
8 JC: and I thought ‗where the heck am I‘ (.) you know (0.5) and I‘ve never seen 
9  red soil (1.2) alright? (0.6) that orangey red (0.3) okay? 
10  (0.9) 
11  and ‗ere I I‘ve loved (0.3) you know (0.4) >who::a whoa:::w wo::y:  
12  (0.3) 
13  you know I was looking at the landscape and looking at all over the (0.4)  
14  thing and it was a real (0.4) out of body (1.2) Peter Pan ((clap)) (0.6)  
15  experience (.) beautiful  
16  (0.7)  
17  erm ((sniff)) (1.0) and enjoying that free:dom (0.9) out of body  
18  (1.0)  
19  an:d er (.) when I came back and we shared it 
20  (0.5) 
21  ↑O:::h you were down the West Country (1.0) Cornwall I believe have got 
22  that (0.5) somewhere down there I don‘t know (.) I haven‘t se(h)en it  
23  mys(h)elf phys(h)ically (0.3) but erm that‘s wh(h)ere I‘ve been to(h)ld I  
24  wa(h)s that ni(h)ght  
 
After talking about the detail of his experience with some very positive and slightly magical 
evaluation (with the inclusion of a fantasy character) – ‗and it was a real (0.4) out of body 
(1.2) Peter Pan ((clap)) (0.6) experience (.) beautiful‘ (lines 14-15) – JC mentions disclosing 
the details to other people (a meditation group – line 19) and being told ‗↑O:::h you were 
down the West Country‘ (line 21).  In doing so, JC achieves the provision of an 
interpretation of this experience without taking personal responsibility for this explanation.  
Additionally, at the end of this experiential account, JC includes a summing up phrase – 
‗but erm that‘s wh(h)ere I‘ve been to(h)ld I wa(h)s that ni(h)ght‘ (line 24).  This phrase 
completes the account effectively and also works to show the final interpretation and the 
way in which it was provided by someone else.  The bubbles of laughter deflect the bulk of 
the responsibility for this interpretation as does the intimation that someone else is 
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responsible and informed JC (he was ‗told‘ that was where he was).  However, this 
explanation is also presented by JC as the correct interpretation of the events relayed.  The 
insertion of the term ‗but‘ at the beginning of these utterances works to convey some 
objective certainty about unexpected and extraordinary events – as if to say, despite any 
possible counter suggestions this is what happened. 
 
In these endings there also seems to be a pattern in the presentation of knowledge as 
opposed to belief in relation to these experiences.  This seemingly subtle distinction 
positions the speaker with a degree of conviction about their experience.  Unlike the 
business of giving views and thus mitigating attributions of overconfidence (arrogance) by 
use of phrases such as ‗I think‘ or ‗I believe‘ (Antaki et al, 2003), many of the respondents 
present things in more certain terms using ‗I know‘ or ‗I knew‘.  Indeed, one respondent 
explicitly made this distinction.  In extract 16, Lyn ends her experiential narrative about 
various extraordinary experiences centred on the death of her friend Alex and engaged in 
sense-making activity. 
 
Extract 16 – Lyn  
 
41 L: so to me it‘s been  
42  (1.9) 
43  to me it it‘s (.) erm it‘s like (0.5) I‘ve been told it‘s not a question of belief 
44  it‘s a question of (0.5) knowing that there is life after death and I mean that 
45  might sound really sort of arrogant but I just feel .hhh because of the way  
46  it‘s come from (1.0) I mean it came from Alex (0.9) that it‘s real 
  
Lyn talks about her knowledge of life after death (line 44) and orients to the potential 
accusation of overconfidence that such a statement might elicit by observing ‗I mean that 
might sound really sort of arrogant‘ (lines 52-53).  Subsequently, her account ends with a 
summing up phrase akin to the ones seen in the previous extracts (15 and 16) – ‗but I just 
feel .hhh because of the way it‘s come from (1.0) I mean it came from Alex (0.9) that it‘s 
real‘ (lines 45-46).  The insertion of ‗but‘ allows deflection from any potential accusation of 
arrogance and also works to attribute the reason for this certainty to someone else, thus 
working to establish its objective status. 
   
A similar ending, after similar referents to belief and knowledge, though with less clarity, 
can be found in extract 17 taken from John More‘s (JM) account. 
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Extract 17 – John More  
 
39 JM: and erm (0.7) that‘s it basically (0.4) so what it (0.4) what a- I think what I 
40  think (0.5) is really nice about the whole thing (0.4) is it it proved to me  
41  (0.8) that erm (1.1) we do people often talk about spirit guides and guardian 
42  angels (0.4) but (0.3) I just feel now that err (.) I‘ve had the kind of (0.4)  
43  proof that you need (.) to kind of believe in it and er (.) when it‘s a personal 
44  experience (0.7) erm (0.4) erm (0.9)it‘s really con- it‘s really quite convincing  
45  (0.6) 
46  and so: I feel as if I know now (0.8) that there is a a guardian angel (0.5) and 
47  I don‘t know to what extent they can intervene in your life (0.6) to prevent 
48  you following certain course of action (0.4) or to guide you in a particular 
49  way but what I do know is that (.) they can reassure at different times when 
50  they feel you need to be reassured 
51  (1.0) 
52  so it‘s a kind of a passive (0.7) presence rather than ss- (0.9) er like a  
53  proactive kind of a presence you [know  
54 I:        [mm 
55 JM: (.) but it is there when you need it 
 
JM talks about his experience providing him with ‗the kind of (0.4) proof that you need to 
believe‘ (lines 42-43) in ‗spirit guides or guardian angels‘ (line 41) and he reports feeling ‗as 
if I know now (0.8) that there is a guardian angel‘ (line 46).  This formulation enables JM to 
sidestep claims of arrogance as it deftly presents his knowledge as cautiously certain.  Such 
knowledge is also presented as resulting from personal experience rather than merely an 
opinion or belief which is evaluated as carrying more weight – ‗and er (.) when it‘s a 
personal experience…it‘s really quite convincing‘ (lines 43-44) – and not as easy to 
challenge.  The closing utterances show JM offering a final interpretation and conclusion in 
similar phrasing to the other accounts.  Firstly, on line 49, ‗but what I do know is‘, and then 
on line 55, ‗but it is there when you need it‘.  These effective demonstrations of how the 
experience has been made sense of are offered as the concluding part of the experiential 
account.  Providing the listener with a final summary statement demonstrating the way in 
which the experience should be understood or interpreted is certainly a common endings 
characterisation in these accounts.  Interestingly in these sense-making endings, there is 
often the insertion of a ‗but‘ which identifies the final summary statement of a particular 
experience.  Exploring whether this is more common across accounts is unfortunately not 
something that there is the space for here.  Nonetheless, there are other features that 
appear in these locations also.  
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4.5.2 Orientation ‘back’ to the interview 
 
Another feature, which characterises some of the ‗endings‘ of ‗what happened‘, is a 
question posed directly to me by the respondent which can be seen as a sort of ‗checker‘ 
(Brown & Yule, 1983a).  In these interviews the checking concerns whether it is alright to 
continue, whether the account or answer given is acceptable to me, or whether the 
respondent is talking too much.  This is demonstrated firstly, in an earlier extract (15), 
where towards the end of her account Kerry asks, ‗does that make sense?‘ (line 31). 
Another example is found in Kitty‘s account.  Here (extract 18) she is towards the end of 
talking about her experience of writing creatively.  This extract comes after extract 7 in 
Kitty‘s interview, though there is some talk in between these excerpts about the content 
and meaning of her writing only being evident to her after she has written it and it being 
emotionally but not experientially biographical. 
 
Extract 18 – Kitty   
 
35 K: …erm but I  
36  find it very therapeutic  
37  (1.0)  
38  er (0.4) so that would be one one example (1.0) of having an extraordinary 
39  experience and feeling very kind of in touch with the universe (0.4) but (1.4) 
40  f-feeling that I c-can control (0.9) ◦things as well  
41  (1.2)  
42  I guess◦ (0.8) is that ok (0.4) d‘you (.) ◦er I◦ (.) do you want me to talk about 
43  other things? I mean that‘s all I can say about that it‘s it‘s kind of hard to (.) 
44  describe 
 
Coming to the end of a segment of talk about her experiences, Kitty includes two questions 
directed at me, the interviewer.  Firstly, ‗is that ok‘ (line 42) and then ‗d‘you (.) ◦er I◦ (.) do 
you want me to talk about other things?‘ (lines 42-43).  There is a sense in which this 
phrase shows an orientation back to the interview context.  Up until this point little 
guidance has been given from the interviewer about what is required and these questions 
might be indicating Kitty‘s recognition of the normative expectations of a two-way 
interaction, particularly one that is usually led or guided by the interviewer.  These 
questions also convey Kitty‘s consideration of the requirements of the research interview – 
whether she is providing me with the correct information – and possible awareness and 
sensitivity about ‗holding the floor‘.  That is, to be expected to talk for extended periods in 
a two-way interaction affords a degree of formality to the setting, which might present 
issues of social discomfort as a divergence from ordinary familiar interaction.  
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Furthermore, if stories are usually co-constructed (Goodwin, 1984) then embarking upon 
an almost monologic construction is at the very least an irregular interactional 
expectation.57 
 
There is a similar sentiment underlying the ending of George‘s experiential trajectory.  In 
extract 19, George is talking about how he cannot tell his friends about his experiences, 
which comes right at the end of a series of TEHEs.   
 
Extract 19 – George  
 
1 G:  and you find out really that you can‘t talk about them with your friends  
2  either (0.5) and so that you‘ll end up (0.4) not talking about them at all and 
3  when I do speak about them (0.6) like this (0.5) you feel nuts (.) you feel  
4  really just (0.3) silly because you suddenly realise how incapable of talking 
5  about them you are 
6  (1.0) 
7  you know I‘m trying to put in all kinda (.) chronological order >to make  
8  some kind of sense to you and I‘ve just realised it sounds like a load of  
9  nonsense (0.7) it‘s it‘s (0.4) ask me something before I keep babbling 
 
George talks about his inability to convey his experiences effectively (lines 4-9), ending 
with, ‗and I‘ve just realised it sounds like a load of nonsense‘ (lines 8-9).  Finally, he states 
‗it‘s it‘s (0.4) ask me something before I keep babbling‘ (line 9).  In this way George orients 
back to the interview context and directly requests to be asked something.  This shows 
firstly, the normativity of the expected interview format, but it also demonstrates a cultural 
phenomenon mentioned above (extract 18).  Including checking questions or orienting, in 
an explicit manner back to the interview, the speaker is able to ‗do‘ being polite and 
acquiescent – to a great extent, culturally and interactionally desirable characteristics.  
Furthermore, speaking for extended periods in ordinary interaction (and in most formal 
interviews) without interjection, questions or prompts from others (or the interviewer) may 
be quite unusual and therefore these orientations display an acute awareness of this cultural 
convention.          
 
There is also a sense in which the checking activity is designed to ensure relevance and the 
correct understanding or interpretation of the interview expectations.  For example this 
extract (20) from James‘ interview at the end of the first experience he recounts does just 
this. 
                                                 
57 There may be other analytically interesting aspects in this extract, such as her references to ineffability but 
unfortunately, there is no room to expand on this here. 
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Extract 20 – James  
 
1 J: I just found myself reading (1.0) more and then synchronicities occurred  
2  where I‘d suddenly (0.5) looked up at the cinema and >then there was that 
3  film Dead Again with Kenneth Brannagh and Emma Thompson about  
4  reincarnation so I went in and watched that I was like (0.5) ◦aaah◦ and that 
5  seemed to catalyse more insights and er  
6  (0.7) 
7  and then I (0.7) very shortly went to see a cl this was all in the space of  
8  about two weeks (0.4) this [event  
9 I:           [mm 
10  (0.4)   
11 J:  is this (.) what you‘re on about (.) [yeh? 
12 I:                  [>yeh yeh 
13 J: heheheh (0.5) erm (0.9) and I:: there was a shop in ((place)) that was like  
14  this: (1.0) so this is kind of a resonance of that really for m[e you know cos  
15 I:               [m↑m 
16  it (0.6) it had such a magic and a sort of (1.2) energy in it and erm… 
  
After completing the account of his experience – ‗and that seemed to catalyse more 
insights‘ (lines 4-5) – James begins to talk about another experience – ‗and then I (0.7) very 
shortly went to see a cl‘ (line 7).  Following this, he self repairs stating ‗this was all in the 
space of about two weeks (0.4) this event‘ (lines 7-8).  This self repair, we discover in later 
talk not included here, is the start of another experience involving James‘ trip to see a 
clairvoyant.  However, he interrupts himself here to give an assessment of the time period 
over which his initial experience and related activity unfolded – ‗about two weeks‘ (line 8) – 
and then following an ‗mm‘ (line 9) from me, asks a question – ‗is this (.) what you‘re on 
about (.) yeh?‘ (line 11).  This is a direct reference to the advert requesting respondents (see 
appendix 1) and can be seen as a verification of understanding or interpretation and a 
check of relevance.  This checking works to display a concern from the speaker that the 
matters relayed are of interest and in line with what is required.  
 
It seems that there are various functions illustrated by these questions and orientations.  
Firstly, that the suspension of normative conversational ‗rules‘ such as turn-taking is only 
temporary and expectations during an interaction are of a two-way (as a minimum) 
exchange (Houtkoop & Mazeland, 1985).  Indeed even if respondents expect to be the 
primary speaker it is likely that they also expect to be asked questions and have input from 
the interviewer.  Secondly, they illustrate a potential power imbalance between respondent 
and interviewer.  This is well illustrated by the articulated questions of whether what has 
been said is acceptable or relevant for the researcher‘s (i.e. my) purposes.  In other words, 
these checkers construct the speaker as trying to please and wanting to be helpful.  Issues 
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concerning footing and stake and interest58, it has been forcefully argued will always be 
problematic for analysts using interviews as data (Potter & Hepburn, 2005).  Indeed, the 
interview will always be an ‗unnatural‘ interaction where the researcher is more ‗in control‘ 
and has potentially implicit agendas, which are problematic for analysis.59  
 
 
4.5.3 The ends of endings  
 
Another aspect of completing these narratives is when the ending is in some way 
‗announced‘ and the story is concluded.  The following phrases enable a quick, clean, clear 
finish which demarcates the ending of the story in a distinguishable and easily identifiable 
way - ‗and that was it and then it just (.) faded away‘ (John More) and ‗so I‘ve never been 
able to explain it since (.) except that‘s what happened‘ (Margaret Scott).  However, it does 
not necessarily indicate the end of the turn, or preclude later references to that same topic 
or material. 
 
Furthermore, not all respondents do this and for others the endings are not announced in 
this way.  For these accounts there is a sense in which the telling of one experience rolls 
into another.  Here (extract 21), Sunset is reaching the end of her first experience, 
following which she begins to talk about other events. 
 
Extract 21 – Sunset  
 
17 S: e:::r and then of course foot and mouth broke out (0.7) and it it began to  
18  seem (0.5) less like a nightmare and more like a premonition 
19  (1.3) 
20  always been interested in esoteric type things paranormal (0.7) erm (0.7) and 
21  that prompted me to-tut-of (0.4) think I must do something about this and 
22  of course didn‘t really know what to do  
23  (1.0)   
24  and 
25  (2.0) 
26  to this day I don‘t know how I really knew about this place but I‘d heard  
27  there was a college erm (0.9) for sort of (0.9) well it‘s called £spook school 
28  (.) it‘s the ((name)) college at ((place)) and (.) it it trains (.) e::r psychics and  
29  mediums 
 
                                                 
58 Footing refers to the nature of participation of the speakers in interaction and the relationship of the 
speaker to the utterances made.  Footing and footing shifts are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Stake 
and interest also concerns the role of the speakers in the current interaction and their agenda or ‗involvement‘ 
in the interaction at hand and the issues topicalised or raised. 
59 This precise issue is discussed in much more depth in Chapter 7. 
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Sunset finishes talking about her ‗premonition‘ (line 18) and then links this to subsequent 
events – ‗and that prompted me‘ (lines 20-21) which suggests that one event was triggered 
by the other.  The way in which the end of the first experience and subsequent events are 
linked thereby promotes continuity in the story.  Indeed, it affords an extended narrative 
format to the experiences that are relayed, rather than deploying them as discrete events. 
 
This is something that is displayed consistently throughout James‘ interview; every time he 
comes to the end of one experience there are subsequent events that unfold in a way that 
give a life-story ‗feel‘ to the overall narrative.  In extract 22 James is talking about his visit 
to a clairvoyant reader who was recommended to him.  This extract picks up where James 
is talking about an esoteric shop in his home town he used to visit. 
 
Extract 22 – James 
 
16 J: (0.6) it had such a magic and a sort of (1.2) energy in it and erm I met  
17  somebody there who became a friend and sshe guided me to a (0.3) ((clap)) 
18  (.) clairvoyant reader who said she‘s really good and you know so I had a  
19  reading and was like this little ((clap/tap)) kid 
20  (0.6) 
21  you know thinking o↑h you know will she be able to read me and will I be 
22  you know and it was just that sort of (0.5) Hu::::::u↑r (0.5) and she reeled  
23  off all this stuff (.) 
24 I: mm 
25 J: about my life that I I I‘d took one word and it was s::o  (0.5) specific (1.2) 
26  about work colleagues about mys- I‘d then split up with my girl friend  
27  because ((clap/tap)) 
28  (1.8) 
29   a sort of this (0.6) energetic chasm see(h)med to op(h)en up and we  
30  couldn‘t relate (.) really (.) it was (0.5) fast (0.5) diverging (.) you know (0.4) 
31  after that point (0.7) er::m 
32  (1.1)  
33  and she told me that (.) she said oh you‘ve just split up with your girlfriend 
34  (1.0) ◦>derderderder◦ and she said erm (1.2) you‘ll she said beware of the 
35  month of March for change >this was about ss oh September August  
36  September 
37  (1.0) 
38  an::d that was that was very kind of erm (0.3) portentous (.) 
39 I:  m::m 
40  J: hmf hmf hmf (0.5) e::r that was kind of another one of these but on a diff 
41  in a different way you know? (0.6) and the::n what happened 
42  (1.4) 
43  that kind of intensity waned and then I started connecting with people like 
44  my affinity group suddenly popped up (.) and I was sort of meeting people  
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James is talking about his visit to the clairvoyant and reports various things that were said 
(lines 22-36).  James does explicitly mark the end of this experiential account with ‗e::r that 
was kind of another one of these but on a diff in a different way you know‘ (lines 40-41).  
However, this is then followed by a continuing phrase – ‗and the::n what happened?‘ (line 
42) – where he posits a question about subsequent events.  The question is not directed at 
me, the interviewer, but is instead a way of linking the events that precede and follow it. 
 
These linking actions characterise some of the narratives and they are difficult to ‗chunk‘ 
into experiential units. These narratives may have several ‗peak moments‘ and more of a 
trajectory ‗feel‘ to the narrative and often communicate more incremental experiences 
(realisation) over time.  This is especially true of those respondents who talk very explicitly 
of life-changing events: as these are portrayed as dramatically transformational – with 
complete reversals reported.  In these accounts the endings are less easy to pinpoint and 
endings often run into beginnings. 
 
 
4.5.4 Summary 
 
Endings vary across the accounts but there are some notable and consistent features.  More 
specifically, there are three main ways in which the experiences are drawn to a close (or 
continued as the life story style narrative shows).  Firstly, when endings are defined or 
marked there are various features that appear often characterised by a final summary and 
interpretation.  This final summary statement is often offered as the definitive 
interpretation of the experience and thus how the experience should be understood. 
Sometimes this is achieved via the use of other voices; that is there is a third party‘s 
reported speech invoked in order to provide the final interpretation.  The use of other 
voices at this point enables the respondent to deflect ultimate responsibility for this version 
and surrender to the reported authority of another‘s opinion.  It equally serves to bolster 
their account with third party endorsement of the factual status of their experience.   
 
Secondly, in some ending instances, there is an orientation back to the interview as the 
contextual setting for this interaction.  Here the ending of an experience is marked with a 
checker question which demonstrates the respondent‘s sensitivity to holding the floor for 
extended periods as potentially undesirable or even impolite during interaction that 
ordinarily follows a turn-taking process (Sacks et al, 1978) – even in interviews.  These 
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questions also topicalise the substantive content of the respondent‘s talk for checking in 
reference to the (implicit) interviewer‘s agenda as the directive for this type of interaction.   
 
Finally, there are accounts where experiences run in a continuous stream, with small ‗joins‘ 
in between, perhaps marked by a brief identification of the end of one experience and then 
followed by how that gave rise to another.  In these accounts the endings are not as 
distinct.  The impression conveyed is that these are a collection of experiences which are 
(or were) part of the respondent‘s life, and that they transformed or changed the 
respondent as an individual.60  
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has been concerned predominantly with the structure and organisation of 
these accounts and what substantive and design features appear.  Some of the functions 
and devices that appear across the data have also been tentatively explored.  This tour in 
particular has focused on the form of these experiential accounts as stories and the 
construction of beginnings, middles and endings.  As is evident from this exploration, the 
beginnings, middles and endings are ‗tailored to the current, specific business of the 
interaction‘ (Stokoe & Edwards, 2006: 61) despite being stories that are elicited in an 
interview interaction.     
 
Beginnings are characterised initially by discourse markers or prefacing devices which are 
suggestive of preparation, planning and thought.  They could also be seen as an indication of 
acceptance of the interviewee role and a change of state token (Heritage, 1984).  Indeed, 
these hesitation devices seem to be a way of managing participatory status and the 
transition from ordinary speaker to interviewee.  This is then followed by scene-setting 
activity; the provision of background details and contextualisation of the story in terms 
relevant to the respondent.  These contextual details can include, when the event took 
place, where it happened, what the experient was doing at the time (either in a broad or 
specific sense) and who else was involved or present. 
 
                                                 
60 We return to the theme of transformation in Chapter 6. 
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Provision of this level of specific and mundane details grounds the subsequent experience 
in ‗ordinary reality‘: it shows the experience occurring in close proximity and closely linked 
to this reality.  Additionally it enables two functions: 
 
- Firstly, it establishes the factual and objective status of the experience by reference 
to this level of detail (the facts). 
- Secondly, it establishes the extraordinariness of the experience by virtue of the 
experient‘s ability to accurately recall mundane detail from the event. 
 
These two functions serve the overall purpose of securing credibility and plausibility for the 
narrative. 
 
Middles contain the ‗what happened‘ part of the story and centres around the pivotal ‗I was 
just doing x when y‘ (Wooffitt 1991, 1992); establishing ordinariness in order to reveal 
extraordinariness and walking a tightrope between categorisation as ‗normal‘ or ‗crank‘ 
(Potter, 1996).  Additionally, the display of cognitive competence on the experient‘s part – 
in terms of displaying precise memory recall for seemingly mundane events – also bolsters 
their case for categorisation as ‗ordinary‘.  It is possible that reported thought may also aid 
this process. 
 
Endings vary from a clean break to a meandering roll into another account promoting 
continuity; a tailing off heralding the end of the account; or a listing of several experiences 
independently presented.  The stories are mostly concluded by the respondent‘s 
engagement in sense-making activities where spontaneous understanding and final 
interpretations about the experience are construed.  Occasionally, respondents also include 
questions that orient back to the interview setting which are possibly indicative of the 
unusual monologic nature of an expected dialogic interaction.  Alternatively, these ‗checker 
questions‘ are potentially reflective of respondents ‗performing‘ culturally desirable traits 
such as being polite and compliant.   
 
Nevertheless, many of the accounts display similar phrasing at their endings with a 
summing up utterance (exhibiting a final conclusion) prefaced by the term ‗but‘.  What this 
does is: 
 
 150 
- Firstly, it shows that this is the final conclusion and thus how the experience should 
be correctly interpreted. 
- Secondly, it helps to establish a sense of objectivity to this conclusion, which can 
also involve demonstrating that this interpretation was endorsed by a third party. 
 
 
4.6.1 Implications and broader issues 
 
This chapter considers the way in which these accounts are narratives or stories and 
explores how the respondents construct these stories-in-interview.  This analysis raises two 
main broader issues, in addition to its findings, concerning methodology and ethics.  
Firstly, regarding the status of interview data and secondly, regarding the role or inclusion 
of the researcher in research.  Firstly, as the analytic stance draws considerably upon DP 
and CA it is important to be aware that there are differences between the data considered 
here and that usually analysed by these approaches.  Indeed, one of the broader issues 
raised by this chapter concerns the status of different data or interaction ‗types‘ and how 
they can or should be approached analytically.  One of the recent issues under debate 
within discursive methodologies has been the status of interview data.  Scholars such as 
Potter and Hepburn (2005; but also others including Stokoe & Edwards, 2006) have 
forcefully argued that there should be a preference for more ‗naturalistic‘ interactions as 
data and that interviews are inherently problematic.  This criticism has arisen due to the 
alleged over-reliance on ‗unnatural‘ interactions such as interviews in much social science 
research.  So, for instance, whilst narratives in everyday interaction are invariably 
‗accomplished with collaboration‘ between speaker(s) and recipient(s) (Goodwin, 1984: 
229; but see also Sacks, 1974, on preface and request formulations), in interview contexts 
this collaboration is quite different.   
 
Nonetheless, akin to mundane talk and interaction and the stories found there, stories-in-
interviews are told in routine but not ‗homogenous‘ (Goodwin, 1984: 227) forms with the 
inclusion of revisions, repairs, reformulations and checking, all designed in a locally-
occasioned fashion, to perform social action.  This notion, that there are routine and 
normative discursive observations to be made about interview talk (that may indeed be 
more widely applicable) demonstrates the importance of grounded analyses across all data 
types.  Thus, what this chapter tentatively suggests is that a more nuanced approach could 
exist towards different data types, where necessary.  This analysis begins to show that it is 
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possible to conduct a detailed, rigorous and thorough analysis on interview data with some 
sensitivity and awareness to some of the potential difficulties and problems provided by 
this medium.     
 
Secondly, a closely related additional issue is that of the dual role of ‗interviewer-as-analyst‘.  
Potter and Hepburn (2005) have suggested that there are various aspects of this which are 
difficult to discern, analyse or resolve.  Firstly, establishing the level of an interviewer‘s 
participation and in what capacity the interviewer is speaking at different times during the 
interview (footing) and secondly, what involvement and agendas the interviewer has (stake 
and interest).  They argue that these are often implicit and it is difficult for the same 
individual to assess objectively.  This is certainly an issue that remains unresolved in this 
thesis.  That is, how is it possible to include myself in the analysis?  From a discursive 
perspective this inclusion would be predominantly limited to the comments and utterances 
made in the analysis, yet as Potter and Hepburn (2005) have argued, it is near impossible to 
‗self-analyse‘ in this way.   
 
However, in work influenced by feminist perspectives there is considerable weight given to 
the inclusion and explication of the researcher‘s role in a broader sense (see for instance, 
England, 1994; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1987, 1991; Maynard & Purvis, 1994; Pini, 2004; 
Stanley & Wise, 1983).  This emphasis extends also to the way in which the person 
conducting and writing up the research process has an effect on how this is done.  This 
consideration of the research process in full must also take into account the wider 
implication of this work in an academic, but also an ethical, sense.  Transpersonal research 
has something to offer here in terms of reconstituting the dominant perceptions of these 
experiences, so that it is possible to see them defined as meaningful in experient‘s terms 
(see for example, Palmer & Braud, 2002).   
 
But these broader implications issues will be revisited in more detail in the concluding 
chapter (7).  In terms of redirection towards the empirical issues at hand; an initial 
exploration of the data has allowed us to identify some potential interesting devices and 
functions which require further explication: the common appearance of reported thought 
and the spontaneous stories of transformation found in the narratives.  Therefore, the 
subsequent empirical chapters explore the instances of reported thought (Chapter 5) and 
the notion of transformation (Chapter 6) across the accounts in more detail. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Reported thoughts in TEHE accounts 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
It was observed in the previous chapter that utterances concerned with reporting thought 
appear regularly throughout the accounts.  Below is one such instance (taken from extract 
5, later in the chapter). 
 
Extract 1 – Lynn  
 
1 L: and it was one of these sort of clear autumn days it was a lovely day (0.5)  
2  and (0.2) my son had actually gone with me as well (.) and we were standing 
3  round the grave and suddenly it just started to pour with rain it was like 
4  stair rods coming down (.) you know just completely quiet but just  
5  >sschhhhe::w .hhh and we were all thinking oh good heavens and £you  
6  know nobody had brought an umbrella or anything cos it had been such a  
7  lovely day  
 
Here, Lyn is talking about attending a funeral and on line 5 she reports the thoughts of a 
group of people.  This is an interesting feature of the extract as it is immediately evident 
that the accuracy of reported thought is impossible to verify.  That is, there is no way for us 
to know definitively what anyone is or was thinking.  It is reported in an ‗as if spoken‘ 
manner and in a collective form – ‗we were all thinking oh good heavens‘.  The thought 
formulation is also identifiable as both an ‗oh prefaced response‘ (Heritage, 1998) and a 
reaction token indicative of surprise (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006).  Devices such as these 
can be deployed to display a ‗change of state‘ proposal with a ‗marked shift of attention‘ 
(Heritage, p294) or a reaction to a surprise or contravention of expectation (Wilkinson & 
Kitzinger, p161).  Both these devices, however, are designed in response to preceding turns 
in talk, whilst Lyn‘s reported thought is a response to reported circumstances.       
 
Many of these reported thoughts are located in similar places in the narratives.  The 
invocation of reported thought demonstrates the speaker somehow ‗making public‘ a 
previously private thought.  It shows the relevance or importance of a cognition (as 
opposed to an observation or other activity) which is to be interpreted as located when the 
event occurred (rather than at the present time).  These properties are suggestive of 
possible functional mechanisms for the construction of an account.  Given that reported 
thought is difficult to verify and may have an interactional function it is certainly worthy of 
further exploration.    
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This chapter is concerned with the use of reported thought in the accounts of TEHEs.   
However, in order to explore reported thought more thoroughly we will firstly explore 
recent work analysing reported thought and reported speech.  The properties demonstrated 
above are similarly found in instances of reported speech and the two devices seem closely 
related, both devices exhibiting shared features.  
 
Additionally, this chapter is addressed to two distinct disciplinary areas.  One is a linguistic 
analysis of reported speech and the other is a constructivist analysis of mental state 
formulations in DP.  It is therefore also important to contextualise this analysis within 
these disciplines and outline the key features relevant to this work.  Following a brief 
outline of how this analysis is connected to DP we will consider how reported speech and 
reported thought can be understood. 
 
 
5.2 Discursive Psychology (DP) and cognitions in talk  
 
The analytic observation made earlier parallels one part of DP‘s focus.  That is, the aim to 
re-cast mental state expressions in terms of their functions in talk and show how mental 
states ‗feature as talk‘s business‘ (Edwards & Potter, 2005: 242) (original emphasis).  The 
possible invocations of these mental processes are quite varied across interactional settings.  
In doing remembering or recalling, individuals are creating ‗versions of past events‘ 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992a: 3) that are relevant for the interaction at hand.  In all cases, the 
speaker is displaying ostensibly private cognitions for public inspection.  Rather than seeing 
talk as the ‗expression of thoughts, intentions and cognitive structures‘ (2005: 255) (original 
emphasis), DP sees their inclusion in talk as performative (e.g. used for handling, 
managing, negotiating, or producing).  Indeed, Edwards and Potter suggest that ‗the status 
of reference to internal mental states is not something to be refuted, even though it is 
conceptually refutable, but rather, studied as a practice within public forms of life‘ (2005: 
256).  This perspective on cognition in talk is a growing one, influenced by the field of DP, 
and research and analysis in these disciplines has been effectively demonstrating the 
interactive functions and locally occasioned features of mental invocations (see for 
example, Heritage, 2005 and Potter & Edwards, 2003, amongst others61).  It is to this part 
of DP that this analysis of reported thought is addressed. 
                                                 
61 For other perspectives regarding the perceived relationship between cognition and conversation see the 
remaining chapters of te Molder and Potter (2005), and for further discussion about moving beyond this 
debate, entitled ‗after post-cognitivism‘, see Kitzinger (2006). 
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5.3 Reported speech and reported thought  
 
Reported speech is very often seen as related to reported thought in linguistic analyses and 
refers to a means used by the speaker, whilst relaying an incidence or occurrence, to include 
what people present said at that time (Holt, 1996, 2000).  Speakers appear to ‗quote‘ (either 
themselves or others) from previous interactions, transporting something that was uttered 
in a different context into a new interaction (Buttny & Williams, 2000; Tannen, 1989).  
Reported speech can take different forms, but is often conceptualised in terms of directly 
or indirectly reported speech (Holt, 2000).  Direct reported speech is where the utterances 
are reported verbatim as if they were spoken like this at the time.  This is often indicated by 
a speech marker verb, such as ‗I said‘ or ‗she says‘.  Indirect reported speech, on the other 
hand, tends to present the ‗gist‘ of a previous utterance, e.g. ‗she said she wouldn‟t‘ or ‗I said 
something like…‘.  Below is an example taken from Holt (2000) to demonstrate one of the 
functions of direct reported speech (see appendix 4 for a key of symbols). 
 
[Holt: 088:1:8:10] 
1 Lesley:  …↑So I said um •hhhh W‘I‘m sorr[y I‘m teaching 
2 Joyce:            [(        ) 
3 Lesley:     →  she said •hh ↑↑Oh: (.) ↑oh my dear, well how 
4      → lovely that you‘re involved in ↑↑tea↓ching. 
5   A[n‘ ↓I: thought •hhh ↑Well al↑right then 
6 Joyce:     [Ohh:. 
7 Lesley:  p‘haps I‘d like to suggest you ↑↑f‘the 
8   nex‘ supply pe(h)ers[(h)oh 
9 Joyce:           [UH::::h 
(Holt, 2000: 429) 
 
In this extract Holt notes how the use of direct reported speech (and in this case 
exaggerated prosody) ‗is used to convey the reported speaker‘s inappropriate positive and 
consequently, condescending reaction to the news that Lesley is currently supply teaching‘ 
(p429).  So, in other words, Lesley is using reported speech to comment on and offer her 
own evaluation of the reported actions of another (absent) speaker.   
 
Reported thought, in spoken language, can be understood as a device employed by a 
speaker in order to refer to their own (or others‘) alleged mental processes during talk.  
Specifically, this might employ the verb ‗think‘ - e.g. ‗I thought‘ - or other verbs indicative of 
cognitive activity (Haakana, 2007), for instance, ‗I recognised, imagined, considered, supposed or 
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assumed‘.62  These cognitions can take different forms such as collective (e.g. ‗we were all 
thinking‘), individual (e.g. ‗I thought‘) or shared/generic (e.g. ‗you just think‘).  Additionally, 
whilst these are mostly past tense formulations, there are some utterances with a degree of 
ambiguity.  For instance, whilst it is clear that ‗we were all thinking‘ and ‗I thought‘ are firmly 
located in the past, ‗you just think‘ is temporally ambiguous.  Reported thought tends to be 
considered and analysed as, or alongside, reported speech and has rarely been singled out 
for a distinct analysis.  Indeed, whilst reported speech has been afforded some degree of 
distinct analytic attention by discourse researchers, reported thought has received relatively 
little.  Haakana (2007: 151) notes that ‗within linguistics, the construction and use of 
reported thought has been studied especially in literary texts, in narration of fictional texts‘ 
(for instance, Leech & Short, 1981: chapter 10).  And whilst she acknowledges Jefferson‘s 
(2004c) work on ‗at first I thought‘,63 she simultaneously points out that there is no 
systematic or ‗thorough interactional study which focuses on both… [reported thought‘s] 
construction and the activities it is used to perform and its sequential environments‘ 
(Haakana, 2007: 151).  
 
It would seem that reported thought has, for the most part, been effectively subsumed 
under the rubric of reported speech.  Take for example, a quote from Holt‘s work, one of 
the main researchers in this field: ‗reported speech is simultaneously a report of a previous 
thought or locution and part of a new sequence used for a different purpose‘ (2000: 433) (my 
emphasis).  In providing a definition of reported speech, Holt (2000) explicitly includes 
reported thoughts.  Perhaps this is because they can be seen to perform similar functions at 
similar moments, are used to represent footing shifts, and are sometimes difficult to 
distinguish.  Whilst there may be a close relationship between reported thought and 
reported speech, and they may often be found in close proximity appearing to perform 
similar functions, there may be features that are particular to reported thought that would 
remain hidden if it was always considered alongside reported speech (Haakana, 2007). 
 
 
                                                 
62 It is possible that all these reported cognitive processes are performing (perhaps subtly) different 
interactional functions in talk.  However, this chapter remains primarily concerned with reported thought, 
marked by the verb ‗think‘ as there is no space for more detailed exploration. 
63 Jefferson (2004c) draws on some of Sacks‘ (1992) observations concerning the use of ‗at first I thought‘ to 
show how first thoughts are worked up as mistaken presuppositions in talk.  She also demonstrates this 
device as a discursive tool, selected to show the search for an ordinary explanation to extraordinary events, 
rather than a display of actual cognitive processes.  Wooffitt (1992) has also explored this device in relation to 
paranormal accounts. 
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5.3.1 Recent findings regarding reported thought 
 
Two recent exceptions contributing towards redressing this imbalance, and distinguishing 
reported thought from reported speech where applicable, are Markku Haakana‘s recent 
work on 'I thought that...' constructions in complaint stories (Haakana, 2007), and research 
by Rebecca Barnes and Duncan Moss (2007) concerned with reported private thought 
(RPT) in everyday and institutional talk.  Both are concerned with the constructions and 
functions of reported thought in talk.   
 
One of the most significant immediate differences between reported speech and reported 
thought is that it is only the internal or 'mental' behaviour or response that is considered 
relevant for the current interaction when cognition is reported (Haakana, 2007).  This 
elicits questions about why the speakers include in their talk something that was ‗‗only‘ in 
their mind‘ (p153) and highlights a distinction (between publicly available reported speech 
and concealed reported thought).  Furthermore, reported thought cannot be contested by 
the recipient as there is no way of checking or verifying someone‘s thoughts.64  In order to 
have a clearer sense of reported thought in interaction let us examine an extract from one 
of the complaint stories in Haakana's work, in which the speaker includes both her own 
reported speech and reported thought responses in narrating the story to a recipient. 
 
[6 Advance payment/telephone] 
01  M:  and then that woman wanted uhmm .mhh advance 
02  what is it now some advance payment. = 
03  K: =ai jaa. ((oh I see/oh really)) 
04  M: well I didn‘t y‘know have money.  I had ninety 
05  marks then she wanted .hh two hundred, .mh and I was then just< 
06  well I didn‘t really have that much with me, .hh then she 
07  terribly deliberated about whether she can now then .hh send 
08  them there to be dyed since I don‘t have money then I th- 
09  thought that I‘m not going to start begging here for anything. 
10  =I said I can come then to order them some other time. 
11  K: joo ((yeah)) 
(Haakana, 2007: 168). 
 
What this extract works to show is how reported thought can be used to highlight an 
alternative version of events to the publicly available one.  On the surface it would seem 
from the narrator's reported speech (on line 10) that the interaction has gone smoothly and 
                                                 
64  This is not to say that it is necessarily easy to ‗verify‘ someone‘s words but in principle at least it is 
considered possible - e.g. people‘s versions of events in court or recorded speech (e.g. cassettes, video, and 
DVD or digital media). 
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the speaker acceded to the shop assistant's request.  However, the reported thought works 
up a ‗more critical and affective‘ response, suggesting that the shop assistant put ‗the 
narrator in the position of ‗begging‘ and [it also] expresses the narrator‘s strong refusal of 
such a position‘ (p17).  Employing the term ‗begging‘ enables an exaggerated and 
anticipatory quality to the reported interaction, as it is an extreme characterisation of what 
the speaker would have to do in response to being unable to provide the requested money 
in advance.  The reported thought therefore not only presents a particular interpretation of 
events and thus an evaluation for the recipient, but also provides access to (in this case) a 
more unsettled or stormier underlying version of the story, through its unspoken 
undercurrent.  In this sense, Haakana argues that reported thought enables an evaluation to 
be more explicit, via its location at the time of the event being reported (and not, by 
contrast, a retrospective evaluation, complaint or criticism from the current interaction). 
 
In this sense, reported thought can be seen to be similar to reported speech in that it is 
used by speakers to provide an evaluation of what is being reported (Haakana, 2007).  
‗Reported speech is speech within speech, utterance within utterance, and at the same time 
speech about speech, utterance about utterance‘ (Volosinov, 1973: 115) (original emphasis), which 
highlights the way in which reported speech can provide a comment on or assessment of 
the original utterance or its author.  However, reported thought provides an evaluation in a 
different way, even when used in conjunction with reported speech.  In complaint 
narratives it suggests a 
  
―Multi-layered picture of the interaction: on the one hand 
portraying what was said in the interaction, and on the other 
hand giving the current recipient access to what went on in 
the narrator‘s mind at the specific point of the narrated 
interaction.‖  
(Haakana, 2007: 153) 
   
Furthermore, in these contexts reported thought is used to construct the narrative as a 
complaint story, to offer critical evaluation by drawing attention to a silent response and 
how something 'was not said' (my emphasis).  This helps to direct the recipient towards the 
same interpretation of events.   Furthermore, this display of deliberate omission provides a 
speaker with further resources for essential face work (Jefferson, 1984). 
 
―By portraying their criticisms as ‗only thoughts‘ the 
narrators can also give a certain kind of picture of the 
narrated situation: the antagonist behaved ‗badly‘ 
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(unprofessionally, stupidly, etc.) but the narrators did not 
start criticising the antagonist.  Thereby they can also depict 
themselves in a certain light, for instance, as reasonable 
persons who did not want to get into an argument.‖ 
(Haakana, 2007: 167) 
 
This is reiterated by Barnes and Moss‘ (2007) work, where RPT seems to be inserted into 
an account to show sensitivity or mindfulness instead of anger, for instance.  Barnes and 
Moss‘ (2007) analytic focus was on what Sacks (1992) originally termed ‗private thought‘ or 
reported thought which remained ‗hidden‘ in an earlier interaction and is then made 
relevant and displayed by the speaker in the reporting context. 
 
Mindfulness Int 05:1b:18:26 
1 IE: U↑uhhh I=think=it‘s kept me ca:lm. 
2 IR: Ri:ght. 
3  (1.2) 
4 IE: Whereas before I used to get really up (0.3) tight 
5 IR: M:mm= 
6 IE: =Y‘know especially (0.5) ‗round with my husband. 
7  =[‗cos    ] some of the things he‘s (1.2) come out with. 
8 IR:    [M:mm]  
9 IE: an said ↑y‘know,= 
10 IR: =↑Mm↑hm. 
11 IE: An I‘ve got >d‘fensive with him?< 
12  (1.3) 
13 IE: B‘t ↑now I (.) I do keep calm 
14 IR: M:m 
15  (1.0) 
16 IE:  Y‘know [(    as   opposed   to                   )] 
17: IR:              [>So you say you‘ve (been a bit)<] 
18  (1.0) 
19 IE: answer back and argue, 
20 IR: [Ye:ah.          ] 
21 IE: → [          Now I] think well (0.4) ↑he can‘t help >what it< what‘s  
22  goin‘ on in his ◦mi:nd wi‘ the drugs he‘s ta:king, yeh-◦ 
23  (0.8) 
24 IE: So I just keep calm and it (0.5) passes on throu:gh 
25 IR: M:mm 
(Barnes & Moss, 2007: 127) 
 
 
In this extract, the speaker shows how ‗practising mindfulness‘ – a technique used to aid 
stress reduction through clinical treatment often including meditative awareness practices – 
has enabled her to keep calm in a situation she would have previously got angry.  
Additionally demonstrated is how this position of mindfulness can be achieved in both the 
‗now‘ (in the current moment) and the ‗then‘ (in the reported previous one).  It is this 
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seeming relocation of an alleged original and previously concealed thought that begins to 
provoke questions about why the speaker opts to reveal thoughts for recipient scrutiny 
during interaction. 
 
As noted earlier, reported thought and reported speech often turn up in close proximity or 
in similar sequences during talk, though this does not automatically imply that they are 
performing precisely the same interactional function.  Indeed, some of the potential 
differences between reported thought and reported speech have already been explored.  
Reported thought and reported speech both regularly appear in storytelling speech and 
narratives.  However, in complaint stories, Haakana (2007) observed that the reported 
thought of the current speaker was being inserted after ‗quotation‘ of another speaker‘s 
words.  In this sense, ‗the narrator … presents the reported thought as a silent reaction to a 
co-conversationalist‘s reported turn-at-talk‘ (p151).  This ‗silent reaction‘ allows the speaker 
to clearly indicate to any recipient how the story should be interpreted and received.   
 
Reported speech is considered to help dramatise, create recipient involvement and often 
construct the climax, peak or crucial moments of a story (e.g. Buttny, 1998; Chafe, 1982; 
Holt, 1996, 2000; Labov, 1972; Li, 1986; Mayes, 1990; Tannen, 1989).  This is achieved via 
the inclusion of voices and the locutions of others (particularly direct reported speech).  
The form of storytelling ranges from naturally occurring stories in talk (occasioned in a 
local fashion through ‗turn-by-turn‘ talk – Jefferson, 1978), to more semi-formal situations 
where people are in some sense invited to tell a story (the interviews that make up this 
corpus, for instance, or the accounts found in the work of Wooffitt, 1992).  
 
Whilst it is sometimes clear that there are analytic and functional differences between 
reported thought and reported speech, there are instances where identification is more 
ambiguous.  Indeed, in not choosing to report a locution as either thought or speech, 
speakers have another tool at their disposal.  Sometimes these ambiguous utterances evade 
distinction as either speech or thought because, as Haakana (2007) points out, they lack an 
explicit marker (verb or contextualising cue, such as ‗say‘ or ‗think‘). Haakana (2007: 175) 
proposes that this ambiguity is deliberate and is another dimension of the evaluation 
device, offering the speaker an opportunity to convey criticism of the antagonist and 
‗ambivalent pictures of the reported situation‘ (see Haakana, 2005, for more on this 
distinction).  Instead, such utterances might be pre-marked by the verb ‗be‘, as in ‗I was like‘ 
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(see Romaine & Lange, 1991).  Alternatively, however, the identification of an utterance as 
reported thought or speech may rely heavily upon the preceding talk.  This may be reliant 
on prosody, pitch, tone, volume and tense shifts (Barnes & Moss, 2007), which indicate the 
thought via what has been termed ‗vocal framing‘ (Coupler-Kuhlen, 1999). 
   
These kinds of non-lexical cues may be linked to other design features of reported thought 
concerned with a speaker‘s footing.  Footing, as a concept, was originally developed by 
Goffman (1981) and refers to the nature of a speaker‘s participation in talk.  Footing is 
directly linked to the identity and role of the speaker and their relationship to an utterance.  
So, a person can speak as the author of what is being said, as the animator of another‘s words 
or as the principal, taking responsibility for the perceived underlying sentiments of the 
words (Goffman, p128).  During talk various linguistic cues can indicate which footing 
position the speaker inhabits towards a particular utterance.  Indeed, reported speech is 
illustrative of ‗footing shifts‘ (Potter & Hepburn, 2005) and may denote a switch from 
author to animator.  However, determining footing can be a complex issue and footing 
shifts are not always a straightforward swap from one stance to another.  As Goffman has 
noted, ‗we are not so much terminating the prior alignment [when we switch footing] as 
holding it in abeyance with the understanding that it will almost immediately be reengaged‘ 
(p155). Plus, speakers may speak from a combination of footing positions; ‗in truth, in talk 
it seems routine that, while firmly standing on two feet, we jump up and down on another‘ 
(p155).   
 
But the use of reported thought appears to be slightly different.  Reported thought will 
often be preceded by response particles (Heritage, 2005) or reaction tokens (Wilkinson & 
Kitzinger, 2006) such as ‗oh‘, ‗goodness‘, and ‗oh no‘.  According to Barnes and Moss (2007: 
130), these particles and other design features of reported thought enable the speaker to 
shift footing, as they position the speaker ‗as an unmotivated witness to the event‘ rather 
than an active constituent of events.  It is included in talk to ‗bring off‘ how something 
came across to the speaker at the time of the cognition.  In this sense, it is ‗designed first to 
say how it appeared to me then‘ (Sacks, 1992: 405).  Reported thought thus seems to be a 
flexible conversational resource affording the speaker a variety of different footing 
positions. 
 
―It provides the speaker-feeler with ways of saying how it 
appeared to me then, how it always appears to me and how it might 
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appear to me in that situation.  It also provides the speaker with 
ways of projecting how it appears to others, how it generally 
appears to everyone and how it might properly appear to anyone.‖ 
(Barnes & Moss, 2007: 141) (original emphasis) 
 
At this point, it is worth considering the relationship between talk about thought and actual 
thought itself in more detail because it is commonly considered possible to discern levels of 
accuracy in everyday life.  Furthermore, it illustrates the performative and rhetorical 
purpose of including reported thought and/or speech in talk.  Haakana (2007) emphasises 
the impossibility of establishing whether reported thoughts and original thoughts actually 
correspond.  Reported thought often takes the form of dialogue (Tannen, 1989) and is 
sometimes reported as if the speaker (or thinker) was thinking out loud.  However, it is 
unlikely that when speakers report thoughts (as if they were spoken at the time of the 
event) they are ‗claiming they actually said these words to themselves‘. Instead it is more 
likely that ‗the speakers … [are] depicting only selected aspects of their thoughts - e.g., their 
plans, excuses, and a sense of surprise‘ (Clark & Gerrig, 1990: 794).  Indeed, we cannot 
know whether speakers report their ‗actual‘ thoughts at all, as there is no way of verifying it. 
 
It is also unlikely that reported speech is a straightforward representation of an original 
utterance or interaction.  Indeed, there is research (e.g. Authier-Revuz, 1994; Baynham, 
1996; Clark & Gerrig, 1990; Mayes, 1990) which suggests that it is incredibly difficult to 
reproduce utterances verbatim and therefore highly unlikely that reported speech is the 
accurate report of an original utterance.  Others, such as Edwards and Potter (1992b), 
suggest work on conversational remembering ought to see recall accounts as performing 
practical and rhetorical functions.  In this sense, reproduced discourse will be variable and 
context-dependent and not merely reflective of one, ‗true‘ version of events.  Reported 
speech is rarely spoken as it was originally and is often edited, revised or changed.  The 
exact reproduction of a spoken phrase would include the stutters, pauses, hesitations and 
repairs regularly found in naturally occurring conversation; yet these are notoriously 
difficult for people to perform accurately (Martin, 1971).  Indeed, Haakana (2007: 159) 
states that ‗the teller chooses what he or she presents and the manner, and through these 
choices constructs a certain kind of picture of the situation and seeks a certain kind of 
response from the recipient‘.  That is, reported speech (and reported thought) are included 
by the speaker in their accounts for specific purposes, to achieve actions and construct 
events in particular ways. 
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Haakana (2007) and Barnes and Moss (2007) provide valuable, but preliminary 
contributions to our understanding of the phenomenon of reported thought.  However, 
Haakana notes that her findings are limited to complaint stories.  That is not to say that 
such observations cannot or will not be extended to other instances of reported thought, 
but they will require demonstration and explication.  She recognises that there are other 
contexts in which reported thought can be found and notes it can have ‗different functions 
in other types of interactional contexts, and it can also be constructed in different ways‘ 
(p176).  Indeed, there appear to be good reasons for sometimes considering reported 
thought as a distinct discursive activity, as this work begins to demonstrate.  Nonetheless, 
the exact detail of this remains to be seen and requires a more substantial and systematic 
body of work than is currently available.   
 
In the corpus of TEHE narratives reported thought is a fairly common device, which the 
majority of experients use - some of them several times during their account.  By the end 
of this chapter I will demonstrate how this work adds to the emerging evidence that 
reported thought deserves distinct analytic attention from discourse and interaction 
researchers. 
 
In order to focus our attention I want to briefly summarise the themes in this body of work 
which will inform the subsequent analysis.  Both reported speech and thought have been 
considered as: 
 
- An interactional device - not a straightforward report of mental processes 
- Representative of footing shifts in interaction - displaying different participatory levels 
- Having an evaluative function - used to reveal a speaker‘s implicit assessments 
 
Furthermore, reported thought has been shown to: 
 
- Act as a silent response to reported utterances 
- To make private, internal process public for the purposes of interaction 
- To show ‗how it appeared to me then‘ 
- To construct the speaker as a sensible, reasonable and thoughtful person  
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In the following analysis, many of these functions listed above are evident.  Additionally, 
there are further actions being achieved via these reported thoughts in this data and these 
are also developed further in this chapter. 
 
 
5.4 Unexpected events: Reported thought and the construction of surprise 
 
Many of the reported thought utterances seem to appear in similar locations within the 
accounts.  Upon initial inspection it seems that a consistent reported thought formulation 
is located just after the ‗extraordinary‘ aspect of the experients‘ narratives (although there 
may be more than one such moment depending on individual accounts). In order to 
investigate these features in more depth and consider what is being achieved by the 
location and design of these formulations I will firstly consider one extract in detail. Just 
prior to extract 1 James was talking about walking into a bookshop, selecting a ‗spiritual 
book‘ and becoming absorbed in it.  This extract picks up just as he mentions getting 
through three chapters of the book without noticing.   
 
Extract 1 – James  
 
1 J: >I suddenly realised I was three chapters through befo-- you know I‘d read  
2  three chapters ((sniff of laughter)) and I I seemed to be agreeing with  
3  everything I‘d heard heheheh (.) which was a bit odd becos (0.5) I‘d never  
4  really indulged in [anything  
5 I:        [mmm 
6 J:   like that before and I was I was going yeah yeah I know this I know this  
7  (0.4)  
8  and I just recognised (1.2) what felt to be true (.) 
9 I:   mmm 
10 J:   without any (.) previous ((soft clap/tap)) kind of promptings o::r (.)  
11  guidance o::r instruction or anything .hhh and er (0.6)  I suddenly had this 
12  kind of like epiphany moment where I thought >‗I‘ve got to buy this book‘ 
 
James‘ entire account is worked up as a coherent, chronological trajectory of his spiritual 
life thus far.  He talks about a series of experiences in succession which are linked by a ‗life-
story‘ form.  However, it is the first experience that he repeatedly refers back to as a pivotal 
moment, and his account of this experience contains one such reported thought 
formulation65 – which is located after the event.  He begins the entire account by 
introducing the usual scene-setting detail (covered in chapter 4), such as an approximate 
calendrical formulation, where he was and what he was doing at the time of the events he 
then goes on to talk about.  
 
                                                 
65 It also contains references to other cognitive or mental processes, which I will mention in the analysis also. 
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This extract appears to be made up of three distinguishable sections.  The first section 
begins with the y element of an ‗x/y‘ sequence (he was reading this book and ‗suddenly 
realised‘ he was ‗three chapters through‘ – line 1), which is constructed as an extraordinary 
occurrence.  The delivery of a sudden realisation includes a self-repair (Schegloff, Jefferson 
& Sacks, 1977) – ‗I was three chapter through befo- you know I‘d read three chapters‘ 
(lines 1-2).  He punctuates this with what can only be described as a short exhalation (air 
pushed rapidly and audibly through the nostrils) indicating laughter.  This laughter marks 
what seems to be the end of a distinct segment of talk completed by the ‗y‘ component; 
part of the extraordinary moment.  The extraordinariness is conveyed by the reported 
rapidity at which the book is read and the implicit absorption and loss of time which is 
being communicated here.  This trades on an intersubjective or common understanding of 
the ability to become absorbed by reading material (in an everyday sense) but also stakes a 
claim for the events‘ extraordinary status.   It is the laughter that helps to mark this event as 
extraordinary for the recipient, conveying surprise, bemusement or puzzlement at an 
implied loss of time through absorption.  This activity might otherwise be received as 
mundane or ordinary (although it may be considered somewhat unusual to become so 
absorbed by a book in a public place such as a bookshop).  This is further cemented by the 
inclusion of how many chapters were read (lines 1 & 2): reporting that he had read three 
chapters establishes the unusual or extreme degree of absorption in the book. 
 
The second section of this extract begins on line 2 with ‗and I seemed to be agreeing with 
everything I‘d heard‘.  James makes references here to the book‘s claims, though he does 
not elaborate on these or make them explicit.  Instead he offers a comment on his position, 
which brings him into alignment with these claims.  Perhaps somewhat unusually he 
positions himself in agreement with ‗everything‘ he had ‗heard‘ (emphasis added).  However, 
strictly speaking he reports previously that he was reading this book, not listening to or 
hearing it.  This contributes to a construction of James as a passive recipient of the book‘s 
contents rather than as an active reader or interpreter.  He follows this with laughter (line 
3), which acts as a reaction of surprise to unexpected events.  This is worked up further by 
an explicit suggestion that his agreement is unexpected or surprising at the end of line 3 
with his use of the phrase, ‗which was a bit odd‘.  James then accounts for why this is ‗odd‘, 
claiming he has ‗never really indulged in anything…like that before‘ (lines 3-6).   
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There is a parallel ‗mmm‘ (line 5) expression uttered by me as interviewer, concurrent with 
James‘ articulation of the word ‗anything‘66 (line 4).  In this utterance James avoids naming 
the type of book, instead saying ‗like that‘ (line 6).  What this conveys is an avoidance of 
using specialised terminology thus distancing himself from any associations of knowledge 
with this book‘s genre, and constructs him as having no commitment to or interest in these 
technical details at the time of the event.  Furthermore, this is reported as an instance of 
indulgence: proposing immoderate or unmeasured behaviour that is enjoyable but not 
respectable or desirable.  In some sense then, it would appear that the lexical selections 
made, at the very least, imply that being absorbed in a book of this nature and agreeing 
with its claims may not be a conventional activity.  James then introduces another reference 
to cognitive processes in the form of reported thought – ‗and I was going yeah yeah I 
know this I know this‘ (line 6).   
 
Here the phrase ‗I was going‘ is used in a casual or colloquial sense, which can refer to 
reports of thinking, speaking or gesturing processes depending on the context.  There are 
other similar expressions that enable this ambiguity, for instance using the verb ‗be‘ – as in, 
‗I was like‘.  In this extract, it seems likely that he is reporting thought and referring to his 
agreement and sense of knowing as a mental process at the time (as opposed to speaking 
out loud by himself in a bookshop).  What James claims here, is a kind of unconscious or 
latent knowing that was in some way ‗triggered‘ by the book‘s content.   
 
He further weaves the notions of cognition and intuitive truth by his reported recognition 
of the ‗truth‘ of the material he was reading (line 8).  This goes further than merely 
concurring on the basis of a reasoned opinion here however, and mentions recognising 
‗what felt to be true‘ (line 8).  The notion of ‗truth‘ can be seen as located, by way of 
linguistic construction, outside of those mental processes invoked for agreement.  Instead 
the talk conveys a sense of truth not arrived at by the same ‗thinking‘, but derived 
alternatively from an invoked recognition of ‗knowing‘.  Despite this, he does draw upon 
notions of cognition (recognition and thought) which are intertwined with reference to 
intuitive knowledge and truth.  This idea is reiterated when he suggests that this 
‗knowledge‘ emanated from the moment and not from pre-existing opinions, ideas or 
                                                 
66 Potter and Hepburn (2005) have noted that it is very difficult to adequately analyse such interviewer 
contributions, as there are issues of footing, and stake and interest.  However, at this stage of the interview all 
the recipient had been asked to do was tell me about his experience.  Nonetheless, I am not completely silent 
or ‗passive‘ during these interviews: I am listening, nodding, making facial expressions, maintaining eye 
contact and occasionally uttering ‗mm‘s. 
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suggestions that he had been exposed to: it arose spontaneously (lines 10-11).  A clap or 
tap sound (either from the experient tapping his legs with his hands, or clapping his hands, 
both of which he did occasionally throughout the interview) punctuates this utterance, 
seemingly marking it in some way (line 10).   
 
The third and final section begins where he delivers another sudden intervention (similar to 
the ‗y‘ element in line 1) which seems to pick up from where the first section in this 
structure leaves off.  It appears to be an extension of the ‗y‘ element; delivered via the 
concept of a sudden ‗kind of like epiphany moment‘ (line 12).  Here James is working up a 
revelation; an epiphany being a sort of awakening or access to knowledge previously 
unknown and generally considered to be of the life-changing variety rather than regular, 
mundane or routine knowledge.  So, the original moment is thus constructed as a 
profound, ultimate, life-changing moment.   
 
What follows is a reported thought utterance, which is delivered immediately after what 
might be considered a pivotal ‗narrative peak‘ (Li, 1986) to the account.  The reported 
thought is inextricably part of the epiphany moment enabled by the formulation, ‗where I 
thought‘ (line 17).  In other words, the thought is constructed as the epiphany moment.  
James builds to this point and reports that at the time of the original experience a cognitive 
process materialised which was outside his conscious control.  His utterance thus alludes to 
something more powerful than his own conscious processes and instead constructs a 
compulsion.  His talk refers to being suddenly (that is, rapidly and unexpectedly) and 
involuntarily (but without reluctance) aware of having to ‗buy this book‘ (line 12).   
 
However, he does not suggest that his mental faculties were conquered by some irrational 
force – an admission of this sort could have potentially damaging consequences in terms of 
how he is perceived and categorised by any recipient – but instead he reports an awakening, 
a revelation which compels him specifically to think (or to know) that buying this book will 
be life-changing.  Whilst thought per se can be considered to be illustrative of a perfectly 
rational act, there is a possibility that the contents of thought can be seen as unsound or as an 
indicator of mental imbalance.  Some characterisations of those with mental health issues 
draw upon the idea of delusional thoughts or irrational thought processes or patterns.  One 
such example of this is a condition called ‗passivity phenomena‘.  Passivity has been linked 
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to diagnoses of schizophrenia in which people report thoughts and actions being imposed 
by some external source (Green, 2007).  
 
Still, the reported contents of James‘ thought are not too controversial.  They perhaps 
indicate a common-sense orientation to trusting intuition or ‗gut feeling‘ as a reliable source 
of knowledge.  Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule (1986) refer to this kind of 
intuitive knowing as ‗subjective knowledge‘; or an inner voice, which can form a strong 
sense of knowing.  Nonetheless, there is an argument to suggest that the acceptance of 
knowledge on this basis is unconventional; though this may depend on the kind of 
knowledge claims being made. 
 
―To accept a belief by yielding to a voluntary impulse, [or 
indeed a seemingly involuntary one] be it my own or that 
of others placed in a position of authority, is felt to be a 
surrender of reason.‖ 
(Polanyi, 1962: 271) 
 
It is possible then that James‘ demonstration of his ability to reason effectively and discern 
between different types of mental events or consciousness are key features regarding the 
use of reported thought in this extract from his account of his extraordinary experience. 
 
 
5.4.1 Summary   
 
So, we have seen the operation of reported thought (and reports of other cognitive 
processes) in this first extract all working up specifically localised and occasioned actions.  
Of most concern for the other instances in this chapter is the reported thought, and it is 
this that we will continue to focus on here.  The reported thought, ‗where I thought‘ (line 
17, extract 1), invokes an epiphany of compulsion, revelation, extraordinariness and 
profundity. 
 
There are three features of the reported thought located here that are important, including 
their structural location and the impression they convey. 
 
 Firstly, it is positioned after the ‗y‘ component (extraordinary element) of the event 
 Secondly, it is constructing thought that was private and located during a past event 
 And thirdly it is constructed as a surprised response to unexpected events 
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What these features seem to be doing here is enabling James to work up a position in 
which he is not responsible for these events.  He is showing that these events were not 
consciously controlled by him, neither were they usual for him, they were uninvited and 
unwilled.  In other words, James is constructed as a recipient of these events, of this 
experience and the experience is afforded agency.  His position is one of ‗non agency‘ 
where any responsibility is resisted and diffused in this account. 
 
Furthermore, the reported thought can be seen as a silent response to reported internal 
(and seemingly private) events made public for the purposes of this interaction.  In the 
same way that Haakana (2007) demonstrated that speakers use reported thought to display 
their reaction to reported speech (public) events and thus locate (construct or position) 
themselves as reasonable or sensible individuals, the same mechanism appears to be at 
work here.  The significance of the construction of surprise and unexpectedness conveyed 
by the tone and content of the thoughts, works to positions these reactions or responses as 
‗the sort of reaction that anyone would have had‘ – displaying and orienting to a normative 
response (Barnes & Moss, 2007).  Furthermore, their construction as thoughts as opposed 
to speech is possibly some invocation of the rational and a demonstration of recognition, 
of the qualitative difference between ordinary and extraordinary mental events.   
 
 
5.5 Managing responsibility and authority in TEHE accounts 
 
 
5.5.1 Agency and normativity in extraordinary accounts 
 
Reported thoughts were recurrently located in similar places with similar structures, after 
the extraordinary element or ‗y‘ component of the experience being relayed.  Furthermore, 
a similar construction of agency/non agency similar to extract 1 could be identified across 
accounts.  The next extract (2) follows the previous one sequentially.  In the talk between 
extracts 1 and 2 James tells of returning home with the book and locking himself away with 
it being ‗totally gripped‘.  Extract 2 immediately follows this part of the account where 
James talks about an extraordinary vision. 
 
Extract 2 – James 
  
1 J:  there was one section in this book (.) where (0.4) the guy said he started  
2  seeing e::yes everywhere (0.6) and he talked about the third eye [opening  
3 I:                 [mm 
4 J: the the psychic (0.7) inner vision and er  
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5  (0.4) 
6 x/y I closed my eyes at that point and I saw a vision of a big (.) purple violet eye  
7  (0.5) blinking (.) with these long lashes hhhh 
8 I:  heh 
9  (.) 
10 J:  heh (0.2) yeah and I suddenly opened my eyes and thought (0.3) did I just 
11  imagine that ((tap/clap))  
12  (0.6) 
13  ‗cause I‘m- (0.4) quite a- (.) y‘well- previously-  (0.2) was quite a (0.3) artistic 
14  (0.3) imaginative type person in that way but (0.5) it it seemed to be (.)  
15  something that I couldn‘t ‗ave come up with (0.8) it just seemed to be  
16  independent of my mind 
 
James delivers the reported thought via the notion of a sudden ‗mental‘ incident (lines 10-
11).  So his reported thought is located subsequent to the extraordinary moment - his 
vision (lines 6-7).  With the reported thought James openly questions the validity, the reality 
and the authenticity of his ‗vision‘, using a common dialogue form (Clark & Gerrig, 1990) 
to perform this action.  He implies that when the ‗vision‘ occurred he immediately 
considered whether he had conjured it up; in other words that his imagination was 
responsible for what he reported seeing.  This question is pivotal to the sense of 
extraordinariness being conveyed here and seems to be providing a way in which James 
contrasts regular imaginary mental events with this experience.  If his talk had answered his 
reported thought in the affirmative then the event could have been ‗explained away‘ by his 
(vivid or powerful) imagination.   
 
Clearly James is aware of this possibility by also providing reasons why that might have 
been feasible.  He makes reference to an identity; an utterance that he self-repairs before 
completion, and re-positions as a former identity (lines 13-14), as an ‗artistic imaginative 
type person‘.  This construction of the artistic identity as part of his former self allows him 
to show that he is able to differentiate between an experience or mental event that is the 
product of an artistic imagination and something which is not.  Furthermore, his 
orientation to his former artistic identity as relevant allows him to defuse or discount the 
inference that his imagination was a possible cause or source of the vision.  In turn this 
highlights the ‗rational‘ explanation that would have normalised this vision.  However, he 
goes on to reassert the extraordinary nature of this experience in stating that ‗it seemed to 
be something I couldn‘t ‗ave come up with‘, and that, ‗it just seemed to be independent of 
my mind‘ (lines 14-16).  Both utterances serve to discount, for James, any seemingly 
ordinary explanation for his experience.  His orientation is then to a non-ordinary source 
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for his vision, conveying the experience as qualitatively different from something that one 
would imagine or voluntarily picture.   
 
What James appears to be employing here is a device, using reported thought, to set up a 
contrast between agency and non-agency.  By including a hypothetical cause for his vision 
– his own previously artistic imagination – he acknowledges awareness of his own agency 
in (potentially) producing imaginative visions or experiences.  However, his subsequent 
reference to the vision as independent of his own volition (thus non agency) refutes this 
hypothetical explanation immediately.  Furthermore, James‘ orientation to a former artistic 
identity allows him to establish his knowledge and thus ability to discern imaginary and 
internally created events from externally imposed ones of extraordinary origin.  This might 
be seen as a form of epistemic negotiation – in which there is a claim to knowing, sensing 
or discerning this critical difference between ordinary and non ordinary mental 
phenomena. 
 
These contrasts are constructed by the introduction of a reported thought that ‗does‘ 
surprise.  Surprise can be deployed in different ways but the inclusion of reported thought 
to effectively convey this surprise is common.  Similar ones are found in many accounts, 
such as extract (3).  Here, JM is talking about an experience that occurred whilst he was 
recovering from a serious operation in hospital.  Just prior to this extract he was describing 
his sporadic sleep processes at the time, talking about how he would often not sleep 
properly in the hospital and instead would be regularly in and out of sleep.  At this point he 
described being in ‗that kind of…grey area between the two [waking and sleeping]‘ (see 
extract 11, Chapter 4 for the full extract). 
 
Extract 3 – John More 
 
7 JM: …I was just laid there with me eyes  
8  closed (.) and then I had this vision 
9  (0.8) 
10  there was this (.) female face (.) with er golden hair (0.5) like that you see (.) 
11  j-just just there looking straight at me 
12  (1.0) 
13  .hhh and erm (1.2) this 
14  (1.6)    
15  thi::::s apparition whatever it was this image (0.4) said (.) erm (.) it‘s alright 
16  John 
17  (1.9)  
18  and that was it and then it just (.) faded away (0.4) so I thought erm (.) wow  
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19  >at first when it was happening I didn‘t think anything of it because it just 
20  seemed so natural 
 
In this extract JM describes his vision.  He talks about a ‗female face with (.) er golden hair‘ 
(line 10), which appears in front of him (he indicates this during the narrative with his 
hands gesturing a face in front of his).  He refers to his ‗vision‘ (line 8) as an ‗apparition‘ 
(line 15) before then delivering a disclaimer, ‗whatever it was‘, to that as the definitive 
interpretation and then offering another – ‗this image‘ (line 15).  Whilst the concept of 
apparition has spectral connotations, the notion of an image is a much more neutral term, 
providing a way of positioning himself as observer, reporter or receiver of events that 
happened rather than as an active creator or interpreter.  
 
JM then uses direct reported speech (lines 15-16) to relay the message that his vision 
delivered to him – ‗it‘s alright John‘ – before fading away.  Finally, on line 18 he introduces 
reported thought to communicate his (alleged) reaction to the event at the time it occurred.  
His reported thought – ‗wow‘ – allows him to suggest that after having experienced this 
extraordinary vision, he was amazed, overawed and overwhelmed.  This notion shows him 
orienting to a sense of profundity and is an expression of astonishment, bewilderment or 
being stunned.  Notably, however, these synonymous expressions are tremendously 
positive and contribute to the idea that what has just been described was momentous.  JM 
uses reported thought here to do ‗giving a response‘ or reaction to his experience, but 
located immediately after the experience and not at the time of relaying the account.  He 
further establishes this by suggesting he was incapable of ‗thinking‘ or ‗reflecting‘ about it 
whilst it was taking place (lines 19-20).  
   
This is unusual because some of the other extracts locate the mental events during the 
extraordinary event itself (or immediately after it).  But it does work to provide a similar 
contrast to the other extracts regarding the identification of ordinary or regular mental 
events versus non ordinary ones.67  So the contrast here is worked up via a reported ‗wow‘ 
after the event, which is distinct from during the event where he reported not thinking 
‗anything of it because it just seemed so natural‘ (lines 19-20) – it was only afterwards that 
he ‗thought‘ anything.  In this sense, the unnaturalness or extraordinariness of the 
experience and its agency emerge as relevant only after the experience.  It is this realisation 
which is marked by the reported thought.  It marks the realisation of something unusual, 
                                                 
67 Indeed, akin to all of these extracts the notion of being in an altered state of consciousness, rather than a 
usual state of consciousness seems to be implicitly alluded to. 
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unexpected and uninvited in the speaker‘s consciousness – something that could be 
contrasted with ordinary mental events by an orientation to surprise.  The reported thought 
also invokes the agentic force of the experience, which is effectively construed in the form 
and substance of this design.  Thus it is the agency of the experience that is effectively 
conveyed by the display of a surprised (silent) response at the time (Barnes & Moss, 2007; 
Haakana, 2007). 
 
As we can begin to see, reported thought is a fairly efficient device in working to establish 
the agency of the experience reported by the experient.  This can be done via the use of 
surprise but there are other ways in which this appears.  Either way the speaker facilitates a 
distance between themselves and the experience occurrence in terms of conscious volition 
or action.  This is achieved via the main reported thought in the next extract (4).  George is 
talking about a dream he had which forms the second event in a series of experiences that 
he reports in a life story trajectory.  Just before this extract George has relayed that it is 
difficult to talk about these experiences.   
 
Extract 4 – George  
 
1 G: I had a dream I had a dream that erm (1.2) I was in a tunnel it was like a  
2  nissen hut68  
3  (2.1) 
4  and there were e- hhh I was grey (1.0) and there were people (.) there were 
5  benches along the side of the hut  
6  (1.5) 
7  and there was a light (0.9) just about here above me ↑I could never w- I-I-  
8  couldn‘t see it (.) 
9 I: mm  
10 G: but it was female I mean to me (.) female goddess and all the rest of it  
11  >↑OOH no (0.3) no no no not going there (.) really (.) not for me (0.4) but 
12  this this light was  
13  (3.5) 
14  a- hhhhhh  
15  (1.7) 
16  it gave something to me like it made me feel wanted (.) it made me feel  
17  comforted and happy and (.) all the rest of it 
18  (1.2) 
19  and just before I‘d gone into the dream there was a kind of a a redness a  
20  golden sort redness and all the rest of it >so anyway I woke up and I  
21  thought oh interesting dream but what a load of nonsense because it was  
22  kind of goddy 
                                                 
68 Nissen huts were originally designed by Peter Norman Nissen and used as infantry housing in World War 
I.  Subsequently, the huts, made out of corrugated steel, were used extensively in World War II as bomb 
shelters (for more information see http://www.nissens.co.uk). 
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George begins talking about the dream detail in the first eight lines which are peppered 
with quite lengthy pauses.  He goes on to report that ‗there was a light‘ (line 7) located 
somewhere above him.  He reports not being able to see it, but somehow having 
knowledge of it being there.  Then George begins to tell me that this light ‗was female‘ (line 
10).  George does not talk about how he knew this, but its controversial status is waived as 
it occurred during a dream state, where rational explanations and logical occurrences are 
not requisites.  Immediately after this, George inserts a sort of hypothetical and ambiguous 
reported thought, concerning ‗female goddess and all of the rest of it‘ (line 10) – which has 
clear New Age associations.  This hypothetical reported thought (line 11) indicates ‗how he 
would usually react to such ideas‘, and is demonstrating a footing shift (Barnes & Moss, 2007) 
from storyteller to ‗how I felt about it‘.  Despite this seemingly negative reaction to these 
connotations, and an explicit expression of discomfort (an emphatic sigh on line 14) he 
goes on to talk about the positive attributions associated with it (lines 16-17).  This 
contrastive set up – how George would usually relate to such things and how he reports 
actually relating to it, ‗it gave something to me like it made me feel wanted‘ (line 16) – 
allows juxtaposition between the actual and the hypothetical.   
 
Subsequently, he reports having thought ‗oh interesting dream but what a load of nonsense 
because it was kind of goddy‘ (lines 27-28).  Beginning with a response particle (Heritage, 
2005) or reaction token (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006), George formulates an evaluative 
position (Haakana, 2007) – of the dream as ‗interesting‘ but ‗nonsense‘.  He accounts for 
this evaluation through reasoning its religious connotations are, in line with references 
elsewhere in his account, not applicable to himself or his identity.  This is effectively 
communicated by use of the term ‗goddy‘ as equated with ‗nonsense‘ and as a derogatory 
evaluative reference to all things religious or notions of the Divine.  His refutation of any 
overt religious interpretation, despite the mention of potential signifiers in this regard (e.g. 
‗a light‘, ‗female goddess‘) sets up a position of agency.  That is, George is not ‗religious‘ in 
any sense so could not have been responsible for this extraordinary dream‘s contents which 
seems to have (negatively evaluated) religious overtones.  Instead, George positions himself 
as having the rational reaction to this dream, and questioning its worth on this basis, 
despite his reported positive response to the light in his dream.  The positive aspect, 
however, is worked up as a feeling response (that is involuntary) rather than his thinking 
response – sensible, rational and considered (Haakana, 2007).  In this sense, the dream was 
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neither willed nor sought by George and constructs him as passive recipient – affording 
agency to his experience and a non agentic position to himself.   
 
In the same way that reported speech can display a collective verbal response, so too can 
reported thought convey a collective attitudinal response.  In extract 5 (the full extract – 
including the excerpt from the beginning of the chapter) reported thought centralises the 
unexpectedness of the events described.  It is this element – surprise as a reaction to 
unexpected events – which provides the common thread between this and earlier extracts 
in this section.  Perhaps interestingly, it is reported speech which supports or provides 
evidence (Holt, 1996, 2000) for the agentic nature of the experience.  It concerns the day of 
Alex‘s funeral; all of Lyn‘s experiences centre on the death of her friend, Alex. 
 
Extract 5 – Lyn  
 
1 L: and it was one of these sort of clear autumn days it was a lovely day (0.5)  
2  and (0.2) my son had actually gone with me as well (.) and we were standing 
3  round the grave and suddenly it just started to pour with rain it was like 
4  stair rods coming down (.) you know just completely quiet but just  
5  >sschhhhe::w .hhh and we were all thinking oh good heavens and £you  
6  know nobody had brought an umbrella or anything cos it had been such a  
7  lovely day  
8  (0.8) 
9  e::rm and >of course you know what it‘s like you‘re just so upset you  
10  don‘t really take things in it was my son that pointed out afterwards he  
11  said it only rained round the grave 
12  (0.8) 
13  he said did you notice that the rest of the ground was absolutely dry and  
14  I said well (.) n(h)o I ha(h)dn‘t you know 
 
Lyn begins by talking about the weather on the day of the funeral (line 1) implying that she 
has a good recollection of this day and its features, but also orienting to the ‗clearness‘ of 
the day as an important aspect of her narrative to be attended to.  Additionally, she 
mentions that her son accompanied her (line 2).  Then she talks about all the mourners 
being stood ‗around the grave‘ (lines 2-3), when the weather abruptly changes.  She talks 
about the rain being ‗like stair rods coming down‘ (lines 3-4) conveying a torrential 
downpour rather than a light shower.  This is further emphasised by the non-lexical 
expression she includes in mimicking what the rain is like ‗sschhhhe::w‘69 (line 5).  
Following this, she inserts a collective reported thought, ‗and we were all thinking oh good 
heavens‘ (line 5).   
                                                 
69 This non-lexical expression I have tried to represent phonetically here. 
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As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is clearly impossible that Lyn is actually 
referring to every mourner‘s literal thought processes at the time – this is not something 
she could possibly know.  However, in reporting what everyone was thinking Lyn is 
effectively conveying a significant sense of surprise; of being caught unawares with this 
dramatic and unexpected change in the weather.  She is also positioning herself as having 
(and sharing) the normative and expected reaction (in this case surprise) to this kind of 
incident.  This design feature further allows an evaluation of the events as surprising and a 
substantiation of this as the proper reaction to such an event (Barnes & Moss, 2007). 
Additionally, the striking change in the weather is also portrayed as slightly bemusing (as 
conversations about the unpredictability of the weather in the UK often are), indicated by 
the light-hearted ‗smiling‘ voice that Lyn uses throughout lines 5-7.  The mild amusement 
shows to any recipient how the unexpected event is to be treated – as a not too disastrous 
event.  There is a sense in which Lyn reports this story as an ‗unmotivated witness to the 
event‘ (Barnes & Moss, 2007: 130).  This display of neutrality (Potter, 1996) allows her to 
normatively position herself alongside everyone else there lending a degree of objectivity to 
the events unfolding. 
 
In making a case for the event‘s extraordinary status, Lyn uses reported speech via which 
the event becomes really extraordinary.  All of the claims here are delivered in the form of 
reported speech dialogue between Lyn and her son.  This begins with Lyn reporting that 
her son said ‗it only rained round the grave‘ (line 11) and then, ‗did you notice that the rest 
of the ground was absolutely dry‘ (line 13), followed by her response ‗and I said well (.) 
n(h)o I ha(h)dn‘t you know‘ (line 14).  By conveying the peak of the narrative in reported 
speech, Lyn is employing a commonly used resource for creating involvement and drama 
through such a process (e.g. Li, 1986).  Also, using the reported speech of her son to 
construct the extraordinary nature of the event allows her to distance herself somewhat 
from making such a claim (it may seem somewhat controversial, unusual or illogical to 
suggest that it rained only in a very localised area).   
 
Clark and Gerrig (1990) have suggested that the current speaker only takes responsibility 
for the presentation of the words from the original speaker.  In this way, the ultimate 
responsibility for the quote lies with the original speaker.  The current speaker can thus 
distance or detach themselves somewhat from the material they present.  Indeed, Lyn 
expressly abdicates any responsibility for this interpretation as she suggests that she did not 
 176 
even notice it.  The authority for this interpretation is passed on despite it being presented 
in such a way as to offer supporting evidence for a non-ordinary explanation.   
There are two aspects to the notion of agency in this extract.  The first is that the 
experience is again displayed as the force with agency – the extraordinary events occurred 
outside the mourners‘ control.  And secondly, that the authority and responsibility 
regarding the detail of the story was also attributed to another source – in this case another 
person.  This third party endorsement is one of a number of devices (connected to 
reported speech and thought) available to a speaker when dealing with the negotiation and 
management of epistemic authority (see for instance, Clift, 2006; Edwards & Potter, 1992a, 
2005; Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Pomerantz, 1980, 1984, 1986; Potter, 1996; Potter & 
Hepburn, 2003; Raymond, 2000; Raymond & Heritage, 2006; Sacks, 1979, 1984, 1992; 
Stokoe & Hepburn, 2005; Wiggins & Potter, 2003; Wooffitt, 2008).  As Wooffitt suggests, 
 
―These studies show how epistemic authority is the 
outcome of discursive activities embedded in routine 
communicative procedures, such as turn-taking and turn 
design, and an attribution that may be challenged, 
negotiated and warranted in various ways.‖   
(Wooffitt, 2008: 9) 
 
Both these aspects (agency and authority) function to provide the speaker with a non 
agentic position in relation to this extraordinary event.  As such the speaker is able to 
reinforce a point and thus aim to increase credibility or reliability (Vincent & Perrin, 1999; 
Wooffitt, 1992). However, Lyn does present this as an extraordinary event and an 
experience she trusts happened as she trusts her son‘s judgement and his experience. 
 
 
5.5.2 Rationality and objectivity 
 
Closely related, but not identical to the issues of agency and authority, are the issues of 
rationality and objectivity that are enabled by the reported thought device.  That is, the 
experients appear to be reporting thought in order to substantiate their own rationality in 
the face of an ‗irrational‘ experience whilst also working to establish the experience as an 
objective occurrence.  Notably, the reported thought found in some of the following 
accounts (extracts 6-8) is located during the experience, rather than immediately after it.  
That is, the experients construct their thought processes as occurring during ostensibly 
altered states of consciousness.  In this extract (6) JC is describing an out of body 
experience that occurred during a meditation session. 
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Extract 6 – John Cooper 
 
1 JC:  this is another out of body experience (0.5) where erm  
2  (1.2)  
3 x going in (.) and just (0.4) being quiet  
4  (0.7)  
5 y and I felt myself lifting out of my body (0.8) and going (.) >I was like Peter 
6  Pan (0.9) flying off (1.0) and I flew over this (.) land (0.6) which was red  
7  (0.4)  
8  and I thought where the heck am I (.) you know (0.5) and I‘ve never seen  
9  red soil (1.2) alright? (0.6) that orangey red (0.3) okay? 
 
The extract begins with JC labelling his experience as ‗another out of body experience‘ (line 
1), indicating his competency in identifying these kinds of experiences because he stakes a 
claim to having had more than one.  He then goes on to talk about the detail of his 
experience.  He describes flying ‗over this (.) land (0.6) which was red‘ (line 6), clearly 
orienting to the colour as important, as opposed to any other possible detail about the 
scene.   
 
The reported thought is inserted on line 8.  It is positioned after the ‗y‘ component, as a 
reflective process located during the experience.  Its inclusion in the narrative suggests that 
there is something pertinent about a report of what was going through his mind in relation 
to his location during his experience, to the current interaction.  JC reports thinking ‗where 
the heck am I‘, which conveys surprise, confusion and a questioning or doubting tone 
about the events he had just talked about experiencing.  These usually ‗rational‘ thoughts 
purportedly take place during a meditative state – commonly considered to be an altered 
state of consciousness (from ordinary consciousness).  This is immediately followed by a 
‗you know‘ (line 8) locating his reported thought as a common and expected reaction to 
this kind of event (something also noted by Barnes & Moss, 2007: 130).  Subsequently it is 
the colour of the earth that he comes back to in line 9, punctuated by ‗alright?‘ (line 9) and 
‗okay‘ (line 9) as if to emphasise and stress his confusion and his assertion of not having 
‗seen red soil‘ (lines 8-9) before.  This emphasis on the colour of the earth during his 
experience is directly linked to the somewhat unconventional explanation provided at the 
end of the narrative70 (see extract 16, chapter 4 for the full experiential account).  This 
enables the speaker to work up a contrast and establish the objectivity of the experience.  
                                                 
70 This explanation is delivered via the reported speech of a third party also at the meditation group who 
proposes JC‘s had in some way ‗travelled‘ to the West Country and seen some red soil there.  The inclusion of 
third party reported speech allows JC to put some distance between himself and the responsibility for this 
interpretation (see Holt, 1996, 2000; and Clift, 2006, for further comment on evidence and authority in 
relation to reported speech).  
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His reported thought, which questions his physical whereabouts, also allows him to 
introduce the reported speech explanation as the satisfactory resolution to the quandary. 
 
JC is invoking rational mental processes during his TEHE.  He talks about asking himself a 
question at a crucial moment in the narrative.  This reported thought is one of the ways in 
which the speaker is able to indicate to the recipient that the event being relayed is 
extraordinary.  By invoking that questioning and surprise were taking place, the recipient 
begins to get a sense that the events are in some way unexpected or unusual.  These 
reported thoughts are located as silent responses in the same way that Haakana (2007) 
identified; only these responses are silent responses to reported exceptional experiences.  
These reported thoughts are also previously ‗hidden‘ in the earlier contexts as Barnes and 
Moss (2007) have suggested.  They work to show (rather than just tell) the recipient that 
the speaker experienced rational thought processes (and those of a questioning as opposed 
to naive nature) at the same time as something extraordinary and non-rational was 
occurring.  Thus the reported thought helps to position this person‘s testimony as a 
sensible, reasonable, rational and normal response to extraordinary events and aims to 
establish the objectivity of this experience.  This construction of reported events as 
objective helps sure up their perceived factuality (Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996). 
 
In various instances, then, thought is reportedly occurring during ‗altered states‘.  But it still 
appears to be performing the same function.  That is, acting as a device by which the 
speaker invokes their response to unexpected events in a rational, sensible and normal 
manner, with critical mental abilities alert and engaged.  In the next extract (7) thought is 
reported during the dream state and there are similar features found here as in other 
instances.  Here Paul is describing an extraordinary lucid dreaming experience. 
 
Extract 7 – Paul  
 
1 PF: and I suddenly become conscious as well (0.8) of the dream state >where I 
2  was actually (inaudible) and suddenly (1.0) again (0.6) I found myself  
3  floating looking down from the top of a tr- (.) but I didn‘t know it at first  
4  what I was looking at  
5  (0.7) 
6  and I thought uh-hum? I looked around and I realised I was at the train   
7  station (1.0) looking down on the top of a train 
8  (1.6) 
9  and I was fully conscious (0.5)  you know and er I was obviously quite  
10  perplexed you know (0.8) what‘s happening here you know 
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Paul‘s assessment of the dream as lucid is communicated effectively by his reference to 
becoming ‗conscious as well (0.8) of the dream state‘ (line 1).  He talks about where he was 
positioned; ‗floating looking down from the top of a tr-‘ (line 3) and then stops himself 
completing this word or phrase (which it seems from later talk – line 7 – was going to be 
‗train‘) to assert that he did not recognise what he was seeing at first.  Subsequently the 
reported thought is included, ‗and I thought uh-hum‘ (line 6).  The non-lexical nature of 
this reported thought makes it somewhat difficult to convey its meaning in transcribed, 
purely textual form.  Nonetheless, from its prosody, inflection and pitch, a questioning 
tone is invoked and so the reported thought becomes a marker of surprise and confusion.   
 
Paul then completes the second half of this with a realisation that he was ‗looking down on 
the top of a train‘ (line 7), emphasising the word train to further stress the nature of this 
being a realisation.  He then returns to his level of awareness at this time as an important 
element of the story to orient to and then curiously says ‗and er I was obviously quite 
perplexed you know (0.8) what‘s happening here you know‘ (lines 9-10).  Paul talks about 
‗obviously‘ being ‗quite perplexed‘ here conveying that he was able to draw on rational 
resources and faculties associated with a waking conscious state, whilst during the non-
rational state of dreaming.  Indeed, his reference to his confusion being evident 
(‗obviously‘) is also a reference to normative knowledge about humanity‘s perceived 
physical limitations.  Further, he is suggesting that he was questioning what was unfolding 
in the dream state and was experiencing confusion.  This would imply that Paul was able to 
employ waking reason in the dream-world.  His reported thought then allows him to 
convey, through exemplification, his rational prowess and ability to think critically even in 
the dream state. Indeed, it is this reported ability to employ (ordinarily) conscious cognitive 
faculties that distinguishes the lucid dream from other types of dreaming (LaBerge & 
Gackenbach 2000).  Other reported features include heightened senses, vividness of 
dreamscape and ‗hyper-real‘ contexts. 
 
It seems that by invoking his (alleged) thoughts during the event Paul can work to manage 
and negotiate his identity as a normal and ordinary person.  There is a sense in which this 
device works to display how, despite having experienced some extraordinary mental 
phenomena, that his rational, sensible and normal powers of thought and reasoning were 
intact (at the time) and he was able to critically question his experience, as any other 
sentient being would have.  Thus he orients to the normative reaction to such an 
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experience and its unexpectedness (Barnes & Moss, 2007).  Being perceived as capable of 
rational thought, one of the mainstays of sanity – might well be fundamental to being seen 
as a credible witness or providing a believable or reliable testimony (Wooffitt, 1992).   
 
It is also interesting that Paul‘s reported thoughts are concerned with his physical location 
(as JC‘s were in extract 6) whilst in the throes of a purportedly altered state of 
consciousness.  This appears to result in two effects.  Firstly, it contributes towards the 
authenticity of the experience by conveying a ‗life-like‘ quality to the ‗dreamscape‘ or 
environment during which the experience is being reported, so much so the experient 
treats it as ‗reality‘ and employs ordinary reason.  Secondly, it provides evidence of sanity 
via a demonstration of critical abilities combined with a display of control over mental 
faculties – even in the face of such exceptional events.  Being in apparent possession of 
these capabilities is clearly important for the communication of a reliable or convincing 
narrative.   It appears that reported thought is working to help achieve these things. 
 
A similar reported thought construction can be found in Richard‘s narrative which is 
additionally concerned with establishing the objectivity or facticity of the experience.  Here 
Richard has been detailing an out of body experience whilst staying at a friend‘s house.  
Just prior to this extract he reports experiencing some form of sleep paralysis and thinking 
that firstly his friend and then a ‗luminous being‘ was entering the room (see extract 14, 
chapter 4 – the missing talk between the two extracts concerns the way in which the being 
was breathing).  Extract (8) picks up when he is reporting hearing this breathing.   
 
Extract 8 – Richard  
 
1 R: I could ↑hear this:: (.) very slow (0.7) deep breathing (1.2) and I suddenly  
2  felt incredibly calm? (0.4) as if ooh- (.) you know this this is alright (.) this is 
3  good 
4  (0.9) 
5 y a:::nd the next thing I knew I was (.) out of my body (0.5) and I was just  
6  looking down and I‘d- (0.5) I‘d- bobbled up to the (0.4) the ceiling erm and 
7  she had big bay windows with (0.6) really heavy f-felt drapes (1.0) and I sort  
8  of bounced against there and I looked and I- I- could just see myself  
9  (1.0) 
10  I could see the room everything I couldn‘t see this: (0.5) this person (0.9)  
11  erm (1.2) and I I was just 
12  (1.6) 
13  lying laying there I couldn‘t tell you whether I‘d got me eyes open or not ◦I 
14  was too far away◦ a::nd  
15  (1.8) 
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16  then I thought maybe I had died aheheh (.) so (.) and as soon as I felt that 
17  fear I was back in my body 
 
In this extract Richard reports leaving his body (line 5) which forms the ‗y‘ component of 
this part of his experience.  He subsequently orients to the observation and reporting of 
external physical features of the environment - the drapes and high ceiling in the room at 
his friend‘s house - and what he claims to ‗see‘ whilst in this state (lines 6-7).  In some sense 
working to establish the objectivity of this state via the purported ability to accurately 
apprehend aspects of the physical world, whilst in an ostensibly altered state.  Additionally, 
he reports being able to see himself (or his body) lying down but being unable to discern 
‗whether I‘d got me eyes open or not‘ (line 13).  All of these elements point to a perceived 
necessity to provide accurate objective, factual evidence about the physical environment in 
order to add weight to the case for the experience‘s ‗reality‘.  This was advocated as a 
research method for studying whether something (consciousness?) did actually leave the 
body in the past (see Cook, Greyson & Stevenson, 1998 and Owens, 1995, but also more 
recently see Dreaper, 2008; Parnia, 2008, 2007 and Parnia, Waller, Yeates & Fenwick, 
2001).   
 
Richard goes on to provide an explanation for this, saying that he ‗was too far away‘, which 
is delivered at a notably quieter volume than the surrounding speech (line 14).  Following 
this and a longish pause he includes his reported thought - ‗then I thought maybe I had 
died aheheh‘ (line 16).  This reported thought, marked notably also by laughter, conveys a 
mistaken thought in some senses - in that he obviously had not died - but also a rational 
one.  His laughter may work here to distance and do ‗face-saving‘ work or possible 
‗troubles resistance‘ (Jefferson, 1984: 351) - as this thought was clearly mistaken, the 
laughter works to show Richard‘s realisation of this.   
 
Akin to the other extracts before (6 & 7), Richard‘s thought is reported as having occurred 
during a different state of consciousness than that of the regular waking state.  It is equally 
set up as a response to his experience.  So, his reported thought provides us with an 
account of how he reacted to this out of body experience.  In this sense, although 
mistaken, the inclusion of this thought is still functioning to display rational powers in 
operation.  Apart from the existence of research which has popularised ideas that out of 
body experiences occur in close connection with death (Alvarado, 2000), there is a 
‗common sense‘ association also.  This common sense notion is perhaps reliant upon 
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fundamental and dominant ideas about our underlying theories of materiality and the 
conceptual separation between mind and body.  In this way, experiencing a separation from 
the physical body could ‗logically‘ lead to an assumption that one is dead.  This thought is 
also worked up as fear (lines 16-17) - again a commonly reported reaction to such 
experiences - which allow a position of usual and normative reactions to extraordinary 
circumstances. 
 
Unusual events are constructed through and by talk.  Reported thought helps indicate that 
the events described are unusual but factual, and may be perceived as irrational but they are 
experienced by rational beings.  Part of Lyn‘s narrative (extract 9) demonstrates these 
aspects also, and is concerned with recounting an unusual experience (that appears 
sequentially after extract 4), whereby musical tracks on a tape cassette and then a cd appear 
to inexplicably repeat.  Firstly, in the car on the way home with a friend Roger (who is 
reported elsewhere as being ‗a bit psychic‘) from Alex‘s funeral and secondly, in the house 
when they got back.  These events are subsequently linked directly to the death of her close 
friend Alex and reported as ‗evidence‘ of Alex‘s transition to an afterlife. 
 
Extract 9 – Lyn  
 
1 L: we were coming back down the road and he‘d got on this music and  
2  (1.3) 
3  you know I was waiting for the tracks I wanted to hear and there was one  
4  particular track that kept playing over and over again and well one of the  
5  things with Roger is if he likes something he just keeps playing it  
6  (0.6) 
7  and it‘s the most irritating habit if it‘s not something you want to listen to  
8  so I (0.9) I just you know didn‘t say anything but I was thinking I wish he‘d 
9  just put that off you know 
(missing talk about getting back to the house and putting a CD on there which kept playing the same track 
repeatedly with no intervention from those present) 
10  and he said that‘s strange he said did you notice the tape in the car?  
11  (0.5) 
12  and I said you know what you talking about and he said well it kept  
13  playing that one track over and over again and I said (smiling voice) I  
14  thought that was you and he says no he says I never touched it honestly  
15   ((claps hands softly)) 
 
Lyn draws attention to the way in which something unexpected seemed to be happening; 
that is, ‗one particular track kept playing over and over‘ (line 4).  She then begins to offer 
an explanation and an evaluation of these incidents.  She proposes that Roger could be 
responsible for playing the same track repeatedly and alludes to him having done just this 
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on other occasions.  She then goes on to offer an evaluation of this as, ‗the most irritating 
habit if it‘s not something you want to listen to‘ (line 7). 
 
Following this, Lyn reports her thinking processes at this time – ‗I just you know didn‘t say 
anything but I was thinking I wish he‘d just put that off you know‘ (lines 8-9).  She also 
explicitly suggests that her thoughts were about an evaluation of the circumstances, and 
that she did not express her irritation or displeasure at the repetitive music at the time 
verbally (or out loud).  As we have seen, this form of ‗silent‘ response allows the speaker to 
display complaint, criticism or displeasure, whilst also demonstrating how they avoided 
conflict thereby acting sensibly and reasonably – even in the face of ‗irritating‘ or 
unreasonable behaviour (Haakana, 2007).  In referring to this criticism as a reported 
thought process at the time, Lyn provides ‗access‘ to an evaluation of the unfolding events.  
It also shows her avoiding interactional conflict.  In this utterance she implies that she was 
irritated by what she assumed to be Roger‘s action of repeatedly playing the same track on 
the car stereo and wanted him to stop, but she did not express this.   
 
Then there is a break in the transcript where Lyn is talking about another ‗inexplicable‘ 
event, back at the house, where the CD player was repeatedly playing the same track.  The 
remainder of the extract is in reported speech. At this point she reports Roger‘s speech 
referring back to the events that took place in the car – ‗he said did you notice the tape in 
the car?‘ (line 10).  She subsequently reports her reaction to this as ‗I said you know what 
you talking about‘ (line 12).  This allows her to hand over responsibility for an 
extraordinary explanation of events, to Roger by using reported speech.  She further 
includes reported thought within this reported speech exchange, when she reports telling 
Roger that she had ‗thought‘ it was him repeatedly playing the same track (lines 13-14).   
 
It is here that Lyn makes the thought explicit, in response to Roger‘s reported observation, 
in a way that is less troublesome that it could have been earlier.  Roger‘s reported speech 
response, ‗he says no he says I never touched honestly‘ (line 14), works to confirm the 
event as an extraordinary one.  Tapes do not just repeat the same track autonomously for 
no reason and seemingly without human intervention, so already here an alternative 
explanation has potentially more credence.  It is this establishment of the first reported 
thought being that of a potentially ordinary source for the phenomena, which goes some 
way towards constructing Lyn as competent and astute: as rational.  Also, these reported 
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thoughts (the silent and the expressed) provide the recipient with direction about how to 
interpret the experience – as an objective event that occurred outside of the agency of any 
human action.   
 
There are also examples in the corpus of data which show slightly different formulations of 
reported thought.  These are often located in different sections of the experiential account.  
However, despite these differences, the function of the device seems to be remarkably 
similar.  Extract 10 is one of these.  It is taken from the beginning of Kerry‘s interview 
before she embarks upon the ‗what happened‘ core element of the account.   
 
Extract 10 - Kerry 
 
1 I:   so if you wanna start just by telling me what happened  
2 K:  okay .hhhh erm  
3  (1.3) 
4  it‘s just one of those things where you look back and you think  
5  now I wonder what was going on there (.) really 
 
I begin as interviewer by asking Kerry to tell me about her experience and ‗what happened.  
Kerry‘s response begins as most others do, with an A + B structure, marked by an 
acknowledgement and hesitation marker ‗okay .hhhh erm‘ (line 2).  Following this, Kerry 
precedes the actual detail of the event with a post-hoc reflection about the experience.  
This reflection (lines 4-5) is constructed as a form of reported thought and is not located at 
the time of the event but instead at an unspecified time in the present.  Using the generic 
‗and you think‘ (line 4) she expresses this cognitive process in dialogue form (a common 
design for reported thought – Clark & Gerrig, 1990), ‗now I wonder what was going on 
there (.) really‘ (line 5).  This constructs Kerry as being in a position where she has spent 
time contemplating, thinking about or reasoning about her TEHE, and conveys her being 
puzzled or perplexed by it.  So it manages to imply ‗strangeness‘ and a rational perspective. 
 
Indeed, there are several actions that are being achieved by the construction of reported 
thought on lines 4-5.  Firstly, the use of ‗you think‘ rather than ‗I thought‘ locates whatever 
claim or utterance in the realm of common sense or shared knowledge.  This suggests 
orientation to a collective, regular, normal reaction to events that any other person would 
have had.  This kind of feature is similar to that found in Barnes & Moss‘ (2007) work 
where the reporting of ostensibly private thought affords the subsequent events that are 
relayed by the speaker a ‗how it would appear to anyone‘ quality.  Secondly, the design of the 
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prior utterance on line 4 ‗it‘s just…where you look back‘, positions this as a retrospective 
or post-hoc thought.  The placement of this thought after the event is suggestive of a 
rationalisation process.  Thirdly, the construction of line 5 indicates the importance, 
recognition or orientation to the event or experience as unexplainable.  In this sense, it 
appears that the reported thought, although located elsewhere (i.e. at the very beginning of 
the narrative, rather than after the extraordinary event) is still being employed in order to 
display rational acuity.  That is, in showing her private thought about the event, Kerry is 
demonstrating her ability to think in a critical and inquiring manner about her experience, 
whilst simultaneously illustrating her cultural competence (i.e. she did not just blithely 
accept an ‗irrational‘ explanation of the event). 
 
Orienting to a rational or normative position does not necessarily require a speaker to align 
themselves with it.  Often by invoking this response they can still perform discursive 
manoeuvres in order to warrant their interpretation as the preferred one (Edwards, 1997). 
Reported thought can be used to heighten the impact of such an orientation.  In extract 11, 
the speaker demonstrates their awareness of the normative cultural response by orienting 
to it, but ultimately rejecting it as an option.  Rose‘s narrative is characterised by its series of 
experiences as a form of transformational life-story narrative.  This extract is preceded by 
talk where Rose has been talking about working in a job she didn‘t enjoy, about an ectopic 
pregnancy (and a subsequent operation where she nearly died) and about her chronic 
sleeplessness.  Following her boss‘s recommendation to see a psychic medium and healer 
(who Rose reports being initially sceptic of) who diagnoses a ‗haunting‘ of Rose‘s bedroom 
as the cause of her insomnia, the medium later returns to help ‗rescue the trapped spirit‘.  
 
Extract 11 – Rose  
 
5  always want to understand more so I started (0.5) doing a lot of research  
6  into (0.4) erm (0.5) er people who could rescue trapped spirits and just just 
7  just understanding >trying to understand how mediums work erm 
8  (0.6) 
9  but the thing about this bloke that really (0.5) er pressed all my buttons was 
10  that (.) he was a very good healer erm and had a lot of success with people 
11  with cancer and conditions like that but .hhh the >most exciting thing for  
12  me was that he could heal animals and telepathically communicate with  
13  animals which (0.6) .hh might‘ve s-s- could‘ve sounded like nonsense to a  
14  lot of people but to me I just thought (.) ↑E:::::hhuuuuu:::h oo:::h you know 
15  this a:::hhh my god I know why I‘m here you know I‘m love animals I‘m  
16  absolutely besotted with animals (.) and the idea of being able to (0.4) do  
17  something more for them than just (0.5) taking them to the bet-vet 
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Rose begins by talking about what she did in reaction to the medium‘s visit (lines 5-7), 
which involved finding out about ‗people who could rescue trapped spirits‘ (line 6) and, 
‗trying to understand how mediums work‘ (line 7).  This utterance is a repair of the phrase 
which began ‗just just just understanding‘ (lines 6-7).  It is possible that this repair is done 
in order to dilute the claim being made.  That is, instead of claiming to have subsequently 
understood how mediums ‗work‘ and what they do, Rose reformulates it into an attempt to 
make sense of medium‘s activity, which given the potentially controversial nature of the 
claim (understanding how it is that mediums ‗rescue trapped spirits‘) is a safer position. 
 
Lines 24-25 show Rose reporting on this man‘s abilities as a healer.  She indicates his 
competencies firstly by alluding to his success levels.  Although Rose does not elaborate 
upon what a healer‘s measure of success might be she refers to this success in close 
connection with ‗people with cancer and conditions like that‘ (lines 10-11).  Linking a 
healer‘s success with such a serious condition (and other, it is implied, terminal illnesses) 
enables an assertion of his credibility, his validity and his deserved status as healer.  Having 
established his healing credentials Rose moves on to account for her further interest in this 
man and his activities.  On line 12 Rose suggests that the healing capacity also extends to 
animals. She takes this further by claiming that this man can ‗telepathically communicate 
with animals‘ (lines 12-13).  This is a relatively controversial claim; on the one hand with 
little consensual scientific agreement on ‗evidence‘ of telepathy‘s existence between 
humans, but on the other quite high levels of reported belief in and/or personal experience 
of some form of telepathy or extra-sensory perception.  Communication between humans 
and animals is, according to some (e.g. Sheldrake, 2004), quite commonly reported.  
Furthermore, some claims have been tested in experiments (see for instance, Sheldrake, 
1999; Sheldrake & Morgana, 2003) but the claims and the experiments remain controversial 
(see the special issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies edited by Freeman, 2005; and 
Henderson, 2006a, 2006b).  
 
Rose reports these aspects as being ‗the >most exciting thing‘ (line 11) for her about this 
man‘s healing abilities.  She then goes on to orient to the possibility of this claim being 
quite controversial when she reports being aware that it ‗might‘ve s-s- could‘ve sounded 
like nonsense to a lot of people‘ (lines 13-14).  Rose establishes her personal positioning 
with distance from seeing healing and communicating telepathically as nonsense.  She does, 
however, manage to display her cultural competency and awareness of this common 
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sceptical view regarding such matters.  The reported thought – ‗but to me I just thought (.) 
↑E:::::hhuuuuu:::h oo:::h you know (line 14) – shows Rose rejecting the ‗rational‘ but 
orienting to it nonetheless, making it relevant here and showing her knowledge of a 
common reaction to such claims.  In doing so she deploys a mundane reasoning device to 
indicate the version of events she presents as the preferred version. 
   
―In conversation, people sometimes warrant accounts or 
pursue rhetorical aims by producing a distinction between 
superficial appearance and an underlying reality which 
represents the true situation or a preferred version.‖ 
(Edwards, 1997: 248) 
 
So Rose suggests that whilst many people might assume telepathic communication with 
animals is nonsense (superficial appearance), she frames it as a valuable and personally 
important way of complementing existing animal medicine (the ‗underlying reality‘, ‗true 
situation‘ or ‗preferred version‘).  This enables a recognition of what might appear obvious 
or even normatively expected (a rational alignment) and subverting this by offering ‗a 
purportedly more insightful and adequate analysis‘ of the situation (Edwards, p248). 
 
Following this, Rose includes a reported thought which begins ‗I just thought‘ (line 14).  
The non-lexical item which comes after this is difficult to transcribe but conveys a sudden, 
emotional and embodied realisation or revelation.  The prosody, pitch and tone of the 
emphatically and dramatically delivered non lexical items work up and enable this to be 
conveyed.  Additionally, Rose reports ‗my god I know why I‘m here‘ (line 15).  This 
revelation of her life‘s purpose is reported as a response to her knowledge of the healer‘s 
abilities with animals.  It is also a revelation conveyed dramatically and as extraordinary, by 
both the ‗as-if-visceral‘ and embodied emotional reaction (see Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006, 
for work on this in relation to ‗reaction tokens‘ and surprise in ordinary turn-taking 
conversation) in the form of non-lexical expressions and by the reporting of her life‘s 
purpose. 
 
The remaining lines (15-17) are accounting for her excitement about animals, ‗I‘m 
absolutely besotted with animals‘ (lines 15-16) and, ‗the idea of being able to (0.4) do 
something more for them than just (0.5) taking them to the bet-vet‘ (16-17).  Here Rose is 
showing that her revelation, her realisation might be extraordinary, but that it is rooted in 
‗actual fact‘.  That is, her displayed desire to help animals, as is communicated here, 
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provides her with resources to account for or explain her excitement in favourable terms.  
In the same way that humans have access to complementary medicine and other forms of 
treatment possibilities in addition to the conventional doctor, so Rose proposes that this is 
a possibility that should be open to animals.  What Rose does is couch a potentially 
troublesome and ‗non-rational‘ reported thought reaction between competent displays of 
critical awareness (lines 13-14) and reasoning (lines 15-17), which work to demonstrate that 
an orientation to normativity and rationality is important here.  It is also worth noting that 
the ‗non-rational‘ response is constructed as knowledge which appears reportedly via an 
inner or unknown source with agency and authority of its own (a common feature in these 
accounts). 
 
 
5.5.3 Summary 
 
So far the analysis has demonstrated where the reported thought is located (often during or 
in response to the extraordinary moment) and what is being effectively conveyed by its 
inclusion.  Significantly, one of the main formulations is of reported thought as a surprised 
(and silent) response to unexpected and unusual events.  Whilst the specifics of each 
instance show subtle differences in the way this is done, the construction of surprise often 
works to demonstrate the agency of the experience and the non-agency of the experient.  
That is, reported thought can show that the experience was unexpected and uninvited by 
the experient and that it had independent agency and authority. 
 
Another common formulation of reported thought occurs during the experience.  That is, 
in an ostensibly altered state of consciousness.  These instances show reported thought 
staking a claim for rational prowess, despite being in the throes of an exceptional 
experience.  Additionally, the reported thoughts often provide a cue for how the receiving 
party should interpret the event – as an objective occurrence that took place beyond their 
control.   
 
It is notable that the majority of the previous instances under interrogation have been 
preceded by the explicit use of ‗I thought‘, which has allowed the deployment of this type 
of cognition to be specifically considered within the analysis.  There are numerous 
instances, however, where no form of explicit identification is used.  In these cases, it is 
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sometimes difficult to discriminate between reported thoughts and reported locutions.  The 
next section considers some of these instances. 
 
 
5.6 Ambiguity and multiple instances 
 
Consistently the reported thought is showing and performing the speakers‘ responses to 
extraordinary events and performing subtly different functions.  There are a few instances 
where it is ambiguous as to whether it is reported thought or reported speech that the 
experients have included in their narratives.  This is more often than not located in 
reported interaction where it is easier to construct such ambiguity (rather than experiences 
when speakers report being alone).  Indeed, Haakana (2007) has noted that there may be 
other interactional purposes being addressed by the selection of a phrase that conveys 
ambiguity (as to whether it was spoken out loud or remained a silent response).  There are 
two instances of this found in Fred‘s account.  One example concerns a tarot reading.  This 
extract (12) covers one of a series of experiences that Fred relays in a long and 
uninterrupted narrative.  Just prior to this extract he has been talking in a favourable 
manner about a tarot card reader he had met. 
 
Extract 12 – Fred  
 
1 F:  I‘d I‘ve never bin one to go for (.) if you like fortune telling but I did go  
2  .hh t::o him (.) erm and have a professional (.) tarot reading  
3  (1.3) 
4  and erm it it really quite astounded me (1.2) becos one of the things as he‘d 
5  sort of had all these cards down he said >yes yes yes (.) erm yes you‘re a  
6  you‘re gonna be a healer (0.5) erm and and I‘d sort of well (0.5) what? you  
7  know what?  
8  (0.7) 
9  ◦erm and he said oh he said it‘s clear as anything don‘t worry◦  
10  (0.5) 
11  er and a I MEAN to me (0.4) erm to be a HEALER (.) erm was like wow 
12  you know (0.6) I can‘t be a healer I‘m you know so humbled by even  
13  someone [suggesting 
14 I:     [mm 
15 F: something becos you don‘t just sort of become a healer like that 
 
This extract has a discernible four-part structure, similar to a three-part structure in 
paranormal accounts originally identified by Wooffitt (1992; also examples in Hutchby & 
Wooffitt, 1998: 199-201).  The first part concerns the speaker being in receipt of some 
extraordinary information (revelation).  The second part concerns the speaker‘s reaction to 
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this information (response).  The third part again has the speaker being in receipt of further 
information, which, as Wooffitt (p179) states, ‗provides the denouement of the mystery 
established by the first part…and is therefore a resolution‘.  In addition to these three-parts 
identified by Wooffitt, this extract appears to have a fourth part, which constitutes the 
speaker‘s second response to the resolution information.  
 
In the first part Fred starts by distancing himself from something he refers to as fortune-
telling (line 1), whilst then stating that he went to see the tarot reader he had previously 
been talking about, for ‗a professional (.) tarot reading‘ (line 2).  His use of ‗professional‘ 
offers an understated positive evaluation of his experience of tarot reading and this is 
contrasted with a previous, somewhat derogatory, view of other ‗psychic‘ readings, which 
he achieves by calling them fortune telling.  Fortune telling has associations with 
fairgrounds, crystal balls and other elements indicating they should not be taken too 
seriously – they are a form of entertainment and not really to be trusted as reliable sources 
of knowledge about one‘s life or future.  Then follows a longish pause, and an utterance 
construing his reaction to the events he has yet to reveal – ‗and erm it it really quite 
astounded me (1.2)‘ (line 4).  So, before he even delivers the experience he is talking about 
being ‗really quite astounded‘ by it.  This helps to convey the impression that something 
unusual or unexpected has occurred (at the very least).  On line 5, Fred‘s talk picks up 
speed as he includes the reported speech of the tarot reader, ‗>yes yes yes (.) erm yes you‘re 
a you‘re gonna be a healer‘.   
 
The second part is Fred‘s response which positions him reacting with surprise and, 
although there is no speech (or thought) marker, lines 6-7 appear to be working to achieve 
the same action as the reported thought devices in previous extracts.  This is indicated by 
‗what? you know what?‘  Here, the ‗you know‘ locates this reaction as a normative or 
expected one.  Fred clearly indicates his response to these events, but it is ambiguous as to 
whether this is reported thought or speech.  By leaving this open, the speaker hands over 
responsibility to the recipient to interpret it either as a silent response or one that was 
uttered.   
 
The third part containing further information and resolution is the reported speech on line 
9.  This is delivered in a quieter tone than the surrounding speech and forms a re-emphasis 
of the revelation that Fred originally reported receiving in the first part.  It also allows Fred 
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to report the tarot reader offering reassurance to him – ‗◦erm and he said oh he said it‘s 
clear as anything don‘t worry◦‘ (line 9) – and orients to Fred‘s reported surprise at being 
told he was a healer.71  Fred reports the tarot reader as an authority who pronounces him a 
healer.  This quieter talk is made even more noticeable by the subsequent contrasting 
louder volume of the capitalised talk on line 11, ‗I MEAN to me (0.4) erm to be a 
HEALER‘.   
 
The fourth part (11-15) occurs when Fred inserts another ‗reaction‘ or response to these 
events.  He further positions himself as surprised and overwhelmed with his use of ‗wow‘ 
and suggests he was ‗humbled‘ at the suggestion of being a healer.  It is not entirely 
apparent whether lines 12-15 are supposed to be (past or current) reported thought or 
speech, but his ‗I‘m you know so humbled…‘ (line 12) suggests that it is meant to be 
located at the time of the experience.  This extract concludes with Fred suggesting he is 
‗humbled‘ (line 12), my ‗mm‘ inserted here as affirmative or encouraging in some way (line 
14), and Fred further suggesting he is surprised because, ‗you don‘t just sort of become a 
healer like that‘ (line 15).  This serves to establish the experience (and the account) as an 
objective series of events, substantiated by the evidence of the invoked reported speaker 
(the tarot reader) – again displaying neutrality, constructing events as objective and 
deploying third party endorsement to substantiate claims (Edwards, 1997, Potter, 1996). 
 
The next extract (13) is linked directly to extract 12 and exhibits the same structural 
features.  Here Fred is talking about an experience that took place during a meditation 
circle or group in which he used to participate. 
 
Extract 13 – Fred 
  
1 F:  we used to (0.8) erm go and have like a (.) a circle where we used to  
2  meditate there were six of us  
3  (1.4) 
4  .hh and I don‘t know if that was before or after but (0.6) erm (0.7) I know  
5  when we were sitting in this circle (0.8) I just had (.) this  
6  (1.4) 
7  <vision (.) of (.) this light going (1.0) to (0.8) the >person who had given  
8  the tarot reading (1.1) erm this light going to their knees  
9  (1.2) 
10  and it wa:s you know hmm?  
                                                 
71 It is perhaps worth noting that this need not be verbal and surprise could be indicated by a facial 
expression or non-lexical expression (see Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006). 
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11  (1.3) 
12  and when I mentioned that he said oh yeah well I‘ve bin havin‘ some (0.6) 
13   bad knees (0.5) and obviously you were sending (.) some healing energy to 
14  me £which I thought well that‘s interesting cos I you know (0.6) didn‘t  
15  really (.) do anything on purpose it just seemed to to happen  
16  (0.8) 
17  anyway by I mean I just tried to put that to one side you know I thought  
18  °oh (.) you know this is this is no it can‘t be this° cos I‘d say I just thought  
19  well you know healers were (0.9) born healers 
 
In this extract, the first part concerns the extraordinary vision as the revelatory information 
that Fred was in receipt of.  He is talking (on line 5) about the activity of ‗sitting in this 
circle‘ [for the meditation activity].  Then he reports having a ‗vision (.) of (.) this light‘ 
which is directed to the ‗knees‘ of the tarot reader that he has mentioned previously (lines 
5-8).  In the second part, Fred‘s response on line 10, he delivers an expression of 
ambiguous reported thought or speech, which allows him to give his reaction, located at 
the time of the event.  In using this device to deliver his reaction, he reports that his 
reaction was ‗hmm?‘ with noticeable rising intonation in a questioning tone.  This 
expression assists in working up a surprised reaction and perhaps even confusion at the 
preceding events.  At the very least these events are thus presented as unexpected, if not 
extraordinary.   
 
In the third part, (lines 12-14) he reports the interpretation of these events, via the reported 
speech of the tarot reader – that this light was Fred ‗sending (.) some healing energy‘ to the 
tarot reader‘s ‗bad knees‘.  This information is presented as the explanation – as the 
resolution to the original conundrum set up in the first part.  Then there is the fourth part 
where Fred‘s second response is reported.  Fred includes his reported thought at the time 
of the event (lines 14-15), where he suggests that he was not responsible for this event, 
which was outside his control.  Further reported thoughts are delivered in lines 17-19, 
which convey Fred‘s denial of two possibilities – a) that he was responsible for these events 
and b) that this meant that he was a healer.  Fred‘s reported thoughts and the construction 
of this narrative work to effectively place agency into the force of the experience (rather 
than Fred himself) and also to establish the objectivity of the experience – his status as 
healer is affirmed by another (third party endorsement) – by his abilities. 
 
The final instance has various reported thought references.  It is included here as the last 
example because it is an analytically rich extract, displaying both the agency of the 
experience and the rationality of the speaker.  The experience that George is talking about 
 193 
took place in his bathroom.  He has already told me about experiencing an amazing white 
light, which had similarities with the light in his dream, and being on a real high.  This 
extract (14) picks up just after he has been describing that ecstatic feeling. 
 
Extract 14 – George 
 
17  now this-is this-is the spooky part I know this is this is I‘m really gonna be 
18  shooting myself in the foot here (0.4) by telling you this part but 
19  (3.7) 
20  was that there was a voice (1.0) a voice not a real voice but a voice  
21  (1.7) 
22  that was kind of not just a voice but images  
23  (1.6) 
24  and sensations at the same time  
25  (1.6) 
26  oh go::d I hate saying this ↑I‘ve never told anybody this (1.3) and it said  
27  ◦a:::h god◦ it said you are the diamond light (0.4) thousand petal lotus (.)  
28  centre of the universe now remember (0.6) I‘m a person who‘s s:::o (0.8) 
29  anti everything [  
30 I:   [◦mm◦ 
31 G: and I had this sorry the experience stopped and I sorta went N::::o:: come  
32  on (0.5) and I sat down on the edge of the bath and thought wo::ah hang  
33  on (0.5) and I stood up again looked up at the light and it happened again 
34  (.) just complete immersion  
35  (1.0)  
36  and I went outside and I told my wife and I said >look something really  
37  spooky‘s just happened and she said aw >yeah yeah yeah she‘s just  
38  watching teevee she said yeah .hhh go and have a bath (0.3) so I went back 
39  into the bathroom and I tried it again and it just happened a little bit more 
40  (1.8) 
40  and (.) because I was a journalist at the time I thought well (0.5) if someone 
41  who was exc-ceptionally religious had an experience like this they‘d have  
42  thought they‘d met god or something like that I thought well (0.7)  
43  obviously it‘s just (.) because I‘m an atheist and I don‘t believe in any of this  
44  kind of nonsense it‘s c:::ertainly some kind of a neurological (0.7) a glitch of 
45  some kind something‘s gone weird  
 
There are many analytically interesting features of this extract but I want to focus on the 
reported thought.  The first reported thought expresses, in a colloquial fashion using the 
verb ‗go‘ – ‗and I sorta went N::::o:: come on‘ (line 23) – a radical sense of disbelief and 
questioning.  This is further achieved by the prosody, pitch and tone of the reported 
thought.  The sentiment of this reported thought is reiterated on line 26, and the prosody, 
pitch and tone match that of the utterance before.  This manages to ‗double up‘ the doubt 
and disbelieving tone.  The other reported thoughts in this extract appear on lines 38 and 
41.  The first of these (line 38) seems to be working to establish George‘s credentials and 
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reliability as a witness for the provision of a believable testimony (Wooffitt, 1992) – he 
describes himself as a ‗journalist‘.  The final reported thought (41) is linked to this and 
provides an explanation of his experience as, ‗some kind of a neurological (0.7) a glitch‘ 
(lines 44-46).  By showing his critical abilities and awareness of materialist science‘s view of 
such an experience George asserts his sense of balance regarding these events.  These 
reported thoughts are working to display the devices that we have witnessed in earlier 
extracts - firstly, that the experience was not in any way willed or invited, it possessed 
agency and the speaker did not; secondly, in response to the experience the speaker 
questioned and doubted the experience, constructing both a sense of speaker rationality 
and objectivity to the experience itself. 
 
 
5.7 Summary and conclusion 
 
At this point it is useful to return to some of the themes that were identified earlier from 
the literature reviewed and consider them in light of this analysis.  It is clear that in these 
accounts, reported thought is not merely a report of mental or cognitive processes that 
took place at the time of a particular event but instead that it can be considered an 
interactional device working to do particular things at particular times.   
 
In all of these accounts there is a common construction of reported thought as a response 
to the experiences they are conveying.  The reported thought becomes a device which 
allows the speaker to report confusion, surprise, and doubt or the ability to question 
events.  In other work reported thought was shown to be silent responses to reported 
utterances (Haakana, 2007) or previously ‗hidden‘ thoughts in a past interaction (Barnes & 
Moss, 2007).  However, in this analysis this is two-pronged.  The reported thought is used 
to convey silent and private responses to hidden and private individual experiences in the 
past, at another time.  In other words, every aspect that is being reported was concealed and 
is being made public for the purposes of the interaction.  So these reported thoughts are 
included in the interview interaction to perform different functions.  These functions can 
be seen in terms of those directed towards the receipt of the experiential account and those 
directed towards the presentation of the speaker.  However, these are not distinct aspects and 
can be seen as intertwined.  The majority of accounts show this design in one of two ways 
(whilst the remaining accounts show elements of both):   
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a) Experience agency, speaker non agency 
 In these instances the reported thought works to show the agency of the experience and 
the passive or involuntary participation of the speaker.  That is, the speaker is able to 
demonstrate their ability to distinguish between ordinary mental events and exceptional 
(often externally imposed) ones.  In suggesting that these experiences are unexpected, 
the inclusion of reported thought also works to demonstrate that the speakers have not 
invited such experiences or consciously willed them (i.e. imagined them).  Their 
reported thought as a response of surprise is working to demonstrate that the 
appropriate evaluation is to attribute agency to the experience and not to the speaker.  
That is, this experience happened to the speaker, it was externally imposed and not 
internally created - and the speaker neither invited nor willed it. 
 
b) Experience objectivity, speaker rationality 
 In these cases, the reported thought works to ‗show‘ the speakers rational thought 
processes and establish the experience as an objective occurrence.  By invoking critical 
thought, the speaker demonstrates that their mental capacities are (and were) intact, 
despite their exceptional experience.  It is used to construct the speaker as a sensible and 
reasonable individual (Haakana, 2007) capable of rational thought.  In some sense, this 
display of rational proficiency may help mitigate against claims of delusion.  In terms of 
the experience, reported thought is often deployed as a support function – to provide 
evidence for, establish the objectivity of and substantiate the experience construed in 
the narrative.  Furthermore, in these accounts the reported thought may appear in 
conjunction with ‗objective‘ features of a reported environment or the reported speech 
of another.  These additional features work alongside the reported thought to construct 
the speaker as a neutral reporter on factual events - thus establishing the objectivity of 
the experience. 
 
 
5.7.1 Authority, Normativity and Credibility 
 
The concepts of neutrality, epistemic authority and responsibility would appear to be 
invoked in distinct ways by reported thought in these accounts, similar to the deployment 
of mundane reason and devices such as ‗at first I thought‘ (Jefferson, 2004c) in ordinary 
talk.  As Edwards (1997: 247) has pointed out, ‗categories of perceptual experience may be 
deployed to construct an effect of objective reality independent of talk‘.  These functions, it 
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is argued, are often found in personal testimony and eye-witness accounts; that is, ‗in 
reports of disputable events generally (Wooffitt, 1992)‘ (p248).  Leaving aside (for now) the 
issue of why such events might be considered disputable, what this demonstrates on a 
discursive level is the use of reported thought in handling knowledge claims and 
negotiating epistemic authority.  It would also seem that these devices are deployed in 
interview interaction in addition to being achieved through designs in turns at talk in 
ordinary interaction. 
 
In terms of neutrality, reported thought in these accounts is also often used to present a 
position of ‗how it appeared to me‘ and other footing positions, particularly concerning the 
normative or expected response (Barnes & Moss, 2007).  Indeed, Potter (1996) has noted 
that footing shifts are often ‗a display of neutrality‘ and they can be considered ‗an 
indication that the subject/matter is being treated as something controversial or sensitive‘ 
(p144).  In this sense, speakers show that it is important to be considered normal, just like 
anyone else, categorised as ordinary (Sacks, 1992; Wooffitt, 1992) and therefore displaying 
the kind of reaction or response to exceptional events that anyone else would have 
reasonably had. 
 
Finally, there are issues of stake and interest within the accounts that require management. 
Ultimately, there is the requirement to come across as a credible witness with a credible 
story.  However, the story concerns a private, prior experience that no one else was party 
to.  Whilst the experient is perceived as having privileged and direct access to their own 
experience, subjective and perceptual experience is often viewed as flawed and unreliable.  
It is possible that levels of credibility and competence increase via the resources deployed 
through the use of reported thought: 
  
a) the experient demonstrates awareness of a possible rational explanation for their 
experience 
b) the experient shows their ability to think critically or rationally at the point of or in 
reaction to the exceptional events 
c) the experient is not mentally responsible for this independent agentic and 
spontaneous event 
 
Seemingly privileged access to the detail however, does not guarantee epistemic authority.  
Appeals to epistemic authority are worked up via third party endorsements, third party 
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responsibility for unconventional explanation or interpretation, and objective statements, 
assessments or evaluations.  Indeed, these accounts are geared up for a sceptical response 
rather than constructed by a perceived privileged witness or outsider (see Pomerantz, 
1980). 
 
 
5.7.2 Broader Relevance  
 
This analysis, as detailed above, contributes to a linguistic analysis of reported speech and 
reported thought; it reinforces Haakana‘s (2007) call for independent analyses of reported 
thought where appropriate; and contributes to work on mental state formulations in 
discursive psychology by continuing to consider what reported thought in interaction is 
doing rather than merely considering what ‗underlies‘ it.  Overall, this chapter offers 
further, demonstrable and accountable empirical support to a perspective which sees the 
performative, discursive and pragmatic remit of cognitions invoked in talk.  However, there 
is a sense in which this analysis feels limited.  Indeed, what else can be said about these 
accounts?  Does this analysis miss something (the extra or non-discursive)?  What, if 
anything, can we meaningfully say about the cultural or wider social context in relation to 
these accounts?  Therefore, it is informative to contemplate how the analysis also begs 
some broader questions, which include:   
 
 The relationship between cognition and the extra-discursive 
In addition to considering that the inclusion of reported thought is ‗doing‘ particular things 
in these accounts, there are further issues that we can consider concerning the relationship 
between concepts of subjectivity and talk.  More specifically, there are debates amongst 
researchers concerned with constructions of identity and self about how the self is 
constructed in talk (see Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, for a discussion of much of this work).  
Indeed, there have been attempts by some researchers to rectify what is seen to be a 
missing element from purely discursive work.  Some of these have tried to reclaim the 
notion of the inner self or ‗interiority‘ (see Craib, 2000; Day Sclater, 2003; Frosh, 1999; 
Hollway & Jefferson, 2001).  These researchers have employed psychoanalysis as a way of 
addressing this perceived gap.  However, the results are mixed and have been criticised for 
regressing into notions of individualised pathology (Hepburn, 2003) or construing the 
researcher as expert and the participant as ignorant (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006: 50, 
commenting on Hollway & Jefferson, 2001).  Other approaches have aimed to include 
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broader concepts of wider society in their analyses (e.g. Edley & Wetherell, 1997; 
Wetherell, 2007).  Both these aspects are further explored in the conclusion.   
 
 Consciousness and communication 
One interesting substantive element in some accounts is the reference to everyday or 
ordinary cognitive abilities taking place during reportedly altered states of consciousness.  
What implications does this have for how we understand consciousness?   What 
implications does this have for notions of self and consciousness?  Given that 
consciousness studies is still grappling with the so-called ‗hard problem‘, what can this 
work offer to an understanding of the experiential aspects of consciousness?   
 
These are matters that will be returned to and discussed in the concluding chapter.  The 
next chapter explores the concept of transformation in TEHE accounts.   
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Chapter 6  
  
Communicating transformation and identity change in TEHE accounts 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The last chapter explored how reported thought operated in the experiential accounts.  
This chapter considers the concept of change which is one of the most prominent aspects 
in the TEHE accounts.  Almost all the respondents72 report some form of change 
occurring in themselves, often a type of self-transformation, and they seem mostly to orient 
to this change immediately after their experiences.  These transformations are conveyed by 
the respondents as being either triggered by or as a result of the exceptional experience(s) 
that they report.  Interestingly, but perhaps unsurprisingly, all the reported transformations 
are portrayed as positive occurrences – some of them could be interpreted as more ‗neutral‘ 
or ambivalent than positive – but certainly none of the accounts suggest any of the changes 
are negative.  This mirrors findings in the literature which portrays transformations as 
overwhelmingly positive and commonly associated with exceptional human experiences 
generally (e.g. Palmer & Braud, 2002; Williams & Harvey, 2001).  Indeed, it has been 
suggested that EHEs generally, have this aspect in common – their ‗transformative aspect‘ 
– that they provide many experients with the impetus to change their lives and themselves 
for the better (White, 1999b). 
 
This chapter investigates these change narratives aiming to understand what is being 
communicated when the respondents talk about self transformation.  Before this, the 
analytic approach is outlined and the literature concerning transformation is reviewed. 
 
 
6.1.1 Transformations in the literature 
 
Aside from the reported effects of TEHEs during and in the immediate aftermath of an 
experience (e.g. sensory phenomena or emotional arousal), there are many reports of 
striking, enduring changes on experients (Wulff, 2000).  These dramatic transformations 
are regularly centred on people‘s beliefs and attitudes or their outlook on life.  In the 
literature various substantive changes are mentioned, ranging from improvements in 
coping with life problems, to religious conversions (James, [1901-2] 1982).  Other reported 
                                                 
72 There are a few experients who do not discuss change as such whose accounts are not included in this 
chapter. 
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changes include: increased psychological and/or physical well-being; better health; renewed 
or completely new meaning and purpose in life; heightened spirituality; feeling more 
positively towards others; a more positive outlook on life generally; reduced negative 
behaviours; and being closer to God (examples taken from Palmer & Braud, 2002; Smith, 
2006; and Wulff, 2000).   
 
These changes often imply transformation to an individual‘s identity, personality or 
psychology.  Indeed, reporting that one‘s outlook on life has dramatically altered would 
suggest that a major psychological shift has occurred.  The notion that these experiences 
are somehow psychologically transformative (Underhill, 1911) is an interesting one, not 
least because it is possibly a controversial claim.  This controversy might arise from the 
difficulty in substantiating dramatic personality or identity change per se. Prevailing western 
conceptions regarding the self and change maintain a persistent and fixed ‗core‘ which is 
not considered amenable to change (Gergen, 1999).  So, there may be inferential 
sensitivities regarding these experiences because they lead to the kind of change which 
tends to be regarded suspiciously in western culture.  Furthermore, changes to one‘s person 
or identity are likely to be perceived as more credible and authentic when incremental and 
inspired by ‗real life‘ events rather than private, intangible and unusual experiences. 
 
There is also contention about whether these transformations are (or even can be) 
immediate (Eugene Thomas, 1997) or permanent (Smith, 2006).  It has been argued that 
dedicated time and reflection is required in order for any benefits to be fully realised 
(James, [1901-2] 1982) and some have even suggested that change is only possible through 
the development of a spiritual discipline (Collins, 1991).  From this perspective, only some 
experients can expect to harness the effects of their experience for long-term self-
transformation.  Indeed, Palmer and Braud (2002) emphasise that these experiences 
provide a potential opportunity for positive outcomes and transformative effects.  The idea 
that other ‗anomalous‘ experiences may produce profound changes in an individual has 
been recognised by others also (e.g. Mack, 1994; Ring, 1984, 1992; van Lommel, van Wees, 
Meyers & Elfferich, 2001; and Waldron, 1998). 
 
In this literature, reported changes are often extrapolated into real changes in behaviour, 
even if only employed anecdotally as opposed to empirically (Wulff, 2000).  These 
conceptions remain concerned with the substantive elements of change whether they 
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concern the experients (e.g. Palmer & Braud, 2002) or the researchers investigating 
exceptional experiences (see the recent call for anthropologist‘s accounts of ‗transpersonal 
phenomena‘ in Devereux, 2007; an article by McClenon & Nooney, 2002, and the edited 
collection by Young & Goulet, 1998).  The work concerning ‗lay experients‘ has 
emphasised the need to document and describe the reported changes and how they occur 
whilst ascertaining the most common transformative elements (e.g. Smith, 2006).  These 
are all valuable and interesting contributions to the study of extraordinary experiences, in a 
broad sense.  However, there are interesting developments in the social sciences regarding 
identity that might provide novel insights for a different kind of focus.  Before we look at 
these it is worth considering how the concept of ‗change‘ and ‗identity change‘ are currently 
being understood by research in the social sciences more generally.   
 
 
6.1.2 Current research on change 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the concept of individual change or transformation per se is rarely the 
focus of social science research concerned with notions of change or transition.  Instead, 
work appears to be centred on how the self is constituted within a broader changing 
context.  A few examples73 include, individuals making sense of self and identity in the face 
of social change (e.g. Burkitt, 2005; O‘Connor, 2006); individuals becoming fathers and the 
issues around this transition (Brannen & Nilsen, 2006); individuals experiencing 
organizational change (Bryant & Wolfram Cox, 2004) or those having been diagnosed with 
major psychiatric disorders (Estroff, William, Lachicotte & Illingworth, 1991).  In these 
examples the focus is not upon the account of change in and of itself, but instead upon the 
anticipated effects of social and cultural change upon an individual‘s presentation of self or 
identity.  In some of the research where change is referred to by respondents, it tends to be 
incremental or gradual change and/or the primary analytic concern is not with this 
inclusion or formulation of change (e.g. Auburn, 2007; Burke, 2006; Burkitt, 2005; Bryant 
& Wolfram Cox, 2004; Estroff et al, 1991; Thomson, Bell, Holland, Henderson, McGrellis 
& Sharpe, 2002).  There are also instances where the concept of change is implicit or not 
directly referred to in a respondent‘s narrative and instead is identified as relevant by the 
researcher or analyst (e.g. Auburn, 2007; Brannen & Nilsen, 2006; O‘Connor, 2006).  Some 
have noted this lack of focus on individual change in particular fields. 
                                                 
73 The examples on change are a selection of fairly recent social scientific papers concerning change or 
transition in some way. 
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―In youth research…the focus has often been on particular 
transitions such as leaving home, starting a family, or the 
movement from education into employment.  While these 
transitions are likely to have biographical resonance, 
researchers have tended to privilege social categories over 
the subjective experience of personal change.‖  
(Thomson et al, 2002: 337)  
 
However, Thomson, Bell, Holland, Henderson, McGrellis and Sharpe do not provide a 
detailed data analysis focusing on individual change either, despite their recognition of its 
lack, and their analysis relies upon traditional conceptions of social class and related 
opportunities. 
 
The majority of the remaining analyses in this selection of papers (with the exception of 
Auburn, 2007) are also integrated with pre-established theoretical perspectives or concepts 
from social theory.  These include Bauman‘s (2000) ‗liquid modernity‘ and Gidden‘s (1991) 
‗fateful moment‘s (e.g. Burkitt, 2005; O‘Connor, 2006); psychological theories of 
personality development – whose central theme appears to be the gradual maturation and 
stabilisation (Caspi, Roberts & Shiner, 2005) of inherent traits over time rather than sudden 
or dramatic change (e.g. McAdams, 2001; Pals, 2006; van Aken, Denissen, Branje, Dubas & 
Goossens, 2006); or theories concerning identity, such as identity control theory or ICT 
(e.g. Burke, 2006).  ICT suggests that ‗an identity is viewed as a set of self-relevant 
meanings held as standards for the identity in question‘ (Burke, 2006: 81).  However, there 
are varying views about conceptualising identity as mentioned earlier, with recent 
developments in the social sciences informing traditional conceptions.  It is these that are 
reviewed below. 
 
 
6.1.3 Approaches to identity 
 
Within the social sciences there are various different ways of understanding how identities 
are formed, invoked and managed (Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995), and how the self is 
constituted (Burkitt, 1991).  There is no space here to trace the differing strands of this 
work in detail (see, Burkitt, 1991, Benwell & Stokoe, 2006 and Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 
1995, for further discussion concerning this) but it is worth giving a brief outline of the 
most major developments.  
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Traditionally, approaches to identity within sociology concerned social or political identities 
with particular descriptions focusing on demographic variables such as gender, social class, 
ethnicity, age or sexuality (Woodward, 2004).  Conventionally, identity was viewed as an 
essentialist phenomenon.  That is, identity was conceived of as a part of a real or pre-given 
(pre-social) self to which traits, features, behaviours and attributes could be attached.  
However, in fairly recent years, the essentialism debate has been somewhat sidelined by a 
series of conceptual and theoretical developments in the social and human sciences 
regarding how the self could and should be understood.  The recognition of the ubiquity of 
verbal data in the social sciences more often than not in the form of stories or accounts 
(e.g. interviews, focus groups, diaries, recorded talk) and the adoption of various post-
positivist or language-centred methodologies (e.g. narrative analysis, discourse analysis, 
conversation analysis) has heralded what has been termed the subsequent ‗narrative turn‘ or 
discursive focus in these disciplines (Speer, 2005).  Many theorists began to argue that 
individuals did not possess a pre-given self as such, but instead proposed that the traits, 
behaviours and characteristics thought to be located ‗inside‘ the self were actually fluid 
concepts, constituted in some way by discourse, language and interaction.  In this sense, 
language and discourse have become central to identity and the self (for continuity and 
change) as both constructive and (re)productive.  However, the ways in which identities 
can be understood to be constituted varies across different approaches (e.g. see Cote & 
Levine, 2002; Leary & Tangney, 2003; and Stryker & Burke 2000 for some examples of 
traditional and non-discursive approaches to identity). 
 
Discursive approaches to identity, personality and change include the narrative approach, 
which sees the self as a constitution employing available cultural narratives or stories (e.g. 
Burkitt, 2005; Bryant & Wolfram Cox, 2004; Thomson et al, 2002).  Additionally, there are 
projects informed by discourse analysis, interested in the broad repertoires employed in the 
construction of identity, the self and their practical manifestation (e.g. Auburn, 2007; 
Wetherell, Lafleche & Berkeley, 2007).  Other projects still draw on developments within 
discourse analysis, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis concerning identity and 
change (e.g. Coupland, 2001; Widdicombe, 1993; Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995). 
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6.1.4 The influence of ethnomethodology and CA on identity and change research  
 
These developments have led researchers to understand identity less as an explanation for, 
or caused by, particular circumstances (e.g. social or psychological), actions or events, and 
more as a topic itself for investigation, or as a resource used by interacting parties during 
talk (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998).  The concept of identity is closely allied to Sacks‘ 
(1992) conception of categories, as it is one example of a category.  Categories are 
descriptive terms that have particular features associated with them any of which can be 
invoked, ascribed, and resisted by interactants with reference to themselves or others 
during interaction (Sacks, 1992).  Sacks (1979) noted that categories are identifiers; for 
instance, ‗women‘, ‗men‘, ‗old people‘, ‗teenagers‘, are all categories rather than groups as 
they do not necessarily describe individuals with common interests but individuals identified 
by common features.  Investigating the category ‗hotrodder‘74 Sacks (1979) observed that it was 
a revolutionary category as it was self-enforced by young people, rather than imposed by 
adults, unlike the category ‗teenager‘.  This self enforcement meant that hotrodders were 
dependent upon others for recognition and any subsequent drag race, but that they could 
equally defend their ‗culture‘ against non-members.  Membership to a category carries with 
it certain connotations and responsibilities.  Indeed, Sacks (1979) suggested that members 
of categories are often seen as representatives of those categories and any misdemeanours 
can become something the whole category is marred with (e.g. reports of criminality often 
focus on categories such as age, ethnicity, sex etc.).  As such, the use of a category has 
implications both in a broad sense and for the way in which interaction is then understood, 
by participants (Sacks, 1992). 
 
In this sense, identity is seen as a tool that enables a speaker to present themselves in 
particular ways, at particular times and achieve particular things.  Thus the invocation of or 
alignment and resistance to identities at particular times in talk can be seen to aid the way in 
which the speaker is understood and how they are situated by their ‗audience‘.  There is 
evidence that identity ‗is a practical accomplishment achieved and maintained through the 
detail of language use‘ (Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995: 133).  This is well demonstrated by 
Sacks‘ (1979) discussion of hotrodders but is equally apparent in other work.  For example, 
Watson and Weinberg‘s (1982) study looked at how homosexual identity was produced and 
                                                 
74 ‗Hotrodders‘ were invariably young males (although Sacks does not draw any attention to this gender 
distinction) who had their cars radically modified (‗souped up‘) and would ‗drag race‘ on the urban streets of 
the USA (Sacks, 1979).  
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sustained during talk.  They studied how culturally available resources were deployed by 
individuals to produce a homosexual identity – showing ‗procedural‘ knowledge – rather 
than solely focusing on a substantive analytic dimension.  Additionally, Widdicombe and 
Wooffitt‘s (1995: 76) study of subculture and ‗youth‘ identities investigated ‗the ways in 
which displays of identity are embedded in talk-in-interaction‘.  One pertinent finding from 
this research is that people seem to work hard in interaction to present themselves as 
consistent, continuous beings with a stable identity (Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995).  It 
seems to be important to portray oneself as a coherent entity with certain established 
features, which may have some interesting analytic implications for a study of 
transformation and change.   
 
This analytical stance towards identity is therefore concerned with the ways in which 
categorical negotiation is achieved in talk by speakers, with ‗no commitment to any position 
on whether someone truly ‗had‘ this or that identity category, or what ‗having‘ that identity 
made them do or feel‘ (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998: 2).  This approach endorses a form of 
discerning analysis towards identities in talk.   That is, only when identities are invoked, 
attended to or resisted and are thus having noticeable effects on the actions being ‗done‘ in 
that very talk (Schegloff, 1992) should they be attended to by the analyst.  This is part of a 
broader methodological debate about the extent to which any extra-discursive phenomena 
can be pertinent for an analysis of discourse (from contentions over context – see Billig, 
1999a, 1999b; Schegloff, 1997, 1999a, 1999b; van Dijk, 1999a, 1999b; Wetherell, 1998 – to 
debates about non-verbal communication e.g. Hammersley, 2003b).  These extra-discursive 
elements include ideologies, concepts of gender and power, poststructuralist theories and 
broader rhetorical resources (e.g. Billig, 1999a, 1999b; Edley, 2001; Kiesling, 2006; 
Weatherall, 2000; Wetherell, 1998, 2007).  However, the extent to which these elements are 
included in any analysis varies from researcher to researcher.    
 
 
6.1.5 The approach 
 
In aiming to better understand the respondents‘ accounts of change, an approach informed 
by some of the developments in ethnomethodology and CA is employed which considers 
how change is communicated and what is being done during talk about change.  This is 
also set within broader cultural and contextual boundaries – but the shape and detail of 
these features will be dictated by the data.  Only Widdicombe (1993: 96) – of the previous 
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work concerning change – has a similar concern in considering ‗how change is constituted 
within accounts, and with what effects‘.  Her focus on formulations of change, where it 
appears in accounts and the functions that this talk performs is similar to the aims for 
analysis here.  However, one notable difference is that the change which Widdicombe 
(1993: 104) discusses in her analysis is solicited: that is, she requests ‗an autobiographical 
account of change‘ from the respondents.   Conversely, the changes and transformations 
referred to in the respondents narratives located here are spontaneous, which adds another 
dimension to the analysis.  
 
Whilst the form and detail of the respondent‘s stated changes might appear, at least 
superficially, to be radically different and highly individualised – connected to the 
specificity of the reported experiences themselves – there are in fact, some substantive and 
analytic features that can be identified repeatedly.  Shared substantive features include the 
reported profound, dramatic and life-changing ‗nature‘ of these experiences.  Many 
respondents do not convey a transient or notionally fleeting kind of change (for example, 
an emotion, feeling or physiological response associated with the moment as or after the 
experience happened), though an account may include references to these shorter and 
peripheral incidentals.  Instead, the ‗big‘ transformational moments are concerned with 
identity, personality and worldviews or Weltanschauung.75  These types of changes are also 
common across accounts.  The analytic focus is how these substantive changes are 
communicated.  As there are identifiable similarities in the resources deployed by these 
respondents to convey change it is possible to consider one extract in detail in order to 
highlight the common properties and features for further explication.   
 
 
6.2 Talking of transformation 
 
Extract 1 is taken from Alice‘s interview and is sequentially placed directly after she talks 
about her extraordinary experience.  Alice reports a TEHE that occurred when she was in 
Africa.  She reports that time appeared to stand still and everything about life and the 
things around her suddenly made sense.  This is the sole experience that Alice reports and 
in her account it is portrayed as a huge, life-changing instant.    In the extract below (1) 
Alice is talking about the changes she perceives have occurred in light of her experience.      
                                                 
75 Taken from the German, this expression means the way in which an individual understands or sees the 
world around them; their framework for making sense of life and events (http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/weltanschauung). 
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Extract 1 – Alice 
 
1 A: and ever since then I (0.5) I dunno (.) I‘ve been able (.) I‘ve found that I‘m 
2  a different person 
3  (0.6) 
4  I found that I‘ve always been (.) had problems coping with situations and   
5  I‘ve always had a lot of (0.6) emotional issues but ever since that‘s  
6  happened to me I‘ve found that (0.3) I can cope with pretty much anythink 
7  (0.5) that life throws at me I‘m a much calmer much more organised person 
8  and (0.4) I‘ve found that things that I never thought I ‗ould achieve (0.7) 
9   I‘m (.) I‘ve actually been able to achieve and I don‘t know if that makes any 
10  sense but it was just like this pivotal moment in my life when I realised 
11  (0.8)   
12  I suppose it is quite a spiritual experience I realised just how small and (0.8) 
13  and (0.6) insignificant I was but at the same time I realised how I was part  
14  of something (0.4) that was (0.7) incomprehensible but amazing and  
15  (0.5) 
16  I don‘t know it‘s changed the way I think about my subject as well (0.3)  
17  being a scientist and (0.5) there was a time when everything was evolution 
18  nothing really had a point except to pass on its (0.7) its genetic (0.4) genetic  
19  (0.3) programming and material but now that I‘ve realised that  
20  (1.1) 
21  you kno:w (.) >the more I think about it the more I realise that obviously  
22  evolution it couldn‘t just be some grand accident but it is part of something 
23  and I don‘t know what that is (0.8) but its just wonderful 
 
Alice uses her experience as a point of departure, to draw upon and highlight a pivotal 
moment, whereby events that occurred prior to this are conveyed as ‗before‘.  Likewise, 
with the introduction of ‗ever since then‘ (line 1), she works up a sense in which events 
occurring subsequently are notably ‗post-experiential‘: in a way that is highlighted as 
discursively relevant for this particular part of the story.  Following this, she utters, ‗I 
dunno‘, which, at one level, is simply a claim to a lack of knowledge.  However, there is 
research which suggests that this phrase acts as a way of putting distance between the 
speaker and particular claims or enables the speaker to convey indifference about those 
very claims (Potter, 1996, 2004).  Furthermore, Potter (2004) has suggested that this 
perceived nonchalance works to ensure that any subsequent claims are not negatively 
received.   
 
Use of ‗I dunno‘ can help to manage the impression of the self that is communicated in 
interaction (see Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995; Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006).  
Therefore, stating ‗I dunno‘ before going on to talk about being a different and changed 
person appears to be doing two things.  Firstly, it is orienting to the potential difficulties 
with announcing dramatic change and allowing Alice to deflect any potentially critical 
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evaluation of these claims.  As noted earlier, claiming dramatic changes to one‘s self or 
personality might be viewed suspiciously in Western contexts.  Claims to this type of 
change could be interpreted as threats to a speaker‘s credibility or authenticity and may 
need to be ‗handled‘ carefully in talk.  Secondly, it works to inoculate against any dispute of 
her claim that a private and highly unusual experience was dramatically life-changing.  
A self-repair is then inserted, where Alice begins on the trajectory ‗I‘ve been able‘ and then 
switches to ‗I‘ve found that I‗m a different person‘ (lines 1-2).  So, from the likely trajectory 
of ‗I‘ve been able to…cope with pretty much anythink that life throws at me‘ (lines 1, 6-7) 
– a formulation of concrete abilities regarding handling potentially difficult situations 
managing the ups-and-downs of life – it is a more fundamental shake-up that Alice invokes 
when she claims finding that since the experience she is (not just changed superficially but) 
‗a different person‘ (line 2).  Additionally, this repair shifts from the originally concrete to the 
subsequently vague (i.e. the non-specific notion of becoming ‗a different person‘).  Whilst 
this phrase does connote profound change it also does not commit Alice to a specific or 
named kind of change and instead allows a more generic, less easily challenged notion of 
change.  
 
Nevertheless, claims to be a changed person work to establish at the outset that the 
reported change should be read as dramatic, profound or radical.  Claiming to be a 
different person on the back of a somewhat intangible experience is possibly problematic.  
This radical change is reported via claims associated with the self or personhood and is 
somewhat tempered by the construction of a passive discovery (she ‗found that‘ she was ‗a 
different person‘).  This passive stance construes change as something that happened to her 
and not something that she consciously directed – in other words she did not knowingly 
make an effort to change her person or her ‗self‘.  The use of ‗I found‘ also enables Alice to 
position herself as an observer of self and has the added effect of her appearing to merely 
point out, seemingly ‗objectively‘, the consequences of her experiences.  Negotiating the 
agentic force for the change could be an important part of how the report of 
transformation is received.  In this sense a successful account with the presentation of a 
transformed self may be reliant on a non-agentic position, where the impetus for change is 
located elsewhere (in this case with an uninvited, unwilled, and ‗spontaneous‘ experience).    
 
The way in which this change is presented as profound and extraordinary is heavily reliant 
upon the ways in which we understand the self.  In this sense, the self (in Western 
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societies) is understood as a fairly consistent entity with a central core that is fixed (Gergen, 
1999), despite the fact that the way the self is theorised is vastly varied (Robins, Tracy & 
Trzesniewski, 2008).  Thus, personality and associated characteristics are usually thought to 
be reasonably static and not normally subject to rapid change or flux.  Whilst change is not 
perceived as impossible, it is usually associated with personality problems or shortcomings, 
the need for psychological or therapeutic intervention, and a process of gradual change or 
change directed by conscious practices (e.g. Cognitive Behavioural Therapy or CBT). CBT 
is a therapeutic intervention that has seen increased popularity in contemporary clinical 
settings.  Billed as a way of changing negative or destructive behaviours and thinking 
processes, proponents of this method teach clients how to recognize and address habitual 
and negative thinking patterns (Williams & Garland, 2002).   
 
Alternatively, changes in a person are associated with more conscious and incremental or 
developmental ‗spiritual‘ transformations signalling changes in self and awareness, such as 
individuation (Jung, 1989) self-actualisation (Maslow, 1943) or non-dual awareness76 
(Wilber, 1999).  There are also further debates within the sociology of religion and related 
fields concerning secularisation and sacralisation (e.g. Flanagan & Jupp, 2007) and the state 
of the spiritual in society77 (e.g. Bruce, 2002; Heelas & Woodhead, 2005; Lynch, 2007; 
Tacey, 2004) – within which, references to contemporary spirituality are located.  Indeed, 
the literature on transformation also suggests that change requires cultivation and spiritual 
discipline (e.g. Collins, 1991).  Therefore, from this perspective, it would be considered at 
the very least somewhat unusual for an individual to transform aspects of this self or 
personality instantaneously.  It is possible, then, that such a dramatic change of self or 
identity requires careful management in talk.  Indeed, Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995) 
revealed that individuals worked hard during interaction to present a level of continuity in 
their identities and ‗selves‘.  Therefore, narratives which refer to dramatic changes 
potentially embody challenges for the respondents. 
 
After introducing the profound change at stake, Alice returns to her ability to cope with life 
and its difficulties.  On lines 4-5 she constitutes a former self via personality traits and 
                                                 
76 The idea of nondual awareness has been around (at least in the East) for centuries, referring to the belief 
that all dualisms or dichotomies are an illusion and that pure or unitive consciousness – a state where this 
illusion is experienced (and not just intellectually known, for instance) – and a transcendence of the self-ego 
can be attained and sustained by adhering to forms of meditative spiritual discipline over extended periods 
(Wilber, 1999). 
77 These issues will be returned to in the concluding chapter (7) of this thesis. 
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characteristics, including extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986).  Extreme case 
formulations – terms such as ‗always‘ and ‗never‘ – can be used in everyday talk to 
legitimise particular claims.  Pomerantz noted three main uses, predominantly in complaint 
sequences, firstly, to defend the speaker‘s claims against (or from) counter claims; secondly, 
to establish a particular phenomenon as objective, as opposed to produced by the 
circumstances or interaction; and thirdly, to establish any given behaviour as normatively 
appropriate due to its commonality or frequency.   
 
By using the formulations, ‗I‘ve always been (.) had problems…‘ and, ‗I‘ve always had a lot 
of emotional issues‘ (lines 4-5), Alice manages to achieve three things.  Firstly, using 
extreme case formulations enables a deflection of any challenges (Pomerantz, 1986) to 
Alice having problems and emotional issues prior to her experience.  Secondly, such 
problems and issues are established as fairly serious, regularly occurring and something 
worth noting (of importance and relevance).  Thirdly, it works up to and allows for a 
subsequent contrasting structure through insertion of the term ‗but‘ (line 5).  Additionally 
talking in terms of generic ‗issues‘ and ‗problems‘ omits the detail or specificity and 
therefore makes them more difficult to refute. 
 
This former identity is contrasted with a transformed personality, which is described as 
being evident since the experience in a three-part formulation; ‗I‘ve found that (0.3) I can 
cope with pretty much anythink (0.5) that life throws at me‘; ‗I‘m a much calmer much 
more organised person‘; and ‗I‘ve found that things that I never thought I ‗ould achieve 
(0.7) I‘m (.) I‘ve actually been able to achieve‘ (lines 5-9).  This is presented as the 
transformed and current version of Alice: a changed person who is better able to cope with 
life‘s challenges (as contrasted with finding coping difficult), calmer and more organised 
(compared with having ‗a lot of emotional issues‘) and also exceeds her expectations.  It 
also includes what Edwards (2000) has termed ‗softeners‘, such as ‗mostly‘ or ‗few‘, which 
are expressions that lessen the extremity of extreme case formulations.  The qualifiers used 
(in this case ‗pretty much anythink‘ – line 6 – emphasis added) seem to weaken the 
universality of the extreme case formulation.  However, Edwards (2000: 354) has shown 
that these utterances can be ‗rhetorically and interactionally stronger‘ as they allude to the 
possibility of ‗one or two counterexamples‘ (p 352).  Thus Alice presents herself as 
reasonable in her assessment of the change, ‗taking account of empirical realities‘ and ‗not 
making excessive claims‘ (p359). 
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In mystical literature or religious texts (particularly some forms of Buddhism) transcendent 
experiences move an individual towards profound changes in awareness, such as the 
beginnings of realisations concerning the ‗illusion‘ of reality and the material world (Suzuki, 
1938).  James ([1901-2] 1982) and Bucke (1905) also note how religious experiences can 
reveal deep levels of knowledge and insight to an experient.  However, whilst Alice has 
made reference to a fundamental change, in suggesting that she is a different person, the 
changes that she claims are absolutely rooted in the domain of the ‗real‘ world.  Alice talks 
about coping with life‘s troubles, being more organised and achieving things – all of which 
are concerned with mundane, ‗daily‘ or ordinary life, as opposed to transcendent, mystical 
or more unusual ‗spiritual‘ changes.  This integration of the ‗ethereal‘ and the ‗real‘ in 
Alice‘s account, points to the manifestation of the transcendent in the everyday, the social.  
Because the changes are centred on ordinary and recognisable aspects of human lives and 
‗selves‘, the previously intangible is afforded tangibility and these changes trade on a 
common shared awareness of everyday struggles and troubles. 
 
However, there are other changes in Alice‘s account, which are substantively concerned 
with more transcendent aspects.  Via a qualification, or orientation to her claim of identity 
change as potentially controversial – ‗and I don‘t know if that makes any sense‘ (line 16) – 
Alice again returns to the changes that she claims happened as a result of this experience.  
Referring to the experience itself as a ‗pivotal moment‘ (line 10) she starts to say ‗when I 
realised‘ but then self repairs to insert, ‗I suppose it is quite a spiritual experience‘ (line 12).  
This displays the experience being considered in spiritual terms as a novel idea, and it is 
presented as a cognitive consideration.78  These two references (‗pivotal‘ and ‗spiritual‘) 
relocate the experience in the profound and the transcendent whilst the somewhat 
reluctant categorisation of her experience as spiritual helps to inoculate against claims of 
either religious fanaticism or sudden spiritual conversion (potentially troublesome 
descriptions). 
        
Alice goes on to include reported cognitive and conscious changes about her 
Weltanschauung via a contrast.  She reports a realisation of her position or place in the 
greater scheme of things.  Alice talks about being both ‗small‘ and ‗insignificant‘ (lines 12 & 
13) and simultaneously ‗part of something (0.4) that was (0.7) incomprehensible but 
amazing‘ (lines 13-14).  Again on line 16, Alice states ‗I don‘t know‘, which deals with the 
                                                 
78 It is entirely possible that this is a reference to our pre-interview conversation, where Alice asked about 
how other respondents defined their experiences. 
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extent to which she has any stake and interest in a particular point of view or position 
(Potter, 1996, 2004).  This indicates that there may be something potentially troublesome 
about allegiance to a concrete definition of this new world view and that there is less 
difficulty with a vaguer formulation. 
   
Following this, she reports another change regarding ‗her [academic] subject‘ and then 
orients to a self-categorisation as a scientist (line 17).  This identity invocation is followed 
by some further explication of possible features for category membership (Sacks, 1992) and 
a contrastive structure.  Alice reports her former understanding of evolution (and by 
implication the whole purpose of life itself) as a way of genetic perpetuation (lines 18-19).  
This alignment with a ‗scientific‘ viewpoint is then contrasted with a reported subsequent 
realisation beginning, ‗but now that I‘ve realised that (1.1) you kno:w (.) the more I think 
about it the more I realise that obviously…‘ (lines 19-21).  This contains three references to 
conscious cognitive processes (realisation and thought) depicting a gradual realisation 
process – triggered by her TEHE – which thus led her to question and ruminate over, 
(subtextually: ‗quite reasonably and rationally, as anyone else would have done in the face of such an 
experience‘) whether life could be adequately explained via evolution and genetics.   
 
There are two things being done in this part of the extract:  
 One is the presentation of a rational and thinking self who is intelligent, learned 
and well-versed in scientific knowledge (i.e. not readily duped);  
 Two is the claim that her experience was so profound and deeply affecting that it 
changed (or instigated change in) fairly well-established views about the 
fundamentals of human existence, life‘s purpose and her Weltanschauung (i.e. 
significant phenomena). 
  
Alice thus presents herself as a rational actor, even in the wake of an extraordinary 
experience, and preserves a balance between these two aspects – the rational self and the 
significance of her experience. 
 
This reported thought preamble is also designed to be more difficult to challenge: not only 
has Alice spent considerable time contemplating this but also the position she now holds is 
fairly indisputable, established by inclusion of the term ‗obviously‘ (line 13).  Presenting 
something as obvious is an appeal to such a perspective being sanctioned by normative and 
general knowledge (and therefore not just subjective conjecture).  Alice then goes on to 
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state the substance of her realisation – ‗evolution it couldn‘t just be some grand accident 
but it is part of something‘ (lines 44-45).  This utterance is designed to convey a marked 
contrast and change in viewpoint but also a level of conviction about this new 
understanding – ‗it couldn‟t just be some grand accident‘ (emphasis added) – without 
sounding arrogant.  Her former understanding is now reported as a limited way of seeing 
life which neglects any deeper meaning or purpose.  This is illustrated by her proposal that 
seeing life as a ‗grand accident‘ and solely in evolutionary terms is ill-considered and 
reductive - ‗it [life] couldn‘t just be‘ - not it might not be but it doesn‟t make sense for it to be (only 
about evolution).  This appeal to reason has a more credible character than a bald 
statement of belief or complete change of position such as, ‗life is not some grand accident‘ 
(emphasis added), and hints at the need for some continuity between current and former 
selves. 
 
Further to this, evolution is not entirely dismissed as irrelevant, but is incorporated into a 
‗transformed‘ understanding, where it is ‗part of‘ a broader explanation.  However, there is 
no explicit alternative explanation proposed.  Instead, the new understanding is offered as 
vague and uncertain – ‗part of something and I don‘t know what it is‘ – coupled with a 
positive evaluation that was not applied to the former evolutionary perspective – ‗but it‘s 
just wonderful‘ (line 23).  This positive evaluation could be a rhetorical device which 
establishes distance from challenges, counter-claims or alternative positions (Billig, 1989).  
Indeed, work is being done to manage a presentation of self which concerns change and 
continuity or consistency.  Alice does not reject evolution and replace it with an alternative 
theory.  Evolution remains part of her ‗new‘ viewpoint, which allows her to institute 
continuity with her scientific, pre-experiential self.  This element of continuity seems 
important for any negotiation and presentation of change. 
 
To demonstrate an outright shift from adherence to a scientific explanation of the world to 
an alternative could be problematic.  If Alice had talked of complete abandonment of her 
previous scientific viewpoint and former scientific self, this would have been troublesome 
for consistency and continuity in her identity and worldview.  Instead, she manages to 
incorporate evolution into a new looser, vaguer worldview and thus negotiates a level of 
consistency in the presentation of her current self.  It would appear then that work is being 
done to manage transformation, communicate profound change and present a credible self 
with continuity and thus authenticity.  Indeed, ‗consistency is a strongly sanctioned 
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normative requirement for being a sensible, accountable, rational, reliable human being‘ 
(Edwards & Stokoe, 2004: 502). 
 
 
6.2.1 Summary  
 
We have explored the way in which change is communicated, the important features of 
which are summarised below so as to inform the subsequent analysis.  Via a series of 
contrastive structures Alice conveys a picture of profound change.  However, her account 
reveals there are various more nuanced features at work.  The preliminary analytic 
observations show that there are four predominant analytical issues: 
 
1. Sequentiality – the talk of change is located immediately after the description of a 
TEHE, which suggests that there might be a pattern to this ordering in other 
accounts.  
2. Credibility and change – though changes are conveyed as profound or dramatic, they 
are simultaneously tempered by references to aspects of continuity in the 
experient‘s identity.  This consistency seems to be important when considering any 
possible difficulty arising from the announcement of dramatic change.  
Transformation of a meaningful kind might be problematically interpreted as an 
instantaneous ‗conversion‘ or as an ‗anomalous‘ disruption to the dominant view of 
self – as fairly fixed individuals with a stable, continuous core (Gergen, 1999). 
3. „Before and after‟ construction – there seems to be a narrative pattern in the account 
whereby a former self and set of circumstances are contrasted with a current self 
and circumstances.  These aspects are constituted as ‗changed by‘ the experience 
and communicate a ‗before and after‘ transition. 
4. Stance/agency – some of the changes are purportedly discovered by the experient, 
almost as if accidentally stumbled across and convey a lack of any conscious action 
on the part of the individual.  Change is attributed to the force of the experience.  
This contrasts with the suggestion that full transformation can only occur with 
consciously directed action (e.g. Collins, 1991). 
 
These four issues inform the rest of this chapter and we will go on to examine these in 
more detail through an exploration of other instances in the data. 
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6.3 Sequentiality 
 
The first feature of the experiential accounts concerns the location of the talk of change.  
In Alice‘s account it was revealed that talk of transformation was located sequentially after 
the description of her TEHE.  The identification of this sequentiality is evident in many of 
the other accounts.  In the next extract (2) Lyn is talking about the last in a series of 
TEHEs connected with the death of her friend Alex when she goes on to talk about 
personal change. 
 
Extract 2 – Lyn 
  
1 L: you know how I was saying they‘d brought Alex‘s body back to the house  
2  (.) for the wake  
3  (0.9) 
4  well apparently her mum had been in the house making up sandwiches and 
5  things and her dad (0.4) .hhh erm had phoned up about something and they 
6  had taken off the the voice message on the (0.4) answer machine (.) or  
7  removed the answer machine (.) and she had the office phone as well and  
8  they‘d (0.7) you know done whatever you do don‘t know whether they‘d  
9  unplugged it or taken off the taken out the tape but anyway there was no  
10  (0.3) voice message on either phone  
11  (0.6) 
12  .hh and he had phoned up her house phone and got Alex saying (.) I‘m  
13  sorry I can‘t take your call just now I‘ll speak to you later (1.0) an::d he  
14  came round and he was upset and he said (.) I thought (0.3) we had taken 
15  this off you know these people‘ll be coming an:d what if anybody phones 
16  (0.7) 
17  so Mary [her mum] says we did take it off (0.3) you know .hhh an::d (0.5)  
18  other people arrived and they were saying (0.4) we thought you might have  
19  got rid of that message you know (.) and they were saying but we ha(h)ve  
20  you know (.) .hh so then we got Alex‘s sister to bring round the phone  
21  from her house (0.7) and plug it in to the (.) socket and it was even doing it 
22  on hers  
23  (0.6)  
24  but the next day it had gone (0.6) you know it was only that night while  
25  (0.3) the body was in the (0.3) house  
26  (0.7) 
27  so to me it‘s been  
28  (1.9) 
29  to me it it‘s (.) erm it‘s like (0.5) I‘ve been told it‘s not a question of belief 
30  it‘s a question of (0.5) knowing that there is life after death and I mean that 
31  might sound really sort of arrogant but I just feel .hhh because of the way  
32  it‘s come from (1.0) I mean it came from Alex (0.9) that it‘s real 
33  (0.8)  
34  and it‘s (.) sent me off on this (.) sort of spiritual quest for the last five years  
35  you know (0.7) .hh erm sort of exploring different religions and (0.7) erm 
36  (0.8) trying to find out what it is:: (0.8) that (0.7) that I would feel  
37  comfortable with (.) you know and erm 
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38  (0.5) 
39  I mean at the present time I feel (0.5) it‘s Buddhism (.) that I‘m comfortable 
40  with  
41  (0.5) 
42  erm but I do- haven‘t really sort of (1.0) signed up to anything I‘m still sort 
43  of (.) you know finding my way through (.)  
44 I:  m↑m 
45 L:   but that‘s the big impact that it‘s had on my life and it‘s made me see  
46  everything differently (.)  
47 I:  mm  
48  (0.7) 
49 L:   and erm 
50   (2.8) 
51  it makes me see life differently and I mean I‘m not saying that (0.4) this is a 
52  hundred percent of the time (.) HUHUHhehehehuh you know I‘m afraid 
53  it‘s (.) er it‘s not that effective 
 
Whilst there is no overt marker for the end of the experience description, the shift in focus 
and content is easily identifiable.  On lines 24-25 Lyn completes the description of what 
happened with ‗but the next day it had gone (0.6) you know it was only that night while 
(0.3) the body was in the (0.3) house‘.  Following this is the beginning of the next part of 
the account where Lyn begins to talk about the resulting changes from her experiences - ‗so 
to me it‘s been (1.9) to me it‘s it‘s (.) erm it‘s like (0.5) I‘ve been told‘ (lines 27-29).  The 
lengthy pause works to show Lyn doing the business of reflecting upon the effects of her 
experience(s).  This sequential transition from experiential description to reflection about 
changes reportedly due to these experiences is not solicited.  In other words, there is no 
request for Lyn to provide this kind of information, she just does.  The unsolicited nature 
of this ordering suggests it is normative.  That is, in providing an account of an exceptional 
experience, the conventional design sequence appears to be prescriptive: experiential 
description followed by post hoc reflections about changes and effects of the experiences.  
 
This ordering can be seen in many of the other accounts, which help to establish that this 
sequentiality has a normative component in this context.  The next three extracts (3, 4 and 
5) also contain very similar illustrations of this normative sequencing at work.  In all of 
these accounts there is a clearly identifiable shift moment, where the talk changes from 
‗describing what happened‘ to focusing on the ‗effects of what happened‘.  In extract 3 
Sunset is talking about her dream-related TEHE before she then goes on to talk about 
change and transformation.     
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Extract 3 – Sunset 
 
1 I:   if you‘d just like to tell me about your experience 
2 S:   erm the experience was 
3  (2.1)  
4  j::ust before (0.7) erm foot and mouth broke out which I think was about  
5  two thousand and one (1.2) and .hhh throughout my life I‘ve had (.) various 
6  experiences and some of them have involved (0.7) er:: very vivid [dreams  
7 I:                      [◦mm::◦ 
8 S:  and (1.2) for (0.8) several weeks I‘d h- I was having a recurring and very  
9  very unpleasant nightmare .hh that my bed was full of dead animals  
10  (0.5) 
11  and because it was leaving me so distressed I told my mother > ab[out it 
12 I:                [◦mm◦ 
13  in the morning and I‘m I‘m glad I did that because obviously it means now 
14  that .hh someone else knew about it before (0.7) anything came of it .hh  
15  e:::r and then of course foot and mouth broke out (0.7) and it it began to  
16  seem (0.5) less like a nightmare and more like a premonition 
17  (1.3) 
18  always been interested in esoteric type things paranormal (0.7) erm (0.7) and 
19  that prompted me to-tut-of (0.4) think I must do something about this and 
20  of course didn‘t really know what to do  
21  (1.0)   
22  and 
23  (2.0) 
24  to this day I don‘t know how I really knew about this place but I‘d heard  
25  there was a college erm (0.9) for sort of (0.9) well it‘s called £spook school 
26  it‘s the [name] college in [place] and (.) it it  trains e::r psychics and mediums 
27  (1.3) erm (1.2) ◦sort of◦ (.) say paranormal experiences .hhh and I went  
28  there (.) for a week and did a course and it was quite a shock >because  
29  there were some very able people there and I was a total beginner .hhhh  
30  erm 
31  (1.3) 
32  but I enjo::yed it and it was good to meet other as I say like-minded people  
33   ↑some bits of it were too extreme for me some of the (.) old (0.6) erm  
34  (2.4) 
35  photos and things that are held up as evidence in the light ((chair squeaks))  
36  of more advanced technology I‘d be extremely sceptical of .hh but er 
37  (1.2)  
38  y-I think you have to trust your own experiences .hhh and then after that I 
39  came back and  
40  (1.5) 
41  joined in a sort of a loose way a local Spiritualist church to continue a  
42  mediumship development 
 
Whilst Sunset‘s account is concerned with enduring aspects of her identity – ‗always been 
interested in esoteric type things paranormal‘ (line 18) – this is directly connected to issues 
of continuity, negotiating change and transformation (as discussed later).  Furthermore, 
immediately after this utterance her talk becomes explicitly connected to the reported after 
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effects and subsequent transformation – ‗and that prompted me to-tut-of (0.4) think I must 
do something about this‘ (lines 18-19). This orientation to change is also evident in extract 
4.  In this extract JM talks about the last in the series of several TEHEs centred upon the 
manifestation of a female voice in various different contexts. He then goes on to talk about 
the effects of these experiences.   
 
Extract 4 – John Moore (JM) 
 
27  and then (0.7) but (0.4) since then on two occasions I think I‘ve heard her  
28  voice (0.5) 
29 I:  m:m 
30 JM: once I was crossing [name] street in [place] (0.6) and I just crossing the road 
31  and just this voice said John (1.2) and erm 
32  (2.2) 
33  and I knew it was he:r (0.3) and that was all that was said 
34   (0.8) 
35  and then (0.4) I think it was t- a couple o- t- one or two weeks ago I was  
36  just I was thinking about something I was going upstairs (.) and I just heard 
37  the same (0.4) the same voice saying the same thing again  
38  (1.0) 
39  and erm (0.7) that‘s it basically (0.4) so what it (0.4) what a- I think what I 
40  think (0.5) is really nice about the whole thing (0.4) is it it proved to me  
41  (0.8) that erm (1.1) we do people often talk about spirit guides and guardian 
42  angels (0.4) but (0.3) I just feel now that err (.) I‘ve had the kind of (0.4)  
43  proof that you need (.) to kind of believe in it and er (.) when it‘s a personal 
44  experience (0.7) erm (0.4) erm (0.9)it‘s really con- it‘s really quite convincing  
45  (0.6) 
46  and so: I feel as if I know now (0.8) that there is a a guardian angel (0.5) and 
47  I don‘t know to what extent they can intervene in your life (0.6) to prevent 
48  you following certain course of action (0.4) or to guide you in a particular 
49  way but what I do know is that (.) they can reassure at different times when 
50  they feel you need to be reassured 
51  (1.0) 
52  so it‘s a kind of a passive (0.7) presence rather than ss- (0.9) er like a  
53  proactive kind of a presence you [know  
54 I:         [mm 
55 JM: (.) but it is there when you need it 
 
JM provides an explicit end to his experiential description – ‗and erm (0.7) that‘s it 
basically‘ (line 39).  Following this, his next concern is how that affected him – ‗so what it 
(0.4) what a-I think what I think is really nice about the whole thing (0.4) is it it proved to 
me…‘ (lines 39-40).  This shift in talk activity is also apparent in extract 5. Here, Maria is 
talking about one of her TEHEs where she found herself out of her body and the 
subsequent impact this had upon her. 
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Extract 5 – Maria 
1 M: I found myself in a completely different place (0.9) and erm (1.4) I didn‘t  
2  (1.4) it wasn‘t it was like it wasn‘t this dimension it was somewhere different 
3  and (0.8) I didn‘t have a body but I was (0.4) did have a consciousness (0.8) 
4  er:m 
5  (1.5) 
6  and (0.7) I can remember (.) feeling  
7  (1.5) 
8  very safe and absolutely fine and not at all frightened or worried (1.0) and I 
9  remember having the thought (0.6) something like oh this is what happens 
10  this is where you go when you die this is what happens when you die (0.8) 
11  and it was completely fine (0.4) it just felt completely fine  
12  (0.6) 
13  couldn‘t really see very much it was all sort of (0.9) erm (1.6) opalescent ◦or 
14  I don‘t know if that‘s quite right word  
15  (1.6) 
16  er erm◦ 
17  (2.1) 
18  an‘ I wouldn‘t know how long that lasted for but then (0.7) I returned (0.4) 
19  to the room I returned and returned to my body and (.) erm (1.3) er  
20  (2.0) 
21  and (0.9) not long after that I went to hospital and went (0.3) got drips and 
22  all sorts of things and got better and (1.4) things continued but (0.6) but  
23  (0.7) there was some (1.3) there was some part of that that made me re- y- 
24  y- y- you know that a learning that came well something that came from ss: 
25  from that which was not (0.5) there was no nee- to need to fear death and 
26  dying 
 
Maria‘s immediate talk, post-experientially, is about practicalities regarding her recovery – 
‗and not long after that I went to hospital and went (0.3) got drips and all sorts of things 
and got better and (1.4) things continued‘ (lines 21-22).  However, she then goes on to talk 
about how the experience affected her – ‗but (0.6) but there was some (1.3) there was some 
part of that that made me re- y- y- y- you know a learning that came well something that 
came from ss: from that which was not (0.5) there was no nee- to need to fear death and 
dying‘ (lines 22-26).  It would appear then, that in many of the accounts there is a common 
organisational feature.  The shift from descriptive experiential accounts to reflections 
regarding after effects demonstrates identifiably similar sequencing, pointing again to the 
likely normativity of this design.  This finding is further substantiated by the final extract 
(6) in this section. 
 
Immediately prior to this section of the account, Duck has been talking about a TEHE she 
shared with her family.  She reports that the entire sky turned pink and the atmosphere 
 220 
noticeably changed engendering complete engagement with their environment.  The extract 
picks up at the tail-end of her account of this experience. 
 
Extract 6 – Duck 
 
1 D: and then aft after a few minutes (0.9) then (0.7) the (.) pink colour went  
2  away (0.8) and (.) a rainbow (.) appeared (.) which was (0.9) odd (.) becos: (.) 
3  it wasn‘t (.) raining (0.7) at the time I mean we we were quite close to the  
4  sea and I could probably come up with a couple of (0.6) rational  
5  explanations for it (.) but it (.) it did seem quite (0.5) quite strange  
6  (1.0) 
7  and then (0.3) that lasted a few more minutes so the whole thing probably 
8  was:: no more than ten minutes (0.9) an::d we were just all sitting together  
9  on a big rock watching this (1.1) erm (0.7) an::d (0.3) then the rainbow went 
10  away and we walked back home and that was it 
11  (2.0) 
12 I: and you‘ve had other (0.4) what you might call similar experiences 
13  (1.4) 
14 D: erm (0.6) yeah quite quite quite a few times 
15  (1.6) 
16 I: do you want to tell me a bit about those 
17  (2.4) 
18 D: H::::::::h ((long sigh)) (0.9) right (0.8) well  
19  (1.6) 
20  after the first one (0.9)  a-aft-a-after I saw everything go pink  
21  (1.7) 
22  I-I can remember thinking why is this (0.8) so amazing (.) I mean i- it‘s just  
23  (0.6) some sort of optical phenomena and (0.4) there shouldn‘t be (.)  
24  anything particularly (0.8) special about it but there was:: (.) and (0.7) I  
25  started (0.9) thinking about quite why this: was: (1.0) so (0.5) beautiful (.)  
26  wonderful (.) amazing (.) etcetera (0.4) an:d why it wasn‘t just some (0.6) 
27  other random thing like (0.5) the grass happens to be green and that‘s  
28  [just what it is and it‘s not 
29 I:       [◦mm◦  
30 D: very interesting (1.1) erm but 
31  (2.0) 
32  and eventually after a lot of thinking I ended up deciding it was because  
33  God had made things that way  
34 I: ◦mm◦ 
35  (0.8) 
36 D: a:n:d (1.3) probably about a year and a half (.) later (1.3) I would have been 
37  about fourteen erm (.) I got (.) confirmed (0.8) er as an Anglican (.) I‘d been 
38  going to Sunday school (.) on and off since I was very small most (0.5)  
39  mostly so I‘d be kept out of the way while my mum was making Sunday  
40  lunch my parents aren‘t particular religious (0.6) 
41 I: ◦mm◦ 
42 D: but I‘d decided I wanted to get confirmed 
 
Duck‘s experiential account ends fairly abruptly immediately after the description of the 
experience with ‗and that was it‘ (line 10).  Following Duck‘s overt ending to the 
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experience, there is a long pause and Duck is not immediately forthcoming with further 
talk, so, I ask in a tentative fashion, if there are other experiences similar to the one that has 
just been described (line 12).  After a pause, Duck provides a positive response - ‗erm (0.6) 
yeah quite quite quite a few times‘ (line 14), suggesting these experiences have occurred 
several times.  There is another longish pause and then I go on to invite her to tell me 
about them (line 16).  On line 42, Duck sighs audibly and emphatically, which 
communicates a sense of discomfort or displeasure at my question (perhaps perceived as 
an interruption to an unfinished story?)  Then she begins to talk about what happened after 
the initial TEHE, which she labels her ‗first one‘ (line 20).  She registers a cognitive 
process, happening at the time, concerning her reflections about this experience (line 22).  
This is communicated as a series of reflections and contemplations about her experience 
presenting herself as thinking and reasoning about her TEHE (lines 22-30).  Subsequently, 
Duck goes on to report a significant change in identity - being ‗confirmed (0.8) er as an 
Anglican‘ (line 37) - as a result of her contemplation which reportedly led her to conclude 
that her TEHE occurred ‗because God had made things that way‘ (lines 32-33). 
 
The sequencing of this account is interesting for several reasons.  Firstly, it might be 
considered somewhat unusual to respond to a request for further information about other 
experiences by doing something else.  Duck provides an unexpected response to my 
request by reporting various contemplations coupled with an introduction of her identity 
transformation, instead of talking about her other experiences.  In this sense, Duck 
contravenes the expected sequence.  This unexpected response suggests that the sequence 
Duck favours is a normative one.  Despite the invitation to talk about other experiences, 
the pull of normativity is so strong that an account which does not conform to the 
conventional sequence might seem incomplete (it should be noted that these processes are 
not regarded as operating on a conscious level).  This orientation to transformation and the 
way in which the individual has been affected or changed by their experience also 
highlights the significance and profundity of the experience and its perceived 
consequences.  Overall, the prevalence of respondent‘s (unsolicited) orientation to this 
sequencing illustrates the normative formulation of this ordering. 
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6.3.1 Summary 
 
What these accounts initially appear to show is the idiosyncrasy of individual experiences in 
substantive content and design.  What they also demonstrate however, is a clear normative 
pull to a certain structural organisation and design.  The normative sequence emerging 
from these accounts appears to be thus: Description → Reflection.  The description of the 
experience can vary in length and detail, with the end not always overtly or explicitly 
demarcated in talk.  The reflection focuses on the way in which the experience has impacted 
upon the individual.  Again the detail may differ from individual to individual but often 
makes reference to profound or meaningful change of some sort, and also may contain 
interpretive ideas about the experience.    
 
 
6.4 Credibility and change 
 
In her account (extract 1) Alice demonstrates some ‗defensiveness‘ towards wholesale 
personality change.  Her talk negotiates and tempers any profound change with invocations 
of consistency and continuity.  To abandon any notion of continuity could be seen as a 
sacrifice of credibility because in Western contexts the rational social actor has, at the very 
least, a core self or personality which is seen as fairly fixed and certainly resistant to radical 
change (e.g. Caspi et al, 2005; Gergen, 1999).  This orientation to rational social actor and 
credibility seems to be present in other accounts.  Duck‘s account shows this type of 
contemplation and reasoning process (see extract 6).79 
  
Duck refers to changes of a religious nature.  Whilst she does not explicitly state that her 
beliefs changed, this shift is indicated by the talk concerning a process of contemplation 
and reasoning (line 32).  Duck proposes that after this process she ‗ended up deciding it 
[the explanation for her TEHE] was because God had made things that way‘ (lines 32-33).  
This implies that this view is something that changed in light of her TEHE.  There are also 
references here to a change in identity (from an unspoken and implicit non-religious one to 
an explicit and named Anglican one – line 37).   
 
It is possible that a change of religious beliefs and identity seemingly triggered by a TEHE 
could be interpreted as a conversion experience.  Instantaneous religious conversions are 
fairly controversial in the UK and predominantly viewed fairly dubiously in the popular, 
                                                 
79 As many of these extracts are long they will are not always re-presented.  Where this is the case, subsequent 
issues for analysis will refer back to the original extract and line numbers. 
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secular imagination.  At the extreme end, this perspective sees conversions and religion per 
se as irrational, delusional or reflective of gullibility80 (see for instance the contemporary 
view of religion that Dawkins, 2006a, 2006b, expounds).  Given that this interpretation 
might be problematic in terms of how an individual is subsequently viewed, it is notable 
that Duck‘s approach towards this change highlights aspects of continuity.  For instance, 
immediately after stating the dramatic change – ‗I got (.) confirmed (0.8) er as an Anglican‘ 
(line 37) – she orients to the continuity of the situation – ‗I‘d been going to Sunday school 
on and off since I was very small‘ (lines 37-38).  Duck shows how the dramatic new 
identity in fact connects with her former life and former self.  By offering the information 
that she occasionally went to Sunday school during her childhood she is able to temper the 
degree to which the change is read as overly radical.  Her choice of religion (Anglicanism) 
is revealed as having a level of familiarity for her.  The effects of this choice are more 
readily appreciated when Anglicanism is replaced with a religion likely to be completely 
new and unfamiliar (e.g. Zoastrianism).   
 
Following this, she provides a non-religious rationale for why she went to Sunday school – 
‗mostly so I‘d be kept out of the way while my mum was making Sunday lunch my parents 
aren‘t particularly religious‘ (lines 39-40).  With this latter utterance, Duck is working to 
ensure that the cause of her experience is not attributed to any former religious belief or 
upbringing.  In other words the change should be seen as triggered by her TEHE.  This 
delicate process is one of negotiation and balance, between radical, dramatic and significant 
change on the one hand, and ‗irrational‘ conversion or ordinary reasoning (such as the 
childhood Sunday school experiences being seen as responsible for her confirmation) on 
the other.  This works to achieve the communication of a profound and meaningful 
change, whilst maintaining a continuous core of, and thus credible, self. 
 
This can also be found at the end of Sunset‘s experiential description (see extract 3) before 
she goes on to talk about psychic and medium training.  Sunset states ‗always been 
interested in esoteric type things paranormal‘ (line 18).  This is a notable utterance for two 
reasons.  Firstly, its location and secondly its content.  Firstly, it is located directly before 
                                                 
80 Of course there are various views of religious and spiritual conversion evident in the UK, perhaps the most 
likely to celebrate conversions are religious and spiritual individuals, but a dearth of research on the 
perceptions of conversion make it hard to generalise.  Hay‘s (2003) research highlighting the reported 
embarrassment associated with religion for many people in the UK perhaps affords us the most accurate 
current indicator of public opinion.  It is perhaps fair to say that public expressions of religion, faith or 
spirituality are less acceptable than any evidence of these in a ‗private‘ form.   
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Sunset talks about any after effects or changes.  Secondly, it is concerned with an enduring 
identification.  The formulation of this identification contains an extreme case formulation 
with – ‗always been‘ – which works to inoculate Sunset against potential challenges to 
interest in the paranormal as a long-standing phenomenon.  That this claim to interest in 
paranormal phenomena is included here works to establish continuity before any changes 
are referred to.  Going on to talk about the ensuing changes such as, ‗I must do something 
about this‘ (line 19) and ‗I went there [training facility for psychics and mediums] (.) for a 
week and did a course‘ (lines 27-28), Sunset has already established links with her former 
self that work to temper the subsequent identity changes.  Indeed, later in the narrative 
Sunset talks about continuing a mediumship development.  It would certainly seem that 
inclusion of this kind of continuity assertion is balancing out later changes that could be 
perceived as otherwise quite radical and a threat to credibility. 
  
The next two extracts show a similar orientation to change that is concerned with 
preserving credibility and maintaining authenticity, but not via an invocation of identity 
continuity.  Instead, another similar mechanism is at work via a slightly different 
formulation.  Extract 7 is where Lyn is talking about the effects of her set of experiences. 
 
Extract 7 – Lyn  
 
34 L: and it‘s (.) sent me off on this (.) sort of spiritual quest for the last five years  
35  you know (0.7) .hh erm sort of exploring different religions and (0.7) erm 
36  (0.8) trying to find out what it is:: (0.8) that (0.7) that I would feel  
37  comfortable with (.) you know and erm 
38  (0.5) 
39  I mean at the present time I feel (0.5) it‘s Buddhism (.) that I‘m comfortable 
40  with  
41  (0.5) 
42  erm but I do- haven‘t really sort of (1.0) signed up to anything I‘m still sort 
43  of (.) you know finding my way through (.)  
44 I:  m↑m 
45 L:   but that‘s the big impact that it‘s had on my life and it‘s made me see  
46  everything differently (.)  
47 I:  mm  
48  (0.7) 
49 L:   and erm 
50   (2.8) 
51  it makes me see life differently and I mean I‘m not saying that (0.4) this is a 
52  hundred percent of the time (.) HUHUHhehehehuh you know I‘m afraid 
53  it‘s (.) er it‘s not that effective 
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Lyn‘s talk concerning the after effects of her experience centres on the concept of a self-
directed exploration of religion and spirituality – ‗it‘s (.) sent me off on this (.) sort of 
spiritual quest for the last five years you know (0.7) .hh erm sort of exploring different 
religions‘ (lines 34-35).  She goes on to talk about this exploration in a fairly casual manner 
and as needing to suit her and her requirements – ‗trying to find out what it is:: (0.8) that 
(0.7) that I would feel comfortable with (.) you know‘ (lines 36-37).  The notion of finding 
a religion that one is ‗comfortable with‘ conveys that a belief system must align with some 
aspects of a current identity or current beliefs.  It does not suggest too radical a departure 
from an already established sense of self, and, at this point, does not commit to any 
particular religion.  However, following this, Lyn goes on to mention her current religion of 
choice – ‗I mean at the present time I feel (0.5) it‘s Buddhism (.) that I‘m comfortable with‘ 
(lines 39-40).   
 
There are two notable observations to be made concerning this choice.  Firstly, Buddhism 
and various Eastern religions are currently enjoying identifiable popularity and interest in 
Western societies (Heelas & Woodhead, 2005) and therefore have both social acceptability 
and a cultural kudos in their favour.  Secondly, this commitment is far from fervent or 
concrete – ‗but I do- haven‘t really sort of (1.0) signed up to anything I‘m still sort of (.) 
finding my way through‘ (lines 42-43) – displaying an orientation to a loose, gradual and 
considered association with any religion.  In many senses, this works to negotiate the 
introduction of any religious phenomena and any potential association with the irrational 
whilst preserving credibility.  It is also reflective of a contemporary cultural inclination for 
some members of society to identify as spiritual but not religious (Flanagan, 2007). 
 
Following this, Lyn explicitly identifies how the experiences should be seen – as having a 
‗big impact‘ upon her ‗life‘ (line 45) – noting the profundity of any change.  But this is then 
tempered by subsequent talk.  Lyn talks about seeing ‗life differently‘ (line 51) and 
‗everything differently‘ (line 46) but immediately afterwards she relents that her change 
appears to be somewhat intermittent – ‗I mean I‘m not saying that (0.4) this is a hundred 
percent of the time (.) HUHUHhehehehuh you know I‘m afraid it‘s (.) er it‘s not that 
effective‘ (lines 51-53).  This intermittency helps to temper and balance the overall effect of 
any dramatic change by not making claims to somehow being ‗superhuman‘ as a result of 
her experience, and in doing so makes the change more realistic or authentic.    
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So, in this extract the orientation is not specifically to continuity but there is work being 
done both to manage and present profound change balanced with maintaining rationality 
and sanity.  Orientation to these aspects can also be found in Anna‘s account.  Overall, 
Anna tells a lengthy story concerning a traumatic experience involving an ectopic 
pregnancy and a miscarriage.  Later in Anna‘s narrative she talks about an epiphany 
moment where she realises the purpose of her difficult experiences.  In extract 8 Anna is 
talking about the moment of realisation. 
 
Extract 8 – Anna 
 
1 A: and at the end of the conversation when we finally (0.5) £finally stopped  
2  talking (1.1) I had this massive (0.8) beam on my face and there was this  
3  (1.4) burning inside it was the heat it was this sensation it was (0.8) it‘s really  
4  really hard to describe (.) it was 
5  (1.7)  
6  er like a light (0.7) er it f- it fel- it was what I‘ve said before like my- a light  
7  bulb going on and it was (1.3) ↑O:::::H so that‘s why I lost (.) those babies 
8  (0.4) that is why I suffered (1.1) so that I could help (0.9) this person (0.6)  
9  this other woman who has suffered (0.9) and is in so much pain (1.1) and 
10  I can talk to her and I and and and help her 
[Missing talk about needing to understand why it had happened to her] 
11  but in that moment in that moment that I put the phone down 
12  (1.5) 
13  I just I was just filled with (0.7) understanding? (1.2) with love? (0.9) with  
14  happiness? (0.7) with warmth? (0.9) with compassion? 
15  (2.0)  
16  just it just made sense clarity (0.8) absolute clarity (0.8) just total (1.3)  
17  ↑O::::H (1.2) that‘s why (.) >and I just had to tell somebody so of course  
18  who did I tell I had to tell £GAYLE didn‘t I had to go I just had to share it  
19  with somebody (1.3) and er (0.7) you know I called round er to see Gayle  
20  and Gayle knows me phuh >inside out back to front £good god she saw  
21  me give birth heh t(h)at woman she‘s se(h)en it all (0.4) >and she just knew 
22  something was up straight away and she said what‘s:: so go on what‘s  
23  happened what-what you (0.7) why you beaming from ear to ear ↑I said 
24  I‘ve just got to tell you this:: amazing thing ((sniff)) 
25  (1.8) 
26  and er (0.9) and it was and it was amazing and she understood and she got  
27  it and she (0.7) didn‘t think I was a complete lunatic and (1.1) didn‘t think I 
28  was mad and (.) just totally (.) got it (0.9) which was great 
 
This extract begins with Anna‘s TEHE (lines 1-7).  Then there is the first report of a 
revelation or realisation of the purpose of her previous suffering and difficult experiences 
(lines 7-10).  This is in the form of a surprise response token (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006) 
and change of state indicator (Heritage, 1998), which helps afford it a dramatic and sudden 
quality.  She then goes on to talk about needing to understand why it happened to her 
 227 
(missing talk, not transcribed) before moving on to retell the crucial part of the story (lines 
11-17).  It is clear why she does this from the talk that follows when she reports a 
subsequent urge to share this experience with close friend Gayle (lines 17-19).  Following 
this, there is a reported speech sequence during which Anna reports what happened when 
she told Gayle (lines 22-24).  Within this sequence, Anna conveys Gayle sensing that Anna 
had something important to share – ‗she said what‘s:: so go on what‘s happened what-what 
you (0.7) why you beaming from ear to ear‘ (lines 22-23) – and Anna sharing the experience 
– ‗↑I said I‘ve just got to tell you this:: amazing thing ((sniff))‘ (lines 23-24). 
   
After the reported speech sequence, Anna reports Gayle‘s reaction to her experience via a 
series of reported cognitions.  She does not state how she came to know that these were 
Gayle‘s thoughts on her experience, she just asserts them – ‗and she [Gayle] understood 
and she got it and she (0.7) didn‘t think I was a complete lunatic and (1.1) didn‘t think I 
was mad and (.) just totally (.) got it (0.90 which was great‘ (lines 26-28).  By stating, ‗she 
didn‘t think I was a complete lunatic and didn‘t think I was mad‘ Anna includes some 
possible interpretations of her claims.  That is, having claimed she had an intangible moment 
of realisation where she realised that her purpose in life was to set up a support group for 
women with ectopic pregnancies might be seen as somewhat unusual.  In asserting her own 
sanity via a reported speech and thought sequence in which this is explicitly oriented to, she 
shows a) that a trusted source knew she was of sound mind and b) that categorisation as 
‗mad‘ is at the very least a possibility in reaction to this kind of change. 
 
 
6.4.1 Summary 
 
Overall, via marginally different formulations these accounts display an orientation to the 
importance of credibility.  Presenting a rational, sane self of sound mind is prioritised, 
whilst simultaneously conveying profound changes that could be perceived as destabilising.  
In these accounts, the design of the talk works to achieve a balance between these two 
aspects via orientation to either: 
- a continuity between ‗new‘ and former selves so as not to entirely abandon a 
rational or core self 
- rationality and sanity as important and identifiable features of ‗new‘ and former 
selves 
In this way the speakers are working to maintain a reasonable balance between change and 
consistency achieved via their constitutions of self. 
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6.5 ‘Before and after’ narratives 
 
It has been suggested that the way in which these transformational stories are told, and 
some of their constituent features or themes, help to paint a particular picture.  In addition 
to Alice‘s account (extract 1), one element that appears regularly in many of the other 
accounts is a ‗before and after‘ construction.  This describes a narrative pattern that trades 
on the contrast between a particular state of affairs before the experience occurred and a 
changed state afterwards.  Wilson (1996) noted that the construction of a ‗before-and-after‘ 
narrative is often used as a rhetorical and linguistic device that enables a transformation 
story from dark to light.  The context ‗before‘ commonly consists of aspects of negativity, 
suffering and trauma which are then contrasted with an ‗after‘, characterised by positive, 
dramatic change and the development of meaningful purpose.  As we might expect, these 
types of narrative construction are often found in conversion stories (Bryant & Wolfram 
Cox, 2004).  However, in the current corpus of accounts the ‗before and after‘ narrative 
does not often appear in this guise.  Instead, there are limited explicit references to contexts 
before the TEHE with greater emphasis on reporting the after effects.  Most common are 
invocations displaying some orientation to this pattern, with an implicit prior context, and 
an explicit ‗glorious hereafter‘ (Wilson, 1996: 7).  In this section, we will explore these 
‗before and after‘ formulations in more detail to try and understand their organisation and 
function.  
 
There are two explicit references to a before and after transformation that bear some 
resemblance to the style considered above.  JM‘s extract (9) shows him talking about one of 
a series of experiences connected to the manifestation of a female face and voice that he 
reports having seen or heard on a number of occasions.  Prior to describing the experience, 
JM orients to the preceding context concerning what was happening at the time and his 
feelings about it.  
 
Extract 9 - John Moore 
 
1 JM: and then (0.5) erm I had a really difficult time in ninety nine into two  
2  thousand >when a relationship broke down I was really upset about it  
3  because I thought I was treated really badly .hhh and I was upset for quite a 
4  while  
5  (0.9)  
6  and then (0.7) one morning I er- just before I woke up the same face  
7  appeared (0.7) and I saw that same face  
8  (0.6) 
9  and it was at the end of a really peaceful dream (0.5) you know it was just  
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10  after a night of complete peace (0.4) whe:re (0.3) I seemed to be taken away 
11  (0.6)  
12  you know and all the problems that I had seemed to dissolve you know and 
13  then at the end of this before I woke up this same face appeared (0.5)  
14  exactly the same face  
15  (0.8)  
16  and then (.) it was shortly after that (.) that I met my wife (0.3) that I‘m  
17  married to now and we‘ve been really really happy 
 
JM begins this extract by talking about a relationship breakdown (lines 1-2).  Whilst he does 
not explicitly state what kind of relationship or whom it was with, it is clear from later talk 
(lines 16-17) that this was a personal and romantic relationship.  He goes on to talk about 
his feelings in relation to this event – ‗I was really upset about it because I thought I was 
treated badly .hhh and I was upset for quite a while‘ (lines 2-4).  JM‘s talk conveys a 
negative set of feelings in relation to a negative situation.  This effectively sets up the 
context for the subsequent experience.   
 
JM talks about his experience which involved the appearance of ‗that same face…at the 
end of a really peaceful dream‘ (lines 7 & 9).  There is an emphasis on the ‗peaceful‘ nature 
of this current experience – ‗it was just after a night of complete peace‘ (lines 9-10).  The 
experience is constituted as positive and welcome as well as spontaneous and involuntary.  
Subsequently, JM claims that some immediate benefits transpired because of this 
experience – ‗and all the problems I had seemed to dissolve‘ (line 12).  As if to emphasise 
that the alleviation of his problems were due to the experience, JM repeats the detail of the 
experience (lines 13-14).  Finally, he talks about a dramatic and more long-term effect on 
his life – ‗and then (.) it was shortly after that (.) that I met my wife (0.3) that I‘m married to 
now we‘ve been really really happy‘ (lines 16-17).  This final change implies that the story 
has a positive resolution emphasised and bolstered by repetition – ‗really really happy‘.   
 
Depicting negative or highly undesirable circumstances as the backdrop to one‘s personal 
life before an experience, provides the discursive context for a glowing and positively 
transformed post-experiential life (or self or set of circumstances, for instance).  This kind 
of contrast configuration is a powerful rhetorical resource, which effectively enables the 
concept of change to be conveyed, as highlighted by Wilson (1996).  It is also a form rarely 
used in a conventional sense by the experients.  However, the second example can be seen 
over extracts 10 and 11.  Extract 10 comes from the very beginning of Anna‘s interview (it 
follows on sequentially from extract 3, Chapter 4) and is concerned with Anna‘s traumatic 
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pregnancy-related experiences which form the prior context that Anna orients to.  Extract 
11 comes sequentially after Anna relays her epiphany experience and then reports sharing it 
with her friend Gayle (see extract 8) and concerns the subsequent change that she reports.   
 
Extract 10 – Anna 
 
13 A: (0.8) and I was only about six and half weeks pregnant when (0.8) I erm  
14  suffered from really bad abdominal pains didn‘t know what was happening  
15  very very (.) scared 
16  (1.6) 
17  er: called the emergency doctor (0.4) came out to see me (1.1) er called an  
18  ambulance (.) ended up in hospital and they weren‘t sure (0.3) what it was it  
19  was a Friday evening the twenty seventh of December so between  
20  Christmas and New Year (0.7) not a great time (.) to be in hospital and  
21  (0.7) THEY weren‘t sure if it was either an ectopic pregnancy an  
22  appendicitis or an ovarian cyst (0.7) one of those three things they couldn‘t 
23  be sure 
[Missing talk: lengthy details of an ectopic pregnancy and miscarriage of another baby also in the womb] 
24  it just tu:rned my world upside down  
25  (1.6) 
26  it was the w- it was absolutely the worst time of my life and that (1.1)  it just  
27  carried on for that r-year really two thousand an‘ three was a h:::hideous  
28  hideous year it was just awful 
 
This extract emphasises the traumatic and difficult nature of the experiences that Anna 
reports.  There is the context (lines 13-23) about suffering bad pains in early pregnancy and 
going to hospital.  Subsequently, there is missing talk about an ectopic pregnancy and 
miscarriage of another baby also in the womb.  Anna goes on to provide an explicit 
evaluation of suffering (lines 24-28) and effectively conveys the negative circumstances 
which form the ‗before‘ context to Anna‘s transformation.  As mentioned above, extract 11 
shows Anna‘s references to her transformation.  These appear later on in her story 
narrative and are included below. 
 
Extract 11 – Anna 
 
20 A: and Gayle knows me phuh >inside out back to front £good god she saw  
21  me give birth heh t(h)at woman she‘s se(h)en it all (0.4) >and she just knew 
22  something was up straight away and she said what‘s:: so go on what‘s  
23  happened what-what you (0.7) why you beaming from ear to ear ↑I said 
24  I‘ve just got to tell you this:: amazing thing ((sniff)) 
25  (1.8) 
26  and er (0.9) and it was and it was amazing and she understood and she got  
27  it and she (0.7) didn‘t think I was a complete lunatic and (1.1) didn‘t think I 
28  was mad and (.) just totally (.) got it (0.9) which was great 
29  (0.8)  
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30  and erm (1.0) I‘m really and since then (0.9) Martha and I have gone on to  
31  become great friends (0.8) and we have now set up a support group? (1.0)  
32  for women who have ectopic pregnancies? 
 
Here Anna talks about how she and Martha have ‗become great friends (0.8) and…set up a 
support group? (1.0) for women who have ectopic pregnancies?‘ (lines 30-32).  Martha is a 
woman who Anna reports having had a similar experience to her and someone to whom 
Anna offers support.  It is whilst on the phone to Martha that Anna‘s realisation 
materialises (see extract 8).  In many senses, Anna‘s transformation narrative is a classic 
example of a before and after narrative construction.  She constitutes the prior 
circumstances (extract 10), which are characterised by trauma and difficulty; this is followed 
by her epiphany realisation of purpose and meaning (extract 8) and finally there is a 
manifestation of tangible change and transformation (extract 11) in the form of the support 
group that is established. 
 
In both JM‘s and Anna‘s narratives the ‗before and after‘ narrative construction is easily 
identifiable, whereby the individual reports (in this order): 
- a negative ‗before‘ the experience status/identity/context 
- a positive TEHE  
- a positive ‗after‘ the experience status/identity/context – that is presented either as 
a direct result of the TEHE or as triggered by it 
This formulation works to convey the experience as a significant, transformative influence 
that is (positively) life-changing.  Furthermore, the positive evaluation offered, of both the 
experience and its after effects are presented as the correct way in which to interpret the 
account.     
 
 
6.5.1 Implicit ‘befores’ and identifiable ‘afters’ 
 
This positive construction of the state of affairs post-experientially can be found in other 
accounts of transformation.  What is perhaps notable about these other accounts is that the 
explicit orientation to a prior context is absent from their talk.  However, it would seem 
that there may be a common display of this ‗before and after‘ pattern (albeit with an 
implicit ‗before‘).  Extract 12 shows Fred talking about how he sees death which he reports 
has changed since his experiences. 
 
 
 
 232 
Extract 12 – Fred  
 
1 F: and you know (0.7) different things just seemed to slot in (.) one of those  
2  that that slotted in (0.4) er::m and now I I don‘t even (0.9) erm have any  
3  concerns that it‘s not true is that (.) we are all spiritual beings there is no  
4  doubt in my mind we are all spiritual beings ffirstly 
[Missing talk: about immortality bringing relief in the face of others‟ deaths] 
5  I can‘t tell you exactly (1.1) the reasons why I know that everyone has their 
6  own journey and they they have to follow (.) wherever that leads but I know 
7  (1.0) as sure as anything (.) that that [spirits] is what we are and I don‘t fear 
8  death I don‘t (1.1) I I try not to be selfish 
9   (2.6) 
10  when (0.8) I mean when my parents die:d yes it‘s always hard and (0.6) it  
11  was a release because they weren‘t (0.7) particularly well hh but I I d:o  
12  (1.6) 
13  live wiv the feeling that (0.8) you know (.) they‘ve just passed to a different 
14  (.) dimension a different (.) area (.) they haven‘t ◦gone◦  
15  (1.0) 
16  er:::r  an‘ an‘ I don‘t need to go to a grave to to you know look at (0.6) them 
17  ‗cause they‘re if- they‘re there if I want ‗em (0.5) ◦they‘re there◦ >SO that  
18  was one of these things that [that actually just  
19 I:             [mm 
20 F: changed (0.8) erm and I can‘t (.) exactly as I said before tell you why 
 
Until Fred explicitly identifies that a change occurred – ‗>SO that was one of these things 
that [that actually just changed‘ (lines 17-20) – there is only an implicit sense of this in his 
talk.  Before this utterance, Fred is talking about not fearing death (lines 7-8), and earlier on 
about humans being spirits (line 4), though there is no sense of these events as particularly 
radical.  Nonetheless, once Fred identifies them as changes – though they are constituted as 
additions to his beliefs rather than wholesale replacements – they form the ‗after‘ context 
of the experience.  It is notable that Fred does not specifically construct a ‗before‘ context 
anywhere in his narrative for there to be an explicit contrast.  Instead, there is a silent and 
‗unspoken‘ before (a time when he feared death and did not believe humans were spirits), 
which is an implicit part of any after-effects mentioned.  Here, the absence of a prior 
contrasting context contributes to a picture of gradual, incremental change, where 
unfolding realisations are effectively integrated into Fred‘s outlook on life and his sense of 
self. 
 
This same narrative construction can be found later in Fred‘s talk about his healing.  Earlier 
in the narrative Fred has reported two TEHEs relating directly to discovering his healing 
abilities.  Prior to this extract Fred reports meeting a Reiki healer at one of the conferences 
he and his wife attended.  Extract 13 picks up where Fred is talking about having a Reiki 
attunement. 
 233 
Extract 13 – Fred 
 
1 F: so::: we decided that (0.5) erm (.) I‘d go across and erm (0.6) have this (0.8) 
2  Reiki attunement (0.6) which (0.4) £◦who knows what that is◦ erm so ↑off I 
3  went and (0.4) and wow (0.4) you know this is (.) was interesting and I came 
4  back and I said (0.8) and my wife said well you know how‘s you go and I  
5  ses yeah I think it was was great 
[Missing talk: Fred‟s talk about the different levels of Reiki up to Mastership] 
6  ((sniff)) and s::o from from that point I‘ve I‘ve bin (.) sort of really into into  
7  healing  
8  (0.8) 
9  erm but that wasn‘t enough either (0.5) ((sniff)) erm because I then went  
10  down an NFSH route  
11  (1.0) 
12 I:  mm- 
13 F:   national federation of spiritual healers as I said before (0.8) erm (.) and to to 
14  become a healer there (0.9) er- (.)  is more of a lengthy process (0.8) erm  
15  (1.2) if you actually read or see how people sell Reiki and I use that word  
16  (1.2) erm you can go on a on a (.) er Reiki healing cour[se  
17 I:                   [mm   
18 F: and go from zero to mastership in a weekend (0.7) which is wrong (1.1)  
19  erm:: unfortunately like all things (0.6)  commercialism (1.2) has got into to 
20  areas (.) and to me healing is not about (0.7) erm making money  
21  (1.0) 
22  healing is about helping people (0.8) erm and to become (.) an a-an NFSH 
23  healer firstly you have to be sponsored by (0.7) erm some other NFSH (0.4) 
24  healers you then have to go (0.6) on a number of courses  
25  (0.6) 
26  and it does take two years before you can actually come out >as (0.9) a  
27  healer  
 
Fred begins this extract talking in positive terms about his Reiki attunement (lines 1-5).  
After some missing talk, where Fred gives some detail about the different levels of Reiki 
training up to Mastership, he explicitly identifies a pivotal moment in his transformation – 
‗and s::o from from that point I‘ve I‘ve bin (.) sort of really into into healing‘ (lines 6-7).  
What this implicitly suggests is that before his healing-related TEHEs and his Reiki 
attunement he was neither particularly interested nor knowledgeable about healing.  It was 
not part of his former identity.  An unspoken prior context is notably absent from his talk 
but identifiable via the reported after effects of his experiences.  By stating that he is now 
‗into healing‘ and later that he has become ‗a healer‘ (lines 6-7), is to imply that he was not a 
healer before: so a change is communicated as being as a result of (triggered by) his 
experiences. 
 
These implicit ‗before‘ contexts and explicit ‗afters‘ is the most common construction of 
transformation to be found across the narratives.  It would appear that its inclusion offers a 
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subtly different formulation of change from one where the prior context is explicitly 
mentioned.  In other words, it is notable that in many of the accounts of change, negative, 
traumatic or anguished circumstances preceding the reported experience are absent from 
the talk.  Not deploying an explicit contrastive structure however, does not eliminate the 
opportunity to convey dramatic transformation.   
 
We saw in extract 3, Sunset talking about her attendance at a training facility for mediums 
and psychics and subsequently continuing a mediumship development.  Indeed, Sunset 
reports being ‗prompted‘ to do something about this‘ (line 19) – referring to a combination 
of her reported long-standing interest in the paranormal and a premonition (her TEHE).  
Her transformation concerns attendance at a training facility for psychics and mediums – ‗I 
went there (.) for a week and did a course‘ (lines 53-54) – and joining ‗in a sort of a loose 
way a local Spiritualist church to continue a mediumship development‘ (lines 68-69).  So, in 
Sunset‘s account her experience is a trigger for change.  The change is still dramatic and 
profound – she becomes a Spiritualist medium – but it is handled in a way that does not 
rely upon a contrast and instead shows seeds of stability in its construction.   
 
This silent prior context enables the speaker to handle change and transformation in quite a 
sophisticated and nuanced way.  As discussing identity transformation appears to be a 
potentially delicate issue to manage in interaction, it may be discursively advantageous to 
provide a more subtle context in which a radical transformation can sit.  In Duck‘s account 
(extract 6) she reports her confirmation to Anglicanism as a result of her TEHE.  The 
change that Duck reports is getting ‗confirmed (0.8) er as an Anglican‘ (line 37).  With no 
reference to any prior disreputable or traumatic circumstances that the archetypal 
‗conversion‘ experience might demand (Bryant & Wolfram Cox, 2004), the change to 
identity is still fairly dramatic (becoming an Anglican).  However, the exclusion of an 
explicit contrastive prior context contributes to the effective circumnavigation of the 
potentially troublesome diagnosis of conversion. 
 
 
6.5.2 Summary 
 
In many examples, respondents present their TEHEs as pivotal ‗identity transformers‘ 
(Garfinkel, 1956: 420).  This pivot is integral to the ‗before and after‘ narrative contrast 
whether the ‗before‘ is silent or explicit.  Generally, these instances have: 
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- no explicit prior context: this might mean it is mentioned earlier in the narrative but 
it is not highlighted as a direct contrast, which conveys a silent or unspoken ‗before‘ 
- a positive or neutrally-presented TEHE 
- an explicitly constituted ‗after‘ where change is prioritised and evaluation of the 
circumstances is overwhelmingly positive 
 
The proposal of a positive interpretation of these changes offers the speaker a tool with 
which to present their new improved self or better circumstances resulting from their 
TEHE.  This is further bolstered by an explicit or implicit contrast with a lesser self or 
negative circumstances to showcase the significance of this transformation.  Additionally, 
in offering an unspoken prior context speakers can sometimes invoke a more incremental 
(and therefore credible) change especially if the identity shift is outright and could be 
interpreted as an instantaneous transformation (somewhat more problematic). 
 
 
6.6 Stance, positioning and agency 
 
 
6.6.1 Stance and positioning 
 
One common notion that surfaced in many of the transformation accounts was that of 
positioning, first covered in Alice‘s account (extract 1).  It is important to note that the 
concept of positioning has a varied and fairly complex theoretical heritage (see Harré & 
Moghaddam, 2003, for a review of the latest developments), which there is no space to 
review here.  The usage here tends towards a practical discursive orientation as opposed to 
a more theoretically-informed notion.  In this way, the idea of positioning or stance refers 
to the way in which the respondents situate themselves in relation to their reported 
experience and subsequent change(s). The perceived active involvement of the individual in 
relation to any claimed changes or after effects could be crucial in the way in which the 
account is generally received, and interpreted.      
 
This is well demonstrated by an extract from Lyn‘s transformation narrative below.  Lyn‘s 
TEHEs are focused around the death of a close friend, Alex.  The following extract (14) 
picks up when Lyn begins talking about the effects of her experiences. 
 
  
 236 
Extract 14 – Lyn 
  
27 L: so to me it‘s been  
28  (1.9) 
29  to me it it‘s (.) erm it‘s like (0.5) I‘ve been told it‘s not a question of belief 
30  it‘s a question of (0.5) knowing that there is life after death and I mean that 
31  might sound really sort of arrogant but I just feel .hhh because of the way  
32  it‘s come from (1.0) I mean it came from Alex (0.9) that it‘s real 
33  (0.8)  
34  and it‘s (.) sent me off on this (.) sort of spiritual quest for the last five years  
35  you know (0.7) .hh erm sort of exploring different religions and (0.7) erm 
36  (0.8) trying to find out what it is:: (0.8) that (0.7) that I would feel  
37  comfortable with (.) you know and erm 
38  (0.5) 
39  I mean at the present time I feel (0.5) it‘s Buddhism (.) that I‘m comfortable 
40  with  
41  (0.5) 
42  erm but I do- haven‘t really sort of (1.0) signed up to anything I‘m still sort 
43  of (.) you know finding my way through (.)  
 
There are two aspects concerning positioning in this extract.  The first is covered on lines 
29-32 and the second is from lines 34-43.  Firstly, Lyn is talking about the effect of her 
experiences, stating ‗it‘s like (0.5) I‘ve been told‘ (line 29) - comparing the way she received 
some ‗information‘ with being explicitly informed it was the case, through which a level of 
certainty is afforded to this information.  She asserts that the information she has received 
is the knowledge ‗that there is life after death‘ (line 30).  In doing this she draws attention 
to the distinction between ‗belief‘ and ‗knowledge‘ about life after death.  Setting up a 
controversial phenomenon as something one knows, rather than merely believes, does 
make it more difficult to challenge.  
  
Recognising this potential controversy, Lyn goes on to acknowledge this and qualify her 
assertion.  She starts, ‗I mean that might sound really sort of arrogant‘ (lines 30-31) and 
then after inserting a ‗but‘ goes on to cite a personal and experiential source for her claim; 
‗I just feel because of the way it‘s come from (1.0) I mean it came from Alex (0.9) that it‘s 
real‘ (lines 31-32).  The casual beginning of this utterance, ‗I just feel‘ suggests a highly 
subjective and possibly interpretive approach towards her experiences.  However, in 
subsequently asserting that this feeling is real because it was communicated by Alex (who is 
no longer living) – which is repaired mid-utterance to convey a greater sense of certainty 
about how these experiences should be seen – devolves responsibility to Alex.  It is implied 
that Alex had an intention from beyond the grave (indeed this is explicitly established 
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earlier in the narrative81 – not included here) to communicate the existence of life after 
death – and did so – to Lyn, via a series of unusual experiences immediately after her death.   
By placing the authority for this change elsewhere, Lyn positions herself without 
responsibility for either her newfound knowledge or the experiences, which further 
substantiates her case for these events as beyond her control.  So, in the first part of the 
extract, Lyn positions herself as a recipient of this change rather than as an active creator or 
seeker. 
 
This is in direct contrast with the second part of this extract where Lyn talks about the 
experiences acting as a trigger for seemingly conscious action – ‗it‘s (.) sent me off on this 
(.) sort of spiritual quest‘ (line 34).  Here she talks about ‗exploring different religions‘ (line 
35) and ‗trying to find out what it is:: (0.8) that (0.7) that I would feel comfortable with‘ 
(lines 36-37).  It is a casual approach towards her newly acquired spirituality that Lyn 
invokes, ‗but I do- haven‘t really sort of (1.0) signed up to anything I‘m still sort of (.) 
finding my way through‘ (lines 42-43).  This weak identification works to present a 
tentative transformation.  Indeed her ‗changed‘ self is a vague construction that does not 
portray strong identification with a particular religion but instead some loose affiliation 
with spirituality.  It may be that there is something more socially acceptable about this form 
of spiritual identification, especially in the current climate where most traditional and 
formal religion is in decline (Davie, 1994; Avis, 2003) and often seen as embarrassing (Hay, 
2003).   
 
There are increasing numbers of people who are reporting a sense of spirituality not so 
keenly tied to a particular religion and it is possible that allegiance to a looser form of 
spirituality is a more tenable position in this climate.  It is highly reflective of a kind of 
‗pick-n-mix‘ approach82 to contemporary religion and spirituality, associated with what has 
been termed ‗New Age‘ (Norlander, Gard, Lindholm & Archer, 2003) but also more 
alternative forms of spirituality, ‗personal‘ forms of religion (Heelas & Woodhead, 2005) 
                                                 
81 Lyn mentions that she and Alex discussed the possibility of Alex coming back to tell her about life after 
death (in a hypothetical and light-hearted sense) if Alex was to die, early on in Alex‘s illness when the 
possibility of death seemed a long way off. 
82 The pick-n-mix approach denotes the way in which people select ideas/beliefs/spiritual principles from 
various different places – including formal religions and ancient traditions – and that allegiance to any one 
tradition is not necessary.  Furthermore, any loose allegiance can be transient, fitting with the idea of a 
personal journey which is exemplified in Lyn‘s construction of Buddhism as something she is currently 
‗comfortable with‘ (line 40).  
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and ‗progressive spirituality‘83 (Lynch, 2007).  These ideas often draw upon Eastern 
traditions such as Buddhism, which Lyn mentions in her talk – ‗I mean at the present time 
I feel (0.5) it‘s Buddhism (.) that I‘m comfortable with‘ (lines 39-40).  However, she does 
not present any specific or concrete commitment to any one particular framework, religion 
or ‗named‘ spiritual path.  This works simultaneously to present a significant 
transformation via a ‗new‘ association with spirituality but equally retains a sense of her 
agency and conscious decision-making, which are centralised, ensuring there is no 
misinterpretation of this as a conversion experience.  Regardless of its accuracy there is a 
popular view of conversion as somewhat dubious.   The allusion instead to a process of 
conscious exploration evokes a consumerist conception of self-directed choice: of the 
rational agent selecting a self-developmental route or spiritual path (see Carette & King, 
2005).  
 
Overall, the link between these two parts of the extract is that the ‗spiritual quest‘ (line 34) 
parallels her search for understanding regarding life after death (lines 42-43).  This 
positions Lyn as both actively seeking to make sense of her experiences and as deeply and 
profoundly changed by them.  Lyn‘s account contains elements of passive and agentic 
change, but they are different kinds of changes associated with each.  Those attributed 
directly to the experience (knowledge of life after death) trade on passivity and those that 
are reportedly triggered by the experience trade on agentic action (spiritual quest). 
   
These different constructions appear in other accounts but usually references to one or the 
other are located separately.  Fred‘s account shows this.  Fred‘s interview is an extended 
‗life-story‘ narrative that tells a seemingly chronological story during which he refers to two 
TEHEs that concern the identification and manifestation of his healing abilities.   His 
overall narrative presents a story of gradually unfolding interest in extraordinary 
phenomena, attending conferences and meetings on subjects such as crop circles and 
UFOs and meeting various individuals (e.g. psychometrists, healers). Prior to extract 12, 
Fred has just been talking about the seemingly involuntary manifestation of his healing 
abilities – his second TEHE.  He then goes on to talk about his subsequent lack of fear in 
death, though he does not explicitly link these events. 
 
                                                 
83 The concept of ‗progressive spirituality‘ does not align with the idea of a ‗pick n mix‘ approach to 
contemporary spirituality.  Instead, Lynch (2007) argues that there is a form of spirituality that is a coherent 
ideological development informed by historical, cultural and religious roots in the west.  
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At the beginning of the extract Fred states, ‗things just seemed to slot in‘ (line 1).  This 
refers to all the activity (e.g. conferences) he mentions previously as well as his TEHEs.  
Fred is suggesting that the ideas or information he was experiencing or coming across were 
starting to make sense - it ‗slotted in‘ (line 2).  The concept of things ‗slotting in‘ conjures a 
metaphorical picture of shapes neatly cohering or of ideas coalescing in a smooth and even 
fashion.  Fred presents these ‗new‘ aspects as effectively integrating with a pre-established 
sense of self.  He reports his conviction that, ‗we are all spiritual beings‘ (line 4), 
emphasising his certainty about this twice with ‗I don‘t even (0.9) erm have any concerns 
that it‘s not true‘ and ‗there is no doubt in my mind‘ (lines 2-4). 
 
Unusually, he goes on to say ‗I can‘t tell you exactly (1.1) the reasons why‘ (line 5) 
punctuated by a long pause and thus sets up the possibility that the source of the ensuing 
disclosure is unknown.  He goes on to talk about having knowledge ‗that everyone has their 
own journey‘ (lines 5-6) and that humans are spirits and he now does not ‗fear death‘ (lines 
7-8).  The certainty of this is emphasised again - ‗I know (1.0) as sure as anything (.) that 
that [spirits] is what we are‘ (lines 6-7).  The certainty Fred presents works to establish this 
claim as unchallengeable.  Earlier Fred appears to attribute his new knowledge to his 
experiences but now he suggests that their source is unknown.  This might appear 
contradictory.  However, Fred instead is actually suggesting that his new sense of 
conviction about the spirituality of humanity and his loss of the fear of death somehow arose 
from his experiences but that he cannot explain exactly how or why this happened – it just 
happened.   
 
Thus the agency for any change is not with Fred - ‗>SO that was one of these things that 
[th]at actually just changed (0.8) erm and I can‘t (.) exactly as I say before tell you why‘ 
(lines 18-20).  Here Fred communicates that something else was responsible for these 
changes: they are something he was not responsible for nor is able to explain.  By placing 
the agency for his change with his experiences, Fred invokes a popular idea that one should 
trust one‘s own experiences and equally positions his ‗self‘ as innocent bystander – the 
fundamental change in how he understands human life and spirituality happened to him. 
 
Alice, Lyn and Fred‘s narratives all constitute, to a greater or lesser extent, a passive self, 
who, in the face of forceful circumstances, either discovered they had changed as a person 
(Alice), or encountered a certainty about their fundamental understanding of or knowledge 
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about life, life after death and spirituality that they had not had previously (Lyn and Fred).  
These narrative devices allow the individuals to position themselves as not responsible for 
any change that has occurred to them or their views, thus negotiating any potential 
difficulties with authenticity and credence.  In other words, if they had claimed 
responsibility for making conscious changes to their views or their personality because of 
their experiences they might appear inconsistent or false.  This is because dominant ideas 
of the self tend to centre upon a consistent and continuous being with only minor and 
incremental ‗natural‘ changes occurring, such as the stabilisation of personality traits (e.g. 
Caspi et al, 2005) and a fairly constant worldview over time. 
 
 
6.6.2 Agency and positioning 
 
In the next group of extracts, there is a slightly different formulation of positioning in 
relation to changes and transformations.  Whilst the latter instances depicted a passive self 
that was affected by an agentic experience, these instances reveal some conscious 
intervention on the experient‘s behalf in their transformation.  In constructing a more 
active role for the self in terms of change, there are different emphases including displays 
of conscious choice and reasoning processes in order to convey authenticity. 
 
One account displaying these features is Sunset‘s (see extract 3).  Sunset displays an explicit 
reaction to her experience – ‗and that prompted me to-tut-of (0.4) think I must do 
something about this‘ (lines 18-19).  This utterance conveys a situation in which she was 
propelled by the force of her experience; that the experience triggered a compulsion to act.  
Subsequently stating ‗and of course didn‘t really know what to do‘ (lines 19-20), works to 
manage how the experience and reported compulsion to act are viewed.  The use of ‗of 
course‘ allows Sunset to position herself with a standard ‗normal‘ or ‗ordinary‘ population, 
who, in the face of an extraordinary experience would not know what to do or be equipped 
with any insider or specialist knowledge in this regard.  Sunset thus displays her alignment 
and identification with an average and normal self that is just like anybody else.   
 
This is an important association given that she reports attending a training facility for 
psychics and mediums.  However, this potentially controversial admission is tempered by a 
variety of devices designed to distance herself from any in-depth or specialist knowledge 
associated with the facility.  This is achieved via; ‗I don‘t know how I really knew about this 
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place but I‘d heard‘ (lines 24-25), which implies a distant and vague knowledge about the 
place, rather than anything more committed or technical.  Additionally, use of the label 
‗£spook school‘ (line 25) with a smiling voice, has a light-hearted trivialising effect.  It is a 
non-serious formulation of the training facility‘s name which does have a formal name and 
which she then goes on to divulge.  This light-hearted label evokes a fondness for the place 
as well as working to diffuse an interest in the paranormal that could be read as too serious 
or unconventional and potentially problematic. 
 
She positions herself as a ‗total beginner‘ (line 29) which allows her to put some distance 
between potentially controversial claims of being able to communicate with spirits for 
instance - at least initially.  Whilst talking positively about meeting ‗like-minded people‘ 
(line 32), connoting some unconventional beliefs and ideas (about mediumship and the 
paranormal), she also works to display herself as a rational and critical agent, not amenable 
to duping or gullibility.  References to being ‗sceptical‘ (line 36) towards some forms of 
‗evidence‘ (line 35) establish her orientation to an intelligent, questioning and rational 
approach.  Sunset justifies any belief in the paranormal (and related abilities) by privileging 
personal experience as a trustworthy defence over third party claims, ‗but er (1.2) y- I think 
you have to trust your own experiences‘ (line 36-38).  Here, Sunset invokes a commonly 
held wisdom about trusting your own experiences as opposed to just accepting information 
from others.  This is something that many of the respondents make reference to – trusting 
in one‘s own experiences over believing third party information – and seems a powerful 
form of lay knowledge about life.  The prioritisation of experiential wisdom also serves to 
militate against any challenge: questioning belief or opinion is possible and might be 
expected, questioning someone‘s experience is not. 
           
Finally, Sunset talks about identity change directly.  She mentions joining ‗in a sort of a 
loose way a local Spiritualist church‘ (line 41) and continuing ‗a mediumship development‘ 
(lines 41-42).  Her casual references to these identities imply an informal commitment to 
Spiritualism and fall short of full identification with mediumship.  This would appear to 
demonstrate a certain level of resistance to and weak affiliation with these identities, which 
allows Sunset to establish some distance from wholesale commitment or membership.  
Nevertheless, her references to training and development do portray commitment to the 
professional status of mediumship and the need to hone one‘s abilities through the proper 
channels (Skultans, 1974), via a process of accreditation and qualifications. 
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Overall, Sunset refers to ‗taking action‘ triggered by her experience which promoted change 
rather than change being reported as ‗passively‘ occurring via the experiences.  The 
experience is thus treated as an instigator for the action to change as opposed to the force of 
change.  In doing this, Sunset claims her transformation was, at least in part, a result of her 
own agency – ‗and then after that I came back and (1.5) joined in a sort of a loose way a 
local Spiritualist church to continue a mediumship development‘ (lines 38-42).  This claim 
to agentic transformation is tempered somewhat by a display of casual association with 
both Spiritualism and mediumship – i.e. an interest not to be misconstrued as a conversion 
experience or a fanatical and obsessive one.  The references to taking action are invoked in 
a careful, considered and rational manner, where any mention of profound changes (in her 
life) prioritises gradual and ongoing development with proper training and accreditation. 
 
These references to agentic transformation are ways of managing what is quite dramatic 
and wholesale change.  By placing it alongside an active decision-making process and self 
involvement, respondents are able to invoke the rational (considered, incremental change 
with accreditation) rather than the irrational (conversion or perceived mental instability).  
As Sunset showed, this is in part negotiated by the display of an incremental professional 
developmental process, one that prioritises accreditation and credentials.  This aims to 
demonstrate authenticity – showing the individual as having taken the recognised and 
accepted route to their new identity, whilst also having changed gradually.   
 
References to accreditation and professional status can also be found in Fred‘s narrative in 
relation to an agentic account of identity transformation.  In extract 13 Fred is talking 
about taking part in a ‗Reiki attunement‘ (line 2), which is a form of ‗training‘ for Reiki 
healing.  This comes after talk about a set of gradual changes triggered by his TEHEs and 
other phenomena for example, conferences they attended and people they met at the time.  
Immediately Fred positions himself as steering this process, albeit with his wife (lines 1-5).  
He describes a process of choice and decision-making that was rationally and deliberately 
enacted.  There is also an indication that this initial action led to his further interest in and 
commitment to his healing development ‗and s::o from from that point I‘ve I‘ve bin (.) sort 
of really into into healing‘ (lines 6-7).  Then he talks about the ‗National Federation of 
Spiritual Healers‘ (line 13) and emphasises the rigour and length of the training process - 
‗more of a lengthy process‘ (line 14), ‗you have to be sponsored‘ (line 23), ‗you then have to 
go (0.6) on a number of courses (0.6) and it does take two years‘ (lines 24-26). 
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Fred emphasises the importance of proper accreditation, training and certification.  The 
implicit message is an appeal for ‗healer‘ authenticity and thus, authentic change.  His 
assertion of the rigour of the process is followed by an explication of the correct 
motivation for healing training – ‗and to me healing is not about (0.7) erm making money 
(1.0) healing is about helping people‘ (lines 20-22) – and embedded within talk about the 
requirement for proper training.    
 
One aspect evident in all these instances is the requirement of balance, between on the one 
hand profound change and on the other, credibility or authenticity.  None more so than 
Duck‘s account of religious transformation, which positions her ‗self‘ as an active 
participant in the changing process.  In extract 6 this agentic positioning is evident after 
having talked about her first TEHE, when she is asked if she has had any other similar 
experiences.  In response to this request, Duck goes on to mention her reflections and 
reactions to the first experience. 
   
In the first part of this extract (lines 44-76) Duck ‗shows‘ the process of contemplation and 
reasoning that she embarked upon in reaction to the experience – e.g. ‗I-I can remember 
thinking why is this (0.8) so amazing‘ (line 22) and, ‗I started thinking (0.9) about quite why 
this: was: (1.0) so (0.5) beautiful (.) wonderful (.) amazing‘ (lines 24-26).  This process 
displays an awareness of the possible rational explanations for her experience – ‗just (0.6) 
some sort of optical phenomena‘ (lines 22-23) – and exhibits her cognitive competence and 
reasoned consideration of her experience.  This is designed to convey the logical outcome 
at the end of a lengthy reasoning process – ‗and eventually after a lot of thinking I ended 
up deciding it was because God had made things that way‘ (lines 32-33). This interpretation 
is thus legitimised by a period of reasoned contemplation, rather than by an immediate and 
‗unthinking‘ conversion or default to religious explanations without consideration.   
 
Duck‘s subsequent reported confirmation as an Anglican, invokes a particular kind of 
religious and Christian identification.  The possible source for this denomination is then 
explored (lines 37-40).  Duck asserts that her attendance at Sunday School should not 
indicate any particular religious fervour or even interest in the family home – ‗my parents 
aren‘t particularly religious‘ (line 40) – which contributes to her confirmation being seen as 
an agentic decision and not as a result of influence from anyone else.  Additionally, this is 
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designed to show that change did occur (as triggered by her experience) and that she did 
not just re-invigorate a lapsed identity, for instance. 
 
Furthermore, her transformation to Anglican is constituted as traceable to her TEHE, but 
is conveyed more in terms of a consciously managed, agentic process rather than an 
instantaneous conversion.  Thus Duck is able to maintain that no coercive force compelled 
her.  Instead, an active, conscious and rational process occurred throughout which she was 
in control: there is no passivity here.  Simultaneously, the talk works to ensure that this 
event is still interpreted as a profound change, illustrating a balancing act inherent in the 
narrative.  Finally, there is notable alliance with and invocation of a rational self which is 
considered vital to the account.  It appears that this construction of rationality is common 
throughout accounts (particularly when agentic action on the back of an experience is 
reported) and can be found bolstering the case for credibility and warding off delusional 
attributions. 
 
 
6.6.3 Summary 
 
Whilst some respondents positioned themselves as active agents – as making conscious 
choices and decisions regarding their transformations – others constituted themselves as 
passive recipients of undirected and unsolicited change.  The way in which the experient‘s 
transformation is relayed appears to be connected to the kind of transformation reported.  
When reporting major life change, taking on a new identity (medium or healer, for 
instance), agentic control and conscious decision making are integral to the talk.  
Experients constitute themselves as having agency, as consciously acting on their experience 
rather than being instantaneously changed by their experience.  In direct contrast, isolated 
changes such as a distinct emotional transformation, a change in behaviours or worldview 
are communicated via the overwhelming nature of an involuntary (agentic) experience.  
These differences between change formulations demonstrate how authenticity and 
credibility is an important impression that requires careful handling in talk and show how 
different substantive types of change demand different constructions and negotiations in 
talk. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
 
Analytically and empirically, this chapter has offered something towards addressing the 
dearth of social scientific work focusing on personal or individual change (Thomson et al, 
2002).  In foregrounding the importance of a grounded discursive analysis, drawing on 
work concerning identity and discourse (e.g. Ataki & Widdicombe, 1998; Benwell & 
Stokoe, 2006; Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995), this work has been distinct from much of 
the work concerning change that has previously been conducted in social scientific spheres.  
Additionally, there are various analytic findings concerning accounts of transformation, 
which are worth highlighting here.   
 
The first concerns the ordering and structural make up of the accounts, whilst the second 
concerns positioning and how change is handled by the respondents.  Thirdly, there are 
various issues that this (and the preceding) chapter(s) raise which invite further discussion 
and consideration in the final chapter of this thesis.  Firstly, the majority of experients 
mention change in unsolicited ways.  The prevalence of this orientation and its sequencing 
(post-experientially) suggests that there is a normative predilection towards narratives of 
positive transformation in relation to TEHEs.  These narratives are mostly enabled by an 
incomplete ‗before and after‘ construction, where a new self or circumstances is (implicitly) 
contrasted with an often absent prior self or circumstances.  Secondly, it would seem that 
transformations require negotiation in talk and a balance between the communication of 
profound change and the presentation of a consistent and continuous self.  Furthermore, 
there is a general orientation to be categorised as rational, sane actors who are either in 
control of their behaviour (agentic) or a passive recipient of something beyond their 
control and uninvited (non-agentic). Thirdly, it is clear that these issues of transformation 
resonate with broader concepts.   
 
 
6.7.1 The self, society and transformation: how to understand TEHEs? 
 
These broader concepts include, the construction of identity and the self; society, religion, 
spirituality and the self; the reported profundity of TEHEs and a suitable approach; 
sensitivity, respect and ethics.   
 
Firstly, transformation can be seen as connected to the construction of identity and the 
self.  More specifically, there are subtle complexities in the ways in which people constitute 
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their ‗selves‘ in relation to these kinds of experiences.  As transformation is not merely 
relayed in a ‗matter of fact‘ fashion it calls for sensitive construction in talk.  As we have 
established, there are issues then concerning the discursive positioning of self and the 
construction of identity (perhaps differently within interviews than ‗naturalistic‘ talk) in the 
midst of reports of dramatic transformation.  So do existing ideas regarding the discursive 
warranting of positioning and identity comprehensively cater for this nuanced 
phenomenon?  Can self and subjectivity be entirely bound by and therefore only found in 
talk?  These are questions that are unlikely to be easily resolved and therefore are 
exploratory openers for discussion regarding the self and subjectivity that will be returned 
to in the conclusion and no doubt, beyond this project. 
      
Secondly, transformation has broader connotations concerning society, religion, spirituality 
in relation to the individual or self.  For instance, why do respondents communicate stories 
of positive change and transformation?  How can we begin to understand the ways in 
which these experiences are talked about (in terms of the broader social context)?  We have 
noted that (at least in Western societies) the prevailing concept of self is an ongoing ‗story‘, 
which requires presenting in a fairly continuous and consistent manner in order to preserve 
credibility and maintain integrity.  The concept of wholesale transformation appears at 
odds with this and to report instantaneous change courts potential categorisation of the 
experience as a religious ‗conversion‘ and the speaker as a ‗convert‘.  To achieve 
experiential authenticity the speaker must aim to avoid any negative categorisation.  
However, these categories (convert and conversion) remain problematic for most non-
religious audiences in the UK.  It is feasible to argue that there is an increasingly visible 
public space (e.g. television, internet, and popular literature) for a fairly intolerant 
perspective of experiences and beliefs associated with the spiritual, religious or paranormal 
(e.g. Dawkins, 2006b) alongside what might be generously termed an apathy towards 
organised religion per se (Hay, 2003), combined with a simultaneous interest in the spiritual 
(Heelas & Woodhead, 2005) and sometimes also the paranormal.  What does this mean for 
experients and their reported experiences? 
 
Thirdly, it is clear that the notion of transformation effectively illustrates the TEHEs as 
important and significant (pivotal) moments in the experient‘s lives because they reportedly 
have real and tangible effects.  Additionally, we observed that the literature concerning 
TEHEs identifies transformation as a possible and common aspect of these experiences 
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(e.g. Palmer & Braud, 2002; White, 1999b; Wulff, 2000).  Wilde and Murray‘s (2008; 2009; 
see also Murray, Wilde & Murray, 2009a; 2009b) recent research into OBE and NDE 
accounts also highlights the potential importance of these experiences for those that report 
them, in terms of mental well-being and meaningfulness.  This profundity, however, has 
often felt lost or sidelined by the process of ‗rigorous analysis‘ and the type of analysis 
conducted.  So the conclusion opens up a reflexive exploration of this lack and how future 
work might continue to interrogate this tension. 
 
And fourthly, the need to try and balance professional credibility with personal integrity 
runs deeply throughout this thesis and closely tied to it is how experients and their reported 
experiences are approached, interacted with, responded to, analysed and written into 
research.   Those reporting these experiences have in the past all too often been 
categorised, if not diagnosed as, suffering with mental health issues or considered 
delusional.  I have begun to argue that for the social sciences at the very least, there are 
other ways of considering these reported experiences that does not involve making 
judgements about the veridical nature of them as ‗experiences‘ and instead, is sensitive to 
and respectful of (via a certain kind of approach) the concurrent reported importance and 
meaning for experients. 
 
It is useful at this point to briefly summarise the issues which are pertinent for discussion in 
the concluding chapter.  Consequently the next chapter works to effectively bring together, 
how people talk about and make sense of their TEHES; what their stories and these 
empirical chapters can contribute to notions of subjectivity, consciousness, the self; about 
how these reports can be understood in relation to the wider cultural milieu; how these 
experiences can or should be studied and where I, as researcher fit into this process.  All of 
these issues are tackled next. 
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Chapter 7  
 
The end? Reflections on researching TEHEs and future paths 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
A concluding chapter usually signals completion, as its purpose is a drawing together of the 
key findings and detailing possible trajectories for future research.  Yet, this conclusion 
feels more like the beginning of new paths than merely the end of a journey.  In many 
ways, this process has raised bigger questions to ponder than it has provided definitive 
answers and there is much to reflect upon.  This alone hints that there might be a different 
stylistic tone here from the rest of the thesis, emanating in part from the inevitable shifts I 
have made as ‗author‘ of this work, but also from the nature of this conclusion.  In 
constructing a retrospective conclusion it seems apt to return initially to the original aims of 
the project.   The research began with a relatively modest aim in seeking to explore how 
people talked about and made sense of their extraordinary experiences.  Other areas of 
exploration became clearer as the research progressed and as a result there are three main 
strands to this chapter.   
 
The first section is concerned with detailing the empirical findings and the particular 
implications these have for discursive psychology (and related discursive work), 
consciousness studies and the concepts of identity and change in the social sciences.  The 
second section is tentative in beginning to outline how my research offers a distinct kind of 
approach to very recent work concerning the sociology of spirituality.  The third section 
focuses upon the tensions that have arisen from the very practical nature of doing research.  
These tensions can be characterised overall by an ongoing struggle between the personal 
and the intellectual, which cannot simply be resolved here.  Instead, I articulate these 
tensions via various methodological conflicts that emerged during the research.  The first 
concerns my experience of interviewing discussed with reference to Potter and Hepburn‘s 
(2005) critique of interviews as data collection resources in the social sciences more 
generally.   The second concerns issues of representation and how we can both fairly depict 
respondents (and their utterances) and maintain both personal and professional integrity.  
The third issue concerns the possible limitations of a discursive and academic approach to 
these experiences and discusses some of the possible ways in which the extra-discursive84 can 
                                                 
84 I recognise not every scholar would term this the ‗extra-discursive‘, but I need a short-hand referent for the 
perceived gap some researcher‘s have identified in certain discursive approaches. 
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be addressed (e.g. the approach of Edley & Wetherell, 1997 or the use of psychoanalysis in 
tandem with discursive methods, such as Frosh et al, 2003).  There is also some 
contemplation about the project generally, how it was conducted and how it might have 
been different.   
 
 
7.2 Empirical findings and implications 
 
People talk about and make sense of their TEHEs in substantively distinctive ways but 
what is perhaps surprising is that there is considerable consistency to the ways in which the 
experiential accounts are constructed.  There are regular, identifiable features deployed by 
the speakers which facilitate particular social actions and invoke, manage and negotiate 
certain issues.  This section considers how some of these findings relate to specific issues 
and existing areas within the fields of discursive psychology, consciousness studies and the 
social sciences.  The positive implications and contributions of a discursive analysis 
(informed by CA and DP) are also emphasised here. 
 
 
7.2.1 Reported thought and agency in Discursive Psychology 
 
Having identified the common appearance of reported thought as a response to the 
reported experience, quite often after the experiential ‗peak‘, my analysis also shows how 
reported thoughts are deployed as a discursive resource. These findings concerning 
reported thought build on existing linguistic analyses of reported thought (e.g. Barnes & 
Moss, 2007; Haakana, 2007) and reported speech (e.g. Holt, 1996, 2000).  As established 
earlier, there is a relative dearth of work on reported thought (compared to reported 
speech, for instance) and it is an understudied area of linguistic analysis.  In light of this and 
my findings, Haakana‘s (2007) request to analytically distinguish between reported thought 
and speech where appropriate is wholeheartedly supported.   
 
Instead of treating reported thought as an avenue to mental phenomena, my CA/DP 
analysis shows how thoughts can be reported as a discursive strategy in TEHE accounts.  
This is significant in several ways.  Firstly, reported thought operationalises notions of 
agency and passivity in relation to responsibility for and control over the TEHE dependent 
upon the claims being made.  Secondly, it is clear that speakers‘ reported thoughts stake a 
claim for mental acuity and intellectual rationality in the face of seemingly extraordinary 
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experiences.  Thirdly, therefore, these reported thoughts invoke epistemic authority and 
negotiate categorisations of credibility and responses of scepticism.   
 
These findings are not just theoretically useful for discursive methodologies but also 
illustrate how CA and DP can positively contribute to participants‘ own understandings of 
their experiences.  For instance, by normalising experiences, both through awareness of 
their more widely reported occurrence and by demonstrating that there are common ways 
of talking about them.  Further, the way in which issues of rationality and credibility are 
identified and dealt with by this kind of analysis, demonstrates sensitivity towards these 
issues and the way in which these stories are crafted and designed.  This kind of analysis 
prioritises what is being ‗done‘ or ‗achieved‘ with the reporting of thought in interaction 
rather than treating it as the reporting of an ‗actual thought‘.  But the agnosticism towards 
the reality of these experiences does not prevent them being treated respectfully. 
 
In addition to extending and developing ongoing work concerning reported thought as a 
linguistic focus of study, these findings also speak to another absence within discursive 
psychology more generally. 
 
In detailing some of the key concerns of discursive psychology and how such phenomena 
should be approached for study, Edwards (1997) lists various kinds of issues requiring 
attention. 
―Attributions of agency, intelligence, mental states and their 
attendant problems are in the first place participants‘ 
categories and concerns (manifested in descriptions, 
accusations, claims, error accounts, membership disputes, 
etc.), just as much as reality, imitation and authenticity are.  
The first analytic task in the study of discourse and 
cognition is to study those attributions, before disputing 
them.‖ 
(Edwards, 1997: 319, original emphasis) 
 
However, the concept of agency has rarely received sustained analytic focus in discursive 
work and as such is a neglected concern.  My work begins to address this as the 
deployment of reported thought in TEHE accounts demonstrates the discursive 
negotiation of agency in talk.  Speakers‘ deployment of reported thought as a response to 
their reported experience provides them with a positioning tool.  They are able to locate 
themselves with or without agency in relation to the perceived force of their experience.  In 
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doing so, their talk is able to reveal their own attribution of agency in these particular 
contexts.     
 
The notion of agency is also foregrounded through respondents‘ stories of transformation, 
though this time speakers work to be categorised as rational, sane actors who are either in 
control of their behaviour (an agentic transformation) or a passive recipient of something 
beyond their control and uninvited (non-agentic change).  These findings also show how 
these issues of agency are closely related to concepts of rationality and how an individual 
works to have their account received in a certain way (as a credible telling, with them as 
credible narrator).  In this way, it contributes to work in discursive psychology on how 
reported cognitive phenomena in talk are, in the first instance, discursive and social, 
performative and pragmatic.  Noting that concepts of agency are operationalised by 
individuals‘ talk of change and reported thought is also important because, like other work 
has claimed, it offers us a way to conceptualise human agency on the back of demonstrable 
empirical evidence (Nikander, 2009).   
 
The work on reported thought and agency is a beginning.  It is the start of a more 
comprehensive and broader documentation, explication and (likely) further refinement of 
an empirical argument regarding the discursive deployment of thought in TEHE (and 
EHE) accounts.  Additionally, space in this thesis did not allow for a detailed exploration 
of alternative lexical expressions of cognition or cognitive activity (e.g. realisations, 
considerations, rememberings), or their relation with reported speech where relevant and a 
more systematic consideration of both these aspects would provide a fuller picture.  
Research into reported thought per se is in its infancy and further work will be required 
across different types of reported experiences or accounts in general in order to establish 
how widespread different deployments are and how they work in different contexts.  We 
have already seen that particular expressions using thought (in these cases ‗at first I 
thought…‘) are deployed in testimonial witness accounts of dramatic incidents, for instance 
(Jefferson, 2004c) or ‗disputed incidents‘ generally (Wooffitt, 1992).  So the presence of 
other common formulations of cognition and attributions of agency would build on and 
extend this work.  There are also ways in which these findings offer something to the field 
of consciousness studies. 
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7.2.2 The experiential in Consciousness Studies 
 
This work makes a distinct offering to consciousness studies.  Recent attempts to 
characterize what is meant by ‗consciousness‘ in the field of consciousness studies 
emphasise the importance of lived experience. ‗‗Consciousness‘ refers to reportable content 
experienced by living individuals. This is the identified referential nucleus of the term.‘ (Pereira & 
Ricke, 2009: 33, original emphasis).  But one of the key debates in consciousness studies 
concerns how to account for, talk about or explain conscious subjective experience.  There 
are hopes that scientific research will bridge the explanatory gap. ‗Future research may 
clarify how far an objective scientific description of subjective experience will be possible.‘ 
(Pereira & Ricke, 2009: 42).  However, consciousness studies continue to struggle with this 
perceived hurdle.  Additionally, introspection is consistently viewed as a method that can 
be ‗tightened up‘ to produce more accurate accounts of conscious experience (see Cardeña, 
2004; but also more recently Beaton, 2009). 
 
What these perspectives neglect to consider however, is the way in which any events or 
experiences are made available to us via the reports of individuals.  These reports are made 
up of language and this language is designed for the occasions in which these experiences 
are reported.  That is, as my work shows, a TEHE account is not simply communicating 
the phenomenology of an experience; it is achieving social things via the deployment of 
particular utterances in particular ways.  These particular utterance designs do things in 
interaction (rather than show us something substantive about the nature of conscious 
experience).  In TEHE accounts they are connected to a series of purposes such as 
managing and negotiating identity and change; negotiating, attributing and resisting 
personal agency; staking a claim for conscious control and rationality; and managing self-
presentation.  Therefore my work demonstrates that a study of conscious experience or 
consciousness is, in the first instance, a study of language and communication. 
 
As social scientists we find consciousness instantiated through interaction in the public 
domain.   The ‗hard problem‘ of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995) and the ‗explanatory gap‘ 
(Levine, 1983) between objective brain processes and subjective experience are thus side-
stepped as consciousness can be conceptualised as a social phenomena.  In viewing 
consciousness as something that is played out in the social realm of interaction, it becomes 
unnecessary to conceptually distinguish between the objective and subjective as these are 
imposed categories upon neural activity and constructions of the mind.  Given that 
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scientists have yet to ‗locate‘ the mind in the brain or ‗find‘ where consciousness is placed 
(and may never achieve this) then this provides an alternative approach to this impasse.   
 
In TEHE accounts, speakers allude to being in conscious control of one‘s mental faculties, 
emphasising the need to be seen to be the master of one‘s consciousness and conscious 
processes.  Speakers additionally draw upon contrastive resources to convey the sense in 
which TEHEs form a state of consciousness beyond the ordinary: an altered state.  These 
constructions show profundity and spontaneity, whilst negotiating a passive role for the 
conscious self.  There is scope for further work in this area, which might better explore 
how consciousness is operationalised throughout these accounts – how exactly do 
experients invoke consciousness, where and when?  How can these constructions of 
consciousness help us to understand conceptions of consciousness?  What conceptions of 
consciousness are most commonly oriented to in communicating profound TEHEs?  How 
do reported cognition and constructions of consciousness operate together in narratives of 
extraordinary experiences?     
 
Whilst this kind of discursive methodology is not often found in this field there are 
precedents (e.g. Allistone & Wooffitt, 2007; Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005, 2008) indicating 
that this type of approach has much to offer.  Indeed, in considering the way in which 
people talk about ostensibly altered states of consciousness, we can begin to see how 
consciousness is constructed in interaction and how speakers delineate differences between 
‗normal‘ and ‗altered‘ states.  A discursive consideration of consciousness offers insights 
into how we communicate and operationalise concepts of consciousness in conversation, 
and may be the only ‗place‘ we can currently locate it at all: in the social.  This kind of 
discursive focus has also helped produce contributions that this work makes to the social 
sciences more generally. 
 
 
7.2.4 Identity and change in the social sciences 
 
This research contributes to the lack of existing social scientific work focusing on personal 
or individual change identified by Thomson, Bell, Holland, Henderson, McGrellis and 
Sharpe (2002).85  In documenting the ways in which people spontaneously report dramatic 
                                                 
85 They specifically made this assertion in relation to youth research, but my use of their observation is 
intended much more widely across the social sciences. 
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self-transformation in TEHE accounts, and what these reports are ‗doing‘, this work 
contributes to discursive work on identity (e.g. Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Benwell & 
Stokoe, 2006).  This discursive work on identity sees identity as oriented towards the fixed, 
stable, consistent self whilst simultaneously appearing in locally occasioned fashions per 
interactional requirements (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006).  There are some recent examples of 
work on age identity and change (e.g. Coupland, 2009; Nikander, 2009), which show how 
change is discursively interpreted and negotiated in relation to mid and later life identities.  
This kind of work is emblematic of how a discursive approach can more systematically 
address the issues of identity and change. 
 
The theme of transformation and change is a common and spontaneous one in TEHE 
accounts, which works to convey profundity and helps to negotiate issues of identity and 
the self.  Its prevalence and (post-experiential) location in the narratives indicate that 
notions of positive transformation may have a normative or routine status in TEHE 
accounts.  These change stories are worked up via a ‗before and after‘ framework that is 
incomplete, where a new self or set of circumstances are referred to in contrast with an 
(often implicit) prior self or circumstances.  Additionally, the analysis shows how speakers 
must carefully negotiate a sense of balance between communicating profound 
transformation and the presentation of a consistent and continuous self.  Transformation 
narratives are concerned also with agency (as mentioned earlier) and speakers indicate one 
of two things when talking about change. These are both ways in which speakers negotiate 
authenticity. 
 An agentic transformation where speakers allude to active, rational involvement in 
their change by reporting considered decision-making processes by which these 
changes came about. 
 A non-agentic change process whereby the speaker is positioned as a receiver of 
powerful change from an external source that they were not responsible for. 
These accounts demonstrate how the self and identity are constructed and positioned in 
TEHE accounts. 
 
This is significant as agency and identity have not comprehensively been theorised within 
discursive approaches, but also, they are sociological (or socially scientific) concepts that 
have not been afforded much attention in previous work on TEHEs and related 
experiences.  Beginning to understand how people invoke, resist, self-categorise and 
manage issues of change and identity in terms of their extraordinary experiences is another 
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way in which these experiences are granted a degree of normality.  That is, there is a novel 
way of theorising these experiences using CA and DP, by locating them in the ordinary 
practices of interaction.  This approach allows us to consider how extraordinariness is 
conveyed, how rationality is interactionally important, how identity transformation is 
handled and a sensitive matter and how agency is invoked and resisted in talk.  This work 
exemplifies the benefits of applying ‗more systematic empirical analyses‘ to talk (Wetherell, 
2007: 673) and shows how notions of transformation and change are formulated in relation 
to identity and discourse. This is particularly topical at the moment given that there are a 
wide range of recently funded contemporary projects on identities currently underway or 
just completed in the social sciences (see http://www.identities.org.uk/ for example). 
 
Future work might explore the concept of self-transformation or change across various 
contexts, in particular identifying the emergence of agentic and passive constructions.  
Alternatively, there is more work to be done on spontaneous instances of transformation 
invoked (or otherwise – e.g. actively and explicitly resisted) in interactive contexts.  It is also 
possible that the interview provides a forum for talk about change which differs from more 
naturalistic data – these differences have yet to be explicated with any systematic 
consideration. 
 
This section has considered how my work contributes to and connects with existing areas 
and disciplines.  The next section reviews a very recent development within the sociology 
of religion and considers how my work might link with this area, substantively and 
methodologically. 
 
7.3 A discursive Sociology of Spirituality? 
 
There is a burgeoning literature, with its roots in the sociology of religion that may be 
termed the sociology of spirituality (this is the title of a recent collection by Flanagan and 
Jupp, 2007, including versions of papers given at a conference with the same title in 2004 – 
see http://www.socrel.org.uk/conferences/Bristol2004/index.html).  There are contesting 
voices within this area, but the common purpose has been to identify, explore and critique 
the state, place, form and character of the spiritual, sacred, religious and/or divine in 
contemporary society.  My work offers a way of studying spiritual experience which is 
distinct from existing approaches and this section both briefly reviews the work already in 
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this field and notes the potential for a discursive sociology of the spiritual.   However, these 
are tentative connections which will require further effort to develop and establish. 
Within recent works (e.g. Aune, Sharma & Vincett, 2008; Barker, 2008; Flanagan & Jupp, 
2007) conceptions of the state of the sacred are discussed in different ways.  Whilst there 
are those who maintain that current notions of spirituality will not replace traditional 
notions of religion, for we are embedded in a period of intense secularisation (e.g. Voas & 
Bruce, 2007), there are others who suggest that it is too early to definitively assess the 
impact of new forms of spirituality and sacred practice in the West (e.g. Heelas, 2007).  
Others still have sought to understand and theorise how the relationship between 
spirituality and religion will continue to be articulated in the social (e.g. Barker, 2008).  
Furthermore, there is broader argumentation that these spiritual forms have emerged in 
tandem with and are connected to, in particular, the monumental changes that women‘s 
lives have undergone in the last fifty years (Houtman & Aupers, 2008; Marler, 2008; 
Woodhead, 2008).  The way in which transcendent experiences fit within these conceptions 
of the ‗spiritual‘ might not be clear at first because not all TEHEs could be (or are) 
described in a way that deems them ‗spiritual‘.   
 
Indeed, Heelas and Woodhead (2005: 5) indicate that ‗transcendence‘ and transcendent 
experiences are, ‗intense experiences…focused on something which is and remains external 
to and higher than the self‘.  Therefore, they argue that the concept of transcendence 
should remain within an externally focused religion.  However, transcendent experiences 
do not inevitably belong to either ‗religion‘ or ‗spirituality‘.  Whilst transcendence is 
concerned with something ‗higher‘ than the conscious self, this is not exclusively perceived 
as an intrusion by an external source.  Many experients (especially those influenced by 
sacred notions more dominant in the East – for instance, Buddhism) prize transcendence 
as an ultimate goal but see this as an extension of the inner and not as an external 
imposition.  Additionally, this idea of transcendent could be seen as limited or restricted as 
experients may report connections to aspects not necessarily considered religious (see 
Tart‘s, 1999, expansive definition of transcendent for instance http://www.issc-
taste.org/main/introduction.shtml). In this sense, it will depend on individual 
interpretation as to how transcendent experiences are understood.  Furthermore, the very 
notion of transcendence and the identification of new forms of spirituality as possibly 
aesthetic, humanist and/or secular (Varga, 2007) – in as much as they don‘t require a 
‗religious‘ element – points to a recasting of spiritual as ‗the search for meaning‘ (Holmes, 
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2007: 27) in all its guises.  Given that these experiential accounts are characterised by 
transcendence and deep affect and meaning, there is a sense in which they can clearly be 
aligned with this work.  In noting that the transcendent is (potentially) spiritual, this work 
also extends the range of issues that are of concern in this field.  
 
Within these collections it has been recognised that contemporary forms of spirituality 
often focus on and prioritise personal experience and extol the value of trusting one‘s own 
experiences or inner self over external authorities (Droogers, 2007).  However, it has also 
been argued that considered research with analytic precision into these personal and 
potentially transformative practices is sorely lacking (McGuire, 2008). 
 
 ―I propose that our field needs to give attention – much 
more carefully researched and analytically precise attention 
– to the personal beliefs and practices by which individual 
spiritual lives are shaped and transformed, expressed and 
experienced, over time.‖ 
(McGuire, 2008: 215) 
 
In showing how people talk about and make sense of their TEHEs my work is an 
(discursive ethnomethodological) extension to and contribution to the existing field, 
currently dominated by theoretical and traditional qualitative approaches (with some of 
these deploying quantitative techniques also).  It is also novel in terms of expanding the 
discursive contexts in which formal and meticulous observations are able to be made.  
Furthermore, the inclusion of the concept of spirituality is a very recent adaptation of the 
sociology of religion and therefore my contribution is timely.  Further development and 
exploitation of these connections can only bring further scope and insights to an emerging 
field.  There are also other areas that my work contributes to but these differ slightly in that 
they are informed by practical and methodological considerations faced during the research 
process.  Thus the next section explores some personal reflections concerning conducting 
research and details the methodological issues arising from this. 
 
 
7.4 Methodological and personal reflections 
 
Whilst I was conducting the research for this project various tensions and conflicts 
emerged.  However, before I explore these it is worth noting that the documenting and 
inclusion of these kinds of reflections is not universally practiced in social science research 
and therefore requires introducing. 
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The place of the personal in research is something that feminists have noted since the 
nineteen eighties/early nineties (e.g. Krieger, 1991) in relation to identifying problems with 
claims to ‗objective‘ scientific knowledge (Harding, 1987, 1991; Smith, 1987, 1990a, 1990b; 
Spelman, 1988; Westkott, 1979) and the need to therefore acknowledge the place of and 
write the researcher into the production of knowledge (Acker, Barry & Esseveld, 1983, 
1991; Blau, 1981; Fonow & Cook, 1991; Hawkesworth, 1989; Maynard & Purvis, 1994; 
Stanley, 1990; Stanley & Wise, 1983). 
 
―Whether we like it or not, researchers remain human 
beings complete with all the usual assembly of feelings, 
failings and moods.  And all of those things influence how 
we feel and understand what is going on.  Our 
consciousness is always the medium through which the 
research occurs; there is no method or technique of doing 
research other than through the medium of the researcher.‖ 
(Stanley & Wise, 1983: 157) 
 
The main way of including the researcher in the process has been to adopt some semblance 
of reflexivity in the process.  This is not to attest that reflexive practices automatically give 
rise to superior or privileged forms of knowledge (Lynch, 2000), but that researchers are 
intrinsically part of the process and that this should be acknowledged.  But what is 
reflexivity and how can it be articulated?   
 
Reflexivity is a contested notion that does not have one straightforward, accepted 
definition for researchers to work from (see Lynch, 2000, for a detailed discussion and 
critique of differing definitions of reflexivity).  For some it is a self-critical kind of self-
analysis or scrutiny that lays (previously) unspoken processes to bare for others to see 
(England, 1994) in order to make for truly accountable forms of knowledge (Blau, 1981).  
But quite what is, or should be, laid bare, or how this should be scrutinised is not self-
evident.  Burawoy (1991) talks of the messy practices of research, the false starts and 
abandoned theories; the processes of production, others talk about locating the ‗self‘ of the 
researcher, unpacking one‘s own identity in some way (e.g. Stanley & Wise, 1983).  
Examples of explicitly reflexive projects focus on the productive nature of reflexivity: how 
critically examining previous assumptions can create new and fruitful avenues for research 
(e.g. Allan, 1997; du Preez, 2008; Le Gallais, 2008, O‘Connell Davidson, 2008; Pini, 2004) 
and how reflexivity as a practice can be a way to investigate the researcher‘s experience of 
research (e.g. McIlveen, 2008).  The practice of reflexivity is explored here via the 
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examination of various methodological issues that emerged in the process of doing 
research (with the proviso that any reflection will provide a reconstituted version of my 
‗self‘ and the research process for the benefit of authorship now). 
 
 
7.4.1 The interview as an interaction and ‘emotionality’ 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, interview data differs from the kind of data usually analysed by CA 
and DP researchers.  Furthermore, interview data has recently come under scrutiny and has 
subsequently been the subject of critical methodological debate, mainly within psychology, 
but the debate is applicable to the whole of the social sciences more generally.  This 
consideration of qualitative interviews focuses predominantly on a recent article by 
Jonathan Potter and Alexa Hepburn (2005) concerning the use of qualitative interviews in 
psychology.  Their cogent critique of interviews was the catalyst for the ongoing debate in 
the social sciences where they argue that there are many intractable problems with 
interviews and therefore where possible researchers should use naturalistic data sources 
(see for instance, Griffin, 2007a, 2007b; Henwood, 2007; Potter & Hepburn, 2007).  It is 
worth reviewing the most pressing of these concerns and reflecting upon how my research 
attempted to address some of these issues.  Ultimately, the authors are keen to question the 
centrality of the interview as a research method; challenge the dominance of what they 
argue is a default method; and champion the merits of more naturalistic data.  This 
challenge, they suggest, is founded on the basis that there are numerous features and issues 
researchers tend to overlook when choosing interviews and collecting data (Potter & 
Hepburn, 2005).     
 
7.4.1.1 The interview as interaction 
  
One of the main criticisms concerns the way in which social science research has employed 
the interview method as a straightforward way of obtaining information about a particular 
substantive topic (Potter & Hepburn, 2005).  Many other researchers, albeit with different 
interests, have also argued that this traditional approach fails to consider the interview as an 
interaction (e.g. Borland, 1991; Seale, 1998; Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995).  Wooffitt 
(2005a) points out that whilst the interview is a different sort of interaction from ordinary 
conversation - it has a formal structure and a unidirectional flow - it remains an interaction.  
In this sense, it has been argued that the interactional nature of the interview must be 
 260 
attended to in making analytic claims.  Furthermore, interviews are thus seen, not as a 
resource for information about a particular topic in a straightforward fashion, but instead 
are a topic for study themselves; an interaction, a ‗natural-interaction-in-interview‘ (Potter, 
2004: 205).   
 
Potter and Hepburn (2005) thus argue that the nature of interviews as interactional events 
has consequences for any analysis and research that employs them as methods should 
attend to this.   They argue that interview findings can, at worst, be a direct result of 
interview questions and agendas because of the way in which speakers‘ utterances are 
informed by the interview context.  In these cases, analytic categories and themes can be a 
‗refined…filtered or inverted form‘ of the agendas and interests (part explicit and part 
implicit) of the research question and design (Potter & Hepburn, 2005: 293).  More 
problematically then, if research findings are seen to be influenced or produced by the 
interviewer‘s questions and the ‗interactional practices of the interviewer and respondent‘ 
(Wooffitt, 2005a: 172) then there are perceived problems with the validity of analytic 
claims.  
 
My research aimed to address this at the design stage of the process.  Awareness that the 
interview is an interaction and utterances are tied to the setting in which they occur meant 
adopting a particular kind of interviewing style which proposed minimal intervention and 
interaction from the interviewer, at least in the first instance.  This consisted of a more 
‗passive‘ interviewing style, which invited the respondent to talk about what had happened 
and then remained fairly silent until they had completed their account (Wooffitt, 1992).  
This form of interviewing is in line with a more neutral approach to interviewing, which 
Potter and Hepburn (2005: 300) propose should be reconsidered (instead of the more 
popular, ‗active interviewing‘).  This approach aimed to ensure that the account provided 
by the respondent required limited involvement from the interviewer.  As a result analytic 
claims could be grounded in the account provided by the respondent rather than in the 
specific questions that I had asked as interviewer (because other than inviting the 
respondent to speak about their experience no questions were posed until after the account 
was complete).  This was also directed towards increasing the validity of these analytic 
claims.  However, there were conceptual and practical issues arising from this approach in 
my research, which have implications for ‗passivity‘ and ‗neutral‘ interviewing in a project 
such as this. 
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Firstly, aligning uncritically with a more positivistic approach (as ‗neutral‘ researchers, 
careful not to contaminate data) underestimates the impact of the researcher and vice versa 
on the entire research process (Acker et al, 1991).  As many feminists identified over ten 
years ago, a positivistic approach has greater social respectability and weightier epistemic 
authority, and tends to be valued more highly by the establishment (Harding, 1987).  
Additionally, claiming that conducting research concerned with subjective experience can 
or should be a value-free process might be considered somewhat problematic (Dachler, 
1997).  Secondly, there are practical issues I experienced that created a real tension and 
some discrepancy between research guidance and the realities of research practice.  It is 
these practical issues that form the basis of the discussion across the rest of this section.  
There are two ways in which these practical issues manifested as methodological concerns: 
a) questions asked by the respondents prior to interviews and b) conducting ‗passive‘ 
interviewing clashed with my experience of the individuals I interviewed.  Methodological 
conflicts between the ideal and the actual have recently been discussed by Guimaraes 
(2007).  She identifies the tension in her own work between following guidelines to be an 
‗impartial‘ researcher, and the reality of confronting involvement in interaction and human 
emotions in any research relationship.   
 
This kind of involvement can raise dilemmas in research; and the questions that many of 
my respondents posed before interviews began, constituted one such dilemma.  This issue 
has been noted as problematic by Potter and Hepburn (2005).  They argue that in much 
social scientific work employing interviews it is unclear on what basis respondents have 
been recruited (for perceived membership or association with a particular category?), what 
they have been asked to do, what they have been told it is for and what interaction takes 
place prior to the start of recording.  They also suggest that one of the ways in which this 
issue can be addressed is to start recording interview interaction as soon as possible in 
order to capture it for subsequent analysis.  However, they also note the potential 
difficulties there might be in practice concerning ethics and informed consent.  Indeed, this 
occurred in my research, where many of the respondents asked questions prior to 
consenting to be audio-taped. Questions were asked about the research process and about 
the nature of my personal interest in these kinds of experiences, and what I understood 
them to be, or mean.  Common questions included, ‗Why are you interested in these experiences? 
Have you ever had one yourself? What are you trying to prove? What are your own thoughts and beliefs 
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about these experiences? Do you believe these experiences can happen? What are you going to „do‟ with my 
experience? I‟ve never told anyone this before, can I trust you? You probably think I‟m crazy don‟t you?‘ 
There were three main aspects to these questions: 
 The first was regarding the potential refutation of the reality of these experiences 
and subsequent discrediting of the individuals and their experiences.    
 The second was concerning how their experiences would be used and represented. 
 The third seemed directed towards connecting with me on a personal level 
 
These questions reflect the common finding that TEHEs may be deeply personal and 
meaningful for those who report them and reflect some of the reported reluctance to 
disclose these experiences (Davis et al, 1991; Palmer & Braud, 2002).  They pointed to 
potential obstacles regarding trust, perceived vulnerability and exposure, therefore I felt 
what was required was a sensitive and reflexive response, aimed towards building rapport 
and offering reassurances.  I aimed to convey that my interest was in exploring the kind of 
extraordinary experiences people have and what meanings people attribute to them; that 
there was no concern with establishing the ‗truth‘ or ‗reality‘ of these experiences; but 
instead the interest was in their subjective impressions; and that I was treating the 
experiences as real for those who reported them.  During these discussions prior to the 
interviews, I was working to reassure the respondents that any material they shared would 
not be misused or misrepresented and that their experiences would be treated respectfully 
and non-judgmentally.  Equally, however, I was working to manage the (sometimes hazy) 
boundaries between professional researcher and routine member of society.     
 
Potter and Hepburn (2005) argue that at the very least, researchers should aim to include 
some ‗gloss‘ of the pre-interview interaction and begin recording as early as possible.  To 
not do this is seen to omit important details about the way in which the interaction then 
ensues.  However, Hollway (2005) suggests that there is a catalogue of omissions from the 
entire history of the research encounter. 
  
―The responses of the interviewee at a particular juncture 
do not just relate back to the last few utterances of the 
interviewer and not just to the last question that was asked.  
They are built up out of the whole history of the research 
encounter: how they were recruited, what they were told 
the interview was about, what happened before the tape 
recorder was switched on, the continuous dynamics (not 
just conscious) between interviewee and interviewer.  This 
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cannot all be represented in the text and so it becomes part 
of the researcher‘s responsibility to reflect on these effects 
and trace them in the context of the whole, providing 
evidence from the record.‖ 
(Hollway, 2005: 312) 
 
What my research suggests is that audio-recording these details may not always be 
practically possible, especially those of a sensitive or controversial leaning (Dickson-Swift, 
James, Kippen & Liamputtong, 2007, 2009).  In the very logistics of negotiating consent 
and establishing trust, it may be more important to attend to the perceived immediate 
requirements of the pre-interview interaction (e.g. sensitively responding to interviewees 
questions and concerns) than to try and record it.  As Hollway (2005) suggests, the next 
best route for explicit and accountable research is to include some form of the researcher‘s 
reflections of these aspects of the research encounter.  This is not to suggest that attempts 
to begin recording as early as possible in a research interview should be abandoned but 
instead highlights the way in which ethics are integral and persistent considerations 
throughout and this specifically may be a delicate part of the research process to manage.  
It is also supportive of the issue identified to more coherently and explicitly explicate the 
practices of interviews (and pre-interview activity) for scrutiny and reflection.  However, I 
still have some reservations about the desirability of a more neutral or passive approach to 
interviews.   
 
 
7.4.1.2 Passivity and neutrality in interviews 
 
The recommended passivity required to be a more neutral interviewer presented some 
problems in the actual process of interviewing.  In pragmatic terms this meant requesting 
the respondents tell me what happened regarding their TEHEs and remaining fairly passive 
until they finished their account.  Reflecting on this now it seems insensitive to view these 
stories as data that could be contaminated, because these words did and do affect me, as 
did the ‗person‘ present and this was as much a part of the process as the data that was 
collected.  There are two possible ways in which to understand and deal with this 
participation.  One is to consider and reflect upon how I felt at the time, during the 
interviews.  However, the process of reflection in itself could be seen as problematic for it 
is a reconstituted version of ‗feelings‘ from interactions then, for specific purposes in this 
writing now.  The second is to consider what potential interactional work the (mostly) non-
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lexical ‗noises‘ were performing.  However, this seems a somewhat clinical approach to an 
emotional aspect of research as these noises do not constitute the experience.   
Also, this has been identified as difficult to achieve pragmatically by Potter and Hepburn 
(2005) for reasons of stake and interest.  That is, it is difficult to become a neutral observer 
of your own previous utterances, as they carry resonances and ‗memories‘ not perceived as 
‗relevant‘ to a discursive analysis.  Additionally, Potter and Hepburn suggest that there are 
issues to do with implicit agendas that are impossible to discern when considering subject 
matters of personal interest.  Furthermore, it is potentially too personally revealing and/or 
embarrassing being so close to the data, to subject it and myself to this kind of scrutiny.  
Therefore, whilst I have been able to include some discursive analysis of my contributions 
to the interviews (e.g. my invitations and minimal continuers located in the initial 
experiential accounts), there has not been the space to analyse any lengthier and more 
involved interaction between myself and the interviewee that occurred afterwards.  This is 
certainly something that future analyses may more directly attempt to do, as it is clearly a 
potential challenge for any researcher, particularly those researching sensitive and 
emotional research topics.    
 
There were various individuals I interviewed that had a powerful affect upon me.  I was 
emotionally affected by their telling of their experiences, their ‗presence‘ and the often 
highly personal nature of the material being relayed (I still think about and recall these 
interactions, I am also sporadically in touch with five of my participants – none of whom I 
knew prior to the research project).  In this sense, I found it difficult and undesirable to 
remain passive and neutral.  Furthermore, there was a personal interest in the experiences 
that people were describing.  I was humbled by these stories, I felt privileged to be granted 
access to them and they were often awe-inspiring.  Many of them were fascinating and 
interesting, which prompted (involuntary and unconscious) ‗mm‘s‘ and other potential 
signs of agreement (Potter & Hepburn, 2005), or encouragement (or perhaps they are 
indicative of other social actions?).  This meant that I felt conflicted between acting in a 
more passive manner from an empathic, ethical, sensitive and personal perspective but also 
was aware that seemingly ordinary levels of interacting (or active interviewing) might be in 
danger of ‗contaminating‘ my data (Guimaraes, 2007; Potter, 2003c) or compromising 
professionalism.  Despite the fact that this project was informed by feminist and 
transpersonal principles, it was also driven by a desire for analytic rigour and robust 
findings (can these principles comfortably coexist?).  
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During various interviews (though not all of them) at different moments, I was 
intermittently overcome with quite intense physical, seemingly physiological and emotional 
feelings (comparable to waves and rushes of ecstatic feelings, goose bumps, feelings of 
elation, of calm, of being warm and absorbed, of being contented) all concerned with being 
deeply moved in some way.  The degree of intensity varied from interview to interview, but 
all enhanced my own personal experience of these people and the relaying of their 
experiences.  These sensations were entirely involuntary and unexpected and in two cases 
affected my ability to continue the interviews (one of these is discussed in more detail 
later).  These kinds of feelings re-emerged whenever I listened to the recordings of the 
interviews (which was countless times during analysis) or when reading the textual 
transcriptions of the TEHE accounts.  During analysis I would also often drift into reverie 
about the encounters, thinking about the individuals I had met and how such brief 
encounters had left such dramatic impressions and reflecting on the strength of emotion 
still lingering as a result.  Often now when I talk about the encounters and the experiences 
I relive these intense emotions in a deeply embodied way. 
 
This is quite staggering.  I cannot recall many other times in my life being so powerfully 
affected by, in some cases, very minimal encounters with complete strangers.  This 
enduring emotion forms a key part of the process and the development of ongoing 
personal relationships has had a significant affect on me.  The level of personal 
involvement from potential interviewees was also interesting.  Several potential 
respondents declined to take part in the project as they reported the irrelevance of studying 
such a subject academically or intellectually.  One respondent invited me to take part in a 
course that was specifically directed towards cultivating these kinds of experiences and 
another shared her experience by email for my own ‗personal and spiritual benefit‘ but did 
not wish to be part of an academic analysis.  Several others contacted me to encourage me 
to seek out my own personal experience, advising me that rational and intellectual study 
could not ‗grasp‘ these experiences – that I really had to experience it to understand it.  
Some of the other respondents who did tell me about their experiences also offered words 
of wisdom about meditation, spiritual growth, my personal life and troubles and developing 
my ‗inherent psychic abilities‘, whilst also directly expressing an interest in and care for my 
‗spiritual well-being‘.   
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My involvement in the interviews therefore cannot accurately be described as passive or 
neutral as I felt a deep form of engagement with many of my interviewees.  What is 
perhaps interesting here in terms of analytical or methodological issues is that this ‗lack of 
passivity‘ is not really captured by the textual representation of the interview encounter 
(though it may be found in the interactions that ensued once the initial account was 
completed).  So, whilst there are minimal lexical and non-lexical utterances, the strong 
sense of emotional affect and engagement with the individuals and their stories is tangibly 
absent.  Additionally, whilst I have reservations about the connotations of passivity and 
neutrality in research regarding these kinds of highly personal experiences, it is notable that 
there was potentially something beneficial about explicitly providing a space for 
interviewees to talk about these experiences in their own time (in requesting a story of what 
happened and sitting back).  However, reporting this emotionality on the back of my 
respondents‘ reported deep affect does also feel voyeuristic, perhaps even somewhat 
colonising of others‘ reported experiences.  This issue resonates with some discursive 
feminist methodology regarding representing other‘s‘ voices (e.g. Weatherall et al, 2002). 
The next issue I reflect on flags these kinds of concerns about representing research 
populations who report sensitive and significant experiences. 
 
 
7.4.2 Representation, roles and integrity 
 
This issue concerning representation is also connected to a personal experience that 
occurred during one of the interviews and remained obscured until relatively recently.  
Initially, in struggling to write this conclusion I felt stuck.  Then I was reviewing the 
research materials and I discovered that I had excluded one of the accounts as a candidate 
for representation in the thesis.  However, this had not been a conscious decision or 
deliberate strategy.   I surmised that this encounter had become an ‗elephant in the room‘ 
for my research and that without writing it in I could not ‗move on‘.  Indeed, once I had 
decided to incorporate my reflections about this experience, I was finally able to complete 
the conclusion. 
 
The entire encounter with this individual was atypical; when I was first contacted by email 
she left a telephone number and a name and little else.  When I telephoned her I was fairly 
quiet and she spent most of the call telling me about various personal events that were 
taking place in my life at that time and what kind of person I was.  The telephone call left 
me feeling exhilarated and intrigued, but simultaneously a bit wary; nervously anticipating 
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our face-to-face encounter.  When we met, the interview was unlike the other research 
encounters because of the ways in which she talked about her experiences and the 
experience that occurred during the interview.   
 
Firstly, she talked about her experiences in a way that conveyed the regularity and 
ordinariness of them for her coupled with an assumed level of knowledge about matters 
such as energies, quantum phenomena and galactic astrology.86  This meant that the 
account was imbued with unconventionality and eccentricity.  Throughout this interaction I 
felt simultaneously fascinated and frustrated.  Fascinated by the sheer number, scale and 
content of the reported experiences, but frustrated by the meandering nature of the telling 
and the high level of assumed knowledge in the interaction.  It meant that the interview 
became quite quickly much more of an ordinary interview interaction as it felt necessary to 
regularly ask questions to clarify meaning and this meant that many aspects remained 
untouched (in particular, I felt the personal experiences she relayed were lacking in detail 
and there was an abundance of experiences).   
 
Secondly, this encounter had a huge and unanticipated effect on me.  I had to stop 
interviewing at one point because I suddenly felt overwhelmed by a very powerful 
nauseous sort of feeling (that I have never experienced before or since) combined with a 
powerful sort of electricity or buzzing sensation around my whole body and within my 
torso (mainly the chest and stomach area), interspersed with the sense of something or 
someone standing behind me.  I also felt slightly distant as if I wasn‘t in my ordinary state 
of consciousness.  These very strong and embodied feelings made it impossible for me to 
continue the interview and I stopped the tape.  The interviewee subsequently informed me 
that she was providing emotional healing which she told me I needed and that there was an 
‗energy‘ standing behind me (I had told her I felt weird and needed a glass of water, but 
hadn‘t described the feelings).  I‘m still not sure what to make of it, but I often think about 
this experience and the encounter.  It felt and still feels hugely dramatic and the retelling of 
it evokes both feelings of vulnerability and relief. 
 
It became clear that there were various reasons why I had excluded this interview.  Firstly, I 
was acutely aware of how it might be unfavourably received because of the potential 
sensitivities around representation of populations reporting these experiences and its 
                                                 
86 See http://www.theastrologicalsociety.co.uk/G-Introduction.htm for a description. 
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unconventionality.  There is clearly power and responsibility inherent in representing the 
words of others, but professionally speaking, ‗what are our responsibilities to representing 
‗the Other‘? (Weatherall et al, 2002: 532).  I felt quite protective of the respondent and the 
way in which her account might be perceived by others.  This fits with feminist work 
highlighting potential issues of representation for researchers (e.g. Blakely, 2007; Kirsch, 
1999; Letherby, 2002, Maynard & Purvis, 1994; Stanley & Wise, 1990).  Furthermore, 
feminist work positively encourages these kinds of reflections and acknowledgements.  
Indeed, Kirsch (1999) suggests that researchers should include accounts of why data is 
omitted from research because it impacts upon the research as a whole.  These issues 
concerning conflicting loyalties and confusion about boundaries of the personal and the 
professional have been documented in other work (e.g. O‘Connell Davidson, 2008) and it 
has been argued that sociological knowledge is enhanced by addressing these tensions and 
conflicts directly (O‘Brien, 2009).   
 
Secondly, I was concerned at the level of personal involvement I had displayed in this 
interview and concerned about sharing a notable experience that affected me quite deeply, 
quite how this fitted into my academic project and how it might be perceived as affecting 
my critical abilities.  However, it has been asserted that as researchers the academic and the 
personal are inextricably entwined. 
 
―As qualitative researchers, our goal is to see the world 
through someone else‘s eyes, using ourselves as a research 
instrument; it thus follows that we must experience our 
research both ‗intellectually and emotionally‘.‖ 
(Dickson-Swift et al, 2009: 62) 
 
Yet, although researchers might experience research in both these forms, quite how to 
cope with, acknowledge and do justice to the emotionality (without compromising the 
intellectuality) can be a relentless source of tension.  It was difficult to know how to write 
the intimacies of research into the research itself and I feel some wariness about how this 
will be received.  A few researchers have noted that all the aspects associated with the 
personal in research, whether they are relational or experiential, are often rendered invisible 
by academic work. 
 
―[T]he intimacies afforded by research materials and 
activities, those materials and activities that inform the 
making of knowledge, that shape power relations and that 
enable or constrain the practical negotiation of ethical 
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problems, are not often foregrounded in debates on 
methods and methodology.‖ 
(Fraser & Puwar, 2008: 2) 
 
In part this editing out process is attributable to academic convention, but also perhaps 
because often researchers do not know how to include such material in a way that retains 
personal and professional integrity, credibility or consistency.  Dickson-Swift et al (2009) 
point out that emotions are judged to be ‗anathema to academic research‘ (p63) by Western 
philosophical traditions and that this has contributed to the lack of inclusion of researchers‘ 
reported emotions in their work.     
 
Fraser and Puwar (2008: 4) acknowledge that communicating ‗what it is ‗really like‘ in the 
field of collection and production, as an embodied being‘ is not a simple or straightforward 
task.  ‗The smells, the sounds, the spatial confines, the tensions and the emotional demands 
are not readily laid out on the academic table‘ (Fraser & Puwar, 2008: 4).  They note that 
communicating the nuts and bolts of any research process might risk ‗revealing, perhaps 
even ‗exposing‘ the so-called unscholarly, anecdotal, irrational and unscientific dimensions 
of the research process‘ (p4).  Indeed, anything spontaneously emotional is certainly 
categorised as such.  This is re-iterated by Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen and Liamputtong 
(2009: 66) who state that a lack of emotional disclosure by researchers may be due to 
perceptions about rigour and concerns about vulnerability and potential judgement and 
criticism from colleagues or peers.  Indeed, including my emotionality has left me feeling 
exposed and vulnerable in many ways, but I felt compelled to include an event so 
significant in the story of my work. 
 
Furthermore, there may be additional risks associated with talking about strength of feeling 
for researchers of these kinds of intangible experiences. Adopting an empathic persuasion 
towards these kinds of experiences could be viewed as an indication of acceptance of 
certain metaphysical beliefs and perhaps even the belief system propounded by experients.   
McRoberts (2004) notes this in relation to studying religion ethnographically, but the point 
is equally applicable here. 
   
―Few sociological ethnographers of religion [for instance] 
claim any level of empathy with the people they study.  
When they do, remarks on the matter resemble apology 
more than justification since the implication is that the 
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ethnographer has experienced the spiritual truth of the 
religion.‖ 
(McRoberts, 2004: 193) 
 
In this sense I had reservations about being accused of ‗going native‘ or displaying a lack of 
critical insight.  This is perhaps because of the status of religious or metaphysical claims, 
but this status should be as equally subject to critique as other forms of knowledge.  
Especially, as anthropologists have shown, researchers are commonly affected by the 
contexts, people and experiences under study, cross-culturally (McClenon & Nooney, 2002; 
Young & Goulet, 1994).   The dearth of honest reflection about such matters leaves any 
sociology of experience bereft and fosters the continuing stigmatisation of extraordinary 
experiences per se.     
 
I also had considerable reservations about the way in which the audio-recording of the 
interview did not correspond with my personal feelings about it.  In other words, I felt that 
the text of the interview was not representative of my actual experience of the interview 
itself.    This general notion – that personal encounters in research are more than the sum 
of their textual or discursive representation – has been identified elsewhere (e.g. Bollas, 
1995; Frosh & Emerson, 2005; Steiner, 1995).  It has been suggested that, ‗a person is not a 
text‘ (Steiner, 1995: 442) and, ‗reading a text and being with an actual person…are quite 
different engagements‘ (Bollas, 1995: 23).  This relates to the idea discussed next regarding 
how there was something left wanting by a discursive approach to TEHEs.   
 
Thirdly, I felt that this was an unsuccessful interview when compared to the others because 
I had failed to obtain a ‗proper‘ account of any one TEHE from the interviewee.  Given 
the radically different nature of this interview from the others, it originally felt like an 
‗anomaly‘.  I‘d wanted to be sensitive to the interviewees and their experiences and I 
certainly did not want to appear critical (Sangster, 1998) but I also wanted to portray myself 
in a good light, as a professional researcher (and not, for example, as an individual who‘d 
had an intangible experience herself) and not betray the integrity of my findings.  I remain 
undecided as how to fairly represent this interaction and its exclusion appears to be the 
only option at this time. 
 
These perceived difficulties might be part and parcel of a dilemma for researchers of 
seemingly controversial phenomena.  Wulff (2000) suggests that this dilemma leaves only 
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two possible approaches for a researcher to take: ‗insider‘ or ‗outsider‘.  An insider would 
be a researcher that actively participates in the phenomena or experiences they set out to 
study and uses this experience as the basis for their examination.  An outsider does not 
partake of the experience, but studies, researches, and observes experients in order to gain 
understanding.  The first has credibility with experients, but not necessarily with (social) 
scientists and the latter may have scientific integrity, whilst lacking experiential authenticity 
(Wulff 2000).  However, in practice these boundaries may not be so clearly marked.  In this 
research, I have inhabited both roles at differing times across the process and there may be 
something of an intermediate position for researchers.  Others suggest the same.  Le 
Gallais (2008: 151-153) proposes that the distinction does not have to be so clearly 
delineated for research generally and could be more fluid as one may begin as outsider and 
subsequently gain insider insights.  My research demonstrates that the categories of insider 
and outsider lack the nuanced complexity required to adequately capture the differing roles 
and identities we inhabit as we do research activity.  I was neither outsider nor insider but 
instead experienced multiple and intricate differing positions to the interviews, the 
interviewees and their TEHE stories.  
  
It is this that Potter and Hepburn (2005) capture in noting the impossibility of explicating 
issues of footing, stake and interest in interview-based research.  They see a footing issue 
arising particularly from the fact that many PhD researchers are also the interviewers for 
their project, which is clearly the case in this research also.  They further suggest that 
distance (between interviewer and interest) is rarely present in qualitative social science 
research, thus an emphasis on disinterest is not really feasible ―whether desirable or not‖ 
(Potter & Hepburn, 2005: 296).  Throughout an interview, with the interviewer taking up 
several different footing positions at different times, this leaves an important and 
significant challenge for researchers hoping to analyse interview data.  ‗The general point, 
then, is that footing for both interviewer and interviewee is potentially convoluted and 
variable‘ (Potter & Hepburn, 2005: 295).  This was indeed the case in my research: but is 
the way in which I have tackled this intractable issue regarding the use of interviews, 
satisfactory?  How as researchers can we cut a path to converge the intellectual and the 
intuitive?  Does detailing and reflecting upon the process alleviate this issue to an extent 
because some of the personal conflicts, interests and ‗messiness‘ of research is explicitly 
laid out for others to see? 
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Future research might more comprehensively engage with Mauthner & Doucet‘s (2008: 
405) listening guide for ‗doing reflexivity‘, whereby researchers analysing data include a 
column for their ‗reactions‘, interpretations and comments.  It is advised that this is one 
practical way in which embedded assumptions can be reviewed and examined.  However, 
there is recognition that reflexivity is not a straightforward process. 
 
―We cannot know everything that influences our knowledge 
construction processes, and there are ‗degrees of reflexivity‘, 
with some influences being easier to identify and articulate 
during the research, while others may only come to us many 
years after completing our projects.‖ 
(Mauthner & Doucet, 2008: 405) 
 
Nonetheless, including a process of reflexivity has allowed me to consider the role of the 
personal in the research process and how this impacts upon issues of representation.  An 
additional issue encountered during the research was how to account for the sense in which 
there was something ‗missing‘ from a purely discursive analysis. 
 
 
7.4.3 Gaps and limits with a linguistic focus 
 
The idea that there is a gap left by some discursive pursuits is aligned to debates about 
context in methodological fields (for instance see Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Schegloff, 1987, 
1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Wetherell, 1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2003b, and 2007).  Out of these 
debates a critical perspective has emerged which suggests that versions of DP too closely 
informed by CA (and CA itself) lack any reference to broader sociohistorical and cultural 
conversations.  This perspective argues that these broader aspects impact upon all 
interactions and shape the ways in which cognitive phenomena, personal selves, 
subjectivities and experiences are constructed in talk. 
 
―Thinking is suffused with dialogue, with the words of 
others, and those words bear the marks of their social 
context of use and historical struggles over meaning.  
Thought, emotion and motivation are, thus, not ineffable 
nor invisible but built from public practices, and minds and 
selves are constructed from cultural, social and communal 
resources.‖  
(Wetherell, 2007: 664) 
 
In conducting the analysis, my approach was initially driven by CA and the version of DP 
articulated by Edwards and Potter (1992a).  However, whilst the analysis was underway I 
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developed a degree of frustration with what appeared to be the limits of a linguistic 
analysis.  Firstly, there was an intuitive sense that this kind of analysis was unable to 
characterize the sense of ‗depth‘ (profundity, meaningfulness) associated with these 
experiences.  Secondly, it became clear that this kind of analysis was limited in terms of its 
ability to connect to and locate the interaction in the broader social context it occurred 
within.  Upon further reflection it became evident that both these issues could be 
effectively subsumed under one consideration.  That is, my analysis seemed unable to 
capture anything extra or non-discursive and this felt problematic.  But did a linguistic analysis 
leave me at a loss in terms of making coherent broader connections?  Should social (wider) 
theory be ignored or engaged with?  If it is to be engaged with, at which point in the 
process is it articulating or directing the analysis and at which point is it merely facilitating 
the conclusions?  And how can an analysis informed by CA and DP incorporate the ‗non-
discursive‘? 
 
There are two examples of more recent work that embody the spirit of this perceived 
limitation.  One of these is a recent paper by Wetherell (2007) which raises some valid 
criticisms about the restrictive boundaries established around discursive empirical study.  
The second is the work of those combining discursive approaches with psychoanalysis (e.g. 
Frosh, 1999; Frosh et al, 2003; Frosh & Emerson, 2005) which has emerged for various 
reasons but is largely about dissatisfaction with the way in which subjectivity has been 
conceptualised.  However, the inclusion of these two examples is not to align my work 
with their interests in developing what might be seen as a theory of self/positioning, but is 
instead illustrative of the possibilities of doing discursive analysis in a thorough and 
rigorous manner whilst also attempting to forge new methodological boundaries – that 
cater for concepts of the extra-discursive. 
 
In this vein, Wetherell (2007: 665) notes a number of researchers who have ‗not been so 
persuaded by the apparent limits and boundaries placed by conversation analysis around 
the object of study‘.  This approach – sometimes termed critical discursive psychology – 
binds micro and macro approaches sometimes drawing on narrative analysis, 
psychoanalysis or social identity theory.  Wetherell‘s (2007) more recent approach develops 
her earlier work (e.g. Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Wetherell & Edley, 1999) and argues that 
the organisation of the psychological in discourse is important in terms of constructing 
subjectivities and ‗of the possibilities for being human and for being a social actor‘ (p665).  
She suggests that the ‗psychological aspects‘ of identity can be recast in a ‗psycho-
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discursive‘ (Wetherell & Edley, 1999) manner whereby ‗the sum of social practices 
constitute a psychology, formulate a mental life and have consequences for the formation 
and representation of the person‘ (Wetherell, 2007: 668).   Wetherell thus argues for a kind 
of discursive psychology that widens its scope and regards the ‗‗long conversation‘ of 
community and institutional life (Maybin, 2006)‘ (p671) as important to interactions more 
generally.  Furthermore,  
 
―This kind of discursive psychology attempts to describe 
the configurations of identity and subjectivity which result 
at particular moments which might be maintained for 
shorter or longer durations.  It also attempts to describe the 
cultural resources, struggles, interactions and relations that 
the person is working with and how these have been 
mobilised, temporarily stabilised and turned into their own 
personal order.‖ 
(Wetherell, 2007: 672) 
 
Her approach indicates one of the ways in which discursive psychology can be applied 
critically and reflexively, both recognising the value of a grounded empirical analysis, whilst 
also engaging with difficult debates about how the extra-discursive can be analytically 
considered. 
  
Another example of this kind of methodological innovation concerns the way in which 
some researchers have recently employed psychoanalysis alongside discursive methods in 
order to include subjectivity in their analyses.  These approaches attempt to ‗locate the 
subject‘ in discourse without returning to or reinstating the divide between the individual 
and social (e.g. Craib, 2000; Day Sclater, 2003; Frosh, 1999; Frosh et al, 2003; Frosh & 
Emerson, 2005; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, 2001, 2005).  The rationale for this inclusion 
comes from a sense in which there is a ‗gap in the explanatory power of much discursive 
social psychology‘ (Frosh et al, 2003: 39).  These attempts argue that there is a realm of 
personal subjectivity that is not accommodated by discursive approaches and it is here 
where psychoanalysis, it is claimed, can help to ‗account for the complexity of specific 
subject positions as they emerge and are negotiated in interactive contexts‘ (Frosh & 
Emerson, 2005: 308).  This placing extends to both the researcher and the researched in 
discursive data. 
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The proposed union aims to include how the unconscious manifests in accounts and is 
both produced by and productive of interaction and interactive consequences (Frosh et al, 
2003). 
 
―While culture makes available the subject positions we can 
inhabit, the ‗investment‘ that people have in these subject 
positions is not necessarily captured by the articulation of 
the discourses themselves; rather, it may hinge on unspoken 
and at times unspeakable events, experiences and processes, 
all of them ‗cultural‘, but also deeply embedded in 
subjectivity.‖ 
(Frosh et al, 2003: 42) 
 
However, there are various issues with the use of psychoanalysis in this regard that have 
been identified by various researchers.  It has been noted that psychoanalysis has an intense 
pre-existing cultural presence as a narrative in its own right, which complicates its use as a 
tool in this regard (Parker, 2003).  Parker suggests that it might be useful to analysts where 
it is not treated as a replacement route to truth and where its cultural presence is critically 
inspected before it can be a useful way of accounting for personal subjectivity in discourse.  
Frosh & Emerson (2005) recognise the limits of psychoanalysis and even note that the 
search for ‗depth‘ may be aligned with a sense of analyst (or researcher) dissatisfaction. 
 
―To what extent may the search for ‗depth‘ be a response 
to dissatisfaction with textual undecideability in the context 
of ‗narrative truth‘ – a version of the defence against 
ambivalence with which psychoanalysts are all too 
familiar?‖ 
(Frosh & Emerson, 2005: 322) 
 
 
Nonetheless, they also acknowledge and recognise the existence of other plausible analyses 
and interpretations of data.  From this they argue that psychoanalysis offers ‗potential 
insights that are hard to garner elsewhere‘ (p322).  
 
More sustained criticism has suggested that psychoanalytic concepts such as repression can 
be seen as a discursive activity and therefore something that can be studied as a social 
practice (Billig, 2006).  As Billig states, 
  
 ―The unconscious is to be understood in terms of the 
discursive activity of repressing. Accordingly, repression is 
not primarily a property of the individual personality.  It is 
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a fundamental feature by which orders of power and 
inequality are routinely reproduced.‖ 
(Billig, 2006: 23) 
 
Analysing the ‗unspoken‘ is certainly an ambitious task and whilst there is scope for much 
more here, psychoanalysis feels too restricted, too imposing and too deeply embedded 
culturally prior to its use as an analytic tool in this regard (Parker, 2003).  There is 
something left wanting in terms of subjectivity by a discursive approach, but I have similar 
reservations to Wetherell (2007) about psychoanalysis as a useful, or appropriate, tool for 
investigating this.  For her, the main problem is the separation of the personal from the 
cultural. 
 
―Psycho-discursive practices are not necessarily mysterious 
or necessarily expressive outpourings of a deep inner 
psyche.  They are frequently procedures or routines that 
people know how to do in talk, making meaning as they 
go.‖ 
(Wetherell, 2007: 676) 
 
However, it is here that the intellectual again collides with the personal and there is a 
tension between my academic and my intuitive self.  Academically, I am resigned to the 
idea that even if there is something that exists ‗outside‘ of the discursive then this kind of 
approach does not allow it to be ‗seen‘. 
  
―As for the issue of whether there is a subject outside of 
narrative, we suggest that there are ‗knowing because 
experiencing subject(s)‘ and that subjects act with 
intentionality and agency.  Nevertheless, even if we do hold 
that there are subjects beneath, behind or beyond narrated 
subjects, we also contend that, as researchers, we cannot 
come to fully know them.‖ 
(Mauthner & Doucet, 2008: 407) 
 
However, intuitively, this extra-discursive subjectivity feels important and impossible to 
ignore (even if it cannot be fully known).  Studying what is reportedly a profound, sensitive 
and meaningful subject for experients will inevitably present challenges.  Attempting to 
apply systematic methods to the analysis of talk about reportedly ineffable TEHEs clearly 
provokes dilemmas about how to study these experiences and what we can say about 
human subjectivity, even human spirituality.  As for how we might begin to understand this 
‗subjectivity‘ intellectually, this is a task for future intellectual trajectories.  It is possible that 
this is something which will remain in tension for the time being.  It is clear then, that there 
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are persistent tensions articulated in this section concerning methodological and personal 
reflections: between producing a competent piece of academic research, the practicalities of 
doing research with ‗real‘ people and a strong sense that there is more to be conveyed 
about these experiences than this approach has allowed. 
   
―All we can know is what is narrated by subjects, as well as 
our interpretation of their stories within the wider web of 
social and structural relations from which narrated subjects 
speak.‖ 
(Mauthner & Doucet, 2008: 404) 
 
But if I could do it all again what would I do differently?  I think there are a few different 
issues I would address if I were to conduct this project again. 
 
7.4.3.1 What would I have done differently? 
 
Firstly, those associated with the conceptual and analytical process discussed above.  I 
would be more likely to spend less time on a purely discursive analysis and more time 
making stronger connections with existing ideas about the wider context.  This is an aspect 
I feel my PhD has not effectively articulated.  Part of addressing this concern might come 
from more concerted engagement with particular literatures (e.g. sociology of religion) 
rather than such a wide range.  Secondly, in practical methodological terms I would 
conduct more involved interviews or participant observation (ethnographic and/or auto 
ethnographic work?) to be more immersed in the field myself (e.g. attending one of the 
courses offered to me).  It would also have been insightful to have engaged in a more 
collaborative analytic process with my respondents (as feminist and transpersonal 
approaches attest).  Furthermore, an eclectic approach including some comparative work in 
terms of different types of interviews/data collection procedures and differing types of 
analysis now seems quite appealing. 
 
Thirdly, if carried out again now the project would more comprehensively involve the 
personal – in the entire process.  This would include more time spent writing myself into 
the entire thesis and therefore more of the personal and ‗spiritual‘ (the transpersonal) 
would be evident throughout.  This would also extend to a greater trust in my own ability 
to discern what was important in my work.  I think this would mean the advent of a more 
committed feminist and transpersonal project, which might have allowed me to more 
readily accept the contradictory nature of conducting research and the tensions between 
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the personal and the academic as a necessary inherent tension without the ability to resolve 
it.  As it was I think that I lived some of these tensions discordantly, without any suitable 
means to incorporate them.    
 
However, I am still left with some dilemmas about how this project was carried out and the 
suggested ways in which I would carry it out differently next time.  These are centred on: 
how best to interrogate meaning and the personal whilst retaining methodological 
credibility and authority?  And whether I should have ‗silenced‘ the feminist/transpersonal 
and produced a ‗straight‘ discursive analysis or would this have compromised my personal 
integrity a step too far?   
 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
My work demonstrates that these TEHEs are important in terms of personal significance 
(which was previously ignored or neglected by social sciences).  This is corroborated by 
recent statistical survey work in the UK which found that almost 40% of the UK 
population report at least one ‗paranormal‘ experience,87 12% of these are made up of 
those who report mystical or transcendent experience.  Empirically, this thesis identified 
how various findings contribute to existing issues in discursive psychology, consciousness 
studies and the social sciences, whilst also forging new connections with an emerging 
sociology of spirituality.  Methodologically, I considered how interviews and their 
pragmatic manifestation fit with discursive analyses informed by CA and DP, in discussion 
with Potter and Hepburn (2005).  And how there appear to be gaps some discursive 
approaches too closely aligned with CA (for some researchers e.g. Wetherell, 1998, 2007).  
However, there are still tensions that remain unresolved that will carry forward to future 
work including, balancing the demands of the intellectual and the emotional in academic 
work and considering how TEHEs (and related experiences) can, or indeed should, be 
studied?   
 
Personally, this may involve refining and honing what might be termed a feminist 
transpersonal discursive approach.  Yet my approach is not advocated as the only approach 
to studying these experiences and I would endorse a pluralistic and integrated range of 
methodologies along with others (e.g. Braud, 2002; Cardeña, 2004; Davis, 2009; Wilber, 
                                                 
87
 This is based on a project carried out by myself and Burrows (full results yet to be published). 
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1997; Williams, 1996).  For instance, there is some recent work that recognises the potential 
importance and meaning of these kinds of experiences for those who report them (see 
Wilde & Murray, 2008, 2009).   It is the ethos of respectful and sensitive work, which 
recognises their potentially transformative nature as important (Palmer & Braud, 2002).    
In prioritising what was important about the experiences for those reporting them, I have 
aimed to provide a picture of how people make sense of their TEHEs and balance a robust 
discursive analytic approach with an empathic, reflexive and respectful concern for their 
stories. 
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Appendix 1 – Advert recruiting respondents 
 
Extraordinary Experiences… 
Have you ever had an experience where you 
 - lost a sense of space and time?  
 - felt at one with the universe, nature or something ‗higher‘?  
 - felt profoundly moved or deeply affected? 
 
If so, I would like to hear from you.  I‘m a university researcher investigating experiences 
such as these. To take part (in confidence) please contact mc512@york.ac.uk 
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Appendix 2 – Article in University of York Student Newspaper ‘Nouse’. 
 
Tuesday 7th November, 2006. 
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Appendix 3 – Respondent Information Sheet 
 
First of all, thank you for agreeing to participate in my research project.  Your participation 
will involve talking to me about your extraordinary experience(s), which (with your 
consent) will be tape-recorded.  All the information you discuss with me will be held in the 
strictest confidence and anonymised (your real name will not be referred to under any 
circumstances).   
 
The experience(s) you talk about will contribute to a PhD research project and extracts may 
be quoted anonymously in any reports in relation to this research.  I am happy to send you 
a copy of the tape-recording if you wish. 
 
Please be aware that you are free to decline to answer questions or withdraw from this 
project at any time. 
 
Should you wish to you can contact my supervisor, Dr Robin Wooffitt on 
rw21@york.ac.uk.  Alternatively, if you need to contact me you can email me, Madeleine 
Castro, on mc512@york.ac.uk or telephone (01904) 433579. 
 
Once again thank you for your participation it is greatly appreciated.   
 283 
Appendix 4 – Transcription symbols (taken from Jefferson, 2004) 
 
[   indicates point of overlap  
 
(0.0)   elapsed time by tenths of a second 
 
(.)   a brief interval (less than 0.2 tenths of a second) 
 
word   underlining indicates speaker emphasis via pitch and/or amplitude 
 
:::   indicates prolonged sound (of the preceding letter) 
 
-   a single dash indicates an abrupt cut-off 
 
?   rising intonation, not necessarily a question 
 
,   a comma indicates low-rising intonation, suggesting continuation 
 
.   a full stop (period) indicates falling (final) intonation 
 
CAPITALS  especially loud volume relative to surrounding talk 
 
◦word◦  utterance noticeably quieter than surrounding talk 
 
↑ ↓   indicate marked shifts into higher or lower pitch following the arrow 
 
<>   indicate the utterance produced more quickly/slowly than neighbouring talk 
 
( )   a stretch of unclear or unintelligible speech 
 
(guess)  indicates transcriber doubt about a word 
 
.hh   speaker in-breath 
 
hh   speaker out-breath 
 
→   arrows in the left margin pick out features of special interest 
 
(h)  indicate explosive particles in the middle of words (laughter, crying) 
 
(( ))  transcriber‘s descriptions 
 
£  utterance delivered with ‗smiling‘ voice 
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